A Discipline Divided: Polish Economists and the Communist Regime, 1945 - 1960 by Haugstad, Aleksandra Witczak
A Discipline Divided
Polish Economists and the 
Communist Regime, 1945–1960
 
  
Thesis for the degree doctor artium
Trondheim, May 2008
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Arts 
Department of History and Classical Studies
Aleksandra Witczak Haugstad  
I n n o v a t i o n  a n d  C r e a t i v i t y
NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Thesis for the degree doctor artium
Faculty of Arts 
Department of History and Classical Studies
© Aleksandra Witczak Haugstad 
ISBN 978-82-471-8978-8 (printed version)
ISBN 978-82-471-8981-8 (electronic version)
ISSN 1503-8181 
Doctoral theses at NTNU, 2008:145
Printed by NTNU-trykk
iACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Many people have inspired and supported me in the course of the work with this thesis. My 
first acknowledgement is to Professor György Péteri, who has been my academic supervisor. 
Gyuri displays a unique combination of unwavering support and honest critique of work 
stopping short of his high academic standards. I highly value his commitment, integrity, 
creative inputs and constructive advice, and I am deeply grateful for his patience and concern. 
Professor Péteri’s role in this project goes beyond his role as an academic advisor. In 
organising and directing the Program on East European Cultures and Societies at NTNU, he 
has created an inspiring intellectual home for this and other projects. The workshops and 
seminars held by PEECS supplied important stimuli, discussions, and encounters. I am greatly 
indebted to all PEECS scholars, both the visiting and the local, for having made these years 
instructive and interesting.   
A fascinating aspect of the work with this topic has been the chance to meet and hear the 
testimonies of the participants of the events described on the pages of this study. The kind 
reception and the generous allotment of their time made a deep impression.  
Prolonged work on narrow subjects can entail frustration and isolation. I have been fortunate 
to avoid such despondency thanks to my fellow doctoral students at the Department of 
History and Classical Studies. They offered not only a forum for sharing and discussing 
research projects, but also companionship and friendship. Lise, Randi, Lars Fredrik, and Erik 
always stood by to display optimism and confidence in this project.
The final version of this thesis was preceded by a good many drafts, which a good many 
people have patiently read – offering helpful advice and challenging discussions. Fellow 
doctoral students and senior colleagues at the Department of History and Classical Studies 
and at PEECS are hereby collectively, but none the least sincerely, thanked for their efforts. It 
ii
is with a heavy heart I now ready myself to leave what has been my place of work for a 
number of years. I thank the academic and administrative staff at the Department of History 
and Classical Studies who have made me feel a part of the collegial community, making my 
stay here instructive and enjoyable.
A year ago, Anna Merton Kan stepped into this project to help me save you readers from a 
multitude of errors, clumsy and obscure formulations, and long sentences in passive voice. 
Her competent and enthusiastic input has been vital. The remaining errors and the 
shortcomings of this text are, of course, my responsibility. 
I also have a long list of supporting staff. I have received invaluable assistance from archivists 
at all the archives I visited, librarians, relatives and friends who opened their homes during 
my long stays in Warsaw to do archival research, in particular Joanna and Paweá SzymaĔscy
and Alicja Wagner. Colleagues encountered in archives made this rather lonely part of the 
work less dreary.
This study was made possible by the financial support of several institutions. The Faculty of 
Arts, Norwegian University of Science and Technology supplied the doctoral scholarship and 
additional funding for travel and proof-reading. The Department of Classical and Historical 
Studies graciously provided extra funding and work space. Additional funding for travel and 
research was granted by the Polish State under a Cultural Exchange with Norway Programme 
and the Herder Institute in Marburg.
The steady rock beneath my feet in these years has been my family, through their support and 
unrelenting faith in this project. My husband Bjørn has throughout this project been a 
steadfast audience and discussant. His ability to keep up his interest in the lives and times of 
Polish economists exceeded all reasonable expectations. My Father, Edward Witczak, has by 
respecting my opinions since I learned to talk, fostered the confidence which kept me up 
through the many rounds of constructive but sometimes severe critique.  
Last but not least, I want to thank my Mother, Barbara SzymaĔska Witczak. She has cared for 
Marius and Marianne Louise with such love and devotion during my absences that I knew I 
could work without making my children unhappy. I could not have completed this project 
without that. DziĊkujĊ Mamusiu. 
        Trondheim, April 2008 
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................. 1
1. POLISH ECONOMICS 1918-1947 ............................................................................................................... 19
CONDITIONS BEFORE 1939 ................................................................................................................................ 20
WORLD WAR II................................................................................................................................................. 31
1945-1947: GREAT EXPECTATIONS .................................................................................................................. 36
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................................... 56
2. POLISH ECONOMICS AND MARXISM-LENINISM, FIRST ENCOUNTERS ................................... 59
THE CENTRAL PLANNING BOARD DEBATE........................................................................................................ 60
THE EVOLUTION OF EKONOMISTA IN 1948........................................................................................................ 80
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................................... 99
3. THE TAMING OF THE CHAIR,  ECONOMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1948-1950 .................. 101
COMMUNIST AMBITIONS AND GOALS .............................................................................................................. 103
“REFORM” OF ACADEMIC ECONOMICS ............................................................................................................ 106
THE POWER OF THE CHAIR .............................................................................................................................. 108
DECIDING WHO WAS TO SIT IN THE CHAIR....................................................................................................... 109
FROM GILDED THRONE TO CROWDED BENCH: ‘COLLECTIVE CHAIRS’ .............................................................. 113
DECISIONS ABOUT TEACHING.......................................................................................................................... 115
RECRUITMENT................................................................................................................................................. 120
THE PARTY ORGANISATION IN ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS ................................................................................ 125
THE MAIN SCHOOL OF PLANNING AND STATISTICS ........................................................................................ 130
PLANS AND PRACTICE, STUDENTS AND RESEARCH .......................................................................................... 132
TENSIONS: OLD STAFF AND NEWCOMERS ........................................................................................................ 134
THE ITSC THREAT .......................................................................................................................................... 138
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................... 142
4. REMOULDING ECONOMICS,  THE FIRST CONGRESS OF POLISH SCIENCE 1950-1951 ........ 145
THE PUWP’S STRATEGY................................................................................................................................. 148
REDEFINING THE DISCIPLINE ........................................................................................................................... 151
DISCUSSIONS IN SECTIONS AND SUB-SECTIONS .............................................................................................. 160
THE STRANGE CASE OF FINANCE AND STATISTICS .......................................................................................... 171
THE FIRST CONVENTION OF ECONOMISTS....................................................................................................... 182
PROVINCIAL SHOW-TRIALS ............................................................................................................................. 193
THE GRAND FINALE: THE CONGRESS............................................................................................................... 195
CONCLUSIONS ON THE CONGRESS PROCESS .................................................................................................... 196
5. A BRAVE NEW WORLD?  MARXIST-LENINIST ECONOMICS 1951-1955..................................... 199
A DISCIPLINE DIVIDED..................................................................................................................................... 202
‘STALINIST’ DISCUSSION IN ECONOMICS ......................................................................................................... 209
THE POLITICS OF ACADEMIC PROMOTIONS ...................................................................................................... 215
REVIEWERS ..................................................................................................................................................... 227
DECISION-MAKING.......................................................................................................................................... 229
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................... 241
6. THE TIME OF THE ECONOMISTS 1956-1960....................................................................................... 245
THAW – ORIGINS AND EARLY PHASE ............................................................................................................... 250
“YOUNG TURKS” ............................................................................................................................................ 257
THE SECOND CONVENTION OF ECONOMISTS................................................................................................... 261
EFFECTS OF THE THAW IN ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS ....................................................................................... 270
THE THAW AND REPUTATION CONTROL .......................................................................................................... 273
THE TIME OF THE ECONOMISTS....................................................................................................................... 283
CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................... 292
iv
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................................. 295
APPENDIX........................................................................................................................................................ 307
LIST OF INTERVIEWS .................................................................................................................................. 311
ARCHIVAL SOURCES ................................................................................................................................... 312
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................. 319
vLIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Ill. 1: Warsaw School of Commerce staff and students, probably mid 1930s.........................28 
Ill. 2: Professor Edward LipiĔski at the Communal School of Commerce, used as a 
cover for the clandestine activities of the Main School of Commerce........................32 
Ill. 3: The Main School of Commerce, main building, view from Rakowiecka Street. ..........33 
Ill. 4: Party organisation in higher education 1949-1952. ......................................................126 
Ill. 5: The festooned exterior of the Warsaw Polytechnic, where the Congress was held. ...146 
Ill. 6: Conference devoted to Stalin’s article on linguistics, Warsaw 04.12.1950. ...............179 
Ill. 7: Meeting of the Union of Polish Youth at the Main School of Planning and 
Statistics.......................................................................................................................199 
Ill. 8: Solemn scientific session of the Polish Academy of Science, devoted to Stalin’s 
“Economic problems of socialism in the USSR”. 17.04.53 Speaking: J. 
ChaáasiĔski ..................................................................................................................212 
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table  1: Authors contributing to Ekonomista more than once 1947-1953.......................... 96 
Table  2: Number of articles and reviews in Ekonomista ..................................................... 98 
Table  3: PUWP membership among staff in higher education institutions ......................105 
Table  4: Overview of junior scientific staff’s political affiliations in late 1949................121 
Table  5: Sub-section activity as reported to the Congress Secretariat and the Politburo. .177 
Table  6: Speakers and themes during the First Convention of Polish Economists ...........186 
Table  7: Articles and reviews as compared with other texts appearing in Ekonomista. ...208 
Table  8: Economists in the CQC Social Science Section 1953-1960................................223 
Table  9: Composition of the CQC Section of Social Sciences 1953-1955. .....................225 
Table 10: Economists presenting cases before the CQC Social Science Section ..............226 
Table 11: Degrees and titles awarded to economists by the CQC in its first three years...230 
Table 12: The procedure of the application of Kraków economists in the CQC: ..............240 
Table 13: CQC treatment of economics: 1954-1960...........................................................274 
vii
ACRONYMS 
AAN Archiwum Akt Nowych, the Archive of New Records, the state archive devoted to 
contemporary history. 
AMSZ Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych, archive of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
APAN Archiwum Polskiej Akademii Nauk, the Archive of the Polish Academy of 
Science.
APMW Archiwum PaĔstwowe Miasta Warszawa, the State Archive of the City of 
Warsaw. 
ASGH Archiwum Szkoáy Gáównej Handlowej, the archive of Warsaw School of 
Economics. 
AUW Archiwum Uniwersytety Warszawskiego, archive of Warsaw University 
BPO Basic party organisation, the party cell located in the workplace. 
CC Central Committee (in the text – of the PUWP) 
CNRS Conseil National de Recherche Scientifique in France 
CPB Central Planning Board (responsible for the first postwar economic plan) 
CQC Central Qualification Committee (Polish acronym CKK) 
CUP Polish acronym of the Central Planning Board, Centralny Urząd Planowania 
DC District Committee (in the text – of the PUWP, refers to city districts) 
IKNP Polish acronym of the First Congress of Polish Science  
ITSC Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres, attached to the PUWP Central 
Committee, established 1950, Polish acronym IKKN, renamed Institute of Social 
Sciences (INS) 
MSzW Polish acronym of the Ministry of Higher Education, Ministerstwo Szkolnictwa 
WyĪszego
NKVD People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Soviet secret police agency 
Orgburo Organisation Bureau of the PUWP Central Committee,  
Politburo  Political Bureau of the PUWP Central Committee  
PAN Polish Academy of Science, established 1951 
PAU Polish Academy of Letters (based in Kraków) 
PEA Polish Economic Association 
PSP Polish Socialist Party 
viii
PTE English acronym PEA, Polish Economic Association 
PPP Polish Peasant Party (opposition to PSP and PWP, headed by Mikoáajczyk) 
PWP Polish Workers Party (communists) 
PUWP  Polish United Workers Party, result of the merger of socialist and communist 
parties in December of 1948) 
RC Regional Committee (in this text - of the PUWP) 
SGH Main School of Commerce (today: Warsaw School of Economics) in 1949 
renamed SGPiS 
SGPiS Main School of Planning and Statistics 
UW Warsaw University 
UJ Jagiellon University in Kraków 
1INTRODUCTION
Polish economists, the subject of this study, do not form an easily-definable group. While a 
wide-ranging categorisation of the profession might include all those employed in positions 
involving economic expertise, from junior accountants to the president of the national bank, 
this study will focus on economists who took an active part in the production, transmission 
and evaluation of scientific knowledge in post-war Poland. In practice this largely means 
economists who held academic positions. Ultimately, the decision on who was or was not a 
member of this tribe was made by the practitioners themselves, with the result that individuals 
recognised by other economists are included in this inquiry regardless of their education, 
institutional affiliation or professional experience. Over the years covered below, the 
composition and structure of this disciplinary group underwent not one but several profound 
transformations, some of these were caused by the Communist regime’s ambitious science 
policy.
This study has two sets of protagonists: economists in academic institutions, and the 
Communist regime’s policy makers. Both were highly resourceful. The former enjoyed the 
recognition and respect of society, were confident of their legitimacy, and had the advantage 
of long term incumbency in academic institutions. The latter controlled financial and 
administrative resources, enjoyed raw power, and brimmed over with revolutionary zeal. If 
we narrow the focus to the circumscribed stage upon which the confrontations and 
negotiations between the new regime and the established academic sector took place from the 
late 1940s to the late 1950s, communist domination was not obvious. From the start, neither 
of the two parties accepted its opponent’s claims of control over scientific knowledge as 
legitimate, and the outcome of the confrontation was by no means pre-determined. This is a 
case study of the ensuing confrontations, negotiations and accommodations, and if we take 
stock of the situation from the point of view of 1960, we will find that there was no clear 
winner. Rather, both the Polish economists who had occupied the field in 1945, and the group 
2of communists introduced into academic positions by the Party,1 were transformed by these 
confrontations with each other, and with the requirements of the regime. Indeed, this study is 
an investigation of the gradual and mutual transformation of both parties, from aggressive 
confrontation, to the apparent victory of the Marxist-Leninist economists, and then to the 
collapse of their monopoly over the field in 1956. 
Stalin is reputed to have said that communism would fit Poland as a saddle fitted a cow. 
Indeed, communism – and especially its Soviet version – was not the preferred choice of the 
majority of Polish society, fiercely attached as it was to national culture and independence. 
Wartime experiences had confirmed the Poles’ view of both of their powerful neighbours, the 
USSR and Germany, as threats to the nation’s existence. Yet in 1944, following the Yalta 
Agreement, and backed by the Red Army and the NKVD, a Communist regime was 
established. Based on a case study of professional economists from academic institutions, the 
present investigation explores the relationship between a reluctant Poland and this 
revolutionary regime. It covers the period 1945 to 1960, during which time the new 
communist system was formed, experienced its first major crisis, and then regained stability.
It is a well-established fact among scholars of Soviet studies that the totalitarian model does 
not offer a satisfying description or explanation of the interaction between the communist 
regimes and the societies over which they ruled. Belief in the omnipotence of the Soviet Party 
was successfully challenged by revisionist historians even before the Soviet Union crumbled 
in the late 1980s. Scholars discerned a greater or lesser degree of interaction between the 
Soviet regime and various social groups, rather than a one way top-down communication 
between an active regime and a passive society.2 Sources available from the early 1990s 
allowed better nuancing of a once heavily-schematic representation.3 Furthermore, research 
on other communist-ruled countries has helped us to challenge the view that the diversity of 
East and Central European societies was destroyed by the imposition of a uniformly 
sovietising system. Several studies demonstrate that historical experiences, local socio-
1 When capitalised, “the Party” refers to the Communist party in Poland, which after 1945 was first called the Polish Workers 
Party and after the merger with the Polish Socialist Party as the Polish United Workers Party. In quotes I have kept the casing
of the original. 
2 An important study was Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 1979. Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934
Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres. For a review of the development of views on Soviet history during Stalin’s rule see 
Reichman, Henry, 1988. "Reconsidering "Stalinism"". Theory and Society, 17, 57-89. 
3 See for instance the volume of sources edited and commented on by Siegelbaum and Sokolov.Siegelbaum, Lewis H., 
Sokolov, A. K., Zhuravlev, Sergei & Kosheleva, L., 2000. Stalinism as a way of life : a narrative in documents New Haven ; 
London: Yale University Press. Kotkin, Stephen, 1997. Magnetic mountain : Stalinism as a civilisation London ; Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
3economic conditions and national cultures deeply affected the various communist regimes’ 
ability to sovietise their satellite states.4
The situation within Polish historiography is radically different at the levels of synthetic 
interpretations and narrow case-studies. The former, often written for a general public with an 
educational purpose in mind, perpetrate a vision of post-war history which is detached from, 
and to a certain extent incompatible with, the findings of specialised studies, including this 
one. The principal message in overviews of post-war history is that an alien totalitarian 
system was imposed against the will and without the participation of Polish society, and was 
sustained only by the threat of a Soviet invasion. Society is portrayed as the active subject 
only when opposition to the regime is discussed, and the narrative is usually structured by a 
division into strands relating to society, “us”, and regime, “them”. The strength of this 
narrative is that it chimes in with popular interpretations of Polish history, which shy away 
from uncomfortable evidence of compromise, and stress a story of noble uprisings against 
foreign oppressors. Polish history during the communist era tends to be analysed in national 
terms: the Polish Communist regime is seen as the extension, the “agentura”, of the Soviet 
Union; unable and unwilling to represent Polish society, and in conflict with the interests of 
the Polish nation. According to this interpretation, the Communist regime was intrinsically 
alien to Polish society, both culturally and nationally. Together with a stress on the totalitarian 
aspects of the Soviet regime, this undermines any discussion of the interaction between the 
regime and society. It allows for no honourable, legitimate ways in which Poles could work 
with what is classified as a foreign and totalitarian system. A possible reason why the insights 
of revisionist historians have not occasioned any substantial reworking of Polish 
historiography’s grand narrative is that totalitarianism fits so well with the logic of this 
narrative that it is hard to challenge. Totalitarianism explained why Polish society had to 
submit to Soviet domination (totalitarian regimes are not easily resisted), and described the 
relations between the regime and society in terms of polarisation and opposition (them and us, 
no co-operation, no common interests) thereby presenting a cohesive and attractive package. 
While a focus on international and political history has led historians to stress the conflict 
4 In a recent review of Peter Kenez, Holly Case confirms the emergence of a consensus on the diversity of countries’ 
experiences within the region. She traces the idea to Z. Brzezinski’s 1960 book, and mentions the recent works of Bradley 
Adams, John Connelly, Charles Gati and Norman Naimark to support it. Review published on H-Net Book Review, 
http://www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/ accessed on 05.12.2007 For discussions of Polish historian’s dealings with the totalitarian 
approaches see the contributions of A. Kemp-Welch and A. Friszke in  Kemp-Welch, A.(ed.) (1999) Stalinism in Poland, 
1944-56 : selected papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European studies, Warsaw, 1995. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
4between Polish and Soviet interests and culture, studies of the relations between the Polish 
regime and its society should have as their subject the many moments of interaction and 
negotiation between them. Such studies may lead to different conclusions and their synthesis 
may in the future give us a different grand narrative of Polish post-war history.
Further explanation of the present situation in Polish historiography may lie in the fact that 
Polish historians have concentrated on dealing with the legacy left by Party historians. Party-
censored historiography not only furnished them with biased interpretations, but also left 
important areas uncharted – for instance, the role of the secret police, and the inner workings 
of the Party leadership. In order to rectify these omissions, historians have focused many of 
their efforts on studying the regime’s abuse of power. After 1990, when politicians with 
backgrounds in anti-communist opposition came to power, the Party censorship was replaced 
with a focus on oppositional activities, particularly heroic resistance, rather than on more 
consensual forms of interaction with the regime. Anything that could be interpreted and 
represented by political opponents as co-operation or collaboration with the regime became 
sensitive material. The relationship between the new regime and Polish society continues to 
be the subject of controversy. The longevity of the debate initiated by Miáosz with Captive
Mind in 1953, on the roles and moral dilemmas of Polish intellectuals, is one illustration of 
the acute feelings regime-society issues continue to arouse.5
Side by side with the cultivation of the totalitarian-nationalistic narrative of post-war history 
in general works, an increasing number of in-depth studies have been conducted both in and 
outside Poland. Today, several institutions conduct research into post-war Polish history, the 
most important being Warsaw University, and the Polish Academy of Science’s Institute of 
History and Institute of Political Studies. Krystyna Kersten and her colleagues at the Institute 
of History at PAN produced individual and collective publications on post-war topics, 
particularly in the first half of the 1990s. Andrzej Paczkowski at the Institute of Political 
Studies first directed the efforts of his team towards the editing of collections of sources 
central to the understanding of the workings of the communist leadership, and then in the last 
decade published both syntheses and in-depth studies. At Warsaw University, Marcin Kula 
and his students have undertaken studies of various aspects of societal and everyday life 
5 Miáosz, Czesáaw, 1953. The captive mind, 1st ed. New York: Knopf. Some important publications in this debate include 
Trznadel, Jacek, 1988. HaĔba domowa : rozmowy z pisarzami Paris: Instytut Literacki, Sáabek, Henryk, 1997. 
Intelektualistów obraz wáasny 1944-1989: KsiąĪka i Wiedza. The last addition, in the form of a book for it is beyond the 
space of a footnote to document this debate in journals and newspapers, is Bikont, Anna & SzczĊsna, Joanna, 2006. Lawina i 
kamienie : pisarze wobec komunizmu Warszawa: PrószyĔski i S-ka. 
5during the communist era. 6  Other central institutions include the Institute of National 
Remembrance, and the private foundation “Karta”.7 The number of Polish history studies 
published outside Poland is naturally lower, but some of these stand out because of their 
dexterity in combining the approaches of western scholarship with thorough knowledge of 
Polish conditions, allowing for a more nuanced perspective than the totalitarian approach. A 
central work, Padraic Kenney’s study Rebuilding Poland; Workers and Communists 1945-
1950, explored the limitations of the Polish Communist Party’s power. By displaying the 
communists’ difficulties when it came to accommodating and persuading their core electorate, 
the Polish proletariat, Kenney demonstrated the potential that might be had by making 
inquiries into the agency of the social constituency. Both his discussion of the importance of 
the “moral capital” of Polish workers, and the insights of Jan T. Gross into the evolution of 
Polish society during the Second World War, exemplify approaches that show society 
enjoying a more active role. Even closer to the subject matter of this thesis, John Connelly’s 
comparative study of university policies across Eastern Europe stresses the great cohesiveness 
of the Polish professors, who together with junior researchers formed a self-referential and 
influential “milieu” (Ğrodowisko) .8 We still await a synthesis of Polish postwar history which 
could incorporate these insights into the overall narrative, revising it in the process. The 
paradox is that in current historiography the Communist regime is generally portrayed as 
being immensely unpopular and lacking in support and legitimacy, but nevertheless able to 
dominate and direct all sectors of society. This paradox is often solved by stressing the role of 
terror and fear, thus pushing interpretations in the direction of totalitarian approaches. In-
6 Publications of the PAN Institute of History include: Kersten, Krystyna et al. (eds.) Polska 1944/45-1989, Warszawa: 
Instytut Historii PAN, Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 
1984. Berkeley: California University Press, Szarota, Tomasz (ed.) (2001) Komunizm. Ideologia, system, ludzie. Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo NERITON, Instytut Historii PAN. Another scholar from the PAN Institute of History whose publications have 
been important for this study is Sáabek, Henryk, 1997. Intelektualistów obraz wáasny 1944-1989: KsiąĪka i Wiedza. 
Examples of interesting works from the PAN Political Studies Institute are: A. Paczkowski, (ed.) Centrum wáadzy w Polsce
(Warszawa 2003), A. Dudek, A. KochaĔski and K. Persak, (eds.) Centrum Wáadzy. Protokoáy posiedzeĔ kierownictwa PZPR. 
Wybór z lat 1949-1970. (Warszawa 2000), A. Friszke,  Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945-1980 (London 1994), K. Persak,  
Sprawa Henryka Hollanda (Warszawa 2006), 365. Warsaw University scholars most often publish their work in the Warsaw 
based Wydawnictwo TRIO series “W krainie PRL” Some examples are: Kochanowicz, Joanna, 2000. ZMP w terenie. 
Stalinowska próba modernizacji opornej rzeczywistosci. KosiĔski, Krzysztof, 2000. O nową mentalnoĞü: Īycie codzienne w 
szkoáach 1945-1956,  TymiĔski, Maciej, 2001. PZPR i przedsiembiorstwo. Nadzór partyjny nad zakáadami przemysáowymi
1956-1970. Thiriet, Damien, 2002. Marks czy Maryja? : komuniĞci i Jasna Góra w apogeum stalinizmu (1950-1956),
SowiĔski, Paweá, 2005. Wakacje w Polsce Ludowej : polityka wáadz i ruch turystyczny (1945-1989).
7 See the publications of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). Fundacja “Karta” keeps archives, collects diaries and 
oral history, and publishes the quarterly Karta.
8 Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-
1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. The Unplanned Society, a collective effort of Polish social scientists, is 
an interesting study which focuses on the late stage of the Communist regime’s rule, and yields a picture of Polish society as 
one composed of citizens unconcerned with revolutionary slogans, and disillusioned with politics, but focusing on their own 
immediate practical problems, and searching for forms of expression and socialisation outside Party control. These findings 
raise the question as to whether this situation was particular to the 1980s or if it could also describe earlier phases. Wedel,
Janine R. (ed.) (1992) The Unplanned Society. Poland during and after Communism, New York: Columbia University Press. 
6depth studies must be made if we are to find an alternative explanation to this strange 
combination of power and impotence, and the modest aim of the investigation that follows is 
to contribute to such an attempt. 
The starting point for this study is that there is no evidence suggesting that the Polish 
Communist Party was at any point omnipotent or in full control of Polish society. Instead, 
there are ample grounds to ask whether the Party was able to implement its objectives, and 
whether the pre-existing societal organisations and interest groups were truly passive and 
powerless. Were the Party’s policies and decisions unilateral, dismissive of public opinion, 
and inspired solely by Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet leadership? Did society 
impinge on the Party, affecting its outlook, decisions and plans? Despite the military support 
of the Soviet Union, the nascent Polish Communist regime had limited resources at its 
disposal, particularly in terms of human resources. It had to establish its power, and at the 
same time cope with vast challenges, such as the task of post-war reconstruction, armed 
resistance, and the hostility of both workers and peasants, not forgetting the strong position of 
the Church. Once the Polish Communist regime had gained a grip on these areas, and had 
built up a Party apparatus to oversee all areas of societal life, many hindrances stood between 
it and the unprecedented ambition, shared with homologous neighbouring regimes, to control 
and transform society. Science was of vital importance for the communist modernisation 
project, but not just any kind of science. The Marxist-Leninist view on science stressed the 
cognitive significance of class relations, and therefore denied the applicability of ‘capitalist’ 
science to the construction of communism. Hence, Polish academic institutions had to be 
reformed, and scholars re-educated in Marxism-Leninism.9 Several historians have pointed 
out that the regime’s attitude to science was characterised by contradictions.10 On the one 
hand it claimed to put science at the centre of its policies and world-view, with Marxism-
Leninism, the ruling ideology, presented as the only truly scientific doctrine. Here, the 
communists promised to surpass the old regime in promoting the scientific endeavour. On the 
other hand, the demand that Marxist-Leninist ideology should permeate science meant that the 
autonomy of scholars employed in academic institutions would be radically reduced. 
9 Marxism-Leninism constituted a specific variant of Marxism, and was minutely defined and frequently revised by the Party 
leadership, which meant that political economy too had to fit into the strict and narrow confines of the ‘central party line’. 
10 Krementsov, Nikolai, 1997. Stalinist Science Princeton: Princeton University Press, Péteri, György, 1998. Controlling the 
Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the 
Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe. New York: Atlantic Reseach and Publications, 
Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
7In order to be able to effect a transformation of the economy and society, the communist 
leaders needed critical, imaginative scholars to furnish them with updated knowledge about 
problems, and to propose solutions. On the other hand, in their efforts to maintain their 
legitimacy and to secure a hold on power, they could allow neither criticism nor creativity. 
The regime was in need of social science expertise and intelligence, but paralysed the 
institutions that could provide it. 
Scientists and scholars fill important functions in modern societies, by producing and 
transmitting expert knowledge. To that end, they partake in well-defined, complex social 
organisations which control the assessment of knowledge and the distribution of material and 
symbolic resources. By comparing the circumstances and development of the academic 
communities in the DDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland, Connelly portrays the Polish 
Communist Party as the least decided and least effective in bringing about a sovietisation of 
higher education. The results of Connelly’s study suggest that further investigation of the 
relations between a regime and its academics could tell us something new about the nature, 
extent and limits of a regime’s power, as well as revealing ways in which professional and 
institutional interest groups responded to and dealt with a given Communist regime. 
Science is a topic which can be approached from a great many angles. György Péteri suggests 
four aspects of science which can be made the subject of inquiry. This study focuses on two 
of them: science considered as “a societal institution within which purposefully organized 
cognition, research activity, the production of new certified knowledge takes place” and as a 
“set of collectivities of individuals engaged in the production of new knowledge”.11 In his 
studies of Hungarian economics, he portrays the Communist regime as riddled with conflicts 
of interests, and torn apart by inherent contradictions. With Michael David-Fox, Péteri has 
also instigated a collaborative and comparative effort to explore the nature and evolution of 
science in state-socialist regimes.12 Alongside Bourdieu and Whitley’s takes on the dynamics 
and functions of scientific fields, these studies have played a decisive role in helping me to 
look beyond the narrow perspectives of source materials dominated by a Party bureaucracy, 
11 Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) Academia
and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe. New York: 
Atlantic Reseach and Publications. p.1 
The other two aspects are science as “a body of knowledge satisfying a particular set of criteria” and science as a “set of 
rules, norms and organisations”.
12 David-Fox, Michael & Péteri, György, 2000. Academia in upheaval : origins, transfers, and transformations of the 
communist academic regime in Russia and East Central Europe Westport, Conn.; London: Bergin & Garvey. 
8and a historiography largely mesmerised by the influence and power of the Communist 
regime. 
Initially, Bourdieu’s concept of field of cultural production inspired me to conceive of Polish 
economics as a field characterised by the polarisation of positions and a scramble for power 
among economists. 13  Richard Whitley’s analysis of scientific disciplines as reputational 
organisations was extremely helpful in describing a framework of functions that need to be 
kept operational in order for a discipline to work.14 Both for Bourdieu and for Whitley, a field 
consists of practitioners who mutually acknowledge each other as artists or scholars, and the 
condition for a field’s existence is its autonomy, in that only recognised practitioners can 
competently evaluate each other’s output. I found Bourdieu’s methodological advice which 
relates the development of a field to interrelationship and interaction between different 
positions in it, very helpful. This perspective allowed me to look in a new way at the non-
Marxist economists who were marginalised from 1949 until 1956, and made it possible to 
note their continued importance in the development of Polish economics, an influence which 
persisted even during those years when they were barred from positions of decision-making 
and could not publish.
While Bourdieu’s perspective has been a source of inspiration, a systematic exploration of the 
implications of his theories and concepts has never been an objective of this study. Moreover, 
during the early stages of my work on this dissertation, I became critical of certain aspects of 
Bourdieu’s theory of cultural fields. In Bourdieu’s interpretation cultural and scientific 
production discourses and arguments used by practitioners in internal discussions are merely 
the tools of a struggle for power over symbolic capital. His focus on power as the sole motive 
of cultural production, however, results in a reductionist view of human relations. With the 
concepts of field of cultural production and symbolic capital Bourdieu makes it possible to 
explain the divisions and polarisations which contribute to the dynamics within the field, but 
he does not elaborate on what keeps it together. The work of sociologist Richard Whitley has 
played an important role in providing a framework which helps to explain the cohesion of a 
disciplinary field. Whitley considers scientific disciplines to be a form of social organisation 
in which individuals join together to perform a set of tasks that involve the creation of new 
13 Bourdieu, Pierre, 1993. The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia University Press. 
14 Whitley, Richard, 1982. The establishment and structure of the sciences as reputational organizations. In N. Elias, H. 
Martins & R. Whitley (eds.) Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook. Dodrecht: 
D.Reidl Publishing Company. 
9knowledge, the evaluation of that knowledge, gate-keeping, and the transmission of certified 
knowledge to new recruits. Scientific production is a competitive activity which involves both 
continuous challenges of established theories and the critical assessment of each other’s work. 
Scholars are bound together by their common interest in attracting funding, and by the fact 
that they both scrutinise each other’s work and confirm each other’s status as members of the 
field.
Covering the experience of the academic discipline of economics, provides an opportunity to 
observe how the social organisation of this field developed in interaction with the Communist 
regime. The social-political study of economics in our period is of particular interest for the 
following two reasons: Expert knowledge about the workings of economic processes is 
directly relevant to the formulation of economic policies. Whether a regime has access to 
competent expert knowledge about the way its economy works, and whether it is willing to 
use it, is highly relevant for the wealth of a nation. Indeed, Hungarian economists have been 
the object of several historians’ attention, on account of their central role in successful 
economic reforms. Polish economics at that time was not a success story if measured in terms 
of its impact on economic policies. Polish economists saw their influence here being stunted 
from early 1948, despite the Communist regime’s pledge that research-based economic 
knowledge would provide the foundation for economic policy. Instead, economic policy 
became the exclusive privilege of the Party leadership, as implemented by a servile planning 
bureaucracy. A short revival of hopes for influence in 1956 ended in disappointment when the 
communist leadership once more turned its back on professional advisers.
Although they were prevented from exerting influence over economic policy, Polish 
economists nevertheless found that their discipline was closely monitored by the Party. The 
regime’s demand that all scholarly disciplines should reform and become Marxist-Leninist 
was applied to economics with particular energy and consistency because of the central role 
of political economy in Marxist ideology.  
Economics is a discipline where bonds with professionals working outside academic 
institutions have been strong. Polish economists combined academic positions, political 
appointments and economic management, or moved frequently between them. Economists 
working outside academic institutions were able to make important empirical and theoretical 
contributions, and access to economic information was of the utmost importance to their 
colleagues in academic positions. Economists in research and higher education play a decisive 
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role in the life of the economic profession as a whole. Although the main focus is on 
academic economists, we will sometimes need to look at the larger groupings of professional 
economists, or of academics from other social sciences.  
To sum up, the principal questions of this study deal with internal relations within the field of 
economics, and with external, political interventions. On the one hand, the regime assigned 
economics the task of furnishing the basis for economic policy, while, on the other hand, it 
wanted to exercise total control over the discipline. Which ‘need’ took precedence in the 
Polish case, and how did it evolve over time? Did the regime place priority on control or on 
independent expert information about the state of the economy, on critical evaluation of its 
performance or on control over what economists thought and said about it? A second set of 
questions relates to the implementation of the regime’s aims in science policy: what means 
were at the regime’s disposal and which did it choose to apply? How did the regime go about 
transforming Polish economics into a Marxist-Leninist science? What was the extent and 
effect of any unintended consequences of these policies on scholars and their work? This 
brings us to problems relating to the reactions and responses that the regime’s actions elicited 
from scholars. How did the professional and academic communities respond to the demands, 
promises and pressures of the regime? What options did they see and which path did they 
choose to follow? Every relationship can go both ways, so we also need to ask how Polish 
academic economists, and the wider communities of scholars and professional economists to 
which they belonged, were able to make their presence felt within the Polish Communist 
regime. 
Studies of science policy, institutional histories, and biographies continue to dominate 
literature on the history of Polish science. The standard accounts of the regime’s policies 
towards science briefly mention collective chairs, the introduction of ideological subjects into 
university curricula, and the imposition of bans on teaching and publication on several 
prominent scholars. In very different ways, each approach exhibits serious problems in the 
understanding of the complex relationship between the political and academic spheres. 
Studies of national science policies, well-represented in Polish scholarship, engender two 
objections:15 firstly, they approach the issue from the perspective of the state, and its goals 
15 Works focusing on national science policies in Poland include Chodakowska, Janina, 1981. Rozwój szkolnictwa wyĪszego 
w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1944-1951 Wrocáaw: Ossolineum.,Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959).
Warszawa: PWN., Hartmann, Karl, 1962. Hochschulewesen und Wissenschaft in Polen. Entwicklung, Organisation und 
Stand 1918-1960. Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag., P. Hübner,  Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. 
Geneza systemu. (Wrocáaw 1992), W. Rolbiecki,  Geneza Polskiej Akademii Nauk (1930-1952) (Wrocáaw 1990), B. 
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and initiatives, and do so at the expense of the initiatives and agendas of scientists and 
scholars. Secondly, national science policy covers such a very wide spectrum of disciplinary 
communities, academic institutions, and state agencies, as to necessitate either a radical 
delimitation or the sacrifice of in-depth analysis. Most authors have opted for the latter, and 
their narratives fail to cover in their analysis issues of implementation and actual effects and 
consequences. We cannot complain about lack of detail in the work of Piotr Hübner, whose 
two volumes on science policy in the early post-war decades is considered the standard work 
on this topic.16 It provides a catalogue of plans, initiatives and measures in science policy, and 
traces minutely the gradual restriction of the autonomy of academic institutions. Hübner’s 
study, however, is problematic for at least two reasons. He chooses the Party/State and 
Science as the principal units of analysis. These large, aggregate entities obscure the diversity 
and conflicts of interest within each of these categories. It also presumes an inherent conflict 
of interests and conflict of values between State and Science. According to Hübner, these two 
were involved in a struggle where a lust for power and control and the search for truth 
confronted each other. The polarisation of State and Science, and the a priori belief that one 
of these is intrinsically good and the other bad, is not a good starting point for a nuanced 
discussion of the negotiations between them. The first important point to be made is that it is 
never “Science” and “State” who interact but humans that populate the various academic and 
political-administrative fields. The second point is that this interaction should be seen as an 
ongoing exchange through which politically administered resources for teaching and research 
are combined with the competence and expertise provided by practitioners of scientific fields. 
Furthermore, in Hübner’s narrative, the identification of “Science” with academic institutions 
(senates, academies and societies) means that once the academic institutions have lost their 
autonomy, only individual scholars remain to face the Party/State colossus.17 In other words 
his approach tends to ignore the existence and importance of informal collectivities and 
disciplinary-professional cohesion of scholars. 
Another approach which has enjoyed popularity is that of the history of individual academic 
institutions. There are many monographs on institutions. 18  They have frequently been 
Jaczewski,  Organizacja i finansowanie nauki polskiej w okresie miedzywojennym (Wrocáaw 1971), 232 p. 24 cm, B. 
Jaczewski,  Polityka naukowa paĔstwa polskiego w latach 1918-1939 (Wrocáaw 1978). 
16 Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu. Wrocáaw: Ossolineum. 
17 This is particularly striking in Hübner’s book on the Kraków-based Polish Academy of Letters, entitled Force against 
Reason; Hübner, Piotr, 1994. Siáa przeciw rozumowi Kraków: Polska Akademia UmiejetnoĞci. 
18 The works of Danuta DrabiĔska and Teresa Suleja, while adopting an institutional focus, stand out in their thorough 
presentation of the wider context of the developments in the institutions they study. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach 
forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics, Suleja, Teresa, 1995. 
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commissioned by academic institutions, and therefore serve a political agenda. They tend to 
reify the institution, provide it with an identity and history, and of course support its claim for 
funding. In many cases they create an impression of unity among the scholars of the 
institution which is illusory. They often overemphasise institutional identity at the expense of 
more significant disciplinary identities and interests across and within institutional 
boundaries. Also problematic is the fact that only a fraction of each discipline is accounted for 
in such studies. Because the regime controlled the legislative, repressive and administrative 
apparatus, it had no difficulty in decreeing the modification or closure of an institution. A 
focus on the fate of institutions therefore favours the same conclusion as that from national 
policy studies – that the Communist regime was able swiftly to take complete control of 
science and higher education. 
Neither Polish economists, nor indeed any other scientific disciplines in Poland, have been the 
objects of in-depth studies.19 This lack of discipline-focused studies in the Polish context has 
been a serious challenge for my enquiry. It has only been sporadically possible to draw 
comparisons with the history of other disciplines, and many aspects of academic life, such as 
the organisation and efficiency of the Party in academic institutions, still need to be studied 
covering also other disciplines. As for economists, it is mainly in the context of the history of 
economic thought or of institutional history that their situation has been approached so far.20
I have consulted a number of archival collections. In the holdings of the Archiwum Akt 
Nowych (State Archive of New Records) I have consulted the fonds of the Central Committee 
of the Polish United Workers Party (KC PZPR), the Polish Economic Association (PTE), the 
Uniwersytet Wrocáawski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955. Wrocáaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wrocáawskiego. DrabiĔska’s choice of an institution dominated by one discipline also has the benefit of avoiding excessive 
fragmentation. Examples of more conventional and narrow institutional histories include Floryan, Wáadysáaw (ed.) (1970) 
Uniwersytet Wrocáawski w latach 1945-1970, Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich, Zakrzewski, Zbigniew (ed.) 
(1976) Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu 1926-1976, Warszawa - PoznaĔ: PWN. 
19 In Poland it seems it is the history of writers which has captured general attention, and their community has been the 
subject of many articles and several studies. See for instance: Sáabek, Henryk, 1997. Intelektualistów obraz wlasny 1944-
1989: KsiąĪka i Wiedza, Shore, Marci, 2006. Caviar and ashes : a Warsaw generation's life and death in Marxism, 1918-
1968 New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Sociologists and historians have shown interest for their own disciplinary histories, but have devoted little attention to other
disciplines. Nina KraĞko has focused on sociology, but devotes a mere 20 pages to our period. Szacki, Jerzy (ed.) (1995) Sto
lat socjologii polskiej. Od SupiĔskiego do SzczepaĔskiego. Wybór tekstów., Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 
KraĞko, Nina, 1996. Instytucjonalizacja socjologii w Polsce Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Romek, Zbigniew 
(ed.) (2000) Cenzura w PRL. Relacje historyków., Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON 
Instytut Historii PAN, Sitek, Ryszard, 2000. Warszawska szkoáa historii idei. Miedzy historią a teraĨniejszoĞcią. Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar.  
20 An overview of economics has been presented by Lukaszewicz, Aleksander, 1997. "Polish Economics and Transformation 
Challenges - 50 Years of Experience 1945-1995". Discussion Papers Frankfurter Institutt für Transformationstudien, 97., 
àukawer, Edward, 1985. Spor o racjonalnosc gospodarki socjalistycznej. Z historii problemu. Warszawa: PWN., 
Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. DrabiĔska, 
Danuta, 1994. "Powstanie Szkoáy Gáównej Planowania i Statystyki." Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 39, 65-71. 
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Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres (ANS), and the Ministry of Higher Education 
(MSzW). At the State Archive of the City of Warsaw (APMW) I studied the files of the 
Warsaw Committee of the Polish Workers Party, and the records from the Basic Party 
Organisation of the PUWP at the Main School of Planning and Statistics.21 The archives of 
the Polish Academy of Science (APAN) hold the personal papers of some economists, and 
valuable documents regarding the First Congress of Polish Science and the activities of the 
Academy’s Research Unit in Economics. The Special Holdings Section of the Warsaw School 
of Economics Library, the archives of Warsaw University (AUW), and of the Warsaw School 
of Economics (ASGH), also yielded some interesting material.22 Polish newspaper clippings 
about economists, economics and the economy that were systematically collected and 
conserved by the Press Archive of the Herder Institute in Marburg have allowed for an 
extremely useful overview of information and debates concerning economics in the daily and 
weekly press, both within Poland and in emigration centres. For the period 1945-1955, which 
is not covered by the collections of the Herder Press Archive, I have consulted: Trybuna
Ludu, Ekonomista, ĩycie Gospodarcze, Nowe Drogi, ĩycie Szkoáy WyĪszej, and ĩycie Nauki.23
Finally, I conducted a series of interviews with economists who were active in the period 
under study.24 These interviews have served as a reservoir of information about daily life, 
relationships, and personal experiences. Even though they do not constitute a “representative 
sample”, they have been very helpful in providing the kind of knowledge which could never 
be found in archival records.
The principal challenge arising from archival searches made for this study is that there is an 
abundance of sources reflecting the perspectives of the political administrators of science, and 
scarcely any which reflect those of the scholars themselves. This imbalance is enhanced by 
the censorship and bans on publication which led to the silencing of many important 
scientists, who nevertheless continued not only to exist, but also to exercise influence through 
21 The present name of the Main School (Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa) is Warsaw School of Economics. In the period covered 
by this study it changed names several times, most importantly from the Main School of Commerce to the Main School of 
Planning and Statistics in 1949. In this text it will some times be simply referred to as the Main School. 
22 One more archive is mentioned in the list in the Appendix, the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The one 
document from this archive which I have consulted during the work on this study comes from the collection of material I 
gathered during work on my Master’s thesis. I have not undertaken any new explorations of this archive for the purposes of 
this study. 
23 Throughout the text I use Polish spelling whenever possible, making only exception for Warsaw. This applies even to the 
few quotes from texts that were translated from Russian into Polish, there I use the Polish convention for transcription of the
cyrrilic alphabeth. For technical reasons, however, Polish signs are not consistently applied in the footnotes and bibliography.
For this I apologise. 
24 A list of names of my interlocutors is provided in the Appendix. 
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private channels of communication and their wide networks of colleagues and former 
students. Periodicals and records of public debates reveal the progress the Party had made at 
the time in asserting its control over access to publication, but the arguments and ideas voiced 
in such records are not representative of the entire field. As there is clearly a need to 
compensate for the bias towards the perspective of the Party, its bureaucracy, and its loyal 
economists, a central concern in the course of my research has been to restore to the silenced 
members of the scientific community their rightful place in history. Fortunately, it has been 
possible to find sources that even after 1948 reveal at least some of the reactions and 
responses of the ‘bourgeois’ economists. Stenographic records of meetings have proved to be 
especially useful. I was able to gather stenographic reports covering a wide range of 
interactions; mostly discussions which were open only to economists, and not to the general 
public. The pictures we get from the stenographic records of verbal exchanges, with unedited 
arguments, objections, insolence, and aggressive forms of expression, differ strongly from 
those given by the minutes and reports produced by the Party-controlled bureaucracy. 
Chapter One, covering the period 1918 to 1947, sets the background by sketching the history 
of Polish economics in the first half of the 20th Century. Initially influenced by German and 
Austrian economic schools, Polish economists increasingly turned to Anglo-Saxon economic 
thought for inspiration in this period. In the twenty years between the two World Wars, Polish 
economists made substantial progress in consolidating the institutional foundations of their 
discipline: chairs of economics were active at all the universities, research institutes were 
established, and several business colleges were making good progress towards recognised 
academic status. Academic economics had close bonds with the larger body of professional 
economists, bonds which ensured continuous cross-fertilisation by bringing economic theories 
to managers and policy makers, and, to professors of economics, access to empirical data and 
to influence over economic policy formation. This steady progress was interrupted by the 
cataclysms of 1939 and after. The end of the war found the economists’ profession decimated, 
dispersed and exhausted, but brimming over with commitment to a rapid reconstruction of the 
country. My investigation into the first post-war years, a task which in terms of sources 
presented great challenges, reveals the dynamism, energy and adaptability with which 
economists adjusted to a novel and swiftly-changing political, economic and social context. 
Continuity with the pre-war years prevailed in terms of the composition of the profession, but 
a generational shift, as well as a climate favourable to economists with socialist sympathies, 
ensured that there was no rigid transposition of pre-war constellations. The role of the 
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Communist regime, and the presence of Marxist-Leninist economists representing the 
interests and policies of the Communist Party, was negligible during these years, so the first 
aggressive and concentrated attack by the Communist Party in 1948 came as a great shock to 
many economists.  
An analysis of this first meeting in February 1948, known as the Central Planning Board 
debate, forms the centre-piece of Chapter Two. The main objective of the communist attack 
on the Central Planning Board – the centre of economic policy formation since 1945 – was to 
weaken the Socialist Party and loosen its hold over economic policy. A secondary motive, but 
one that is important in the context of this study, was to challenge the dominant brand of 
western-oriented economics. During the debate, representatives of the Communist Party 
asserted that only Marxist-Leninist economics, as defined and controlled by the Party, could 
henceforth be tolerated. The circumstances and the content of this debate provide important 
information on the manner in which Marxist-Leninist economists entered the scene, and on 
how the established economists dealt with the Party’s claims. The Central Planning Board 
debate put an end to the Board’s influence over economic policy and also to the influence on 
policy-making by academic economists. It is important to note, however, that this 
confrontation took place in February 1948, nearly a year before the merger of the Socialist 
and Communist parties which produced the Polish United Workers Party, and more than a 
year before the PUWP initiated a concentrated effort to transform higher education and 
research. This delay gave rise to a particular set of circumstances, under which the intentions 
of the regime had been made clear but their implementation was not yet forthcoming. A study 
of the contents of the main periodical of economists, the journal Ekonomista, allows us to 
track the gradual restriction of intellectual autonomy in economics during this period.
Sources for the first post-war years are often scarce because of the challenges inherent in 
organising administration in a ruined country. However, starting in 1949, the PUWP initiated 
a comprehensive drive to transform higher education and research to fit with its plans for a 
new societal order, and the administrators of state, party and academic institutions produced 
increasing amount of documents. This abundance gives us a more detailed view of events but 
it also makes it necessary to allocate two chapters to the task of tracing the motives, actions 
and effects of the Communist regime’s offensive in higher education and research.
In Chapter Three the focus is on higher education, where PUWP decisions radically and 
abruptly changed both the type of economic knowledge offered to students and the professors’ 
16
control over their chairs. Up to that moment economics had been taught at all universities by 
professors who had held these posts since before the war, or by their direct successors. From 
1949, undergraduate training was offered at reformed business colleges, while students who 
wanted to pursue graduate studies only found them available at the Main School of Planning 
and Statistics that had been established to replace the Main School of Commerce (today the 
Warsaw School of Economics). This radical reduction in the number of institutions offering 
advanced economics was carried out to ensure that henceforth only Marxist-Leninist 
economists approved by the regime would teach the subject of political economy. Alongside 
the closure of many study programmes, the PUWP also took measures which reduced the 
professors’ control over their chairs, meaning that they no longer decided what they would 
teach, which students they would recruit to research training, or what kind of research they 
would conduct themselves. An examination of the Main School of Planning and Statistics will 
allow us to observe the challenges and constraints that the PUWP scholars and officials 
encountered in the implementation of this bold transformation of higher education in 
economics. 
Chapter Four traces economists’ preparations for the First Congress of Polish Science, an 
event commissioned by the Politburo and organised with the professed goal of transforming 
research in every single discipline, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Carefully selected 
scholars were invited to represent the discipline, and to participate in the elaboration of a 
Marxist-Leninist critique of each sub-discipline and discipline, and the entire ensemble of 
Polish science. In the course of different Congress-related events held in 1950 and 1951, 
PUWP officials and Marxist-Leninist scholars, recently elevated to prominent academic 
positions thanks to the political patronage of the PUWP leadership, reinterpreted the past and 
publicly humiliated prominent representatives of the discipline. The Congress allowed the 
PUWP to broadcast both its commitment to science and the news that scholars fully endorsed 
the regime’s policies. It did not, however, have the mobilising effect that the Politburo had 
hoped for. Examination of the documentation of the Congress shows that the changes it 
wrought on economists were superficial. It imposed new agendas, a new rhetoric, and a new 
disciplinary hierarchy, but it did not convince or activate economists. Through aggressive 
attacks and the public humiliation of scholars branded ‘reactionary’, the PUWP introduced an 
atmosphere of fear into scholarly discussions. The only alternative to statements conforming 
to the Party line on economics was silence. 
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The new order established by the PUWP in science only lasted for five years before it 
crumbled in 1956. Although it was short-lived, this epoch has left deep traces. For an 
economist out of favour with the regime, these were years of silence and of career prospects 
suspended for what seemed an indefinite period. Others were able to continue in their 
profession but had to accept marginal positions and subordination to political protégées of the 
PUWP, and were cut off from influence over economic policies and access to empirical data. 
They were isolated from international developments in the discipline, and able to conduct 
genuine discussions only among trusted friends, Polish economists did not have any outlet for 
expressing their dissatisfaction. This silence produced little source material, and so the major 
part of Chapter Five discusses the developments among the Marxist-Leninist economists. It 
was they who were supposed to make the new regime in economics work, but they too felt its 
constricting character. An examination of the discussion in early 1953 which followed the 
publication of Stalin’s article on economics reveals how the Party leadership’s demand that 
Marxist-Leninist economics conform to the prevalent party line made it impossible to conduct 
a constructive scholarly debate. Politics had invaded scholarly discussions, leaving no margin 
for doubt or alternative ideas. The second part of this chapter concentrates on another arena 
where Marxist-Leninist scholars found it increasingly difficult to reconcile professional and 
political arguments – the discussions of the body responsible for the allocation of academic 
titles in economics, the Social Science Section of the Central Qualification Commission. The 
expectation that the primacy of political qualification over scholarly output was only a 
temporary measure, as expressed in the earlier discussions of this body, were gradually 
replaced by increasing dismay at the interventions of the Party bureaucracy and the political 
overwriting of decisions on promotions undertaken by hand-picked Marxist-Leninist scholars. 
Scholars who were not trusted or favoured by the regime had no reason to wish this situation 
to be prolonged. What is more surprising is that even the group of scholars ostensibly 
favoured by the regime had many good reasons to look for change. These grievances were 
expressed loudly and with vehemence in 1956, when the Party’s control over academic 
institutions and professions suddenly broke down.
Chapter Six investigates some of the central developments in the eventful year of 1956, and 
takes the story to about 1960, when the Party had regained its sense of purpose, and a stable 
new order was established. Both in term of sources and the number of important events, 1956 
alone could furnish ample material for an entire thesis. The modest aim here is to sketch the 
fundamental re-orientation of Polish economics of that year, and the renegotiation of its 
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relations with the regime. Following Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and the death of 
Bierut, the Polish leadership lost control over the Party apparatus and over society. Among 
economists this became manifest during the Second Convention of Economists held in early 
June, where the situation in the discipline was assessed in highly critical terms. Young 
economists as well as those who had been doomed to silence since 1948 reclaimed freedom of 
research, access to economic data, and opportunity to advise economic policies. This was the 
beginning of an important public debate over the future direction of the Polish economy, 
which energised economists and provided the profession with wide publicity. With the 
establishment of an Economic Council, economists were also invited by the regime to 
articulate a reform proposal. The debate and the activity of the Economic Council relied on 
the input of both economists of Marxist-Leninist persuasion and those who had been 
previously stigmatised as ‘bourgeois’. These categories which had served to re-order 
economics in the early 1950’s became obsolete, as a new, more pluralist, field emerged. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
POLISH ECONOMICS 1918-1947 
Our understanding of the history of Polish economics in the interwar years has been strongly 
influenced by the polarised nature of interpretations of the period between 1918 and 1947. 
During its rule, the Polish United Worker’s Party (PUWP) denigrated all economic thought 
apart from that of state-approved Marxist economics.25  Opponents of the ruling regime, 
however, countered by claiming that the interwar years (1918-1939), and the relatively free 
immediate post-war period, were a positive era for Polish economics, and that it was after 
1948 that education, research and the prestige of economics deteriorated severely. 26
The fall of communism brought an end to this polarity, and subsequent research has given us 
a clearer, more nuanced picture of economics in interwar Poland.27 This means that attention 
25 In later chapters we shall return in more detail to the construction of a critique of the pre-war achievements of the 
discipline by the Communist regime. For the time being it suffices to say that the first ideologically motivated critique of so-
called ‘bourgeois’ economics was put in very harsh and uncompromising terms. Only after 1956, were efforts made to 
publish a synthesis based on detailed presentation of the views of pre-war economists. Differences of opinion between 
independent-minded scholars and those obeying the ideological prescriptions of the Party delayed these efforts. In the early 
1960s a team headed by E. LipiĔski started working on a new synthesis of the history of Polish economic thought. Due to 
professional and political conflict the enterprise was abandoned. A new effort was made towards the end of that decade for a 
trilogy where E. LipiĔski, J. Górski and T. Kowalik would write successive sections. Again political and professional 
disagreements in 1968 made it impossible to agree even on the basis of this work, and the full version of Kowalik’s 
contribution, which covered 1864-1950, was only published in 1992. Kowalik’s work was sequestered because of his support 
for the “revisionist” trend with its stress on the need for reform. Although originally part of the team preparing a general 
history of economic thought, Górski, Janusz, Kowalik, Tadusz & SierpiĔski, Witold, 1967. Historia powszechnej myĞli
ekonomicznej, 1870-1950, 1st ed. Warszawa: PWN. His contribution was removed from the second edition, and no 
references were made to his input. For a fuller explanation of the difficulties surrounding the publication of a history of 
Polish economic thought see the introduction to Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950. Wrocáaw:
Zakáad Narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich . Another team was more successful in producing a synthesis which was authorised 
by the ideological watchdogs of the regime.Guzicki, Leszek & Seweryn ĩurawicki 1974. Historia polskiej myĞli spoáeczno-
ekonomicznej : 1914-1945.  Warszawa: PaĔstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
26 While this view could not be expressed in official publications prior to 1989, it was widely circulated by word of mouth 
and in émigré publications. Verbal and printed critiques of the achievements of Marxist-Leninist economics were widespread 
in 1956. See for instance the interventions at the Second Convention of Polish Economists in June 1956, printed in 
Ekonomista nr. 5, 1956 Nowicki, Jozef, 1991. Luminarze polskiej teorii ekonomii XX wieku Warszawa: PWN,. p.17 For 
publications outside Poland see for example Drewnowski, Jan, 1979. "The Central Planning Office on Trial: An Account of 
The Beginnings of Stalinism in Poland." Soviet Studies, XXXI, 23-42., and articles in the London based daily Dziennik Polski
for instance: Nowak, Jan: “PamiĊci Profesora Edwarda Taylora” Dziennik Polski, London, 29.08.1964. 
27 LityĔska’s work on the Kraków school of economics and Gazda’s on the long-neglected catholic economic thinkers are 
examples of new research into Polish interwar economics. LityĔska, Aleksandra, 1995. Polska myĞl ekonomiczna okresu 
miedzywojennego Kraków: Akademia Ekonomiczna w Krakowie. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1996. Nurt katolicki w polskiej myĞli
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is now being given to the work of economists whose output was underestimated for 
ideological and political reasons, and that textbooks on the history of economic thought have 
been updated to include their profiles.28
In the second part of this chapter, under the subtitle “Great Expectations”, we shall look into 
the first post-war years, which were for economists a period of intense work in a rapidly 
changing political landscape as far as the reconstruction of their discipline and of the national 
economy were concerned.29 Despite being an extremely vibrant and interesting period, it has 
presented great challenges in terms of sources. The disorganisation and shortages of the era 
compromised the range and quality of archival materials related to Polish economics, meaning 
that the current section will rely largely on existing literature and published material. I shall 
endeavour to provide at least a sketch of how economists dealt with each other, and of how 
they attempted to re-establish their discipline in the immediate post-war years. 
Conditions before 1939 
Classic economic thought was concerned with the economics of the nation-state. After the 
Partitions of the 18th Century, Polish economists faced the dilemma of which State they 
should now scrutinise. Should they assist with the economic development of the occupying 
powers, or concentrate on devising the most efficient way of reaching independence? The 
tragic failure of successive armed uprisings prompted a new focus on the creation of wealth as 
a precondition for independence. Also, in the second half of the nineteenth century the Polish 
territories underwent a profound economic transformation, providing Polish economists with 
new areas for research.30
ekonomicznej okresu Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej 1918-1939. Reassessments of the whole interwar period are now also 
available.Nowicki, Jozef, 1988. Teoria ekonomii II Rzeczpospolitej Warszawa, Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. Historia ekonomii w 
Polsce 1864-1950. Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich . Also interesting from the perspective of this study is 
Mróz’s work on higher education in economics at the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw before 1939. Mróz, Maria 
Wanda, 1994. DziaáalnoĞü  dydaktyczna WyĪszej Szkoáy Handlowej - Szkoáy Gáównej Handlowej w latach 1915-1939
Warszawa: Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa.and Zagóra-Jonszta, Urszula, 1991. "MyĞl ekonomiczna wobec idei planowania 
gospodarczego w Polsce w okresie miedzywojennym". Ekonomista, 501-521. 
28 I have found Stankiewicz’s text-book particularly useful. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej
Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. Profiles of the most important interwar economists are presented in 
Nowicki, Józef, 1991. Luminarze polskiej teorii ekonomii XX wieku Warszawa:PWN., and there are some biographies 
covering this period, such as Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, ZarĊba,
Janusz, 1985. Reforma w testamencie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: MáodzieĪowa Agencja 
Wydawnicza. 
29 For a detailed analysis of political and societal developments in these years see Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The 
Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press. 
30 For an introduction to the economic developments and their bearing on the economic thought of the late 19th Century see 
Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950. Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich , 
Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
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The development of economics as an academic discipline suffered greatly after the abolition 
of the Polish universities. Only with the advent of the cultural liberalism of the Habsburgs did 
this situation change, with the right to teach in Polish being accorded to the University of 
Kraków in 1861 and of Lwów in 1869.31 The blossoming of economic thought in Galicia, 
however, stood in stark contrast to the Germanisation and Russification policies in the rest of 
the Polish territories. There, economic thought was stimulated by the lively political and 
ideological debates of the era, but had no institutional base.
During the First World War, the Eastern Front undulated back and forth over Polish territory, 
while a number of different groups fought to promote Polish independence. In the west, there 
were armed actions and uprisings in Silesia, and in the east hostilities between Poles and 
Ukrainians. The Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War raged in the undefined 
territories between the nascent Poland and Soviet Russia. When independence finally came, it 
required from the new Polish Government urgent solutions to many serious problems: the 
military threat from the Red Army, food-shortages, and epidemics. Economic policies were 
also fraught with challenges. To name just two: both currency and taxation reforms were 
needed to unite the three former partition territories under a single administration; and war-
damage and the loss of access to the Russian market had seriously weakened the emerging 
industrial sector.32
For scientific communities, independence meant a new start, and during the interwar years 
Polish economics underwent rapid and important developments. New universities and chairs 
of economics were founded in Warsaw, PoznaĔ and Wilno, and staffed by scholars from the 
existing centres in Kraków and Lwów. To this we have to add two private institutions – the 
Catholic University in Lublin, and the leftist Free University in Warsaw,33 as well as the 
Technical Universities (Politechnika) in Warsaw and Lwów, where professors of economics 
31 Both these universities had chairs devoted to economics and fostered a number of economic thinkers. At Lwów Julian
Antoni Dunajewski (1861-1880), the first professor in economics, was also the first Pole to hold the position of Treasury 
Minister in Vienna. He was followed by Leon BiliĔski (1846-1923), who was not only Treasury Minister but also the 
instigator of a bold reform of currency. After 1892, when BiliĔski left the university, Lwów had two chairs of economics. 
One of them was held by Stanisáaw GáąbiĔski (1862-1943), an adherent of historicism in economics and one of the founders 
of the National Democratic Party in Galicia. In Kraków the Chair of Political Economy established in 1883 was held by 
Wáodzimierz Czerkawski (1866-1913) and from 1912 by Adam KrzyĪanowski (1873-1963) who turned towards classical 
economic theory. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
p.320-322
32 Landau, Zbigniew & Tomaszewski, Jerzy, 1985. The Polish Economy in the Twentieth Century London: Croom Helm. 
33 The Free University, (Wolna Wszechnica Polska), established in 1918-1919 in Warsaw, from 1927 a section operated in 
àódĨ, academic status granted in 1929. It employed many prominent scientists, and has been noted for its leftist profile and 
contributions to social sciences. The àódĨ section became the basis for the establishment of àódĨ University in 1945, but the 
main section in Warsaw was not reactivated after the War. 
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offered seminars and study programmes in the discipline. For economists, the slow progress 
in establishing departments of economics in their universities was highly unsatisfactory: with 
the exception of PoznaĔ, economics continued to cohabit with law. Business colleges were 
established in Kraków and PoznaĔ, with the most important being the Main School of 
Commerce in Warsaw, which was alone in gaining the right to confer masters and doctoral 
degrees. 34  The number of students attending business colleges in the academic year of 
1937/38 was 4,13135 and their instruction was assured by the existence of a staff of thirty 
professors and 157 docents.36 In the 1930s, about 500 students a year graduated from these 
schools.37 Research outside academic institutions was carried out in the Institute of Business 
Cycle and Price Research (led by Edward LipiĔski and employing, among others, Michaá
Kalecki and Ludwik Landau)38 and the Institute of Social Economy (under the direction of 
Ludwik Krzywicki, and employing economists, statisticians and sociologists). 39  Several 
34 The Main School of Commerce (Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa, known today as the Warsaw School of Economics), a private 
institution, was financed by tuition fees and some modest state subventions. A number of works detailing its history have 
been published. Most recently, during the celebration of its centenary, new publications have been added and some material 
made accessible on the internet. http://www.sgh.waw.pl/ogolnouczelniane/100lat/ accessed 2.06.2007. Mróz, J. Nowicki, ed.,  
Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945 (Warszawa 1986), W. Morawski, ed.,  Historia SGH w 
Warszawie 1906-2006 (Warszawa 2006), R. Bauer, ed.,  Ksiega SGH. Pracownicy i absolwenci - kto jest kim? (Warszawa 
2004),   PamiĊtnik trzydziestolecia Szkoáy Gáównej Handlowej w Warszawie, 1906-1936. (Warszawa 1938), A. Minkiewicz, 
ed.,  Poczet wybitnych profesorów SGH - SGPiS (Warszawa 1986), 415. 
35 The figure of 4131 is the total number of students in PoznaĔ and Kraków Business Colleges, Lwów Foreign Trade College 
and Warsaw Main School of Commerce. 1327 of the 4131 students were women. Hartmann, Karl, 1962. Hochschulewesen 
und Wissenschaft in Polen. Entwicklung, Organisation und Stand 1918-1960. Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag. p.13 
36 A habilitation (habilitacja) was and still is in Poland and Germany the step following the doctorate and a precondition for a 
professoriate. A doctor who has written and successfully defended a habilitation thesis and gained the committee’s approval 
of a public lecture may become a docent and be allowed to lecture at the university which granted him or her the title. 
37 Unfortunately the figures do not include economists educated at the universities, as they were grouped with law students 
The four institutions included in these figures are the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw, the School of Foreign Trade in 
Lwów, Kraków Business Academy and Poznan Business Academy. Hartmann, Karl, 1962. Hochschulewesen und 
Wissenschaft in Polen. Entwicklung, Organisation und Stand 1918-1960. Frankfurt/Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag. p.14-15  
38 Institute of Business Cycle and Price Research (Instytut Badania Koniunktur i Cen) was organised in 1926-27 and fully 
functional from 1928. LipiĔski, Edward, 1981. Problemy, pytania, watpliwosci : z warsztatu ekonomisty, Wyd. 1 ed. 
Warszawa: PaĔstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. Kalecki, Michaá (1899–1970), economist and policy adviser whose 
contributions to the discipline have won international recognition.  Landau, Ludwik (1901-1944) worked together with 
Kalecki at the IBCPR on studies of national income and comparing the economic situation in different countries. Gazda, 
Zbigniew, 1998. Slownik biograficzny ekonomistów polskich od XIII wieku do polowy wieku XX. Kielce: WyĪsza Szkoáa
Pedagogiczna im. J.Kochanowskiego w Kielcach. 
Edward LipiĔski (1888-1986) economist and one of the protagonists of this study, so we shall frequently return to his 
activities. Edward LipiĔski studied economics at the Leipzig Handelshochschule and in Zürich, worked at the Polish Central 
Statistical Office in the early 1920s, taught at what would be later be the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw where he 
became professor in 1928. He contined to be strongly involved in the teaching and administration of the Main School until 
1950, when he was transferred to Warsaw University by the decision of the Communist regime. He organised and directed 
the work of the IBCPR until 1939 and between 1945 and 1947 when it was reactivated under the name Institute of National 
Economy. He was active in the organisation of the Polish Economic Association serving as its president from 1945 to 1965 
and as Editor of Ekonomista between 1928 and 1978. A member of the Socialist Party and later of the PUWP, he was a free-
spoken and independent personality. Among scholars he was respected both for his pre-war academic record and for his 
wartime resistance. He went on to become an important figure in the political opposition in the 1970s and 1980s.  Helena 
Hagemajer’s introduction to LipiĔski, Edward, 1981. Problemy, pytania, watpliwosci : z warsztatu ekonomisty, Wyd. 1 ed. 
Warszawa: PaĔstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. Paweá SowiĔski’s article in Nowicki, Jozef, 1991. Luminarze polskiej 
teorii ekonomii XX wieku Warszawa: PWN, SkórzyĔski, Jan, 2000. Opozycja w PRL : sáownik biograficzny 1956-89. 
Warszawa: OĞrodek Karta. 
39 Instytut Gospodarstwa Spoáecznego, founded in 1920 and led by the famous sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki (1859-1941)
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journals devoted to economics were established, the professional associations formed in all 
the principal cities cooperated to organise national congresses, and Polish economists made 
increasing numbers of contacts with the Anglo-Saxon world. Indeed, with the support of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, an English-language journal was established in order to make the 
findings of Polish economists accessible to international scholars.  
Development of economic thought 
Originally, the eldest institutions, Lwów and Kraków Universities, were both influenced by 
the German historical school, but after 1918 this dominance waned. Kraków economists had 
already been inspired by Austrian subjectivism. In the interwar years the trademark of the 
“Kraków School of Economics” would be defence of the liberal market economy from state 
intervention. PoznaĔ’s principal figure in economics, Edward Taylor, had studied in Kraków 
and was therefore predisposed to favour liberalism. Nowicki points out, however, that Taylor 
favoured only limited use of mathematics.40 In Warsaw, neoclassical economics ruled the 
roost, and liberalism prevailed at Warsaw University, but because there were several 
institutions involved in economic research, the picture is more composite. At the Main School 
of Commerce, W. Zawadzki and his students concentrated on mathematical approaches close 
to the Lausanne school of Walras and Pareto,41 while economists connected with the Free 
University and the Polytechnic showed more support for interventionist economic policies. 
Only Lwów remained true to the historical school, at least to a certain extent, since Lwów 
scholars amalgamated their German historical heritage with approaches inspired by sociology 
and reflections on the social effects of capitalism.42
Also in circulation were the economic ideas of socialists and of catholic ‘solidarist’ 
economists. While bitterly opposing each other, both these groupings were concerned with 
issues of justice in ownership and distribution of wealth. Socialist economists found it 
difficult to penetrate academic strongholds, but catholic solidarism was firmly anchored both 
who is also recognized for his contributions to economics.  
40 Nowicki, Jozef, 1988. Teoria ekonomii II Rzeczpospolitej Warszawa :.p.204 
Edward Taylor (1884-1964) studied under Kraków professor W. Czerkawski, and became professor of economics in 
PoznaĔ when the Polish university was established there after World War One. Taylor is considered as the creator of a 
PoznaĔ school of economics, which in methodological terms was close to that of Kraków. He continued to be active after 
1945 and so will be spoken of in later chapters. 
41 Zawadzki, Wáadysáaw (1885-1939) professor of economics at Wilno University and the Main School of Commerce in 
Warsaw  
42 This summary of interwar economic thought is based on . Both Stanisáaw Grabski (1871-1949) and Tadeusz Brzeski 
(1884-1958), professors of economics at Lwów and Warsaw Universities respectively, can be classified as adherents of a 
sociologically-inspired brand of economics. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie 
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.338-339 
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in Lwów under Professor Caro and in the Catholic University in Lublin.43 Economists with 
leftist sympathies and active socialist politicians had a much more prominent place in 
scholarly and political debates, although the number of academic positions they held was very 
limited. The Free University in Warsaw was alone among academic institutions in employing 
scholars who openly acknowledged their leftist views.44 Communist economic thinkers were 
active in Polish lands before 1918, but the Polish authorities had banned the Communist Party 
because of its refusal to support the cause of Polish independence. 45  Communist Party 
members’ overt tenure of academic positions was in these conditions impossible. 
Social bonds and shared identities 
Economists sought out each others’ company in a number of fora, and established many 
professional and social networks.46 At an institutional level, it was a common interest in the 
welfare of their institution, day-to-day collaboration on teaching and research, and good 
student-teacher relations that fostered vertical and horizontal bonds and allowed for a strong 
sense of inclusion. The Main School of Commerce is one such example of a cohesive, 
institution-based community. 47  The development of a strong ‘esprit de corps’ there was 
43 Leopold Caro (1864-1939) was professor of social economics at Lwów Polytechnic University from 1924 to 1935. He 
was President of the Economic Society in Lwów, and founder and editor of the Economic Society’s journal Dissertations and 
Reports of the Economic Society, in 1932 renamed the Economic Review (Przegląd Ekonomiczny). Gazda, Zbigniew, 1998. 
Slownik biograficzny ekonomistów polskich od XIII wieku do polowy wieku XX. Kielce: WyĪsza Szkoáa Pedagogiczna im. 
J.Kochanowskiego w Kielcach. Other representatives of Catholic economics in Poland were professors at the Lublin Catholic 
University: Ignacy Czuma (1891-1963), Antoni SzymaĔski (1881-1942), Czesáaw Strzeszewski (1903-1999) and Ludwik 
Górski (1894-1945), as well as Bishop Stanisáaw Adamski, who lectured at PoznaĔ University. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1996. Nurt
katolicki w polskiej myĞli ekonomicznej okresu Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej 1918-1939.
44 Leon Biegeleisen (1885-1942?) was Professor of economics at the Free University. Oskar Lange (1904-1965), a student 
of Adam KrzyĪanowski, who was involved in the socialist movement, encountered difficulties in finding employment in 
Poland, was offered a chair at the Free University but chose to accept an offer of a chair at Chicago University, appearing at 
the Free University only as a guest lecturer. ZarĊba, Janusz, 1985. Reforma w testamencie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem, Wyd. 1. 
ed. Warszawa: MáodzieĪowa Agencja Wydawnicza.pp.70-71 
Socialist activists mentioned by Stankiewicz as having made important contributions to the economic debate were senator 
Daniel Gross (1866-1942), and Zygmunt Zaremba (1895-1967), the editor of Robotnik and a member of the Socialist Party 
leadership. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
pp.356-357
45 Communist activists were repeatedly imprisoned, and many spent extensive periods in the Soviet Union. In 1938, Stalin 
too banned the Polish Communist Party, and during the Purges most of them were arrested: few survived. Communist 
activists who took up economic issues included Maria Koszutska (1876-1939) and Jerzy Heryng-Ryng (1986-1938), both of 
whom perished during Stalin’s purges. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie 
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.357 
46 The literature is rather fragmentary but institutional histories and memoirs provide some insight into the issue. Biographies 
have proved a good starting point as they abound in references to friends, fellow students and teachers.Bobrowski, ZarĊba, 
M. Wyczaákowski, ĩycie czáowieka kontrowersyjnego (Warszawa 2004), A. Ivanka,  Wspomnienia skarbowca 1927-1945 
(Warszawa 1964). The Polish Economists Association (Polish acronym: PTE) has published a number of biographical 
articles and obituaries in issues of the Biuletyn PTE, and graciously made them available on the internet. These cover the 
lives of Jan Drewnowski, Kaziemierz Secomski and Stanisáaw Rączkowski among others. (http://www.pte.pl) The short 
survey of the PEA’s history also provides an outline of associations of economists in the interwar period.Orlowska, Janina & 
Orlowski, Tadeusz, 1987. Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie spoleczno-zawodowego ruchu 
ekonomistów w Polsce. Warszawa: PTE. 
47 Its professors were better paid than the state average, but had to work more, which meant they spent much of their time at 
the Main School, rather than moving between different institutions as was usual for state-university professors holding 
multiple positions. Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. Dziaáalnosc  dydaktyczna WyĪszej Szkoáy Handlowej - Szkoáy Gáównej 
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encouraged by the fact that the Main School often employed its own graduates and ensured 
that its staff spent more time at the institution than was usual in other academic 
establishments. Such close and exclusive communities of economists were less likely to be 
found in universities, where economics had to co-habit with law, and economists mixed to a 
greater extent with representatives of other disciplines. Institutional identities were also 
undermined by the considerable degree of mobility between institutions and the fact that 
many economists either had part-time work outside their academic institutions, or spent most 
of their careers in business and state agencies, only joining academic institutions for limited 
periods of time. However, case studies of, for instance, PoznaĔ, where economics had its own 
section in the University, and of the University of Kraków, where the Rockerfeller Foundation 
helped fund an Institute of Economics in the 1930s,48 could modify this picture.
Alumni organisations could also act as focuses of contact-making and identity-building. That 
the Main School of Commerce’s alumni organisation has a history of regular conventions 
should come as no surprise. In PoznaĔ, former graduate students of Professor Edward Taylor 
formed an association to help them keep in touch when they left their Alma Mater to work in 
business or state agencies.49 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the PoznaĔ alumni network 
was based on allegiance to a professor rather than to an institution. John Connelly has stressed 
the high level of loyalty that Polish professors inspired in their students, and here Taylor’s 
were not unique. Other professors of economics whose students continued to acknowledge 
their indebtedness and loyalty to their Master were Adam KrzyĪanowski, Wáadysáaw
Zawadzki and Edward LipiĔski.50 The latter two were professors at the Main School, for even 
at an institution with a marked esprit de corps, students still had strong bonds with their 
mentors. Furthermore, in the majority of cases strong links to a professor signified adherence 
to a particular theoretical and methodical direction in economics.51
Handlowej w latach 1915-1939 Warszawa: Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa. 
48 In the few years it was active, it provided an anchorage for a number of gifted junior economists, and for the temporarily 
chair-less Heydel. It also published a journal in English, making the work of Polish economists accessible to an international 
audience. However, even without the interruption of the war in 1939, the future of the Institute was uncertain. Neither the 
Polish Academy of Letters nor the Jagiellon University were able to take over its funding when RF support was phased out 
up to 1939 and there were no alternative sources of funding in sight. Haugstad, Alekandra Witczak & Ingebrigtsen, Erik, 
2003. National Policies and International Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation and Polish and Hungarian Science 
between the World Wars. In G. Gemelli & R. Macleod (eds.) American foundations in Europe : grant-giving policies, 
cultural diplomacy, and trans-Atlantic relations, 1920-1980. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang. 
49 For an account of E. Taylor’s  relations with students see Nowak, Jan (Nowak-JezioraĔski). 1964. Pamieci Profesora 
Edwarda Taylora Dziennik Polski, 29.08.1964. 
50 Adam KrzyĪanowski (1873-1963) professor of economics at Jagiellon University in Kraków 1912-1949.  He was 
politically active from the early 1920, was member of Parliament, participated in debates of economic policies. During the 
1930 he criticised interventionist policies and resigned from Parliament in protest against repressions of the opposition.  
51 All of the above-mentioned were adherents of mathematically-oriented neo-classical economics. Connelly argues that the 
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The regional centres of Kraków, Warsaw and PoznaĔ seem to have generated a patriotism of 
their own, partly based on joint activities that over-rode the institutional divisions within each 
city, and partly generated in meetings with economists from other centres. The university 
communities of Kraków and PoznaĔ shared a liberal, neo-classical theoretical orientation, and 
both took a critical view of the increasingly interventionist economic policies of the Polish 
government. Warsaw gradually grew in importance and provided a home for several different 
trends, while on the other hand Wilno failed to make any significant impact and Lwów kept 
aloof from the other centres of economics. This does not mean the political impact of the 
Lwów economists was weakened. On the contrary, with their preference for autarchy through 
protectionism and for state intervention to promote the development of domestic industry and 
capital, they provided the makers of economic policies in Poland with the kind of advice these 
officials increasingly wanted to hear.52 With the exception of congresses and the exchange of 
ideas through journals, the absence of a national association which could act as an integrating 
nationwide forum, served to strengthen regional schools and their identities. 53  The 
professional associations acted mainly as fora for the exchange of ideas by economists in 
individual cities, as no national organisation was created until 1945.54 For the majority of 
economists, it would seem that regional identities were superimposed directly over personal 
bonds of loyalty to a professor, while institutional identities played a secondary role. Finally, 
there were communities of shared ideas. One example was the journal Gospodarka Narodowa 
(National Economy, edited by Czesáaw Bobrowski) and its associated Club, with readership 
strong bonds with professors were a characteristic feature of Polish academic culture.Connelly, John, 2000. Captive
University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956 Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press. It is to be expected that similar circles of devoted and loyal students were also attached to 
representatives of historically-oriented economics such as Professors GáąbiĔski in Lwów and Roman Rybarski (1887-1942) 
in Warsaw. The absence of accounts documenting their existence is probably due to the fact that the focus of my 
bibliographical search has been the post-war period. I have probably unearthed more material relating to those professors 
whose students were able to continue their careers in economics well into the post-war years. The stronghold of historical 
economics, Lwów, became part of the Soviet Union in 1939 and its academic staff suffered heavy losses and 
dispersal.Kalbarczyk, Sáawomir, 2001. Polscy pracownicy naukowy ofiary zbrodni sowieckich w latach II wojny swiatowej
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITRON. 
The point has been made about Professor Adam KrzyĪanowski that he allowed his students to evolve in different directions. 
It was the combination of erudition and a very liberal attitude towards differing opinions which inspired the respect and 
devotion of his students. Thus while one of his students, Adam Heydel turned into a radical opponent of interventionist 
policies, Oskar Lange gained international renown for arguing for a planned economy. ZarĊba, Janusz, 1985. Reforma w 
testamencie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: MáodzieĪowa Agencja Wydawnicza. 
52 Both professors of economics in Lwów, S. GáąbiĔski and S. Grabski, were active politicians in the National Democratic 
Party. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
53 See for instance work on the Krakow economists’ association:Kowalski, A., LityĔska, A., Raganiwicz, J., Rybarski, A. & 
Szopa, B., 1993. Zarys historii zorganizowanego ruchu ekonomistów w Krakowie 1867-1993 Kraków: PTE Kraków, Pollok, 
Artur, 2006. "Powstanie i rozwój Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego w Krakowie". Biuletyn PTE, 4-9. 
54 This assumption is based on the post-war claims justifying the creation of a national association, the PEA. However, 
further research may show that the regional associations did play a significant role in the integration of the discipline on a 
national scale, for instance through frequent invitations of lecturers from other towns. 
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and membership taken from the loose gathering of young economists working predominantly 
in the state apparatus and advocating an interventionist economic policy.55
The existing literature on the subject of Polish economics in the interwar years is primarily 
concerned with the history of economic thought and with biographies of illustrious 
representatives of the discipline. As far as economists in general are concerned, few questions 
have been raised regarding their social and material conditions, the composition of their 
profession, or the ethnicity, gender and political orientation of those in academic positions.56
What we can assert is that the economists of the interwar years were overwhelmingly male57
and principally gentile.58 Their family backgrounds were in business, the landowning gentry 
and the intelligentsia, although the last group was not necessarily wealthy. Because their 
careers developed at the intersection between academic institutions, the world of business, 
55 Czesáaw Bobrowski (1904-1996) studied economics at Warsaw Univeristy and in Paris. In the 1930s he worked in 
Moscow for the trade enterprise “Sowpoltorg” and later became departament director at the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reform. During the war he was in France and Britain. He returned to Poland in 1945 to play an important part in the later 
chapters of this study. 
According to Bobrowski the “Gospodarka Narodowa” cirkcle included around 40 persons, among the central persons he 
mentions: H. Greniewski, A. Ivanka, W. JastrzĊbski, M. Kaczorowski, P. Kaltenberg, W. Landau, T. àychowski, J. 
Poniatowski, J. RudziĔski, K. Sokoáowski, Z. SzempliĔski. Many of these names turn up in later chapters as several of the 
circle’s members pursued successful careers in the state administration after the War. They were held together by shared 
opinions and social bonds, meeting at a coffee house once a week. As for their views on economic policies, they thought 
Kwiatkowski’s Central Industrial Territory initiative was a good thing, only insufficient, which indicates they were for more 
radical state intervention in the economy. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo 
Lubelskie.p.76-77 Bobrowski describes the group as rather informal, but it appears that the Club had a board and an editorial 
team at least.Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.10 
Other groups of economists with a shared outlook were found in the industry, trade and finance association known as  
“Lewiatan” : A. Wierzbicki, H. Gliwic, H. Tennenbaum, E. Rose and “The First Economic Brigade” (Pierwsza Brygada 
Gospodarcza) consisting of people working in the Ministry of Treasury gathered around dept.dir. Stefan StarzyĔski: A. 
Ivanka, A. Krahelski, W. Fabierkiewicz, B. WĞcieklica and the editors of “Przymysá i Handel” W. Gieysztor and C. Peche. 
Gazda, Zbigniew, 1996. Nurt katolicki w polskiej myĞli ekonomicznej okresu Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej 1918-1939.p.92-93 
56 I have relied on more general studies of academics, intellectuals and a case study of the students of the Main School of 
Commerce. Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ:
Uniwersytet àódzki, Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. DziaáalnoĞü  dydaktyczna WyĪszej Szkoáy Handlowej - Szkoáy Gáównej 
Handlowej w latach 1915-1939 Warszawa: Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa, Hass, Ludwik, 1999. Inteligencji polskiej dole i 
niedole, XIX i XX wiek. àowicz: Mazowiecka WyĪsza Szkoáa Humanistyczno-Pedagogiczna. 
57 There were some exceptions: the economist Zofia DaszyĔska-GoliĔska (1866-1934), was never accepted by the academic 
establishment both on account of her gender and of her leftist past, but obtained a professorship at the private Free 
University, where she ran a seminar in economics for many years. Wincáawski, Wáodzimierz, 2001. Slownik biograficzny 
socjologii polskiej Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.  
Jadwiga Mrozowska, the first woman student of the Warsaw Main School of Commerce, completed her doctorate there and 
was employed as assistant until 1949 when she lost her job during the political ‘verification’ of employees. Two more 
doctorates were awarded to women at the Main School in the 1930s, to Aleksandra Kieákiewiczówna and Zofia Cichocka-
PetraĪycka. Source: http://www.sgh.waw.pl/ogolnouczelniane/100lat/Sylwetki/mrozowska accessed 08.04.2005 
58 The difficulties encountered by students of Jewish origin were seldom of a formal nature, being in general due to the 
approach of radical nationalist student organisations. Although there was no formal segregation at the universities, it came to
be introduced through the student’s welfare organisations, which were organised separately by Jewish and non-Jewish 
students. The extent of the problems varied in time and space. In Warsaw, the Main School of Commerce was the stage of 
several brutal actions on the part of the nationalist-radical student groups in the late 30s, behaviour that was not acted upon
effectively by the school authorities, while the University and the especially the leftist Free University saw less anti-
Semitism. 
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and the realm of banking and state agencies, it is clear that prominent representatives of the 
discipline were members of Polish high society.59
Ill.  1: Warsaw School of Commerce staff and students, probably mid 1930s. 60
There was a great distance between the heights at which the wealthy and influential professors 
lived and the lowly conditions endured by the junior researchers. In the 1930s, the 
disproportion between the number of economists qualified for academic research and the 
number of positions available for young researchers increased. Few professors were retiring, 
while the numbers of doctorates and habilitations were increasing. Docents had very limited 
prospects in terms of academic careers, and their veniam legendi, the right to lecture, provided 
them with prestige but no stable income.61 Research assistants and the more experienced 
adjuncts were employed on two to three year contracts, meaning that their income was at least 
predictable, if not particularly high. Many budding economists from the cohorts that would 
populate economics in the first decades following World War II spent the interwar years in a 
precarious material position, with very limited hope of academic careers. Understandably, this 
coloured their perception of the period, and made them more receptive to arguments for a 
radical reform of society. 
59 Senior positions in Academia were tolerably well paid. A professor could afford a life-style that was in accordance with the 
prestige the position conveyed, living in a villa and employing a housekeeper. At the Main School of Commerce where the 
salaries of professors were higher than at the state universities, but where in return they had to teach more and could not 
accept other positions, professors received monthly salaries of between 800 and 1500 záoty, compared to a docent’s salary of 
650 záoty and an assistant’s of 240 záoty. KoĨmiĔski, Leon, 1986. Chap. 7: Sytuacja po zakoĔczeniu wojny. In J. Nowicki 
(ed.) Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945 
Warszawa: SGPiS. p.143 
60 http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/biip/www/Historia_zdjecia/Historia08.jpg Accessed 05.04.2005 
61 Docents were hired for specific lectures only, see chapter on docents in Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z 
zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet àódzki.
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Political pressures and influence on policy making 
An economist’s political orientation was likely to have implications for his chances of a 
successful career. Supporters of Government policies were given access to lucrative jobs in 
the state administration.62 Although siding with the political party currently in power could 
certainly be advantageous, it did not preclude the rise to important positions of people 
indifferent or even actively unsympathetic to the ruling constellation. 63  According to 
Baranowski, as far as appointments to university chairs were concerned, most docents tried to 
keep a low political profile. During the rule of the Sanacja regime, the Ministry was reluctant 
to appoint outspoken supporters of the conservative National Democrats.64 It was not able, 
however, to impose Sanacja-friendly scholars on predominantly anti-Sanacja faculties, and 
candidates had to please both the regime and the local faculty, a circumstance which hindered 
the careers of both outspoken rightists and radical leftists. The latter could find shelter at the 
Free University in Warsaw or at some research institute, but stood little chance within the 
university system. Oskar Lange’s biography illustrates the difficulties of combining an 
academic career with involvement in the socialist movement, as his choice of topic and 
prospects of employment were affected by his political outlook. He was discouraged from 
submitting a thesis in political economy and followed the advice of his academic adviser by 
opting for the politically more neutral area of statistics.65
However, since the removal of a professor from his chair was nigh on impossible, many 
scholars surprised those around them by taking a much more active part in political 
62 Bobrowski commented thus on his job at the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform: “The material situation (…) 
became excellent after JĊdrzejowicz’s reform of bureaucratic salaries, which was so favourable to high-ranking officials that 
it was embarrassing. As a consequence, we moved from a two-room flat without a kitchen to a beautiful villa with a garden in 
the ĩoliborz-district.” Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.74 
Baranowski asserts that the salaries of academics were lower than those of other state officials.Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. 
Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet àódzki.p.121 
63 Hilary Minc (1905-1974), economist, the most powerful figure of Polish economic policy from 1945 to 1956. Studied 
economics Warsaw and in France, worked during the interwar years in the office of Minister of  Industry and Trade 
Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, despite his communist sympathies.Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: 
Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. 
For more on the political sympathies and activities of Polish scholars see Jaczewski, Bohdan, 1978. Polityka naukowa 
paĔstwa polskiego w latach 1918-1939 Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy im. OssoliĔskich Wydawnictwo PAN, Baranowski, 
Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet àódzki. 
64 Sanacja is the term used to describe the political stance of J. Piásudski and his followers. Originally a socialist, and 
therefore at odds with the conservative National Democrats (Endecja), Piásudski (and after his death, the so-called ‘Colonels’ 
Regime’) espoused increasingly authoritarian policies.  
65 Oskar Lange (1904-1965) internationally renowned Polish economist, remembered for his controversy with Mieses. 
Student of A. KrzyĪanowski in Kraków, Lange obtained a chair of economics at Chicago University, where he spent the late 
1930s and the war. In 1945 he returned to Poland. According to his biographer, came close to becoming the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. In compensation for his disappointment he was made ambassador to Washington and the UN. He was part of 
the leadership of the Polish Socialist Party, and seems to have spent most of his time in the late 1940s in politics, putting his
academic career on hold. He returned to academic work in the early 1950s but was not allowed to teach political economy, 
placed instead in a chair of statistics at the Main School of Planning and Statistics. He later moved to Warsaw University, and
with the advent of the Thaw was admitted to political economy. ZarĊba, Janusz, 1985. Reforma w testamencie : rzecz o 
Oskarze Langem, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: MáodzieĪowa Agencja Wydawnicza. 
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discussions once their appointments had been secured. 66  The initiative for suggesting 
candidates to chairs lay with the local institution. University law gave the Minister of 
Education the right to veto these proposals, and although this veto was seldom resorted to, 
some interwar governments were tempted to use this prerogative to stifle political opposition 
among academics. The most extreme case is that of the liberal Kraków professor Adam 
Heydel.67 Heydel lost his chair after budgetary cuts following the retrenchments provoked by 
the Great Slump, and because of his and his colleagues’ vociferous criticism of the 
Government’s rough treatment of the opposition, notably the arrest and internment of 
opposition politicians in the Bereza camp.68 This episode, however, was an exception to the 
rule and was followed, as the financial crisis caused by the Depression passed, and funding 
increased, by a smoother cooperation between academic communities and the regime.69
Judging by available information, economists with academic degrees and strong links to 
academic institutions participated in policy making at national level and company level to a 
relatively high extent. Several ministers from the ranks of economists, and specialists with 
theoretical training in economics, worked in governmental agencies such as the Ministries of 
Finance, Agriculture and Commerce, the Central Statistical Office, the National Bank, 
business banks, insurance companies, and the cooperative movement.70
The role of the state in the economy was the main issue with direct relevance for economic 
policy-making in the interwar years on which economists took different positions, with 
partisans of state intervention, dubbed “etatists”, confronting the “liberals”. The latter were 
not directly involved in the making of economic policies, but adhered to a laissez-faire 
policy71 while criticising government policies from academic positions. The Liberals based 
66 Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet 
àódzki.pp.168-170 
67 Adam Heydel (1893-1941) economist at Jagiellon University, vocal supporter of liberalism in economic policy and 
neoclassical economics. Died in Auschwitz. 
68 Heydel eventually got his chair back, surviving the interlude with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation. He had been 
away on a RF fellowship when his chair was abolished, and so officers of the Foundation felt a certain concern for his 
predicament, going as far as trying to persuade the Vice-Minister of Education to relent. Witczak, Aleksandra, 1997. 
Vitenskap, penger og politikk : Rockefeller foundations engasjement i polsk vitenskap 1918-1950. Norges teknisk-
naturvitenskapelige universitet. 
69 Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet 
àódzki.pp.223-224 Haugstad, Alekandra Witczak & Ingebrigtsen, Erik, 2003. National Policies and International 
Philanthropy: The Rockefeller Foundation and Polish and Hungarian Science between the World Wars. In G. Gemelli & R. 
Macleod (eds.) American foundations in Europe : grant-giving policies, cultural diplomacy, and trans-Atlantic relations, 
1920-1980. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang. 
70 An overview is supplied by Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II 
Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet àódzki.
71 Dziewulski, Kazimierz, 1981. Spór o etatyzm : dyskusja wokóá sektora paĔstwowego w Polsce miedzywojennej 1919-1939
Warszawa: PWN, Zagóra-Jonszta, Urszula, 1991. "Mysl ekonomiczna wobec idei planowania gospodarczego w Polsce w 
okresie miedzywojennym". Ekonomista, 501-521. 
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their anti-interventionist stance on neo-classical economics, while the etatists favoured 
historically or sociologically-inspired economics and tended to support the National 
Democratic Party, although their interventionist stance had also appealed to the “Sanacja” 
regime of the 1930s. While economic policy makers tended to heed the advice of liberals in 
the first decade after Independence, the Great Depression tipped the balance in favour of 
interventionist and protectionist policies, and the etatists’ influence grew.72 Meanwhile, in 
academic institutions it was the liberals who saw their influence increase, with the liberal 
economists of Kraków leading the attack on interventionist policies. In PoznaĔ, the first 
moves to import Keynesian economics to Poland were made, while in Warsaw, Kalecki 
independently developed ideas similar to those of Keynes within E. LipiĔski’s Institute for 
Business Cycle and Price Research. As E. LipiĔski also taught at the Main School of 
Commerce, these ideas and approaches were also made known there.  
To sum up, we may conclude that economists made good progress during the interwar years, 
establishing a firm base for further development of the discipline. The Great Depression made 
economics attractive to gifted students, by motivating them to understand and solve the 
problems of the Polish economy. The poverty and social distress caused by economic 
depression provided a formative experience for budding economists, infusing them with 
doubts about the solutions proposed by the disciplinary establishment. Also, we might note 
that the rise of the neo-classical paradigm in the interwar years changed the outlook of the 
discipline. The need to master the complex tools of neo-classical economics, with its highly 
hermetic vocabulary, demanded the completion of university-level courses, making it easier 
for established economists to control access to the profession. 
World War II 
The disastrous legacy of the Nazi and Soviet occupations of Poland presents a serious 
challenge for the historian of science. There is no doubt that what happened in wartime had 
profound implications for Polish economists and hence for economics. The direct effects of 
the war, with many scholars killed and buildings destroyed, are amply documented. The war 
also affected the subject of any economist’s study: the economy. Other important aspects, 
72 One example of “liberal” policies in the first decade is the fact that Poland took up a position alongside Norway, one of the 
most faithful keepers of the gold standard. E. Kwiatkowski’s introduction of planning and the development of the port in 
Gdynia are the principle examples of the interventionism of the last interwar decade. 
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however, such as the psychological and intellectual effects of the war on individuals and 
social groups, still await the attention of historians. 
Nazi policies towards the educated Polish classes were as ruthless as they were ambitious. 
Poland was to be reduced to a reservoir of cheap, unskilled workers, and Polish culture and 
science were to be eliminated. The Soviet treatment of educated Poles was in many instances 
equally ruthless.73 Lwów and Wilno Universities were taken over by the Soviet authorities 
and became Soviet institutions. The staff was dispersed and deported. The faculty members of 
Kraków University were collectively deported to Sachsenhausen, and released only after 
sustained international protest. PoznaĔ was incorporated into the Reich and the Polish 
institutions there were taken over by a German administration. Polish university staff 
members fled from PoznaĔ to Warsaw, where some engaged in clandestine activity, including 
the teaching of economics in university-level courses, the penalty for which was death. 
Ill.  2: Professor Edward LipiĔski at the Communal School of Commerce, used as a cover for the 
clandestine activities of the Main School of Commerce.74
Social networks were crucial in the organisation of clandestine activities during the war, and 
for the circulation of information.75 This is amply illustrated by the way the tightly-knit staff 
of the Main School of Commerce continued to meet at the library, to grow crops in the school 
grounds and, last but not least, to teach. Organised under the cover of a secondary Trade 
73 According to Jan Gross, if we compare Nazi and Soviet policies towards the Polish population in the first years of the War, 
before the Nazis launched their extermination of the Polish-Jewish population, the Soviets killed more people. Gross, Jan T., 
2002. Revolution from abroad. The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia., Expanded ed. ed. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.p.299 
74 http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/biip/www/Historia_zdjecia/Historia10.jpg accessed 05.04.2005.
75 Jan Nowak (Zdzisáaw JezioraĔski) recounted taking books on economics from library holdings kept safe by A. Grodek and 
Z. Makarczyk in Warsaw to Professor Edward Taylor, who had settled in Kielce following the expulsion from PoznaĔ.
Nowak, Jan: “PamiĊci Profesora Edwarda Taylora” Dziennik Polski, London, 29.08.1964. 
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School, the clandestine Main School of Commerce can boast of 139 Masters of Economics 
diplomas and three doctorates, with fifty one Masters and three doctorates being awarded 
immediately after the war based on work principally carried out during the war.76 On the eve 
of the Warsaw Uprising, 820 students were studying economics, and when the capital was 
forcibly evacuated and systematically razed to the ground after the defeat of the Uprising, the 
Main School staff regrouped in CzĊstochowa, where they continued to teach. Docent Andrzej 
Grodek stayed behind in the empty city, hiding and guarding the library from looters and the 
elements with courage and determination.77 He managed to salvage 98% of the Main School’s 
books - a situation unique in Poland, where most academic libraries were destroyed. There 
were tensions among the staff, no doubt exacerbated by scarce resources and the difficulty of 
deciding on a safe course of action when danger was all around,78 but the overall experience 
of clandestine education, when students and teachers had to trust each other with their lives, 
reinforced the bonds among Main School economists. 
Ill.  3: The Main School of Commerce, main building, view from Rakowiecka Street.79
Not all research activities came to a halt because of the war. Nowicki has compiled a 
bibliography of the research carried out during this period by employees of the Main School, 
in which he lists sixty items published before 1947.80
76 Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945, Warszawa: SGPiS. p.10 
77 Andrzej Grodek (1901-1959) economist and economic historian. Became professor of the Main School after the war and 
was elected its rector (1947-1949, 1957-1959) 
78 LipiĔski’s testimony on the conflict between him and Wakar in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa w 
Warszawie w latach 1939-1945, Warszawa: SGPiS. 
79 http://akson.sgh.waw.pl/biip/www/Historia_zdjecia/Historia14.jpg accessed 14.10.03 
80 Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945, Warszawa: SGPiS.p.59-62 
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During the war, Polish state structures were divided between the Government in Exile and its 
network of agencies inside occupied Poland, known as the Underground State. Within Poland, 
clandestine activities by experts included economic analyses of the current situation for the 
Government in Exile, and work on ideas for post-war reconstruction,81 with plans for future 
policies also being deliberated in London.82 Many academics, especially students, took part in 
the armed resistance. Economists felt very fortunate if they were able to secure some means 
of subsistence which allowed them to use their professional knowledge. The co-operative 
movement ‘Spoáem’, for instance, provided jobs for several young economists during the 
War.83 None of this could compensate for the fact that for six years Polish economists had no 
influence over the management of their country’s economic policies, an experience that would 
fuel their zeal in the post-war years. 
The majority of economists who spent the war under Nazi and Soviet occupation endured six 
years without access to new literature, and were isolated from international developments in 
the discipline. Polish economists emerged from this ordeal in poor physical and mental 
condition, facing not only great difficulties in meeting the basic needs of their families but 
also an overwhelming need to reconstruct the national economy. Their academic institutions 
were in ruin, libraries had been ravaged, and the most basic office equipment was lacking.
Estimates of deaths among Polish scholars exceed one third of all scholars.84 To this we have 
to add the survivors’ poor mental and physical health, emigration, and the suspension of 
nearly all education and recruitment during the six war years. The human resources of the 
discipline had been blighted. Malnourishment, illnesses and deportations took a deep toll on 
elderly people, so much so that the losses among senior professors precipitated an age-related 
shift within the field. At Warsaw University only one of the five professors of economics 
returned to his post in 1945,85 and at the University of Kraków only two of the original 
81 Examples of economists’ contributions: A. Grodek and M. Kieáczewska prepared a report justifying the Oder-Neisse Polish 
border. p.52, 204. Jan LipiĔski worked on reports on the financial situation of the General Gubernment for the clandestine 
economic information agency working for the Government in Exile’s Home Delegation (Delegatura Rzadu na Kraj) Ibid. K. 
Secomski and others also worked on post-war economic policies KarpiĔski, Andrzej (ed.) (2000) Kazimierz Secomski. 
Nauka, praca, dziaáalnoĞü - w 90-lecie urodzin., Warszawa: Komitet Prognoz "Polska 2000 Plus" przy Prezydium PAN. 
82 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.140 
83 A.W. Haugstad interview with Stanisáaw Rączkowski, Warsaw, 2000 
84 Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-
1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. p.327 List of names of economists employed in higher education 
before 1939 who lost their lives during the war is provided by Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej 
myĞli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50. I am much obliged to prof.Gazda for enabling me to consult this unpublished 
doctoral thesis.
85 1946 Spis wykáadów Uniwersytetu JagielloĔskiego w Krakowie, rok akademicki 1945/1946. Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu JagielloĔskiego, 1946 Skáad Uniwersytetu na rok akademicki 1946/1947. Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, 
Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myĞli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50.  pp.118-129 
35
professors remained. The historical school had been popular with a good number of the older 
economists, while practically all the younger ones had turned to neo-classical economics. The 
accelerated generational shift therefore also had consequences for the intellectual landscape of 
economics. 
While many historical studies have explored the horror and destruction experienced by the 
population during the war, only a handful have taken up the question of how this affected 
Polish society subsequently. The insights they give us raise many questions, but do not 
provide a systematic exploration of this complex issue. 86
We need to know more about the way in which the craving for a return to “normality” 
structured post-war attitudes to cultural, political and professional activity. How did the 
individual traumas and collective experiences affect the interaction between economists after 
the war? Until more research is available it is difficult, nay impossible, to gauge the effect of 
the war on the intellectual production of economists and other scholars during the first post-
war decades.87
What is certain is that the Second World War changed Polish economics irreversibly, by 
altering the world view of the individuals who made up the discipline, and by radically 
transforming Polish society and its economy. The wilful efforts of Hitler and Stalin to 
eradicate Polish culture and science destroyed both human and material resources. Those 
Polish scholars who survived gained one thing from the war, a deep reservoir of admiration 
and respect for their society. By singling academics out for destruction, the enemy powers had 
made the nature of Poland’s principal asset clear to the Polish population. After the war, 
supporting clandestine higher education was considered equal in heroism to engaging in 
armed resistance. 
86 Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: 
California University Press, Bessel, Richard & Schumann, Dirk (eds.) (2003) Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and 
Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wyka, Kazimierz „Life as 
if“ published in English in Wedel, Janine R. (ed.) (1992) The Unplanned Society. Poland during and after Communism, New
York: Columbia University Press. Gross, Jan Tomasz: “Geneza spoáeczna demokracji ludowych” in Gross, Jan T., 1979. 
Polish Society under German Occupation: the Generalgourvernment 1939-1944. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
Szarota, Tomasz (ed.) (2001) Komunizm. Ideologia, system, ludzie., Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON, Instytut Historii 
PAN. 
87 Based on an analogy with the work done on the German population presented by Bessel, we can assume that a majority of 
the Polish population suffered from psychological disorders following trauma-inducing experiences during the war. Bessel, 
Richard & Schumann, Dirk (eds.) (2003) Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 
1940s and 1950s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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1945-1947: Great Expectations 
During the first post-war years, hopes for democracy and modernisation coexisted with brutal 
political repression, and with armed conflicts bordering on civil war. 88
For scholars, the priority in 1945 was the reactivation of higher education and academic 
institutions. The degree of destruction varied: Warsaw was depopulated and in ruins, while 
Kraków remained relatively intact but crowded with refugees from Warsaw, Lwów and 
Wilno. The wartime experience of organising research and teaching outside state frameworks 
did not end in 1945. Scholars met in ruined campuses to reopen universities and other 
institutions of higher learning. As soon as hostilities ended in the spring of 1945, students 
were admitted, the long summer vacation was cancelled, and courses started for those eager to 
make up for lost time.  
In Kraków, economics had suffered serious losses, with the deaths of Professor Adam Heydel 
and the gifted docent Janusz Libicki, and the emigration of Professor Ferdynand Zweig. The 
remaining professor, Adam KrzyĪanowski, was not well disposed towards communist rule 
and his ideas would find little resonance in the post-war years. 89 The economic debate was 
gradually restricted to discussing the issues dividing the socialist from the communist 
economic programmes. The trademark of Kraków economists was their scepticism about state 
intervention in the economy. As the central question was no longer the legitimacy of central 
planning but its shape, classical Kraków liberalism was considered irrelevant by policy-
makers. This does not mean that the Kraków economists were unable or unwilling to adjust to 
the new realities. For instance, the launching of a study programme on Co-operatives 
(Studium Spóádzielcze), can be taken as a sign of adaptation to post-war economic conditions. 
A focus on co-operatives was in tune with the political programme and economic conceptions 
of a tri-sector economy dubbed ‘the Polish way to socialism’. Other Kraków scholars 
investigated and documented the effects of the war and the Nazi occupation, and legal 
scholars worked on the preparation of the Polish case for the Nuremberg Trials.  
88 Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: 
California University Press, Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1993. Zdobycie wáadzy 1945-1947 Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i 
Pedagogiczne. A literary work which to my mind gives a very convincing portrait of these years, especially the seamless 
transition from war into a conflicted peace. is Miáosz’ novel Zdobycie Wáadzy, published in English as Milosz, Czesáaw,
1955. The usurpers. London,: Faber and Faber. 
89 Although he engaged in some political activity after 1945, Adam KrzyĪanowski never developed a close relationship with 
the emerging regime. He took part in the 1945 delegation to Moscow for the negotiations which preceded the creation of the 
Provisional Coalition Government, and was deputy to the Sejm from 1947 to 1949, when he resigned his mandate.  
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People started to return to their ruined capital shortly after the Red Army entered the empty 
city in January 1945. Among those returning was a docent of the Main School of Commerce, 
L. KoĨmiĔski,90 whose testimony illustrates the hardships faced by scholars in the first post-
war years.
 I was living in the library building with A. Grodek, sleeping on mattresses 
abandoned by the retreating armies, and trying to prevent the looting of whatever 
was left. The team protecting the property of the School received a monthly 
subsistence consisting of: 1500 zá for a docent or 2000 zá for a professor; soup 
from the canteen at Puáawska Street; a monthly allowance of bacon; and the 
protection of a military post. Water was obtained by melting snow, and when that 
ended after some time, by carrying water from a well on Aleja NiepodlegáoĞci. 
Heating was provided by burning the fence of a cemetery for German soldiers 
killed in the Uprising, in rudimentary ovens installed in some rooms. The struggle 
against pillage was a great problem.91
Due to the formidable challenge of running a country from within a sea of ruins, the status of 
Warsaw as the capital and academic centre was in question. The Minister of Education 
suggested that the Main School of Commerce should be moved to àódĨ. The arrival of large 
numbers of students wishing to start their studies, however, prompted the decision by the 
School authorities to re-open in Warsaw.92
At the Warsaw campus, there were 317 applications in May 1945 and in December 
1945 the number of newly enrolled students was 610. They were for the most part 
worn out by the war and the camps, and had no food, nor any place to sleep among 
the ruins. After their dramatic experiences, they needed not only education but also 
support. Feeling responsible for those young people and for the preparation of 
qualified personnel for the nationalised economy, the Senate of the School decided 
to reopen the School in Warsaw and to move the Czestochowa unit to àódz.93
At Warsaw University the subject of economics was paralysed for a considerable period by a 
reduction in the number of professors from five to one. Meanwhile, at the Main School of 
Commerce, qualified and trusted junior staff members were at hand to fill any vacancies,94
90 Leon KoĨmiĔski ( 1904-1993 ) economist, studied at the Main School, doctorate at Sorbonne. During the war he fought in 
the Warsaw Uprising. After the war he went on to become professor of the Main School in 1946 (prof.nadzw.)  
91 KoĨmiĔski, Leon ”Sytuacja po zakoĔczeniu wojny” in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa w Warszawie 
w latach 1939-1945, Warszawa: SGPiS. p. 134 While KoĨmiĔski does not make it clear who provided the support, we must 
assume it was the provisional Lublin-Governement in co-operation with the Red Army. 
92 KoĨmiĔski, Leon ”Sytuacja po zakoĔczeniu wojny” in Ibid. p.135 
93 KoĨmiĔski, Leon ”Sytuacja po zakoĔczeniu wojny” in Ibid. p.135 
94 4 out of 7 docents survived: Drewnowski, KoĨmiĔski, Wakar and Grodek. Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. DziaáalnoĞü
dydaktyczna WyĪszej Szkoáy Handlowej - Szkoáy Gáównej Handlowej w latach 1915-1939Ibid.: Szkoáa Gáówna
Handlowa.p.89, Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945, Warszawa: 
SGPiS.p.150
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This institution displayed a considerable ability to reform and adapt to post-war realities. No 
doubt the generation shift made the changes easier, for the junior faculty had been debating 
the possibilities and need for the reform of study programmes from as long ago as the early 
1930s. There were moves towards reform in the interwar years, but they became stranded on 
the banks of the senior staff members’ hostility towards change. The war had changed this. 
Now, there was no longer a status quo to uphold, and reform came to be seen as necessary. 
The School Senate soon initiated work on a reform proposal which stressed the need for a 
swift provision of qualified specialists for the economic reconstruction of the country. It 
should be noted that the communist authorities, in the person of Franciszek Blinowski, were 
consulted during the drafting of the reform, and that both his suggestions and the needs and 
nature of a planned economy were taken into account.95 The reform proposals, which were 
submitted to the School Senate in May of 1945,96 envisaged the reorganisation of the main 
subject of business economics into four sector-oriented courses. All courses were to include 
the economic and technological aspects of each branch of the socialist economy. This reform 
was carried out in the spring of 1945 and teaching continued in this form until 1949. 97 Nine 
doctoral degrees, as well as a great number of masters’ degrees, were awarded in this period. 
The surviving Main School docents were very active in organising and re-organising their 
own alma mater. Grodek and KoĨmiĔski concentrated on the running of the Main School, 
while others were active outside it. Drewnowski and Secomski held important positions on 
the Central Planning Board.98 After serving as rector of the Main School from 1946-47, 
Wakar became rector of the Academy of Political Sciences. He also joined the Polish 
95 Franciszek Blinowski (1907-1997), PWP-official. In the period 1948-1949, a member of the mass propaganda section, 
and from 1949 to 1951, a member of the economic section in the Central Committee apparatus of the PUWP. Janowski, 
Wáodzimierz & KochaĔski, Aleksander, 2000. Informator o strukturze i obsadzie personalnej centralnego aparatu PZPR
Warszawa: PAN ISP. KoĨmiĔski, Leon ”Sytuacja po zakoĔczeniu wojny” in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) Szkoáa Gáówna
Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945, Warszawa: SGPiS. p.138 
96 1934, which is what the book says, must be an error, the context showing clearly that the entire work of the commission 
was done in 1945. KoĨmiĔski, Leon ”Sytuacja po zakoĔczeniu wojny” in Nowicki, Józef (ed.) (1986) Szkoáa Gáówna 
Handlowa w Warszawie w latach 1939-1945, Warszawa: SGPiS.p.138 
97 The apparent nonsense of implementing educational reforms in late spring is explained by the fact that in that year there 
was no summer break. Unijewska, Hanna  in Ibid. p.96 
98 Jan Drewnowski (1908-2000) studied economics the Main School of Commerce and London School of Economics, spent 
the war in in a German POW camp, returned to Poland where he became professor at the Main School, joined the Socialist 
Party, worked at the Central Planning Board.   
Kazimierz Secomski (1910-2002) before the war he studied and later taught at the Main School of Commerce, continuing to 
teach during the war in clandestinity. After the war worked first at the CPB, later at the Planning Commision, first as general
director (1949-1954) and later as its vice-president (1955- 1956). He continued to hold highranking positions in the planning 
bureaucracy and government.Was not member of any political party. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN. 
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Workers’ Party (the Communist Party, hereafter PWP, Polish acronym PPR), to the 
astonishment of his colleagues, who found the PSP (Polish Socialist Party) more attractive.99
The PoznaĔ economists were renowned for their pragmatism. While firmly grounded in neo-
classical economics, they were not as opposed to interventionist policies as the Kraków 
School: after all PoznaĔ was the place where Keynes was first studied in Poland.100 PoznaĔ
University and the Business College (Akademia Handlowa) were vigorous and efficient, 
producing a large number of students in these first years.101 PoznaĔ graduates filled many 
vacancies created by the War and the expanding economic bureaucracy, and this in turn 
provided the PoznaĔ scholars with an extensive network in Warsaw.102
There were few new academic institutions established in the immediate post-war years. It 
seems that in the absence of an active national policy for higher education, the initiative was 
left to the scholars themselves. PoznaĔ economists managed to establish a subsidiary 
department in Szczecin, and the Main School of Commerce had one in àódĨ. The efforts of 
the Law Department in Wrocáaw to establish a business college there were slow in showing 
results, since, recently transplanted from Lwów as they were, Wrocáaw economists lacked the 
established infrastructure of PoznaĔ or the Main School. Success in building up a new 
institution in Wrocáaw would have demanded great efforts on the part of the Government, and 
these were not forthcoming. In other cases Government policies not only failed to allow for 
the support of local academic communities, but deliberately prevented it. Lublin and ToruĔ
were blocked from establishing economic centres, despite their best efforts. 103 In sum, in the 
99 Aleksy Wakar (1898-1966) studied and then taught at the Main School of Commerce. The reason for the quick move has 
been widely debated. Born in Samara, Wakar spent a good part of his childhood in Warsaw before First World War. He 
completed secondary studies in Moscow and started studies in St.Petersburg. After a bout of forced participation in the Civil 
War on the White side Wakar settled in Warsaw. His experiences from the Revolution were, it has been argued, the reason 
why he decided early on that the communists would win, and that it would be best to start working with them. Also part of 
the story was Wakar’s arrest by the Polish security police: he was handed over to the NKVD, who considered him a Soviet 
citizen. Imprisoned without trial – the reasons for this can only be conjectured and Wakar himself was not certain. He 
returned from a labour camp in 1955 and continued his career at the Main School. ASGH/Aleksy Wakar personal folder  
100 A student of E. Taylor, Stanisáaw Rączkowski managed to publish his thesis on Keynes just weeks before the war. A.W. 
Haugstad interview with Stanisáaw Rączkowski, Warsaw 2000 
101 According to Gazda, about 1500 master degrees and 57 doctorates in economics were awarded by Poznan University 
before the section was closed down in 1950. To this we can add the 1415 diplomas in economics awarded by the Poznan 
Business School, which in the academic year 1946/47 had 4600 students enrolled. Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja 
polskiej akademickiej myĞli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50.   
102 Among prominent students of Edward Taylor we find Stanisáaw Rączkowski and Central Bank director Witold 
TrąpczyĔski. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
p.349
103 The law and economics faculty of the private Catholic University in Lublin was transferred an institution run by the state, 
the Marie Curie-Skáodowska  University Connelly. The Law Faculty at ToruĔ was closed down, chair of economics with it. 
Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp.138-140 
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first post-war years the increase in the number of institutions offering education and research 
opportunities in economics merely compensated for the loss of Wilno and Lwów. 
The historical school, whose decline was well advanced before the war, was now reduced to a 
cipher by the effect of the loss of its stronghold Lwów, the recent war deaths, and the 
attractiveness of other schools of thought. Historians of economic thought have recorded the 
waning in importance of historical economics. However, the vacuum this left was not filled 
by liberal, neo-classically orientated economics of the type which had been on the offensive in 
the interwar years, as represented by the Kraków School. Instead, during the first post-war 
years Polish economists can be roughly sorted into groupings of interventionists with leftist 
sympathies, or of conservative liberals. While the former group’s interest in and enthusiasm 
for planning was genuine, a fear of censorship and a realisation that debate was becoming 
futile led to an increasing reserve on the part of old liberal economists like Adam 
KrzyĪanowski and Edward Taylor. Their resignation from the Scientific Council of the 
Central Planning Board, to which Czesáaw Bobrowski had invited them, suggests as much. 
Rather than tilting at windmills, they concentrated on teaching their students. The floor was 
left open to leftist-oriented economists who were fascinated by the opportunities and 
challenges posed by a planned economy. Despite their leftist sympathies these were not 
Marxist economists in any possible sense of this elusive term. Their vocabulary and 
methodology were those of the neo-classical school, and they had a growing interest in 
Keynes.
The immediate post-war period also saw the establishment and rapid development of the 
Polish Association of Economists (PEA). Membership swelled rapidly and the Association 
was generously funded by the institutions where its members held central positions: the 
Central Planning Board, the National Bank and, on a lower scale, several enterprises. Despite 
the desperate housing situation in Warsaw the headquarters of the PEA was established in an 
exquisite and centrally-located building, with offices, conference rooms, a library and a club 
where members could meet for discussions over coffee.104 Founded by scholars, the PEA 
addressed itself to the entire profession, and the membership lists seethed with business 
administrators and bureaucrats.105
104 An equally centrally placed building in GdaĔsk also bears the sign “Dom Ekonomisty”. I do not, however, know more 
about its history - when it was handed over to the PEA and if it remains at their hands today. 
105 The lists of members were in the first postwar issues published in Ekonomista together with the PEA’s yearly accounts. 
Ekonomista (1947:2) and (1948:2) 
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Debates over reform of higher education and research 
In the years between the end of the war and the onset of the PUWP’s reform of higher 
education, scholars and politicians took part in a lively debate about the organisation and role 
of science.106 Three main orientations can be discerned, which differed on the desirability and 
shape of reform. Representatives of academic institutions, although not of one mind, at least 
agreed on their principal interests: the maximum degree of autonomy, and generous financial 
support from the state. This view was most actively represented by Kraków scholars, who 
opposed all projects which might restrict the discretionary power both of professors and of 
established academic institutions. They argued strongly for freedom of research and the 
objective nature of science, and spoke in favour of an increase in the power of the Polish 
Academy of Letters (PAU).  
At the other end of the scale, the communists criticised the academic establishment, calling it 
“reactionary” and demanding a “break”- a radical transformation of the sector to match their 
new society. The communists’ primary rhetorical weapon was the assertion that everything is 
political (i.e. all relations are power relations) and hence that there was no such thing as 
objective or free science. To this they added the contention that as it was the ideology that 
represented the proletariat (the sole non-exploitive class), Marxism-Leninism was alone 
among the different political options in being true and just. In science policy this translated 
into an insistence that Marxism-Leninism should be introduced into all scholarship 
immediately. What was more, given their strong position in the central political organs, and 
their low numbers within academic institutions, it was clear that the communists’ aims would 
be best served by extreme centralisation of power in the hands of a Minister of Education, 
who, needless to say, would be under their control.
In between the two extreme positions of minimal change and revolution from above, several 
groups and individuals were to be found. Many were young, and affiliated to the Socialist 
Party. This was the case with the group of Kraków University docents who formulated their 
own reform proposal, and also with those economists from the Main School who now 
gathered around the Central Planning Board (CPB).107 Their proposal was to create a central 
co-ordination and planning research organ linked to the CPB. Yet compared with the 
106 Chodakowska, Hübner,  Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu, Rolbiecki. For an overview in 
English, see Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher 
education, 1945-1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
107 The reform proposals prepared by socialists working at UJ in September 1946 and sanctioned by a “meeting of docents at 
UJ” are described in Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu. Wrocáaw:
Ossolineum. p.199-200 
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communists’ scheme, this would allow for a much greater level of discretion to remain at the 
level of academic institutions. Some disciplinary communities, especially in the natural, 
medical, social and technical sciences, stood to gain from a new deal, while humanities, 
which had been the dominant area up to that point, could lose importance. 
The jostling between these three positions in fact had a negligible impact on the final reforms. 
When the communist-sponsored plans for reform were made public, it became clear that even 
proposals submitted by the most influential academic institutions had not been taken into 
account, and no suggestions about or responses to the plan had been incorporated into any 
modified draft. The only effect of determined and vocal criticism on the part of the academic 
institutions was a slight delay in implementation. In Hübner’s presentation the reforms were 
drawn up without the participation of the communities concerned.108 However, it is clear from 
the documentation he presents that the communist decision-makers took care to include 
professors in the organs formulating the reforms, although not in the way expected or wished 
for by university rectors and senates, who considered themselves to be the only legitimate 
representatives of the sector in discussions with the Ministry and the PWP. The PWP, for 
obvious tactical reasons, chose to circumvent opposition to radical change in the sector by 
setting up new councils for the discussion of reform plans, composed of reform-friendly 
scholars.109 The PWP’s refusal to negotiate with the scholars through traditional mediation 
channels was a breach of theretofore-observed formalities in the relations between political 
and academic establishments. It might be excessive, however, if we were to conclude on this 
basis that the PWP displayed a total disregard for the opinions of academics in the process of 
preparing the reforms. Were that the case, it would be difficult to understand why any 
scholars bothered to sit on the new PWP-sponsored bodies. We might also fail to notice the 
tentative alliance between some scholars and the PWP.  
Piotr Hübner’s assumption that State and Science comprise two distinct groups of both 
protagonists and interests leads him to downplay any evidence which suggests that numerous 
individuals were crossing institutional boundaries or using complex strategies to promote their 
agendas. In Hübner’s analysis, institutional affiliation determines any perception of the role 
and motives of an individual. Where an individual belonged to more than one institution or 
108 Ibid. 
109 An outline of PWP policies in English is provided by Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in 
Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.p.378-381 Kersten takes into account Hübner’s 
study, but points out the fact that the PWP council was manned by scholars of ”unquestioned academic importance”. 
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community of interest, this approach becomes problematic. Even a brief glance at the 
activities of prominent economists shows that they were active in academic positions, 
ministerial bodies and party organs simultaneously. Hübner’s work, written at a time when 
free criticism of communist policies was impossible, concentrated on proving that the radical 
reorganisation of academic institutions after the war was not the result of scientists’ demands 
but of the self-serving designs of the PUWP leadership. It was a position which, at the time 
Hübner put it forward, undoubtedly demanded a fair admixture of courage and integrity, and 
the polarised political context of the time may explain why he looked away whenever there 
appeared to be evidence suggesting that scholars participated in reform-making.110 Another 
historian of Polish science policy, Waldemar Rolbiecki, stressed the multiple interests and 
strategies of scientists, while at the same time adopting a perspective that the political regime 
would find more acceptable.111 Rolbiecki’s work was published, while Hübner’s was banned 
for many years. 112  The result is that we have two interpretations, each with its own 
shortcomings. Hübner presents an almost overwhelming number of sources and details but, 
his interpretation is warped by an excessive insistence on the evil intentions of the all-
powerful Party-State towards an idealised academic community united in its struggle for 
freedom. Rolbiecki’s approach is more promising, in being open to a better-nuanced picture, 
but he has written much less on the subject, both in terms of detail and in the number of 
problems studied. There still remains a great deal to be researched within this topic. This 
study can only hope to make the limited contribution of attempting to investigate the role 
played by economists in the debates on reform. Professors and docents from Warsaw in 
particular were eager to embrace reform and planning, and seem to have entered into 
negotiation with the regime. For instance, Edward LipiĔski had dealings with the PWP not 
only to secure resources for the Polish Economic Association but also to negotiate the 
publication of the Ekonomista, endeavours that we shall be returning to. We have already seen 
110 It is to Hübner’s credit that he does not avoid the presentation of such evidence, but he does not comment on it or 
incorporate it in his analysis and conclusion. 
111 For instance, when summing up the diverse reform proposals elaborated before the PWP’s political turn-about in mid 
1948, Rolbiecki concludes that all proposals included alternatives to the traditional academy led by members co-opted for 
life. Rolbiecki mentions three types of motives: firstly, a distrust of scholars, coupled with a desire to secure more power for
Ministry officials, secondly, a desire to extend the supply of research material and graduates to the national economy, and 
finally the desire to empower junior scholars. Rolbiecki, Waldemar, 1990. Geneza Polskiej Akademii Nauk (1930-1952)
Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy im. OssoliĔskich, Wydawnictwo PAN.p.99 
112 Hübner’s account of the conflict can be found in Hübner, Piotr, 1994. Sila przeciw rozumowi Kraków: Polska Akademia 
UmiejetnoĞci. p.408-413 Rolbiecki gives his views on the matter in Rolbiecki, Waldemar, 1990. Geneza Polskiej Akademii 
Nauk (1930-1952) Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy im. OssoliĔskich, Wydawnictwo PAN.p.5 
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evidence that Andrzej Grodek did the same thing for the Main School, where he alternated 
between the positions of rector and pro-rector.113
At this stage I would like to look at the activities of Jan Drewnowski, who was particularly 
committed to science policy forums. 114 Drewnowski came into science policy through his 
work at the Central Planning Board, where he participated both in the immediate distribution 
of funds to research115 and in conceptual work on research planning.116 The CPB drew up a 
proposal for a central science planning institution along the lines of the French CNRS. This 
proposal was monitored by ministry officials, who approved it before it was made public in 
1947, a fact which demonstrates the extent to which the PWP strove to control science policy 
initiatives, even those coming from close political allies.117 Drewnowski’s involvement in 
science policy continued even after the CPB debate, but the CNRS-inspired proposal lost 
relevance as the political standing of the CPB declined.118 Drewnowski, however continued to 
present modified versions of his proposal and to be active in science policy fora. All this was 
documented and fully described by Hübner, who consistently treats Drewnowski as the 
mouthpiece of the PSP, without exploring the possibility that Drewnowski could have had an 
active role in the formulation of PSP positions on science organisation. Nor does he consider 
Drewnowski’s involvement in plans for reforms in the organisation of higher education and 
research in terms of his close ties to the Main School. How did Drewnowski reconcile his 
socialist affiliations with the interests of his profession and academic institution? Hübner 
relates a meeting in January 1948, where Drewnowski criticised the suggestion that the Main 
Council should approve en bloc all the decisions about appointments to chairs suggested by 
113 Grodek probably made early contact with PWP, in 1945, in his capacity as curator of the ruined Main School and its 
library. It was also during his time as rector and pro-rector that the above-mentioned contact with PWP representatives was 
made. This coincided with the drafting of the study programme reforms at the Main School. 
114 Participating in reform work were also other academics: on the PWP side, we should also mention that the influential head 
of the Section for Higher Education and Science at the Ministry of Education, was economic historian Stanisáaw Arnold, 
another graduate and lecturer at the Main School and the soon-to be rector of the Main School Czesáaw NowiĔski, on the 
other end of the political scale, professor of Warsaw University Stefan Zaleski, who wrote the reform proposal submitted by 
the UW. Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu. Wrocáaw: Ossolineum. p. 
201 Chodakowska, Janina, 1981. Rozwój szkolnictwa wyĪszego w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1944-1951 Wrocáaw: 
Ossolineum. 
115 His central position in the Commission for the Reconstruction of Science (Komisja Odbudowy Nauki) meant he was in a 
position of great influence. The Commission was to distribute  an allocation a sum of 100 million záoty, later raised to 300 
million zloty. A clue to how much that influence mattered is provided by Hübner, when he quotes Drewnowski explaining 
that 52% of the funds allocated in the first year went to recipients who had been promised funds by Bobrowski and the  Prime 
Minister. Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu. Wrocáaw: Ossolineum. 
p.190
116 For Drewnowski in the Committee for Reconstruction of Polish Science, see Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze 
stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.158 
For allocation of funds to PEA, see published accounts of the association in Ekonomista (1947:2) 
117Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu. Wrocáaw: Ossolineum. p.269-70 
118 In November 1947, Drewnowski presented a proposal for the organisation of planning in research, continuing in a 
modified form the concepts of the CPB Ibid. pp.267-270  
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the Ministry. When his demand that the list of proposed candidates be read out and discussed 
was refused, he persisted in criticising three of the candidates for assistant professorships 
(extraordinary professorships) for their lack of scientific qualifications.119 Surely this shows 
that Drewnowski was on this occasion more concerned with the academic establishment’s 
control over reputations than with expressing PSP policy or respecting the will of its PWP 
coalition partners? The only reason I can imagine for Hübner passing over this episode 
without any comment is that it had no significance in his world of clear-cut separation 
between State and Science.  
I assume that Drewnowski’s views on science policy were closely related to his position on 
the planned economy. He seems to have prescribed the same medicine for all. Economic 
policy, higher education and research in general needed reforms in order to create the basis 
for a modern, socialist society open to contacts with the West. It is also interesting to note 
how long Drewnowski continued to find his participation worthwhile, and how long he was 
allowed by the communists to engage in science policy. Even after the merger with the 
communists had put an end to hopes of a realisation of socialist policies, Drewnowski did not 
withdraw from science politics. In the extensive system of commissions and sub-commissions 
set up to prepare for the First Congress of Polish Science, which will be the subject of the 
Chapter Four, he assumed a position analogous to the one he held in the Main Council, as 
chair of a sub-commission on the organisation of science as well as member of the Executive 
Committee. He also continued to resubmit his proposals, making a last attempt in March 
1950.120 It was only the establishment of a Polish Academy of Science (PAN) on the Soviet 
rather than the French model, and his exclusion of from the PUWP, that ended Drewnowski’s 
involvement. How should we interpret this insistence, this continued belief that his efforts 
counted? Is this a case of political naiveté, or of influence that has been mis-judged by 
historians? And what was his and his colleagues’ reaction to the failure of these efforts; what 
lessons did they draw from their experiences? At present, we do not have at our disposal 
sufficient knowledge to form an opinion about either the role of scientists in the debates 
preceding the reforms, or what impact the failure of their attempts had on later developments 
and attitudes. I quite agree with Hübner, that it would seem that the reform measures carried 
119 Ibid. p.341 
120 Drewnowski presented his proposal at a joint session of the Organisation of Science Section of the Main Council and the 
Subsection for the Organisation of Science of the Congress of Polish Science. Drewnowski also published his ideas in what 
Hübner calls the last forum of discussion on the subject of planning in science, namely the third volume of the journal MyĞl
Wspóáczesna Ibid.pp.624-627 
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out after the political turnaround in the summer of 1948 were formulated by the stalinist 
faction of the Communist Party, that of Hilary Minc, Jakub Berman and Bolesáaw Bierut. 
Publication opportunities 
The evolution of scientific disciplines is dependent upon scholars having control both over 
access to publication and over the quality and variety of publication channels. Before 1939, 
economists who wished to publish their work in Poland could choose between several 
journals specialising in economics, as each regional centre had its own publication,121 while 
the post-war period was characterised by centralisation and the domination of Warsaw-based 
journals. 122 Ekonomista, published in Warsaw by the Polish Economic Association, became 
the focal point of Polish economics.123 The founding assembly of the PEA which gathered in 
àódĨ in December 1945 saw the publication of Ekonomista as one of its most urgent tasks. At 
the time, in the absence of specialised publications, economic policy discussions were taking 
place in the Party press. In 1945 and 1946 Przegląd Socjalistyczny contained articles on 
economic matters by Bobrowski, Lange, Hochfeld, Dietrich, Rapacki and LipiĔski, while 
Nowe Drogi served as a forum on issues of economic policy for representatives of the PWP, 
with Brus editing the economic section and attracting contributions by Hilary Minc and 
JĊdrychowski, among others.124 The journey towards the publication of the first issue of 
121 In Warsaw ‘Ekonomista’ (Ekonomista), the first theoretical economics journal in Polish, appeared for the first time from 
1864-1874, resumed publication in 1901, and remains active today. In Lwów there was ‘Przeglad Ekonomiczny”, in Poznan 
‘Ruch Prawniczy i Ekonomiczny’ and in Krakow ‘Czasopismo prawnicze i ekonomiczne’Orlowska, Janina & Orlowski, 
Tadeusz, 1987. Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie spoleczno-zawodowego ruchu 
ekonomistów w Polsce. Warszawa: PTE. p.18-19. We may also mention Economic studies  which appeared in Kraków in 
English. Economic policy issues were also the main interest of the Warsaw-based Gospodarka Narodowa. Orlowska, Janina 
& Orlowski, Tadeusz, 1987. Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie spoleczno-zawodowego 
ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce. Warszawa: PTE.p.13 
122 PoznaĔ’s Ruch Prawniczy i Ekonomiczny and Kraków’s Czasopismo prawnicze i ekonomiczne did not re-emerge until 
after the Thaw. 
123 A continuation of the journal of the pre-war Warsaw Economists Association, its editor from 1928 to 1975 was Edward 
LipiĔski. In 1947 the editorial board further included: Prof. Adam KrzyĪanowski, Edward Taylor, and Stefan Zaleski 
Oráowska, Janina & Oráowski, Tadeusz, 1987. Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie spoáeczno-
zawodowego ruchu ekonomistów w Polsce. Warszawa: PTE.The executive committee of the journal consisted of: S. 
Zalewski, J. Drewnowski, W. Hagemejer, S. Rączkowski, K. Secomski and J. Zagórski.  
124 Wáodzimierz Brus (1921-2007) economist, started his studies at the Free University before the war, continued in the 
Soviet Union (Leningrad University – replaced to Saratov). Returned to Poland with the Polish Division of the Red Army, 
worked in the economic section of Nowe Drogi. One of the protagonists of the study.  
Julian Hochfeld (1911-1966) socialist polititian, studied in Kraków and Paris, doctor of economy (1937), member of PSP 
from 1930, spent the war in the Soviet Union and later London. Upon his return to Poland he was editor of Przegląd
Socjalistyczny, lectured at the Main School and was vice-president of the Central Planning Board.  
Tadeusz Dietrich (1905-1960), socialist politician, studied economics in àódĨ and PoznaĔ, worked before the war in the 
Ministry of Treasury, where he continued to be employed after 1945, Vice-minister from 1948. Minister of Domestic Trade 
(1949-1952), Minister of Finance (1952-1960). 
Rapacki, Adam (1909-1970) Son of Marian Rapacki (socialist politician and lecturer at the Main School of Commerce), A. 
Rapacki had studied economics at the Main School of Commerce and in Italy, at the time of this debate he was member of 
the PSP Central Executive Committee and Minister of Maritime Affairs. Rapacki is best known outside Poland for his 
activity as Foreign Minister when he launched the Rapacki-Plan in 1957Held, Joseph, 1994. Dictionary of East European 
history since 1945 Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 
Stefan JĊdrychowski (1910-1996) communist politician obtained a doctorate in law at Wilno University where he was active 
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Ekonomista in 1947 was fraught with difficulties, but once they had been overcome scholarly 
discussions could resume.  
The wartime destruction of paper factories, print shops and editorial offices severely 
hampered all publication activities. These practical problems were gradually overcome, and 
during the first two years after the war previously active private firms, associations and 
institutions resumed their publishing work.125 During the year that followed the founding of 
the PEA, the board managed to set up an editorial office, secure allocations of money and 
paper, and establish contact with a printing-house in àódĨ. Last but not least, articles and 
reviews were secured and prepared for printing, and political assent was obtained. All this 
was no small achievement given the situation. 
The accounts of the PEA show that in 1946, the association’s first year, it had already 
managed to secure a publishing allowance directly from the CPB, where many of the 
association’s members worked.126 In the years of post-war penury, securing money was not 
necessarily the end of the problem.127 Decisions about the use of paper were taken within the 
highest government organs. 128  In these circumstances it is not surprising that the first 
periodicals to appear in economics were endorsed by institutions like the CPB or the National 
Bank.129 During this period, economists were probably in a better position than other scholars 
in the leftist student community. Joined the PWP in 1944 and became member of its Central Committee in 1948. Went on to 
hold many prominent positions in the Party apparatus and Government, among them: Minister of Maritime Affairs and 
Foreig Trade (1945-1947), vice-president of the Planning Commission (1949-1951), Politburo member (1956-1971), 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1968-1971). Moádawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991 Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
PaĔstwowe PWN.  
125 The first printing shop was up and running in Warsaw in June 1945 but to meet print demands in the capital material was 
sent for printing to àódĨ and Kraków. Lojek, Jerzy, MysliĔski, Jerzy & Wáadyka, Wiesáaw, 1988. Dzieje prasy polskiej
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. MyĞliĔski p.153-4 
126 The CPB donated 1,000,000 zloty for publications in 1946 and 1,800,000 zloty in 1947. By the second half of 1947, the 
PEA was making money from the sale of Ekonomista and the first of the two books they published themselves, allowing the 
journal to pay honoraria to the authors. For sums paid to the different authors see the published accounts of the PEA: "Polskie
Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, Zarząd Gáówny. Bilans zamkniĊcia na dzieĔ 31.12.1946 r." Ekonomista (1947:2) p.157-158 and 
"Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, Zarząd Gáówny. Bilans na dzieĔ 21.12.1947" Ekonomista (1948:2) p.175 
127 In the same vein there is Bobrowski’s account of how he hardly received any pay during his time as director of the Central 
Planning Board, , but was housed in a luxurious compound with other government and party leaders, with all goods down to 
cigarettes being provided free of charge. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo 
Lubelskie.
128 See quote in chapter 2, p.16 JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. 
Początki planowania. Materiaáy Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: the speech by Eugeniusz 
Szyr, the Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade 19.02.1948. p.587-8 
129 The CPB published the periodical Gospodarka Planowa and financed the publications of the PEA which, in addition to 
the Ekonomista, included the series "Biblioteka PTE" which by mid 1948 had 6 titles published and 7 in preparation. The 
National Bank published the monthly WiadomoĞci NBP: in addition to a monthly report on the economic situation in Poland 
this featured articles on topics related to the bank's activities. Authors in the 1946 and 1947 issues included W. TrąpczyĔski,
J. Lubowicki, J. Zagórski, M. Oráowski, Z. PiroĪyĔski, S. Rozmaryn., T. Dietrych, M.R. Wyczaákowski, K. Secomski and J. 
ĝwidrowski, who not only wrote articles, but had their books published by the bank. Information gathered from adverts for 
publications in Ekonomista 1947 and 1948 issues as well as the accounts of PEA published in Ekonomista (1947:2) and 
1948:2).
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when it came to publishing, since representatives of the discipline were close to or indeed 
party to decisions about the allocation of resources.130 This proximity to the political decision-
makers also seems to have been helpful with regards to obtaining political endorsement for 
the publication of Ekonomista and in the relationship with the emerging censorship bodies.  
The books market was first revived by private publishers, and only became subject to political 
control from 1948. For periodical publications such as journals the situation was quite 
different. Private companies had already been banned from publishing newspapers and 
journals in 1944. Social associations, academic institutions, and political parties had the right 
to publish periodicals131 subject to political approval, and certified by a concession.132 In 1946 
the paper and printing industries were nationalised, so that control over publication was 
transferred to the PWP-controlled and aptly-named Ministry of Information and Propaganda. 
At the same time the apparatus of censorship was under being constructed, and went through 
a series of changes and restructurings before the censorship office that would dominate the 
history of the People’s Poland emerged (GUKPiW).133 Regrettably, the role of censorship in 
scientific journals remains unresearched, so it is unclear whether censorship was applied prior 
to printing, and how control of the published material was handled, once the green light for 
publication of the Ekonomista of 1946/47 had been given. In fact the situation evolved 
rapidly: while the 1947 issues sometimes contained material that might have been excised if 
rigorous controls had been carried out, in 1948 evidence of censorship in the journal steadily 
increased.134
Finally, the editorial board of Ekonomista had to collect, select and prepare material for 
printing. In order to investigate the problems of finding materials and political backing for the 
130 As well as the PEA publications another example of this trend was the research institution which E. LipiĔski was leading 
at the time, the Institute for National Economy (IGN), which published its bulletin as an appendix to the CPB journal 
Gospodarka Planowa. Ibid. 
131 Lojek, Jerzy, MysliĔski, Jerzy & Wáadyka, Wiesáaw, 1988. Dzieje prasy polskiej Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. 
p.155
132 Although the 1938 press decree which merely demanded registration had not been formally revoked, the power to issue 
concessions for periodical publications was first given to the Ministry of Information and Propaganda, and then, once it was 
established, to the Censorship Office (CBKB, later GUKPPiW) . Nalecz, Daria (ed.) (1994) Gáówny Urzad Kontroli Prasy 
1945-1949., Warszawa: PAN ISP. p.17 
133 From 1945 a Central Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Public Events, best known by the long acronym 
GUKPPiW, was established under the aegis of the Ministry of Public Security. Its remit included the right to issue permission 
for publishing journals. MyĞliĔski, Jerzy in Lojek, Jerzy, MysliĔski, Jerzy & Wáadyka, Wiesáaw, 1988. Dzieje prasy polskiej
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. p.153. Those studies of censorship that are available focus on political censorship, and 
pay little attention to the effects of censorship on scientific activity. Romek, Zbigniew (ed.) (2000) Cenzura w PRL. Relacje 
historyków., Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON 
Instytut Historii PAN. 
134 A glaring example of this is that in Ekonomista (1947:1), Janusz Libicki's obituary specified that he had been captured by 
the Soviets, imprisoned in the camp at Kozielsk, and probably murdered in Katyn. We shall return to the evolution of 
censorship in the 1948 issues in greater detail in Chapter Two. 
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journal, I shall look more closely at the content of Ekonomista from the first volume in 1947. 
The publications in this volume reflected a great interest in Keynesian economics and 
planning among established economists.  
The editorial at the beginning of the first post-war issue of Ekonomista, published in March 
1947, defined the profile of the journal.135 The text reflects both the hopes held at the time of 
its writing (the end of 1946 or even the start of 1947) and the concerns of the editorial board.  
We are for progress and the development of science. But progress and the 
development of science are most closely linked to the progress and development of 
the economy. We do not adhere to any economic doctrine, because the 
development of theory in economics has reached such a stage that we can today 
freely speak of the absence of “schools” in economics. We profess the principle of 
freedom of inquiry to be especially useful and necessary in a period in which the 
forms and shape of life are only in the process of developing, through the ‘trial and 
error’ method.136
This was written before the communists turned their attention to economics, and while the 
Socialist Party had considerable influence over economic policy. In this text the legitimacy of 
the discipline rests on an identification with economic development and modernisation. While 
the passage referring to the discipline quoted above was couched in ideologically neutral 
language, the wording used to refer to the contemporary economic and political setting was 
closer to the political rhetoric of the Communist regime: 
The science of economics is presently at a so-called critical moment. The planned 
economy is based on the revolutionary will of the planners and does not take into 
account ‘eternal’ and ‘unchangeable’ economic laws as formulated by the middle-
class science of the nineteenth century. Do economic laws exist in a planned 
economy? What makes up the values and content of economic theory in such an 
economy? These are the questions that science has to answer in order to justify its 
existence.137
This text echoed both the voluntarism of socialist and communist ideas, and the genuine 
enthusiasm and optimism in the circle of economists in Poland, at a time that appeared to 
135 W. Fabierkiewicz, B. Klapkowski, A. KrzyĪanowski, W. KrzyĪanowski, E. LipiĔski, J. Lubowicki, Z. Makarczyk, F. 
Máynarski, M. Oráowski, S. Rączkowski, K. Secomski, W. Skrzywan, Cz. Strzeszewski, J. ĝwidrowski, E. Taylor, W. 
TrąmpczyĔski, E. Ugniewski, A. Wakar, M. Wyczaákowski, S. Zalewski, A. ĩabko-Potopowicz. Orlowska, Janina & 
Orlowski, Tadeusz, 1987. Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie spoleczno-zawodowego ruchu 
ekonomistów w Polsce. Warszawa: PTE. 
136 Editorial manifesto opening the first post-war issue of Ekonomista, (1947:1) 
137 Editorial manifesto opening the first post-war issue of Ekonomista (1947:1). The strange term ‘middle-class science,’ is an 
effort on my part to convey the fact that although a better translation of the neutral-sounding ‘nauka mieszczaĔska’ would be 
‘bourgeois science’, the term ‘bourgeois’ corresponds in Polish to ‘burĪuazyjny’ which had a pejorative ring and was 
communist propaganda lexis.  
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produce a sellers’ market of unheard-of dimensions in economic knowledge. The content of 
the journal, however, appears to show that the editors found it difficult to find good, suitable 
articles.138 The opening article by Lange was probably commissioned by the editor, there was 
one excerpt from a doctoral thesis, and at least two of the articles were re-worked versions of 
lectures given in 1946.139 Also, all the Polish authors were based in the capital, and even 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s contribution was based on a lecture held at the PEA during his stay in 
Warsaw. Communication with the other towns was clearly still difficult. Three articles 
discussed policy-related issues: Secomski (who worked at the CPB) and Wyrozembski (who 
would later be a renowned Marxist-Leninist) wrote an article on foreign trade which did not 
bear a trace of the Marxist-Leninist approach,140 and, finally, Rosenstein-Rodan wrote on the 
industrialisation of developing countries.141 If considered on its own merits, it would seem 
there was nothing out-of-the-ordinary about the first issue, either in terms of quality or of 
political controversy. If we compare this first issue with the subsequent 1947 examples, 
however, it stands out from the rest in its blandness. The later issues had contributions from 
economists representing a range of trends: the new planning partisans from the CPB as well as 
those who opposed planning; and representatives of the liberal PoznaĔ and Kraków schools 
alongside socialists and scholars from the Catholic University. There were also review articles 
on Anglo-Saxon and French literature and contributions from British scholars. One of the first 
reviews, for instance, discussed “The Economics of Full Employment” – a collection of 
papers by economists working at the Oxford University Institute of Statistics during the 
138 The Ekonomista (1947:1) issue had 5 articles, followed by 3 reviews and 12 obituaries. Articles: O.Lange: “The subject 
and method of economics”, P.Rosestein-Rodan. “On the industrialisation of poor countries”, J.Zagórski: “Profit in 
competition” (Zysk konkurencyjny), Z.J.Wyrozembski: “Outlines of foreign trade policies”, K.Secomski: ”Methods for 
financing extraordinary expenses”. 
139 Oskar Lange was the only one to receive payment for his article in this issue, before payment for articles became general 
in issue (1947:3/4), indicating that this article was especially commissioned by the editor, LipiĔski. Ekonomista. See the 
accounts of PEA published in Ekonomista (1947:2). 
Józef Zagórski’s article was a chapter from his doctoral thesis "Ogolna teoria konkurencji" written under Edward LipiĔski's 
supervision. It contained references to Walras, Joan Robinson, and Chamberlin. 
140 Zygmunt  Jan Wyrozembski, (1907-1979) I lack detailed biographical information on his subject, but it appears that he 
worked at the Ministry of Foreign Trade in the first postwar year, in 1946 professor of economics and later was the vice-
rector at the Academy of Political Science (ANP). In 1949 he joined the Main School of Planning and Statistics as one of the 
Marxist-Leninists sent there to reform the institution. 
In view of Wyrozembski’s later commitment to Marxism-Leninism, it would be tempting to assume that his presence in this 
issue could have been solicited to ensure publication, the content of his article, however, does not support such an 
interpretation. It deals with the foreign trade deficit, the obsession of all post-war economic discussions. Although the Soviet
Union is mentioned as a promising trading partner, and reference is made to the 1945 trade agreement made between the two 
countries, it would be difficult to interpret this article as even remotely Marxist-Leninist. 
141 Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan (1902-1985), specialised in problems related to economic growth in developing countries; 
educated at the University of Vienna; lectured in London where he, during the war, came into contact with Polish economists 
who worked on plans for the industrialisation of Poland; from 1947 he worked in the USA. (Stankiewicz p.488) The article in 
Ekonomista (1947:1) was based on the lecture he gave at the PEA, and was edited for publication by Helena Tatar-Zagórska 
and Jan LipiĔski, both students of Edward LipiĔski. 
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war.142 So, had the editorial board been particularly cautious not to offend any political 
sensitivities in order to secure the printing concession, and then become bolder, or had the 
difficulty in getting hold of contributions from other towns made the first issue more 
homogenous not only geographically but also in terms of approach? The sources available do 
not answer this question. What is certain is that 1947, as it appeared in Ekonomista, was a 
year of intellectual freedom and increasing scientific production. The main effort was directed 
towards understanding and discussing the importance of new developments in the discipline, 
notably Keynsian economics and the problems of planning. References in the articles were 
made to works by Polish, English, French, German and Austrian economists, and there were 
occasionally references to Marx and contributions from leftist Western economists such as 
Sweezy, Dobb and Bettleheim.143
The same orientation towards western scholarship is visible in the titles of books produced in 
1946 and 1947 under the aegis of the PEA and the National Bank.144 Some of the works 
published were in fact written during the war.145 Among economists, books from abroad were 
in greater demand than new Polish publications. Initial concerns voiced at the founding 
meeting of the PEA related to the publication of a bibliography and the procuring of books 
published in the years while Poland was cut of from international academic developments by 
the war. Such a bibliography was published in Ekonomista, and the contributions considered 
to be most interesting were reviewed, translated and published. These pluralist, optimistic 
features of the 1947 publications were balanced by the political context of 1947, when hopes 
for the future of democracy began to dissolve. Indeed due to the delays caused by editorial 
work and printing, these publications might have seemed overly liberal by the time they 
reached their readers. 
142 The reason why this book received attention in Poland was probably related to the fact that a Polish economist was one of 
the contributors. M. Kalecki had worked at this institute during the war. The book contained contributions by F.A. Burchardt, 
M. Kalecki, G.D.N. Worswick, E.F. Schumacher, T. Balogh and K. Mandelbaum. Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1944. 
143 In issue 1947:2, Edward LipiĔski's article included references to Robinson, Burns, Norris, Pareto, Marshall, Neuman, 
Morgenstern, Marx, Schumpeter, and Sweezy, while his student Jozef Zagórski argued against a thesis by Lerner and 
Hotellinger by referring to J. Robinson, Coase, Norris and Harrod. 
144 Prior to 1948 private publishing houses co-existed with the officially impartial but in reality PWP-controlled publishing 
house Czytelnik and the organs of the political parties. Both the PEA and the BN used private publishers for their books. The 
PEA used the àódĨ-based K. Rutski press, while the BN used the firm Trzaska, Evret i Michalski, established in Warsaw in 
1920, which published among others the book for which Jan Drewnowski was criticised in 1948 during the Central Planning 
Board debate. The academic presses, controlled by universities and scientific associations but depending on the State for 
paper allocation, showed no great activity in the field economics during this period. 
145 For instance: E. Taylor’s book on the theory of production (1947), J. Zagórski’s study of the general theory of competition 
(1947) and K. Secomski’s book on investment policies from the same year. The publication of the translation of F. Benham’s 
“Economics” by a group of POW’s led by J. Drewnowski during their imprisonment in Germany, was another example. 
Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950. Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich. pp.282-
283.
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Economists and economic policy 
Simply in themselves, wartime destruction and the difficult economic situation of the inter-
war years constituted the strongest possible incentive to participate in the reconstruction and 
development of the country. In the words of Zdzisáaw Sadowski, born in 1925 and thus one of 
the youngest economists to have witnessed the inter-war and war years: 
… based on their own experience, young Polish economists of this generation had 
to be more sensitive to the backwardness and poverty of their country than anyone 
else. It is therefore very understandable that after independence had been 
regained, even in a very restricted form (…) educated Polish economists 
immediately devoted their energy and creative powers to the task of reconstructing 
the country.146
The overwhelming majority of economists were neither communist Party members nor 
communist sympathisers. In the first post-war years their political engagement and their 
relation to the emergent Communist regime was informed by the hope that Poland would 
choose its own path, not the dictates of the Soviet Union. Those who had spent the war in 
exile now had to make a decision on whether they would return. Among those who returned 
home were the economists Oskar Lange and Czesáaw Bobrowski. Bobrowski explained his 
decision to return from France as follows: 
“In the beginning, to a certain degree, I worried about the shape of the new 
political regime in Poland. However, I reflected that a priori someone who could 
loyally work for the pre-war regime, in spite of all the antipathy he felt towards it, 
did not have the moral right to back away from co-operation with the new one.”147
It is difficult to analyse all the reasons for or against return, but it seems that those who 
returned were motivated by a desire to act, and to affect the course of economic development 
in their war-torn country, something which they shared with their colleagues in Poland.  
Meanwhile, scholars appear to have oscillated between different attitudes towards the 
emerging regime and the possibilities of taking on expert roles in the new political set-up. In 
Kraków, law and economics scholars were active in the political arena, both in the 
establishment of the Coalition Government, and in preparing documents for the Peace 
Settlement and the Nuremberg Trials. However, they were increasingly seen as and targeted 
by the PWP as a ‘bed of reactionary forces’. Indeed Kraków was a stronghold of the PPP, so 
146 Sadowski, Zdzisáaw “Kazimierz Secomski i drogi polityki rozwoju Polski” in KarpiĔski, Andrzej (ed.) (2000) Kazimierz 
Secomski. Nauka, praca, dziaáalnoĞü - w 90-lecie urodzin., Warszawa: Komitet Prognoz "Polska 2000 Plus" przy Prezydium 
PAN. p.27 
147 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.143  
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Kraków academics were not obvious choices as advisors for the socialist and communist 
politicians who controlled economic policy. Finally there was an element of natural selection, 
as those Kraków economists who wished to take on roles as experts in the new regime moved 
to Warsaw.148
Before the War, PoznaĔ University was dominated by scholars with national democratic 
sympathies. After 1945, in order to understand their position, it is useful to look at the 
relations between national democrats and the emerging Communist regime. According to 
Kersten, once it became clear that there would be no legal political activity by the National 
Democratic Party in post-war Poland, many ND activists and sympathisers decided to join the 
work of the reconstruction of the country. Although they did not engage directly in politics, 
they hoped to influence the shape of society through active participation in public 
institutions.149 On the other hand, the communists often preferred a ‘loyal’ non-party expert 
for a post over an outspoken socialist or communist who might criticise the leadership and 
challenge the Party line. As the economic historian Witold Kula observed in 1947, in his 
parable of the contemporary situation presented as correspondence between two Roman 
citizens after the Christianisation of the Empire:
We find it easiest to agree and work with people with whom we share opinions. For 
the Christians [i.e. communists –AWH] it is the opposite. They can co-operate 
excellently with those they consider to be pagans [i.e. political opponents- AWH], 
but they cannot abide to have in their midst, nay, are willing to persecute those 
among their own who differ from them in opinions on matters that seem secondary 
to us. A heretic is worse than a pagan, to put it their way.150
Warsaw was where economists acted out their roles as experts, advisors and policymakers, as 
it was here that the headquarters of all central authorities from government and ministries to 
the Central Statistical Office and the National Bank were to be found. Consequently, it was 
from here that economists were dispatched to take part in international economic 
organisations and negotiations. Oskar Lange and Michaá Kalecki, for instance, worked as 
148 See for instance Oskar Lange who did not return to his alma mater but settled in Warsaw, or another graduate from 
Kraków, Wáodzimierz Hagemajer who worked at the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw. 
149 See Kersten on the arguments used by those siding with the National Democratic Party on entering and trying to influence 
cultural and state agencies, local and central government, etc. Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist 
Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.pp.206-207 
150 The text was written in 1947 but was published only in 1958 Kula, Witold, 1958. Gusla. In W. Kula (ed.) Rozwazania o 
historii. Warszawa: PWN. pp.234-235 
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Polish representatives at the United Nations, while S. Rączkowski and J. Drewnowski took 
part in negotiations with the USA and the international banks.151
The single most important economic policy institution was the Central Planning Board, and it 
employed a great number of economists.152 Established in the autumn of 1945, it was to 
prepare economic plans and co-ordinate the work of ministries. The story of the Central 
Planning Board allows us to follow the evolution from the relatively liberal years of 1945-
1947 to the abrupt political turn in 1948, which brought about a change in economic policy as 
well as in higher education and research. It also tracks the evolution, form and extent of the 
interaction between academic and applied economists and the new Communist regime.  
The leadership of the Central Planning Board was entrusted to Czesáaw Bobrowski. 153
Bobrowski’s qualifications for the job of planner-in-chief were his “etatist” stance on the role 
of the state and planning before the war, his work in the Polish-Soviet trade agency 
Sovpoltorg in Moscow in the 1930s (where he came into contact with Soviet planning), and 
lastly his work in Britain during the last phase of war, where the Government in Exile had 
worked on a plan for post-war reconstruction. On taking office, he recruited staff from among 
his former associates in the intervention-oriented “Gospodarka Narodowa” circle and opened 
the door to several graduates from the Main School of Commerce, who in the meantime had 
joined the PSP. Starting out in ruined Warsaw, it required tremendous energy and effort to 
design the Three-year Plan of Reconstruction. Underlining the fact that his was not an isolated 
case, Bobrowski described his own workload as follows: 
151 Stanisáaw Rączkowski (1912-2006) economist, student of E.Taylor. After the war he briefly worked at PoznaĔ
Universtiy but his principal academic workplace was the Main School. He also worked in the CPB and then the National 
Bank. Not member of any party. 
152 The Central Planning Board, Centralny Urząd Planowania, it is best know by its Polish acronym, the CUP, which is even 
used in some English translations. I shall refer to it as the CPB. 
153 Czesáaw Bobrowski returned to Poland in 1945 and joined the PSP, and was co-opted into the Party leadership on his 
appointment to the Central Planning Board. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo 
Lubelskie.
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I got into work at 8 a.m., ate my lunch at my desk, and left the office at midnight. 
Petitioners whom I had not managed to receive during the day discovered that I 
ate my supper at the ‘Polonia’ restaurant at around midnight, so hunted for me 
there. It sometimes happened that on leaving the office at midnight, I asked a 
director to prepare a case for the morning. (This was made simpler by the fact that 
some lived in the office.) … Of course this style of work could not continue 
indefinitely. I recall, however, that even in the summer of 1946 President Bierut 
phoned me at the office, scandalised by the fact that not all ministers worked on 
Sundays.154
The Central Planning Board was directly under the authority of the Council of Ministers, and 
was tasked with formulating economic plans, co-ordinating the work of institutions involved 
in economic policy-making, and processing the necessary information. Executive power lay 
with the ministries, notably the powerful Ministry of Industry and Trade, which was directed 
by the Communist Party’s undisputed leader in economic policy matters, Hilary Minc. 
The Three-year Plan of Reconstruction (1947-1949), the main achievement of the CPB, aimed 
to increase industry’s share of the GNP, to attain 1938 levels of consumption, and to 
reconstruct the energy and transport sectors as rapidly as possible.155 Based on drafts prepared 
during the war by a team of Polish economists in London, the Three-Year Plan adopted a 
pragmatic stance.156 Using economic tools from what later came to be termed ‘bourgeois’ 
economics, it favoured indicative planning, and displayed a fair amount of creativity and 
innovation. This was planning with close kinship with what was being undertaken in Western 
Europe, and quite removed from the Soviet-style Six and Five-year Plans that were to follow.
Bobrowski objected to any identification of the Central Planning Board with PSP economic 
policy, and noted that the PSP leadership was neither especially interested in economic 
matters nor likely to support the Central Planning Board against PWP-dominated 
ministries.157 What mattered was that the CPB was perceived (not only by its rivals, but also 
by historians) to be an agent of the Socialist Party158. By placing a heavy emphasis on the 
154 Ibid. pp.161-162 
155 Jezierski, Andrzej & LeszczyĔska, Cecylia, 1999. Historia Gospodarcza Polski Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Key Text.p.402 
quoting from Stankiewicz, T. DziaáalnoĞc inwestycyjna paĔstwa w Polsce w latach 1945-1947. Warszawa 1993. 
156 Ibid.p.402 
157 The reasons for Bobrowski’s refusal to be fully identified with the PSP are unclear, but it has to be noted that the political
context of the 1980s and his continued advisory functions within the regime might have played a part. Bobrowski, Czesáaw,
1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.156 
158 According to data provided by 1998. Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE. 
Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne., among the leadership and departments heads there were nine members of 
the PSP, four members of the PWP and five non-party employees. Bobrowski, who refuted such charges, claimed without 
giving names that from the group of the 20 most important employees, the largest group (half) was formed by non-party 
employees, and that the socialists had only one party member more than the communists. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. 
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need for a strong co-operative sector to co-exist with the nationalised and private sectors it 
came to be identified with the so-called tri-sector economy. The CPB was also seen as a 
proponent of a gradual and more consumer-friendly path to industrialisation, dubbed “the 
Polish Way”. However, the consumption-orientated nature of the Three-year Plan should not 
be overestimated. It was more a consequence of the lack of food, clothing and other basic 
consumer items, than of any decision to avoid investment in industry. Evidence suggests that 
if the Central Planning Board had been allowed to continue its activities it too would have 
devoted more attention and resources to industrialisation, though hardly on such a scale and at 
such a speed as that adopted under H. Minc’s direction.159 In addition, the Three-Year Plan 
had itself been the result of a compromise between the PSP and the PWP, between Bobrowski 
and Minc, and so not devoid of the latter’s imprint.160
The post-war surge of energy, the opportunity to work in one’s chosen profession, the sense 
of performing a deeply-needed and appreciated public service, and a well-functioning and 
inspiring team of experts, all combined to make the Central Planning Board years an 
experience its workers would look back on with great nostalgia. This nostalgia was only 
enhanced by the sudden and unexpected demise of the CPB will be the subject of the next 
chapter.
Conclusion
Polish economics before the war was characterised by several vibrant communities who 
displayed great openness towards international developments in their discipline. While 
university economics still had some way to go in terms of gaining an institutional base 
independent of legal studies, there were grounds for optimism. Economists had vigorous 
professional associations, specialised journals and dynamic research institutes at their 
disposal. The destructive effect of the war changed Polish economics in a number of ways. 
The loss of highly-qualified scholars and talented students, the physical destruction of several 
academic institutions, the dispersal of established communities, and the interruption of most 
professional activity and training, all made a great impact. Economists emerged from the war 
years exhausted, shattered by grief yet energised by the urgent needs of reconstruction. 
Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.160 Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-
gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW. 
159 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, KaliĔski, Janusz, 1995. 
Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne. Warszawa: PaĔstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
160 Jezierski, Andrzej & LeszczyĔska, Cecylia, 1999. Historia Gospodarcza Polski Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Key Text.p.396 
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The first post-war years were ones of great mobility for economics, both intellectually and in 
terms of geography and hierarchy. The great gaps created by wartime loss of life had to be 
filled either by migration from other institutions or by the advancement of junior researchers. 
The early post-war era saw also the establishment of a national professional association, the 
PEA, which boosted professional cohesion among economists in the various regions. We 
should also bear in mind that regional and institutional bonds were in many cases 
strengthened by the shared experiences of co-operation in clandestine wartime education, and 
in the later efforts to reconstitute scattered communities and reorganise higher education and 
research under conditions of great privation and sacrifice. 
Polish economics was evolving to the rhythm of the changing political and social realities of 
post-Yalta, post-war Poland. This turn of events was manifested in the content of articles 
published at the time, in widespread participation in government agencies, and in the adjust-
ment of the education of economists to match the new tasks of economists in a planned 
economy. Control over the discipline remained firmly with established, hierarchical and 
reputation-based organisations. The old professoriate continued to determine the curriculum, 
evaluate research, define relevant problems for study, and find suitable methods to solve 
them.  
As far as influence on policy-making is concerned, these years were a time of hope and 
excitement for economists, especially for those interested in planning. 161  Through their 
alliance with the socialists and with positions on the Central Planning Board they were able to 
influence economic policy directly, by drafting the Three-year Plan. The profession profited 
from the fact that the leading economists had good contacts with the political leadership, and 
access to scarce resources, as reflected in the restoration of a historic house in a prestigious 
part of the capital for the use of the PEA. 
While socialist economists were an integral part of the academic establishement, there was a 
great distance and few links between established and Marxist-Leninist theoretical economics. 
Hardly any of the few economists adhering to the Communist Party pronounced publicly on 
economic matters, and when they did, they tended to do so in their own party press and 
161 Jan SzczepaĔski claimed that the Polish pre-war intelligentsia easily adapted to the new conditions of post-war life, and 
played an important role in the reconstruction taking on important managerial and administrative positions. Kowalik 
responded that this cannot be said of economists, especially the majority of those working at universities, whose liberal views
made such an adaptation difficult. He went on, however, to show how there was little euphoria in their support to traditional 
liberal approaches, and to list the evidence of interest and even growing fascination with planning. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. 
Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950. Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich .pp.283-284 
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periodicals rather than in fora for academic discussion. PWP members in the CPB avoided 
confrontation and discussion, and the editor of Ekonomista, the leading journal on economics, 
found it difficult to recruit contributors from among Marxist-Leninists. This gave rise to the 
illusion that the discipline would not necessarily have to come into any closer contact with the 
agitprop sector, and that concepts of Marxian economics would be applied by established 
practitioners at their discretion, to the extent that they found it appropriate, and in ways that 
they considered compatible with the ruling standards for academic research.162 This was an 
illusion soon to be dispelled. 
162 On the PWP members’ behaviour in the CPB, see Drewnowski, Jan, 1979. "The Central Planning Office on Trial: An 
Account of The Begginings of Stalinism in Poland." Soviet Studies, XXXI, 23-42. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
POLISH ECONOMICS AND MARXISM-LENINISM, FIRST 
ENCOUNTERS
After two years of cautious optimism, 1948 opened on a different note for Polish economists. 
For two years they had focused on the reconstruction of the national economy and academic 
institutions, but now, for first time, they were confronted by Marxist-Leninists who, on behalf 
of the Communist Party (PWP), condemned outright their methods and approaches. 
In Chapter 1 we saw how economists adopted different stances towards the new regime. Some 
withdrew from political involvement and concentrated on academic pursuits, while others 
became involved in advising on economic policy. The latter’s close ties to the political 
establishment, notably to the Socialist Party, had opened the way both for wider funding of 
the discipline and to gaining influence over economic policy. During 1948, however, these 
strong links to the PSP became a liability rather than an asset. Economists became embroiled 
in the ruthless political struggle between the PWP and the PSP, and found themselves on the 
losing side. Following the Soviet leadership’s decision to bring the countries east of the Iron 
Curtain into line, and the establishment of the Kominform in September 1947, the PWP 
stepped up the pressure on its socialist coalition partners. Economic doctrines supporting 
policy options other than Soviet-style planning and collectivisation came under fire. The year 
closed with the annexation of the socialist party by the PWP, ending a period of relative 
political and cultural plurality. Although the PWP’s plans for radical change in higher 
education and science had been delayed pending the resolution of the socialist problem, 
nevertheless that year the Party took its first steps towards the goal of control over the 
discipline of economics.  
In fact for most economists 1948 spelt the end of many hopes and illusions. Established 
economists lost their influence over policy-making (which was from this moment jealously 
guarded by the top communist leadership) and also their control over channels of publication 
60
(now under the jurisdiction of the PWP-sponsored Marxist-Leninist economists). This chapter 
will examine how the intense struggle between socialists and communists affected the way the 
established economists and Marxist-Leninist economists related to each other by investigating 
the unfolding of their first confrontations in two arenas: a two day discussion over economic 
policy and economic methods at the Central Planning Board; and the pages of the journal 
Ekonomista.
The Central Planning Board debate 
During the course of a heated debate which lasted from the 18th to the 19th of February 1948, 
the leadership of the Central Planning Board was accused of basing its plans on erroneous 
calculations, and its employees were attacked for their adherence to ‘bourgeois’ economics.163
The atmosphere of the meeting was such that arrests and show-trials seemed to its participants 
to be a possible outcome. Luckily for the individuals involved, no dramatic events followed. 
However, the institution did not survive the ordeal. The chairman of the CPB was forced to 
resign immediately, and the work of the agency was taken over by a new Planning 
Commission presided over by Hilary Minc. 
Historians often mention this debate as an important step in the PWP’s subjugation of the 
socialist party. It is important for this study because the economists who had formulated and 
supported CPB economic policy were removed from power, together with the Socialist Party. 
Also, this was the first direct attack on the economic thought and policies inspired by and 
resting on the platform of mainstream, neo-classical economics. Finally, it exhibited all the 
163 The Central Planning Board debate was recorded in shorthand and a protocol was issued in a limited number of copies. 
Prof. Tadeusz Kowalik reports having had access to the entire document in the 1950s, but only excerpts have been published 
by JĊdruszczak as the whereabouts of the complete document are not known. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój 
spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW. 
There are three published witness-accounts of the debate: Drewnowski, Bobrowski, W. Brus, 'From revisionism to 
pragmatism: Sketches to a self-portrait of a "reform economist".' in Reform and transformation in Eastern Europe. Soviet-
type economics on the threshold of change., eds. J. M. Kovács and M. Tardos (London 1992), 136-142. This last item was 
based upon an interview with Bobrowski, conducted by Tadeusz Kowalik. The transcript of this taped conversation provides 
further interesting information as it was not subject to the same degree of auto-censorship as the book. Tadeusz Kowalik was 
at the time a political persona non grata, so his participation in the process is not openly acknowledged in the published book.
Tapes and transcripts are lodged in the Special Holdins Section of the Library of the Warsaw School of Economics. I am 
obliged to Professor Kowalik for providing this lead. 
The debate has also been the subject of historical studies KaliĔski, Janusz, 1977. Plan Odbudowy Gospodarczej 1947-1949.
Warszawa: KiW, Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW, 
Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: 
California University Press.and in the source anthology, which comprises the material from the CPB discussion, Hanna 
JĊdruszczak also wrote a thorough introduction on the subject. JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki 
socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materialy Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN. Finally there are materials 
from a conference devoted to the debate organised by the PEA on its 50th anniversary in 1998, at which Drewnowski, Szyr 
and Kowalik were present.1998. Walka o Losy Centralnego UrzĊdu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE. Warszawa: 
Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne. 
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characteristics of the stalinist model “debates” in cultural and academic life that had emerged 
in the 1930s and, that came in particular to dominate Soviet intellectual life in the immediate 
post-war era. According to Jan Drewnowski, who was then director of the CPB’s Department 
of long-term planning:  
The character and importance of the CPB trial did not lie exclusively in the content 
of the criticism directed against the planning methods. Equally important was the 
way in which the debate was conducted and the whole atmosphere of the meeting. 
The trial of the CPB was the first full-scale presentation of the Stalinist mode of 
public life in Poland. For the first time we were told that modern economic science 
should be called ‘bourgeois economics’. Equally, it was the first time the terms 
‘non-Marxist’ or ‘anti-Marxist’ were used in public debate as labels which 
automatically ‘disqualified’ opposing arguments without the need to examine their 
content. For the first time, too, quotations from Marx, Lenin and Stalin were used 
out of context as magic formulae guaranteeing victory in debate. Also for the first 
time the Soviet Union was used as a model which must be blindly followed. As the 
debate unfolded, the impression became quite unreal. Clearly formulated 
arguments met with a blank wall of deliberate misunderstanding and planned 
hostility.164
Before we turn to the question of how the communists established the ‘wall’ Drewnowski 
describes, or try to assess the validity of his interpretation of the CPB debate, we need to look 
into the political rivalry between the communists and the socialists.165
1947 was a year when many were unsure about what to expect and how to react to the swiftly-
evolving context. The increasing chill in relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet 
Union eclipsed the question of democracy in Poland on the international agenda. At home, the 
year started with the January election’s aggressive campaign and rigging of results. In 
September 1947 several activists from the Polish Peasants’ Party were put on trial. Soon after 
that, the leader of the PPP, S. Mikoáajczyk, fled Poland, fearing for his life. The only non-
socialist political alternative, the PPP, was thus eliminated from the political scene. The 
Communist Party (PWP), a disciplined organisation characterised by militaristic rhetoric and 
revolutionary zeal, could now turn on the last potential source of alternative policies, the 
socialist party. The PSP had always enjoyed a much greater following than the communists, 
164 To avoid confusion, I have replaced the Polish acronym for the CPB used in Drewnowski’s article (CUP) Drewnowski, 
Jan, 1979. "The Central Planning Office on Trial: An Account of The Begginings of Stalinism in Poland." Soviet Studies, 
XXXI, 23-42. 
165 Krystyna Kersten’s excellent work provides a firm foundation for any political/social history of the period 1943-1948. I 
have also used several volumes of the concise, but orderly and easily accessible series “Dzieje PRL”. Kersten, Krystyna, 
1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University 
Press, Garlicki, Andrzej, 1993. Stalinizm Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1993. 
Zdobycie wáadzy 1945-1947 Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.  
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and since 1944 the PWP had taken great care to exert control over its rival. After the war the 
PSP was reactivated under a leadership that was approved and controlled by the PWP. 
Prominent socialist activists who tried to organise an alternative socialist party (PPS-WRN), 
or to remain independent from the communist-controlled PSP, were arrested in April 1947.166
Yet as old members re-enlisted and voters of now-forbidden parties flocked to the only 
remaining alternative to the PWP, the PSP once more became less pliable. The mass of the 
membership was all for pushing for greater independence from the PWP, whilst the PWP 
called for a union of these two workers’ parties. The merger became the pivotal issue in 
Polish politics. 167  An enforced unification could have been a more efficient way of 
demonstrating the power of the communists, as happened in Bulgaria and Hungary in the 
early months of 1948, but the PWP opted for a softer approach which would allow it to absorb 
the legitimacy of the socialist party.  
To begin with, the PWP concentrated on securing political control over Poland. The PSP and 
PPP  were thus initially allowed to exercise a measure of influence over economic policy, and 
over education and research, to mention the areas most relevant for this study.168 Once its hold 
had been secured, however, the PWP endeavoured to extend its control to new areas, and in 
the summer of 1947 it made its first bold move in economic policy. A campaign to eradicate 
private enterprises, shops and crafts, which became known as the ‘battle for trade’, was 
orchestrated by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Hilary Minc.169 The socialists opposed the 
campaign but were unable to prevent it, as it was swiftly implemented through administrative 
measures. Relations between the Central Planning Board and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade were deteriorating,170 and it was now unavoidable that there would be confrontation 
between the communist and socialist visions of the Polish economy and models for 
modernisation.
At the same time, tension in international relations was mounting, as were the number of signs 
indicating that the Soviet leadership was aiming for stricter control of its zone of influence. 
166 Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1993. Zdobycie wáadzy 1945-1947 Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. p.75 
167 Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: 
California University Press. pp.157-165 (Polish ed.) 
168 Jezierski and LeszczyĔska point out that even in the first postwar years economic policy was the result of a compromise 
between the PWP, represented by Hilary Minc and PSP represented by Bobrowski.Jezierski, Andrzej & LeszczyĔska, 
Cecylia, 1999. Historia Gospodarcza Polski Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Key Text.p.396 
169 Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: 
California University Press, KaliĔski, Janusz, 1995. Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne.
Warszawa: PaĔstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
170 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.pp.189-190 
63
The announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 was followed by Poland’s 
rejection, under Soviet pressure, of Marshall Plan aid, and the establishment of the 
Kominform in September.  
In this atmosphere of mounting pressure on both the domestic and the international fronts a 
Congress of the Polish Socialist Party was held in Wrocáaw in December 1947. The 
discussions and resolutions at this Congress demonstrated that resistance to a merger was still 
strong among socialists, whose rank and file were well aware that they had much broader 
support from Polish society than did the communists. They refused to resign themselves to 
communist domination simply because the PWP was backed by the Soviet leadership and by 
Soviet forces stationed in Poland – including a Security Police co-operating closely with the 
NKVD. The PWP understood from the resolutions passed at the Wrocáaw Congress that they 
had to increase the pressure they were exerting, for at some point in the last weeks of 1947 the 
PWP leadership decided that the Central Planning Board would serve as the decoy for an 
attack on the Socialist Party. Soon afterwards a treaty signed in Moscow in January 1948 
marked the formalisation of economic co-operation and the co-ordination of economic 
policies within the Soviet Block. This development changed the parameters of Polish 
economic policy and reduced the possibility of a 'Polish Way'. As Minc’s deputy Eugeniusz 
Szyr announced during the CBP debate:171
We have signed an economic treaty with the Soviet Union, a treaty with 
Czechoslovakia, treaties with a whole range of countries. Each of these treaties 
means that we have to start establishing the economic future of Poland at once, 
and we have entered a critical phase in this matter. 
 It means that the system and duties which were under the jurisdiction of the 
Central Planning Board have disappeared, a crisis has arisen, and we have 
entered a phase in which the establishment of genuine planning, not just playing 
with numbers, is the fundamental problem. Today, ministry, inter-ministry, and 
supra-ministry policies are not important. Today the important thing is the brain of 
planning in Poland.172
171 Eugeniusz Szyr (1915-2000) holding secondary education, he joined the Polish Communist Party in 1934, the French 
Communist Party in 1936, and the PWP in 1944. Fought in the Spanish Civil War under Karol ĝwierczewski; after the 
Second World War which he spent in concentration camps in France and Algeria and from 1943 in the Soviet Union, 
returned to Poland. From 1945 to 1946 director of the department of economy in the Minsitry of Industry. At the time of the 
debate, Vice-minister of Industry and Trade. 1949-1954 vice president and from 1954 to 1956 the president of the Planning 
Commission. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991 Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN.p. 431, also 
see Strzeszewski’s account in ToraĔska, Teresa, 1997. Oni, new revised ed. Warszawa: Swiat Ksiazki. p.180.  
172 JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy
Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade 
Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. 
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Eugeniusz Szyr not only announced a reorientation of economic policies but made it clear that 
the turnaround would be so radical that the existing structures would not be able to 
accommodate it. The communist leaders considered that CPB had become outdated. 
The aim of the PWP’s attack on the CPB was two-fold: to accelerate the merger of the two 
parties by intimidating central socialist politicians; and to seize the initiative in economic 
policy-making from the Central Planning Board.173 With hindsight, Bobrowski realised that 
he had been made a scapegoat. Minc and the PWP leadership needed to dissociate themselves 
from anything which was turning out to be a ‘misconceived’ economic policy in the new 
political climate, and they also needed to blame someone.174 In January 1948 Minc revealed 
to a mutual friend that the conflict between him and Bobrowski was not personal but 
ideological. Bobrowski relates that upon being told this, he immediately asked the PSP 
leadership’s permission to resign. He could not work with a hostile Minc. Rather than letting 
him step down, to his surprise the PSP leadership told him they would defend him, and so he 
stayed on.175
It is important to stress that a large number of participants in the debate were unaware of 
many aspects of the political context. This is true not only for the socialists and the Central 
Planning Board employees, but also for their opponents. Unbeknown to Bobrowski, in early 
January 1948 the PSP Central Committee received a memorandum from the PWP, criticising 
the work of the Central Planning Board, and announcing its intention to reject both the CPB’s 
legislative proposal for a national economic plan for 1948, and its newly-established co-
ordination scheme. The PWP leadership called for an inter-party discussion and announced an 
alternative to the CPB’s proposal in the form of an economic plan for 1948 prepared by 
Minc’s Ministry of Industry and Trade.176
173 Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW. p.89 
174 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. Minc’s prominent role in 
economic policy has been attested to by Werblan, Andrzej, 1991. Stalinizm w Polsce Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Fakt. 
175 It would appear that the communication between the friend (Ludwik Grosfeld) and Minc took place during Minc’s trip  to 
Moscow (15-27 January 1948), during which Minc aimed to negotiate a long-term economic treaty between Poland and the 
Soviet Union. What transpired during these meetings is not known, but it seems clear that Stalin put pressure on both the 
PWP and the PSP to accelerate their merger and the sovietisation of Polish politics.Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia 
ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 
1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.p.190-191 Kowalik reports that Minc destroyed his 
detailed notes from the discussions with Stalin in March 1968. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-
gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW.p.35 
176 07.01.1948: Memorandum w sprawie báĊdnych metod opracowania planu gospodarczego na 1948 r. Przez CUP. The 
letter was probably sent on January 14th. JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-
1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN.p.560-565 
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The most obvious person to conduct the defence of CBP was Oskar Lange, the PSP’s highest 
authority on economics. Unfortunately, Lange was at that time attending a UN meeting and 
the best he could do was to prepare a paper in response to the accusations.177  In it he 
vigorously defended the Central Planning Board and the economic soundness of their work. 
According to Kowalik, the memorandum contained a minor error, despite Lange’s erudite and 
thorough analysis, and was for this reason downgraded from being the official PSP position in 
the debate as originally intended, to being a private opinion.178 Another possible reason for its 
demotion was the fact that the uncompromising defence of the CPB went against the interests 
of the PWP, which was an uncomfortable position to be in for those in the PSP leadership 
who were loyal to their coalition partner. According to the testimony of Jan Drewnowski, he 
and Adam Rapacki were charged by the PSP leadership with co-ordinating Bobrowski’s 
defence at the upcoming discussion meeting. To Drewnowski’s surprise and dismay, the PSP 
Central Executive Committee delayed appointing the main speaker until the last minute. Then 
the man in question, Tadeusz Dietrich, prepared a speech which appalled Drewnowski with its 
incompetence, and its leniency towards the PWP position. It was not the energetic defence 
Bobrowski needed, so Drewnowski and Rapacki resolved they would have to speak up at the 
meeting themselves.179
The ‘attacking’ group was formed from a mix of high-ranking polititians and lower-level 
PWP activists with varying claims as to their level of interest and competence in 
economics.180 This was their first apparation as Marxist-Leninist economists, and their debut 
in the presence of the established economists. While much can and will be said about their 
criticism of the views and methods of the CPB economists, there is little we can say about the 
stance of the Marxists-Leninists representing the PWP. They spent their time criticising their 
opponents, rather than presenting their own views on economics. What was apparent, 
177 Ibid. 1948, not earlier than January 7th: Oskar Lange comments on the Memorandum on the erroneous approach to 
establishing an economic plan for 1948 by the Central Planning Board. 
178 Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW. p.81-2 
179 Drewnowski, Jan, 1979. "The Central Planning Office on Trial: An Account of The Begginings of Stalinism in Poland." 
Soviet Studies, XXXI, 23-42.pp.26-27 Dietrich was later to take Bobrowski’s position as the head of the Board. Kowalik, 
Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW. 
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include all mentioned by all sources it consisted of: Hilary Minc (Minister of Industry) and his brother Bronisáaw Minc (CPB 
employee), E.Szyr (H.Minc’s second in command)W.Brus, (editor of the economic section of Nowe Drogi) S.JĊdrychowski 
(vice minister of Maritime affairs), B.Blass, Z.Wyrozembski, Cz. NowiĔski, M.Popiel (CPB employee), S. ĩurawicki,
W.Bienkowski, L.Rzendowski, A.Wang. 1998. Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna 
PTE. Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne., Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: 
Wydawnictwo Lubelskie., Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: 
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however, was their close links with the agitprop sector in terms of the adoption of ideological 
rhetoric and argumentation, and their subordination to the Party line (as defined by the Party 
leadership at any given moment). Even on such a flimsy basis it is clear that this brand of  
Marxism-Leninism differed strongly from the Marxism which had inspired influential Polish 
social scientists since the turn of the century.181 They also differed from their opponents in 
term of the cultural norms which underlay their political and scientific debates. The PWP 
economists considered the attack on the PSP via the Central Planning Board to be within the 
limits of those means that were necessary and permissible in the service of a greater good, as 
defined by the Party leadership. A revolutionary outlook and obedience to the Party 
leadership was characteristic of this disparate group of PWP economists. The only available 
source describing the viewpoint and role of the economists enlisted by the PWP leadership to 
take their part in the debate is the published testimony of Wáodzimierz Brus.182 According to 
him, these economists were not informed about the political aims of the manoeuvre, which is 
indicative of the stance of the Party leadership towards its own experts. They were treated as 
tools, not partners, and although the ‘tools’ willingly agreed to the aims and means deployed, 
this episode illustrates how the PWP leadership was from the start unwilling to include 
anyone from outside the closest circle of leadership in the decision-making process.  
The meeting itself was held on February 18th and 19th. On both days, the discussions started in 
the afternoon and went on until midnight, before an audience consisting of the leaderships of 
both parties, ministers, economists, and employees of the Central Planning Board, ranging in 
numbers from 120 at the beginning to 60 persons towards the end. As it was organised as an 
inter-party meeting, the non-affiliated employees of the Central Planning Board were 
excluded from the discussion, tilting the balance in favour of the PWP.  
181 Marx’s ideas were debated and served as inspiration for important scholars such as the sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki and 
Edward LipiĔski. 
182 Brus, Wáodzimierz, 1992. From revisionism to pragmatism: Sketches to a self-portrait of a "reform economist". In J.M. 
Kovács & M. Tardos (eds.) Reform and transformation in Eastern Europe. Soviet-type economics on the threshold of change. 
London: Routledge, 136-142. p.375-6 
 “At the time I was basically convinced of the correctness of this criticism and took an active part in the debate, the 
final stage of which was rather unexpectedly lifted to the level of the leaderships of both parties involved – PPR (Polish 
Workers’ Party – communist) and PPS (Polish Socialist Party) in February 1948. (…) This concise and subjective account of 
the “CUP debate” is not intended to create the impression that I shared only the theoretical communist positions while 
objecting to the political aims at the time; I had no objections to the latter when they finally became clear to me. The point 
which I want to make here is that those who were drafted as experts on economic matters were never told of, let alone asked 
to express their views on, the real issues at stake.” 
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The accusations against the Central Planning Board centred on two points, the first being the 
adopted practice of including services in the national product, which was stigmatised as 
‘bourgeois’ and false: 
Not only is it erroneous in economic terms, but it is also clearly a class-hostile 
method. It aims at the reduction of the role of the working class in the creation of 
the national income, and at the representation of the profits of parasitical social 
layers as a contribution to the national income.183
The other issue was the new scheme for the internal co-ordination of the plan. This brainchild 
of Bobrowski and his co-workers was designed to track the implications of the modification 
of one parameter for other parts of the plan: according to Bobrowski, they had been trying to 
invent Leontieff’s input-output tables.184 The PWP criticism seemed to him to have been 
founded on a lack of goodwill, or on a misunderstanding. Hilary Minc claimed there was a 
subordination of production to consumption in the CPB’s plans, something to which the PWP 
strongly objected. In Bobrowski’s explanation, the problem would not have arisen if the paper 
the schemes were written on had not been flat but cylindrical, as the idea of the co-ordination 
scheme was to connect the end with the beginning. The ‘hierarchy’ criticised by the PWP had 
not been seen as such by the CPB staff.185 However, behind these two secondary issues (on 
which the disagreement was not in fact as great as the PWP made it appear) loomed the 
question of whether Poland could continue to elaborate its own conception of economic 
planning.
The force of the plan consists in its being deeply scientific, and based on the 
principles of marxism. Only that can be the force of the plan, and only the 
scientific method of establishing the plan can be decisive. Furthermore, the force 
of the plan is that it is not merely a programme that provides orders (nakaz) and 
predictions. The force of the plan is that it transforms an idea into a real force, 
moving the working masses, and that through the intermediaries of political 
parties, trade unions and the Peasant Mutual Union it mobilises the whole nation 
in the struggle to fulfill andexceed the plan.186
183 JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy
Ĩródáowe, Warszawa: PWN. 07.01.1948: Memorandum w sprawie báĊdnych metod opracowania planu gospodarczego na 
1948 r. Przez CUP. (Memorandum on the matter of the erroneous methods of establishing an economic plan for 1948 by the 
Central Planning Board.) p.561 
184 As Bobrowski notes in his memoirs, Leontieff had already done this but the economists at the CPB were not aware of his 
work. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.197 
185 Czesáaw Bobrowski, transcript of interview by Tadeusz Kowalik. Biblioteka SGH/Zbiory specjalne/TaĞmy prof. 
Bobrowskiego
186  JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy
Ĩródáowe, Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade 
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The PWP’s vision of planning as explained by Szyr was quite different from how planning 
was conceived of in Bobrowski’s CPB.  
After speeches by H. Minc and Dietrich, which failed to introduce anything more than the 
contents of the document handout, the PWP began an efficiently organised campaign with a 
series of concerted speeches.187 Party discipline ensured that the PWP group was well-co-
ordinated and cohesive. They had also enlisted the support of some socialists, 188  which 
eventually allowed them to claim that the socialists had agreed with the PWP stance. The 
central PWP ideologue Jakub Berman was present at the debate, and while he did not take 
part in the discussion, it seems likely that he supervised the PWP attack.189 It is worth noting 
that the leadership of both parties was present but did not take part directly. Direct 
confrontation between the leaders of the ruling coalition was undesirable. The power struggle 
would instead be played out in a staged altercation between lower-ranking troops. This 
situation brings to mind a chess game where silent players move their pawns over the board. 
Oskar Lange had concluded his paper with the words: “…the aggressive tone of the 
memorandum (…) creates the impression that this is a case of looking for trouble rather than 
for a constructive discussion.”190 However, despite these premonitions, no-one seems to have 
been prepared for the aggressive and hostile attack that characterised the meeting. Instead of 
addressing its critique directly to the chairman, the PWP chose to attack the intermediate layer 
of department heads: Drewnowski, who was responsible for long-term planning, and 
Greniewski, who headed the coordination scheme. 191  This choice took Drewnowski and 
Rapacki, who were responsible for the preparation of the defence, completely by surprise. 
187 The sources differ slightly on the composition of the attacking group, but agree on who the principal critics were. If we 
include all those mentioned in all sources it consisted of: Hilary Minc (Minister of Industry) and his brother Bronisáaw Minc 
(CPB employee), W. Brus, (editor of the economic section of Nowe Drogi), S. JĊdrychowski (vice minister of Maritime 
Affairs), B Blass, Z. Wyrozembski, Cz. NowiĔski, M. Popiel (CPB employee), S. ĩurawicki, W. BieĔkowski, L. 
Rzendowski, A. Wang. 1998. Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE. Warszawa: 
Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne., Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie., 
Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW., JĊdruszczak, Hanna 
(ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: 
PWN. 
188 T. Dietrich, W. JastrzĊbski, K.Dąbrowski
189 Jakub Berman was present at the meeting both days. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: 
Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.193 
190  JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy
Ĩródáowe, Warszawa: PWN. Oskar Lange p.656 
191 In addition to Drewnowski and Bobrowski, the following  spoke up in defence of the Central Planning Board, but 
primarily in self-defence: K. Sokoáowski (one of the ‘Gospodarka Narodowa circle’, a member of PSP, and vice-director of 
the CPB),  H. Greniewski (‘GN-circle’, PSP, deputy director of CPB), Z. Surzycki (PSP, CPB employee), W. Hagemajer 
(PSP, Central Statistical Office). The list of champions of the CPB is completed by Prof. Edward LipiĔski (PSP, director of 
the Institute for National Economy, Prof. At Main School of Commerce, director of Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego) 
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They were also taken aback by the range of issues raised, as the list of PWP complaints was 
much broader than had been intimated by the initial memorandum. Shortly afterwards, 
challenges were made not only to minor points within specific proposals but to the entire 
economic policy orientation that the PSP and the CPB stood for. Criticism was expanded from 
specific methods of calculation used by the CPB to the legitimacy of non-soviet economics as 
such. As the attack was broadened, so attempts to defend became more difficult.  
Those who responded to this extensive criticism had been personally targeted and needed to 
defend themselves, before being able to help others. Drewnowski attests that he had planned 
to help Bobrowski, but following W. Brus’ vehement critique of his book, he had to 
improvise his own defence. Brus claimed Drewnowski’s work was an example of the 
detrimental influence of ‘bourgeois’ economics on the work of the CPB.192 Since the personal 
attacks were made in the context of political murders and show-trials, they made very 
powerful impressions. With them the PWP group introduced an atmosphere of fear and a level 
of aggression unfamiliar to both the socialists and the academics present. 
Bobrowski wanted to defend the CPB and its employees, but was granted the right to speak 
only at the very end, on the second day. Until that time he was only once allowed to respond 
directly to an accusation. Due to the serious nature of the alleged crime, Bobrowski was 
allowed to explain himself, at Gomuáka’s direct intervention, when he was accused of using 
CPB publication channels to spread anti-Soviet information.193 Since the error for which 
Bobrowski was held accountable had been committed by one of the PWP’s own people, 
recommended to Bobrowski by Minc, the matter was quickly dropped, to Bobrowski’s great 
relief. However, this incident left a sense of threat hanging in the air.
Rapacki made an effort to defend the CPB, but it had little impact, as he was neither part of 
the Central Planning Board, nor of the inner circle of power that straddled the boundary 
between the PSP and PWP. At the beginning of the discussion he objected to the broadening 
of the discussion topics, and the personal attacks, an intervention which was met with an 
192 At that time W. Brus was editor of the economic section of the Party ideological journal Nowe Drogi , wrote propaganda 
leaflets in the series “Soldiers Library” for the Army, and worked on an economics doctorate under Edward LipiĔski’s
supervision.  ASGH/ Wáodzimierz Brus’ personal folder  
The book which Brus criticised during the CPB discussion was: Drewnowski, Jan, 1947. Próba ogólnej teorii gospodarki 
planowej. Warszawa: Trzaska, Evret i Michalski. 
193 The accusation, made by B. Blass, touched on the publication in CPB sponsored journal of a review of a book that spoke 
of the Soviet labour camps. The employee responsible was in February 1948 no longer employed at the CPB. He had been 
included in Bobrowski’s staff on H. Minc’s recommendation. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: 
Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.193 
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ambiguous response from the PWP.194 His second intervention, at the very end of the second 
day, was made in a bitter and ironic tone, as he realised that the case was lost. Hagemajer, of 
the GUS, tried to clarify what appeared to the socialist economists to have been a 
misunderstanding by the accusers of technical practices and constraints resulting from the 
absence of reliable, comparable data. However, in the face of the silence of the PSP 
leadership, there was little that sympathisers from other institutions could do to help. 
Since he had not been allowed to conduct his own defence, Bobrowski clung to the PSP 
leadership’s promise to defend him. The leader of the Socialist party, Cyrankiewicz, however, 
appears to have abandoned all illusions of postponing the unification with the PWP to some 
distant date, or of avoiding it altogether.195 Whether he took an active part in setting up the 
debate in order to persuade reluctant party-colleagues, or merely abandoned the defence of a 
hopeless case, remains an open issue. When push came to shove, Cyrankiewicz did not speak 
up. Those like Drewnowski who expected him to throw his weight behind the Central 
Planning Board and the socialist economic programme in his concluding speech, were sadly 
disappointed.
The debate made it clear that the PWP wanted to take over economic policy, and that the PSP 
could not and would not stop it. We shall now look in more detail at those aspects of the 
debate that are directly relevant to our inquiry into the discipline of economics. Since the 
central element of the new economic course was the introduction of Soviet-style planning, 
there was no room for either the ‘old’ CPB or the economic theories upon which its work was 
founded.
Szyr launched the attack on neo-classical, or in his words ‘bourgeois’ economics, by 
describing the current situation in the discipline as sharply divided into two polarised 
tendencies.
We have in present-day economics literature in Poland and in economic journals 
an obvious conflict between two theories and two world views in political 
economy, and also in concrete and detailed questions, and no-one can deny in 
Poland that this is so.196
194 Both Gomuáka and H. Minc responded to Rapacki’s intervention, the former seeing nothing wrong in the way discussion 
was running, and the latter emphasising the need to concentrate on organisational issues. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o 
ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW.p.83 
195 Syzydek, Eleonora & Syzydek, Bronisáaw, 1996. Zanim zostanie zapomniany Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Projekt. p.140-
141
196 JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy
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Szyr’s description of the situation contrasts with the claim presented by the disciplinary 
establishment in the first 1947 issue of Ekonomista that “the development of theory in 
economics has reached such a stage that we can today freely speak of the absence of 
‘schools’ in economics”.197 In fact, Szyr was not so much describing an already-existing 
situation as creating it. In his intervention he redefined the boundaries and the ‘fault-lines’ of 
the discipline by imposing the PWP’s definition of ‘good economics’. This redefinition 
touched on several aspects of the discipline: the type of scientific discourse, the international 
orientation of the discipline, and the role of economics in economic policy-making. He was 
assisted by other PWP speakers who made use of aggressive propaganda vocabulary to attack 
CPB economists for being ‘bourgeois’, a label which had not previously been used. 
Control over scientific language was a key to control over the content and method of the 
discipline. This is because the choice of concepts, definitions and models reflects the ideas in 
economics that they express. Edward LipiĔski objected to the PWP group’s frequent use of 
ideologically charged expressions in the discussion of the content and quality of economic 
ideas. To this Szyr retorted: 
Comrade Professor LipiĔski talked here with biting irony about the issue of 
flashing about the terminology “revolutionary”, “counter-revolutionary”, 
“reactionary” etc. This irony was quite subtle, but I got the point. 
[Prof. LipiĔski: There was no irony.] 
 ...we must use revolutionary language for the masses. It is understood, that among 
ourselves we could use another language. We fought and fight still so that there 
will be one language among us and for the masses.198
From his position as rightful representative of the oppressed, Szyr re-cast LipiĔski’s demand 
for a language of economics controlled by professional academic economists as an elitist 
project, and as such to be condemned. Szyr justified the use of propaganda language by 
claiming that anything else would be an insult to the workers, the masses. Nevertheless, his 
manner of expression indicates that he felt uneasy facing an academic authority such as 
LipiĔski. His response is tinged with something akin to an inferiority complex, creating an 
impression of awkwardness in the positioning of the Party intelligentsia, drawn as they were 
Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade 
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Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade 
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in two directions by their wish to be acknowledged as professional while remaining loyal to 
the “proletariat”. 
If we look past Szyr’s justification of the introduction of ideology into the scientific 
discussion, however, the real issue at stake was not whether the ‘masses’ would be offended 
by the economists’ continued use of their specialist disciplinary discourse. Language and 
power being inextricably linked, the heart of the matter was that no groups outside the PWP 
leadership could be allowed to define the agenda or the concepts underlying policy decisions. 
Economists could not be allowed to maintain a professional language of their own that could 
escape the control of the PWP’s chief ideologues. Despite the protests voiced during the 
debate, professional language started an evolution towards newspeak. Words that were 
originally neutral were now given strong connotations, euphemisms abounded, and ready-
made formulas from the communist political vocabulary were repeated endlessly. The 
practice of name-calling was introduced, until then considered a breach of academic decorum: 
‘counter-revolutionary’, ‘bourgeois pseudo-science’ and even ‘fascist’ were to become the 
staple fare of scientific discussions and publications. These rhetorical devices were applied in 
such a way as to force the reorganisation of the discipline into a battle between Marxist-
Leninist and ‘bourgeois’ economics, an “us against them” setting which reflected the rising 
animosities and polarisation of the international situation. From a political perspective, the 
bonds with Anglo-Saxon economics that had been restored by Polish economists after the war 
were no longer an asset. Szyr presented the labels ‘American’ and ‘English’ as being highly 
objectionable:
When I open “Planned Economy” (…) people in authority, working in hands-on 
planning, write long pieces that are built upon the school of neo-capitalistic 
economics of apologetic character. This means they try to defend imperialism and 
capitalism in its final stage. Of course they do so with plentiful hedging: that there 
is the land reform in Poland, that there is the nationalisation of the means of 
production. Nevertheless, in a systematic and consequent way terminology, 
opinions and methods of calculation of the national product, are transferred from 
the English language to the Polish language. And it is a fact, that in a whole 
number of official publications we find, unfortunately, a terminology taken directly 
from the English and American school of economics…199
Szyr also went into the issue of control over the content of scientific publications. In his eyes 
publications in Poland were the domain of the PWP: to him simply “our press”:  
199 Ibid. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. 
p.587-8
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It is clear, that from our point of view, we need finally to break with this practice - 
that in our press and publications an ideology foreign to us and theories foreign to 
us are propagated and broadcast. This is a matter which is independent of the 
results of this discussion. We had to deal with the following case: there was a 
shortage of paper, and in the Economic Committee [the government committee co-
ordinating economic policies – AWH] the Central Planning Board was to present a 
proposal on which books should be printed. And what happened? 90% of that 
literature was by English and American economists, Keyns (sic!) and others, and 
was presented as the most appropriate literature for the Polish consumer at a time 
of acute paper shortage.200
Szyr wanted the PWP to assume control over scientific publications, to use this control to stop 
the flow of western literature into Polish economics, and instead to reorientate firmly in the 
direction of the Soviet Union. From there his intervention turned into an attack on economics 
and related disciplines for hindering progress through criticism of political initiatives, notably 
the recently launched Stakhanovite movement (June 1947):  
As soon as we say “development of work competition” suddenly there is a whole 
range of scientific interventions: Physiology of work, and the scientific work 
organisation, and all the great guns are rolled out to prove: - careful with the work 
competition, for you will exhaust the worker. When we talk of exceeding the plan, 
we hear: -these are people who do not understand the precision of scientific work, 
be careful about exceeding plans, for you will make more car wheels than cars. 
For these cases a whole literature was written during the time of the first 5-year 
plan in the Soviet Union. If there were such facts there, then we will use the 
opportunity to avoid them now. The criticism in itself is not right I believe, because 
it can provoke anxiety – not among us, but among the working class.201
Social scientists were denied the right to criticise policies on the grounds that the general 
public might “worry”. What the public was to be denied was expert assistance in any critical 
assessment of government policies. In the PWP’s patronising view the working class did not 
need to think critically about the Party, for it would always choose what was best for it.202 The 
authorities, on the other hand, did not need the opinions of Polish social scientists because 
from the Soviet experience they already knew all there was to know. Szyr’s message to 
economists was that the new regime no longer required the kind of services they had been 
providing. Independent and public criticism of the policies of the regime was no longer called 
200 Ibid. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. 
p.587-8
201 Ibid. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. 
p.590-1
202 See the work of P. Kenney on PWP and later PUWP relations with the working class.Kenney, Padraic, 1996. Rebuilding 
Poland : Workers and Communists, 1945-1950.
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for; in fact it would not even be tolerated. Inferring from this statement a dismissal of the 
usefulness of ‘bourgeois’ economics, LipiĔski reacted thus: 
We want the right to analyse, we want the right to research, in the name of the 
service of socialist construction. (…) In developing economic research and 
critically outlining certain objectives we do not want to let ourselves be pushed 
towards the opposite side of the barricade.203
LipiĔski had good reason be concerned. The area beyond the barricade being erected by the 
PWP was reserved for enemies of the state. If some of those present had missed the danger of 
such a development, he spelt it out, protesting: 
Comrade Szyr said: do not play at economic science, take everything (…) that 
Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia have created, and be content that you are fulfilling 
your scientific mission (…) I must say, humble ranks of economists such as those in 
Poland, (…) understand their mission quite differently and, as far as means and 
forces allow, have set themselves the aim of co-operating in the grand undertaking 
of constructing a socialist economy. (…) The construction of socialism cannot 
proceed without critical thought, or without the development of scientific 
analysis.204
LipiĔski fought for the existence of economics in Poland using rhetorical devices designed to 
match the tastes of the communist participants. So did other defenders of the CPB, a fact 
which Kowalik interpreted as an indicator of the discipline’s weakness in the face of the PWP 
attack. Rather than being an admission of defeat, I believe the fact that economists who sided 
with the CPB during this discussion used Marxist vocabulary and Soviet-friendly rhetoric 
reflects their realisation of the importance of enabling communication with the new decision-
makers.  
LipiĔski demanded work conditions under which scientific activity would continue to be 
possible, and a place in society where economics could contribute to the development of the 
country. When LipiĔski referred in his response to Szyr to sections of Soviet history which 
included purges and show-trials, he made it clear that Polish economists were well aware of 
what Soviet political culture had in store for intellectuals.
203 Quote after Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW.p.86 
204 Quoted after Kowalik, Tadeusz, Year. Intervention in  panel debate. In: Pte, ed.^eds. Walka o losy Centralnego Urzedu 
Planowania w 1948 roku, Warszawa: PTE. p.46 
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We all know, just as comrade minister Szyr does, what went on in Soviet Russia, 
what the history of the development of economic ideas was, we know all about 
certain deviations, about the ideas of Bazarov, Bogdanov, the coniucturalists, that 
turned out to be hostile to the construction of the socialist system in Russia. In 
remembering these events and referring to my intervention, Comrade minister Szyr 
somehow wanted to point out that what is hidden here is pseudo-socialism.205
The Soviet regime had a history of intervening politically in the discipline, and Szyr’s 
announcement that the PWP would follow the Soviet example was a reason for concern.  
Why was it LipiĔski who presented the strongest defence of the CPB? After all, he did not 
even work there.206  It would appear that Edward LipiĔski was attempting to defend the 
discipline of economics. As chief editor of Ekonomista and president of the national 
association of economists, he was well-qualified to act as the representative of the profession. 
His lengthy period of activity in the socialist movement, his wartime role as organiser of 
clandestine education, and his history of firm opposition to anti-semitism before the war, 
combined to provide him with the necessary political capital in the post-war political 
landscape. Throughout the years of the People’s Republic, the communists found it extremely 
difficult to tell Edward LipiĔski to stop talking, and he on his part never showed any 
inclination to do so. His aim was to bridge the yawning chasm that was now appearing 
between western economics and Marxism-Leninism, an endeavour I shall return to in the 
second part of this chapter.
The PWP’s recipe for success was seemingly simple: to use propaganda language, to ignore 
protests, and to refuse to understand any arguments formulated in neo-classical economic 
terms. The explanations of Drewnowski, Hagemejer and Bobrowski were brushed away as 
‘technicalities’. The absence of ideologically-laden rhetoric on the CPB side was interpreted 
205 Quoted after Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW.p.86  
A great number of Soviet economists perished during the purges, and their views were condemned. Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 
1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.521-525 The economists mentioned by 
LipiĔski were from the group of “old bolsheviks” who were gradually removed from positions of power and influence by 
Lenin and then Stalin. Vladimir Alexandrovich Bazarov (1874 - 1939) joined the Bolsheviks in 1904 and produced a Russian 
translation of Das Capital between 1907 and 1909. Before 1917 his most important works were philosophical, and his key 
associate was Alexander Bogdanov (1873-1928) who in 1918 became a professor of economics at the University of Moscow 
and director of the newly-established Socialist Academy of Social Sciences. Bogdanov was condemned in a show-trial, and 
Bazarov turned to research on blood transfusions and died following a failed scientific experiment. Source: 
http://www.answers.com/topic/vladimir-alexandrovich-bazarov and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bogdanov 
accessed 16.05.2007 The term “coniuncturalists” probably refers, among others, to Nikolay D. Kondratyev (1892-1938?) 
who lost his position as director  of the Institute for the Study of Business Activity in 1928 following his critique of Stalin’s
collectivisation policy, was arrested in 1930, sentenced to an eight year sentence in 1931 and to death in 1938. Kondratyev, 
Nikolay D. (2007). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved September  24,  2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: 
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9045995 
206 According to Bobrowski, LipiĔski’s support warmed him greatly because it was unexpected; there were no close bonds 
between them.Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.192 
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in a report to the PWP Central Committee by JĊdrychowski as weakness, and as 
demonstrating an absence of opinions on the part of CPB economists and their supporters. 
Revealing his own stance, he referred to his opponents as “ideologues”. A “wall of deliberate 
misunderstanding and premeditated hostility” (to use Drewnowski’s phraseology) had certainly been 
erected by the PWP.  
Bobrowski asserted in his memoirs that before the CPB discussion he had already been aware 
that the real distribution of power was such that the CPB could not continue without the 
permission of the PWP, which could veto any important decision made by the CPB. From this 
came the desperate efforts to reach an agreement, to negotiate some room for manoeuvre, and 
to find space for scientific practice and constructive criticism on the part of the ‘defenders’ of 
the CPB and established economics.  
The PWP also had the advantage of the element of surprise. It seems that only some on the 
CPB-socialist side (such as Cyrankiewicz) knew what to expect, while some (such as 
LipiĔski). were quick to read the situation correctly. However many, including those 
responsible for the organisation of the CBP’s defence, Drewnowski and Rapacki, were 
unprepared for what was to come, unable to see the greater political game, and were thus 
outmanoeuvred. Bobrowski himself was disorientated and unsure how to act during the 
meeting.207 It is difficult in retrospect to evaluate the extent to which fear influenced those 
under attack. LipiĔski’s reference to the fate of Soviet economists during the stalinist purges 
clearly indicates that at least part of the audience was fully aware of the political mechanisms 
of the system. With the statement, “One cannot hold false opinions and have a false world 
view in such institutions as the Central Planning Board, without influencing the latter’s 
work...”,208 Szyr was in fact accusing all the employees of the CPB, at a time when arrests for 
‘sabotage’ of economic enterprises were common. What went on at this meeting could well 
have been the prelude to a political show-trial, and the realisation of this danger, in 
conjunction with feeling startled, could well have paralysed the socialist economists, and 
stopped them from doing and saying what they might have wished. 
It is possible to point out a number of details in the preparation for and conduct of the debate 
that demonstrate the PWP’s political skill in manipulating their opponents and negotiating the 
207 Ibid.p.194, 199 
208 JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy
Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN. The Central Planning Board debate: The speech of Vice-Minister of Industry and Trade 
Eugeniusz Szyr: 19.02.1948. p.590 
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best possible position in the argument for themselves. Firstly, the PWP secured the 
collaboration of the PSP leadership in keeping the plans and content of the discussion from 
Bobrowski and not allowing him to defend the CPB. In this way the PWP ensured that their 
view would be backed by some socialists. They also arranged for Hilary Minc to deliver the 
concluding words of the debate. An atmosphere of pressure and fear was created that was 
designed to break down the CBP and the socialists’ defence. The discussions dragged on for 
hours into the night, there were interminable accusatory speeches, and even elements of ‘good 
cop – bad cop’ routines: vicious attacks from lower-ranking communists were met with 
rebukes from the PWP leadership, and, after coordinating the attack on Bobrowski, Berman 
showed concern for Bobrowski’s well-being by driving him home and putting him to bed.209
Bobrowski was confused by these ambiguous signals, and this hesitation made him hold back 
from defending himself too vehemently. He may have thought that not all of the Central 
Planning Board was yet a lost cause. 
Most importantly, the PWP broke the fundamental rule that the participants in a debate should 
feel safe about voicing any arguments they considered to be valid. The sense of outrage 
present in the testimonies of those attacked is in great part the result of this transgression. 
Even the attacking PWP members were aware of this, and JĊdrychowski had to defend the 
tenor of the debate: 
It could be said that certain errors and exaggerations may have been made on our 
part, and that these could have led to discussants saying, “The PWP members are 
attacking us” or, “Now I am on the operating table”. These exaggerations arose 
from a certain feverishness in the discussion, but apart from that the discussion did 
not have such a character, and towards the end there was a series of interventions, 
that clearly stated the necessity of carrying out a break with the past, and that the 
methods of planning applied by the Central Planning Board were false, were 
bourgeois. 210
The admission that the PWP group got carried away should be seen in relation to testimonies 
revealing that even H. Minc showed his disapproval of some of the more ‘heated’ attacks 
during the meeting. 211  This admission, however, was also the end of PWP’s concern. 
JĊdrychowski was not about to admit that fear of the repressive apparatus affected the 
discussants. Instead he alleged that no defence of the relevance of and right to use ‘bourgeois’ 
209 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.193 
210 JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy
Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN.p.639. Stefan JĊdrychowski’s speech to the PWP CC, 25.05.1948. 
211 Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoáeczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948. Warszawa: NOW. p.88 
78
economic methods was attempted, thereby deliberately ignoring LipiĔski’s intervention. As 
the victor, JĊdrychowski felt entitled to rewrite history; he belittled the opposition and made 
the arguments of his own team appear to be even more forceful and superior. According to 
him, H. Minc’s speech was a “brilliantly tempestuous attack” while Rapacki’s intervention 
was “buffoonery”. His report made the CPB and socialist opposition seem lacking in 
determination and conviction. 
The reported attitude of the attacked socialist economists continued to provoke emotional 
debate even fifty years after the event. Drewnowski’s claim that the CPB economists 
defended their institution and established economic theories in a cohesive and determined 
manner has been challenged by T. Kowalik on the basis of his reading of the protocol of the 
debate. Kowalik argued he could not see any defence.212 Instead he expressed disappointment 
with the socialists for not defending their vision. This interpretation profoundly upset 
Drewnowski, who saw in it an allegation of cowardice and an acceptance of stalinism.213 I see 
no reason to doubt Drewnowski’s assertion that there was indeed a desire to defend the 
Central Planning Board and the legitimacy of applying western economic theories and 
methods to the new socialist economy. Drewnowski himself acknowledged the failure of this 
defence, so the controversy with Kowalik boils down to whether all that could be done was in 
fact done.
Szyr’s redefinition of the discipline explains in part the surprise expressed by Drewnowski in 
the quote on page 61. Those who arrived at the meeting thinking that they represented a 
cohesive profession were told by PWP politicians that this was not the case. Their discipline 
was a stage in a struggle between ‘bourgeois’ and Marxist-Leninist economics. Those who 
saw themselves as members of a profession defined by mutual recognition were shocked by 
the political appointment to the status of “economist” of individuals who had no formal 
education and training as economists, and were aghast at finding their argument overwhelmed 
by the propaganda slogans proclaimed by the latter. In his intervention (amply quoted above), 
212 Kowalik (1980) p.93: “(…) during his discussion not one of the participants defended any of the concepts which made up 
his model [i.e. the socialist economic program –awh]. If we look away from the intervention of LipiĔski quoted above on the 
topic of the fate of economics and certain economists, we can see that no-one stepped forward with even a veiled criticism of 
the existing Soviet system. (…) From his perspective, not only Bobrowski, but all socialists, including LipiĔski and Rapacki 
– that is, the authors of the boldest statements, spoke as ones vanquished, as ones who already assumed that more general 
matters, matters of system or model, were doomed. So they did not touch upon these areas, and in their interventions created 
an impression of fundamental agreement with their accusers.” 
213 Stalinism is not capitalised in this text as I follow the usage established by Kenney and Connelly. See Connelly, John, 
2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956 Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press. p. xi 
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vice-minister Szyr had spoken on behalf of the regime, laying down the line for the 
relationship between the profession and the governing bodies. Rather than the sugar-coated 
version of their grand role in the new system that the PWP would later offer economists, Szyr 
had blatantly stated that Soviet experience would replace native economic research. He made 
it clear that if economists wanted to avoid a ‘lock-out’ they should cease their criticism of 
Government policies.  
Overnight Bobrowski found himself in the limbo of political disgrace: “… on February 20th, I 
came to the CPB as I had done every day. The phenomenon that I now am familiar with: not 
one single phone call, not one visitor, was new to me then.” 214  Clearly, the news of 
Bobrowski's fall from power had already spread widely through political and economic 
circles, and the signals concerning the reorientation in economic policy had already reached 
other institutions. The dismantling of the Central Planning Board also meant the disbanding of 
the team working there. In the weeks following the debate, the PSP and non-party employees 
were fired or moved to lower posts. Some would never again have positions of this calibre. 
Drewnowski’s claim that the CPB debate marks the start of stalinism in Poland is not 
generally acknowledged.215 If we look at it from the more limited perspective of the history of 
Polish economics, however, it is not difficult to see Drewnowski’s point that the CPB debate 
marked the beginning of something new. 
During the CPB debate the economists’ control over methods and research problems was 
challenged by people with neither academic degrees nor authority from within the profession. 
Marxist-Leninist economists claimed authority in all scientific discussion, on the basis of two 
assertions. Primo, power and class relations permeate society and economy and so the 
‘bourgeois’ economists’ claim that their arguments rested on objective knowledge was 
invalid. Secundo, only Marxism acknowledges the fundamental role of the power relations in 
society and takes the side of the oppressed masses, which makes Marxism the only truly 
214 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.197 It may be noted that some 
years later, with the coming of the Thaw, Hilary Minc would find himself in the same position. See ToraĔska’s interview 
with his wife Julia Minc in ToraĔska, Teresa, 1997. Oni, new revised ed. Warszawa: Swiat Ksiazki.. Bobrowski, once he 
returned to Poland and regained an influential position, renewed his acquaintance with Minc in 1956, partly out of sympathy 
with the then ailing Minc, and partly out of respect for the latter’s intelligence.Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze 
stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie.p.168 
215 Bobrowski considered it was blowing up the importance of the debate out of proportion, while Kowalik argues that 
elements of stalinism were in evidence before this, and that public debates openly challenging communist ideas continued 
even after February 1948. In addition, the version of Minc’s conclusion that was made public mentioned no-one by name and 
represented the debate as a friendly gathering. Kowalik points out that as the debate was not made fully public it had a 
limited impact on the Polish society. Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1980. Spory o ustrój spoleczno-gospodarczy w Polsce 1944-1948.
Warszawa: NOW.pp.94-95 Czesáaw Bobrowski, transcript of interview by Tadeusz Kowalik. Biblioteka SGH/Zbiory 
specjalne/TaĞmy prof. Bobrowskiego 
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scientific ideology in the eyes of Marxist-Leninists.  What established economists regarded as 
a neutral method of analysis was, according to the Marxist-Leninist, merely a hostile and false 
ideology in disguise. The logic of ‘everything is politics’ made it difficult to uphold the 
boundary between the ‘internal’ scientific and ‘external’ political spheres. In turn, the 
abolition of this boundary undermined the autonomy of the discipline, and also the 
professional economists’ control over what could be classed ‘good science’.
The PWP’s move against the CPB did not immediately bring down the old, established 
economic profession hierarchies. The senates of the academic schools, the editorial boards of 
scholarly journals, and the boards of professional associations all continued to function. The 
attack on the CPB only started the process through which Marxism-Leninism would take its 
hegemonic position in the discipline. The next battle for control over economics would be for 
control over the journal Ekonomista.
The evolution of Ekonomista in 1948 
The three volumes of Ekonomista published in 1947 reflect the response of established 
economists to the challenges of reconstruction in a new political setting, as well as to recent 
developments in economic thought. In 1948 the journal became the scene of a confrontation 
between three trends, as established Western-oriented economics was challenged by two 
competing brands of  Marxism-Leninism: PWP-sponsored, Soviet-oriented political economy, 
and a moderate ‘eclectic’ version aiming at a synthesis of both Marx’s concepts and neo-
classic economics. While these alternative tendenciess were being debated on the pages of 
Ekonomista, however, political develpments tilted the balance towards the Marxist-Leninist 
economists. Their competitors were successively silenced and the debate closed.  
During the first post-war years (1945-1947), higher education and research did not figure 
among the PWP’s primary concerns. The conquest of political power, the establishment and 
stabilisation of control over a disorganised and reluctant society, occupied most of the Party’s 
attention. Instead of alienating a group that enjoyed high status and a great deal of respect in 
Polish society, the PWP mostly left the academic world alone. During the same period 
economics profited from the profession’s close contacts with economic policy making. Both 
these circumstances were about to change, as the PWP turned its attention to the submission 
of the PSP and of all scientific life. As we have already seen in the example of the CPB 
debate, the tension between the PWP and the PSP was affecting PSP-dominated economic 
policies, including the status of economic theories underlying these policies.
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By the end of 1947 the liberal and pluralistic content of Ekonomista was out of tune with the 
political situation. New developments were quickly perceived and acted upon by the editorial 
board. 216 As was evident from his interventions at the CPB debate, LipiĔski was not fully 
unprepared for what he encountered at the there, and was quite aware of the dangers for the 
discipline that would follow from the deterioration in PSP-PWP relations. With the Socialist 
Party losing power, the future of economics came to depend solely on its representatives’ 
ability to negotiate successfully with the PWP. Some time in late 1947 or early 1948
Ekonomista’s editor Edward LipiĔski took steps to ensure that the 'contract' upon which the 
concession to publish Ekonomista was founded was still valid. Based on what he said in a 
discussion in February 1953, we know that he contacted the leaderships of both the socialist 
and communist parties to ask for help in organising co-operation between Marxist-Leninist 
economists and the Ekonomista.217 LipiĔski reported in 1953 that the response was polite but 
ineffectual, as no Marxists-Leninist economists were allotted to work for Ekonomista. In 
order to make Ekonomista appear to be open to trends favoured by the PWP, LipiĔski had to 
do the work himself, searching out articles in Soviet journals and having them translated, as 
well as writing on Marxism-Leninism and Soviet economics.218 His contacts in the PWP 
leadership assured LipiĔski that:  
...this was a point at which it was not in the interests of the party to alter the profile 
of ‘Ekonomista’ completely, and at this stage of development – he said – “we will 
still tolerate the utterances of bourgeois economists.”219
Several things can be deduced from this piece of information. Firstly, we learn that the PWP 
leadership accepted and (actively but not publicly) sanctioned the continued existence of 
‘bourgeois’ tendencies within the discipline. Secondly, it is a rare clue as to the nature of the 
216 According to Kersten the first meetings where PWP started to plan a more offensive policy towards higher education and 
research were held in the spring. Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1.
edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: California University Press.p.380 
217 AAN/ANS/5/44 Stenographic report of the discussion held at the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres to honour 
and assess the import of Stalin’s work on economic problems under socialism, 27.02.1953-01.03.1953. pp.45-55, 68-75 
 LipiĔski stood up to defend Ekonomista and his activity as its editor. The reason the issue of Ekonomista came up, was that 
Stalin’s total turnabout in the matter of the existence of general economic laws meant that the border against ‘bourgeois’ 
economics had to be redrawn. This was what ĩurawicki tried to accomplish through a new interpretation of the history of 
Polish economic thought. I shall return to this discussion in a later chapter. In 1953 LipiĔski was uncertain about the exact 
date, and so it is possible these moves were made either directly before the planned CPB discussion, or even after when the 
reorientation of the PWP policy had become apparent. However, his interventions during the CPB debate indicate he was 
well informed about the situation in advance. Unfortunately neither the PEA collection at AAN nor LipiĔski’s papers in the 
PAN Archive contain any material on this question. 
218 LipiĔski’s claim that no articles from Marxist-Leninists were available for publication in Ekonomista is corroborated by 
the fact that no-one contradicted it when he presented it in the above quoted discussion in 1953. Given the nature of that 
discussion we could assume that his opponents would have done so if they had a basis for doing so. 
219 AAN/ANS/5/44, Stenographic report of the discussion held at the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres to honour 
and assess the import of Stalin’s work on economic problems under socialism, 27.02.1953-01.03.1953. p.74 LipiĔski did not 
reveal the identity of this interlocutor, but stressed that it was the person who held the authority to make such a decision. 
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relationship between an editor of scientific journals and the PWP. Thirdly, it is a possible 
explanation for LipiĔski’s worries about the plans that the PWP had for the discipline and the 
journal, if it is the case that he remembers the PWP politician’s statement correctly.  
The important process of recruiting and selecting contributions from among the submissions, 
and the necessary adjustment of the profile of each issue to the political situation, remain 
obscured by a lack of appropriate sources. Did the mid-winter consultations undertaken by 
LipiĔski evolve into a regular practice? Did the PWP Central Committee continuously 
supervise work on the composition of Ekonomista, or was some lesser activist installed as a 
watchdog? If so, who set down the limits of manoeuvre for the editor, when, and in what 
terms? If not, how did he collect the information necessary to make this assessment himself? 
How much independence did he have in relation to the PEA’s governing bodies? These 
questions must await further research, preferably based on not one, but several scientific 
journal editors’ experiences. I will relate my findings, but what I have found in my archival 
searches is too fragmentary to answer these questions fully.
Ekonomista 1948:1 
The first issue of 1948 already bore initial signs of change. Prepared previously, but appearing 
just after the CPB debate, it opened with a reprint of a Soviet article: J.A. Kronrod's “Basic 
issues in Marx and Lenin’s theories of production under capitalist and socialist systems”.220
This article introduced new concepts by discussing Marx and Lenin's ideas, and by revealing 
new patterns of political behaviour. On the very first page Kronrod respectfully referred to a 
Stalin quote: "In order to live, one needs food, clothes, shoes, fuel for heating, shelter, etc. 
and to obtain these goods, one must produce them."221 The quote surprises by a banality 
worthy of an elementary school assignment, though here it was presented as the basis for a 
discussion on production theory. Also, no more references were made to Stalin, as the author 
was concerned with Marx’s economic thought. The function of the Stalin quote was clearly to 
ensure the political correctness of the piece, a practice which represented a radical departure 
from the traditions and practice of Polish scholarship, or at any rate of Ekonomista. Kronrod’s 
220 Kronrod, J. 1948 „Zasadnicze zagadnienia teorii Marksa i Lenina dotyczące pracy produkcyjnej w ustroju 
kapitalistycznym i socjalistycznym” Ekonomista, 1
221 Kronrod, Jakow (1912-1984) specialised in the theory of reproduction and took part in the discussion on the law of value 
in socialism. The article was published in Izwestia Akademii Nauk SSSR -Otdilenie Ekonomiki i Prawa. (1947:1) and was 
translated into Polish by LipiĔski. More on the later publications of Kronrod can be found in Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. 
Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. p.528, Stalin J. in "O dialektycznym i 
historycznym materializmie" Zagadnienia Leninizmu. quoted in 1948 Ekonomista, 1,  p.3  
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example told Polish economists to pay symbolic homage to the political patron and then 
proceed to business.  
The entire 1948:1 issue appears to have been set up according to this philosophy. The 
editorial board made a bow in the direction of the PWP by publishing Kronrod, and continued 
in the old vein. 222 Ekonomista still contained contributions from eminent ‘bourgeois’ 
economists such as Edward Taylor and Wacáaw Fabierkiewicz. 223  The most important 
discussion centred on the work of Józef Zagórski. Supervised by E. LipiĔski, the study 
examined how the tools of neo-classical economics could be applied to socialist economy and 
planning.224 The main part of the discussion was dominated by an exchange of polemic 
between representatives of the academic establishment, whose articles contained no 
references to Marx or any Soviet economists' work. M. Oráowski's article, for instance, 
contained references to Schumpeter, Holtrop, Wicksell, Petty, Cantillon, Keynes, and E. 
Bark.225 Cz. Strzeszewski, a professor at the Catholic University in Lublin, discussed the 
latest developments in the theory of production, referring to names like Taylor, Pigou, 
Raynaud, Calmette, Byé, Witkowski, Bordas, and Hayek.226 Furthermore there were many 
reviews of foreign (mostly western) literature, as well as a bibliography of works published 
since 1939 listing page after page of western economists’ works.227
On the whole the 1948:1 issue appears to have been only slightly influenced by the political 
tension building up between the PWP and the PSP. However, there were difficulties behind 
222 Editor: E.LipiĔski, Secretary: Jerzy JĊdruszek. Editorial committee: A. Krzyzanowski, E. LipiĔski, E. Taylor, S. Zaleski. 
Executive committee: S. Zaleski, J. Drewnowski, W. Hagemejer, S. Rączkowski, K. Secomski, J. Zagórski. The issue was 
printed by Spóádzielnia Wydawnicza "Wiedza" in àódĨ.
223 Wacáaw Fabierkiewicz (1891-1967) was before the war active in the PSP, docent at the Free University’s section in àódĨ
where he taught political economy. During the war he was active in clandestine teaching, escaped from a transport heading 
for the Concentration Camp in Majdanek. After the war he became professor (prof.nadzw.) of àódĨ University. Removed 
from his position in 1948, worked at Textile Institute. Reinstated in academic position in 1958. Tych, Feliks (ed.) (1987) 
Slownik biograficzny dzialaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego E-J, Warszawa: KsiąĪka i Wiedza. 
224 Zagórski, Józef, ”Zysk konkurencyjny” Ekonomista (1947:1); ”Koszty krancowe a produkcja optymalna” Ekonomista
(1947:2); „Techniczna koncepcja kosztów a optimum produkcji” Ekonomista (1948:1); Oyrzanowski, Broniáaw „Koszty 
krancowe a produkcja optymalna .Uwagi na temat artykulu Jozefa Zagórskiego” Ekonomista (1948:1) 
The discussion had commenced in earlier issues and was based on Zagórski’s doctoral thesis, excerpts of which were 
published in Ekonomista in 1947, now available in the 'PTE library' series. In issue (1948:1) Zagórski responded to Wakar's 
review of his book and in another article Oyrzanowski gave his comments on Zagórski's work. Ekonomista (1948:1), 
Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.573-574 
225 Orlowski, Mirosáaw, 1948. "Uwagi o szybkosci pieniadza". Ekonomista.
226 Strzeszewski, Czesáaw was between 1946 and 1949 dean of the Lublin Catholic University’s Department of Law and 
Socio-economic sciences. Strzeszewski, Czesáaw, Ibid."Problem czasu w sprawie wydajnoĞci zmiennej". 
227 Wacáaw Fabierkiewicz engaged in polemics with Witold Krzyzanowski, and when discussing the work of M. Polanyi 
related the theories of the latter to Keynes’. Fabierkiewicz, Wacáaw, „Czy moze byü mowa o specjalnej teorii usáug” 
Ekonomista (1948:1) Edward Taylor reviewed the work of Szynkaruk-Sulmicki, who worked on concepts from Keynes’ 
theory of employment, and responded to the rather unsuccessful attempts at self-defence by another author he had reviewed 
earlier. Taylor, Edward, ”Szynkaruk, Paweá” and ”Odpowiedz recenzenta” in Ekonomista (1948:1) 
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the scenes, as the first source to mention the censorship of Ekonomista indicates. In a letter to 
the PEA central board sent before this issue appeared, Professor Taylor asked: 
(…) could Ekonomista be censored in Warsaw, despite being printed in àódĨ? If 
so, would it be better to print it in Warsaw? Provincial censors will tend to delete 
items without any justification or understanding, as was lately the case with the 
review of Dr. Szynkaruk’s work.228
The review he referred to appeared in the 1948:1 issue, so it is clear that this issue was 
subjected to censorship, and that the censors did delete parts of the original text. While it is 
possible to read this quote as an indication that this was not the first occurrence of this kind, 
as he appears to speak of censorship as an accepted fact, the sources I have found on this 
subject are too scarce to make it a certainty. 
At this stage, rather than direct pressure, it was the general political context, and anticipated 
future developments, that motivated the editor of Ekonomista to introduce Soviet economic 
theory into the journal. His decision to compromise at a time when some still hoped this could 
be avoided must have been the result of a conscious decision. LipiĔski’s openness towards the 
PWP paid off in 1953, just days before the death of Stalin, and at the darkest moment of the 
stalinist Polish era. At a Party gathering convened to celebrate the wisdom of Stalin’s 
pamphlet Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, LipiĔski was able to argue 
convincingly that the absence of Marxist-Leninist articles from the journal in these early years 
was a result of the Marxist-Leninist economists not submitting writings, rather than of any 
deliberate obstruction on the part of Ekonomista’s editorial staff. In 1953 he was even able to 
go on the offensive, and to make the audience laugh at his opponents on several occasions 
during his speech: 
228 AAN/PTE/157 PTE ZG dzial programowy. DziaáalnoĞü  wydawnicza PTE. Sprawozdania. Korespondencja (1948-1949)
Letter from Edward Taylor to the Central board of the PEA( ZG PTE), written in Poznan 9.1.1948 
Szynkaruk-Sulmicki, Paweá (1909-1980) completed a doctorate in Freiburg (Switzerland) during the war. On his return to 
Poland he worked at the CPB and later the National Bank, while lecturing at PoznaĔ University. As we shall see later, in 
1958, according to Drewnowski, he ran into problems and was denied an approval (nostrification) of his doctorate in Poland, 
so that the work he had submitted as a habilitation was only counted as a doctorate. Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia 
naukowa". Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 35, 451-489, Gazda, Zbigniew, 1998. Slownik biograficzny ekonomistów 
polskich od XIII wieku do polowy wieku XX. Kielce: WyĪsza Szkoáa Pedagogiczna im. J.Kochanowskiego w Kielcach.
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It is evident to all that I have no intention of defending ‘Ekonomista’, that erstwhile 
‘Ekonomista’. It was certainly a journal featuring bourgeois articles (in 1946 and 
1947). It featured such articles because no others existed. (…) The editorial board 
of “Ekonomista” published different articles at the time. Among others it published 
an article by Professor Skrzywan, crying bitter tears as it did so. Professor 
ĩurawicki wonders how that article could have appeared so freely [bezkarnie- 
literally ‘without punishment’-AWH] and that no one responded. I wonder as well.
I wonder why Professor ĩurawicki did not then come forward with a critique. Why 
he did not write an article on that topic, why did he allow such things to happen 
freely [bezkarnie], and why it did not enter his head that he should write and fight 
with all his force? “Ekonomista” was open to everyone, and it invited marxist 
economists in. But Professorĩurawicki did nothing.229
LipiĔski’s allegation that the editors had been ‘crying bitter tears’ over the publication of this 
article in 1947, which could be read as a disavowal of his former actions and opinions, calls 
for an explanation. The gist of Skrzywan’s argument in the article was that economists should 
resist the temptation to pursue planning and other forms of interventionist policies, while 
LipiĔski was among those economists positive about planning (although not about the Soviet 
version of it). What is significant is that when the article was accepted for publication (in late 
1947 for the first part and early 1948 for the second) the fact that an economist’s opinions 
differed from those of the journal’s editor was not a reason to bar him from publication.230
Ekonomista 1948:2 
In April, after the PSP had agreed to an acceleration of the unification process, the PWP lifted 
some of the pressure. Kersten states that “After forcing the Socialist leaders to agree to 
accelerate the process of merging the parties, the Communists decided to, as Cyrankiewicz 
put it, unite the party ‘by using heads and not asses.”231 The speed-up could seem to be a 
poor deal given the support the PSP enjoyed in Polish society, but a good deal when 
compared to the way the socialist parties were merged with the communist parties in other 
229 AAN/ANS/5/44, Stenographic report of the discussion held at the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres to honour 
and assess the import of Stalin’s work on economic problems under socialism, 27.02.1953-01.03.1953 pp.72-73  
A look at Ekonomista’s tables of contents show just how biting this remark was. ĩurawicki published his first piece in that 
journal (a review) in the (1952:3) issue. 
230 Skrzywan, Wacáaw (1898-1956), a statistician, worked at LipiĔski’s Institute of Business Cycles and Price Research 
before the war, deported to Auschwitz in 1940, and gained his doctorate in 1945 at ToruĔ University where he was then 
employed as a docent. He was made extraordinary professor in 1949.Trzynadalowski, Jan (ed.) (1980) Uczeni Wrocáawscy, 
Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy im. OssoliĔskich.The article in question was: "O podstawowych twierdzeniach ekonomii c.d." 
Ekonomista issue 3-4, 1947, p.179 He wrote: “… planned activity is the dream of many economists; that is why we search 
for the dynamic equilibrium just as we searched for the philosophical stone in former times, forgetting that the greatest 
tragedy is that of the dream fulfilled…” 
231 Kersten, Krystyna, 1991. The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948., 1. edition 1984 ed. Berkeley: 
California University Press.p.435 
86
People’s Democracies during these months. After the tension at the CPB debate in the winter, 
in spring there was a slight relaxation. Hence, although in the next issue of Ekonomista
(1948:2) the steady progress of the Marxist-Leninist presence and influence was evident, it 
did not size up to the threat of the elimination of ‘bourgeois’ economics made at the CPB 
debate.
In the issue submitted for printing in July 1948, a “censors’ code” was added to the technical 
information inside the jacket, indicating that the censorship mentioned by Taylor did not only 
continue but became regulated and organised. 232  Given that censorship was now an 
established practice, it is as interesting to see who was no longer able to publish as to discover 
which articles actually appeared. The principal proponents of liberal neo-classical economics, 
such as KrzyĪanowski, Taylor, and Zaleski, found themselves barred from access to the 
journal. This was not a temporary silence but the start of an absence that was to last until the 
reversal of the Marxist-Leninist monopoly in 1956.233 Throughout 1948, however, all three 
continued to sit on the Publications’ Section committee of the Scientific Council of the PEA 
which supervised Ekonomista. In May the Section decided to honour Adam KrzyĪanowski’s
fortieth anniversary as a professor in Ekonomista’s 1948:3 issue. This plan was not realised, 
but its existence indicates that the economists sitting in central PEA bodies at that point still 
felt they were masters of their journal.234
Compared to the 1948:1 issue, the accent had now moved from a discussion of how to apply 
the tools of western economics to a socialist economy, to one of whether importing such 
elements into Soviet marxist economics was desirable or possible. An important mover 
behind a ‘western-marxism’ (later termed ‘eclectic’) option was Edward LipiĔski. In his 
article, after presenting an overview of Soviet economists’ views on economic laws, he 
concluded by raising, “…the problem of the critical importing by socialist marxist economics 
of some of the tools of work and methods of analysis established by bourgeois science over 
the course of a long evolution.”235 In addition to LipiĔski’s article, one of his students – 
232 In addition to information like the names of the editor - E. LipiĔski, and of the Editorial secretary - Jerzy Jedruszek, the 
inside of the jacket informs us that this issue was printed by the same printer as those of 1947, and that the number of copies
was still 3,100. The final piece of information, the date when the issue was finished and signed over for printing 
(10.07.1948), is followed by a code:- D-030036, which looks like the code of the censor responsible for this publication. 
(1977-1978) Czarna Ksiega Cenzury PRL, London: Aneks. 
233 The next issue (1948:3) carried the last review (Stiegler) signed by Edward Taylor. 
234 APAN/PTE/54, Protocol of meeting held by Publications Section of the Scientific Council of the PEA, 29.05.1948.
Prof. A. KrzyĪanowski was not present at that meeting, in fact he was not present at any of the meetings held by the section 
in 1948 for which protocols are to be found in the archive. 
235 LipiĔski, Edward, 1948. "Notion of Economic Laws in Soviet Science". Ekonomista.
LipiĔski used this article as an introduction to an anthology of Soviet economists published late in 1948. Kowalik has 
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Zagórski – continued to discuss this problem. There was also the translation of an article by 
the British communist and economist M. Dobb, who argued for the application of Marxism to 
the analysis of not only the past but also the present, as well as a review of the French 
communist Charles Bettelheim’s book "La planification Sovietique" which exhorted the 
virtues of Soviet planning. The choice of westerners as representatives of Marxism alongside 
Kronrod serves as a reminder that Marx’s ideas exerted a great attraction over intellectuals on 
both sides of the rapidly-descending iron curtain.236 In the political context of 1948, however, 
its main significance was that it presented alternatives to a Marxism-Leninism controlled by 
the PWP and ultimately by the Soviet leadership.  
Proponents of ‘western’ Marxism also met Marxists-Leninists to discuss the issue in person. 
A series of twelve discussion seminars was organised with the support of the Ministry of 
Education. The proclaimed aim was to establish the definition of a socialist economic model 
and to explore the conflicts and complementarities of neo-classical and Marxist-Leninist 
economics. The perspective of these seminars resonates with what E. LipiĔski was trying to 
promote in Ekonomista.237 Neo-classical economists who did not support planning or did not 
have strong socialist or communist credentials were being stamped as ‘bourgeois’ by the 
PWP, and were refused the right to participate in public discussions, so LipiĔski’s open and 
western-oriented Marxism was becoming the only alternative to a PWP-controlled and Soviet-
inspired interpretation of economics. The PWP, however, did not show much interest in any 
search for common ground, or attempt to build bridges between the established discipline and 
their own version of Marxism-Leninism. 
After their forceful charges at the CPB debate, the PWP needed to keep up their 'offensive'. 
Based on an analysis of Ekonomista’s 1948 issues, it seems that each issue was allotted to one 
established that the text was submitted for revision at the last moment. The last sentence of LipiĔski’s introduction was 
pasted over, as the passage had become too controversial. This fact was established on the basis of an author’s (unedited) 
copy, Kowalik, Tadeusz, 1992. Historia ekonomii w Polsce 1864-1950. Wrocáaw: Zakáad Narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich . 
p.284-5. The passage deleted by censors is identical to the last passage of the article published in Ekonomista (1948:2) and 
quoted above, showing how rapidly LipiĔski’s stance was becoming unacceptable. 
236 Maurice Dobb's article was a reprint of a piece first published in The Modern Quarterly 1947/48 Vol. 3, pp.5-21. It was 
translated into Polish by E. LipiĔski's assistant Helena Tatar-Zagórska. In his conclusion he countered criticisms made 
against  Marxism-Leninism that it neglected nationalism; he did this by referring to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as 
countries led by Marxist doctrines in which the problems of nationalism had been solved (sic!). 
237 The seminars were held at the Main School of Commerce from October 1947 to May 1948. According to DrabiĔska, from 
1947 on the Ministry of Education and the Party organisation at the Main School of Commerce sought to strengthen their 
position by supporting initiatives from Marxist staff.DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen 
spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. p.67-68. Given the small numbers of PSP and 
especially PWP members in academic institutions, it is likely that E. LipiĔski was central in the organisation of these 
seminars, probably with the participation of other members of the PSP and PWP at the Main School, such as J. Drewnowski 
and J. Hochfeld. It may be that some of the articles concerned with Marxist and Soviet economic thought that he published in 
1948 originated from these seminars. 
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PWP-comrade responsible for the Marxist-Leninist presence in the journal. 238  This 
arrangement is reminiscent of the CPB debate, where the attack had been planned by the 
political HQ and each ‘party-soldier’ was assigned his section of the 'front'.239 First out was B. 
Minc, who joined in the on-going debate on Zagórski’s work on the theory of competition, 
and accused Zagórski of disregarding Marx’s definition of the same.240 In Minc’s article, 
references to western economists (Chamberlin, Robinson) were only made to show who was 
wrong. In B. Minc’s view:
"Neither the vulgar school of economics which presents an apology for 
competition, nor the Keynesian or left-Keynesian schools, are able to provide a 
scientific analysis of the phenomena of monopoly and competition. Both these 
phenomena appear at the base of contradictions in capitalism, and contribute to an 
exacerbation of these contradictions. Dominant capitalist monopolies intertwined 
with "free competition" are characteristic of the decaying stages (fall) of 
capitalism."241
He concluded, "Dr.Zagórski's book proves that it is impossible to construct a "general theory 
of competition" by using the marginal and rejecting the marxist method."242 Having dealt with 
Zagórski, Minc moved on to combat Catholic visions of economic planning in a review of the 
work of K. Turowski:243
"… it is appropriate here to state that the system proposed by K. Turowski has 
nothing to do with a planned economy, and that his theories are a collection of 
views taken from papal writings (encykliki) and pre-war fascist corporationist 
ideas, to which the demagogy of the English Labour Party has been added."244
The intensity of the attacks was making it difficult for those who differed from the PWP’s 
appointed economists to publish their ideas, even if censorship let them through. The dangers 
of expressing ideas which could at the next moment be condemned by the political 
leadership,would be demonstrated in the case of agricultural economics. In an article based on 
a report commissioned by the regional agency responsible for local planning, Professor 
238 I would seem this was B. Minc in issue (1948:2), L. Rzendowski in issue (1948:3), and Z. Wyrozebski in (1948:4). 
239 See the quote from Brus, Wáodzimierz, 1992. From revisionism to pragmatism: Sketches to a self-portrait of a "reform 
economist". In J.M. Kovács & M. Tardos (eds.) Reform and transformation in Eastern Europe. Soviet-type economics on the 
threshold of change. London: Routledge, 136-142. p.375 in footnote 182 page 66. 
240 Bronisáaw Minc (1913- ) economist, brother of Hilary Minc. Studied economics at Jagiellon University, completed his 
doctorate at the Main School in 1948. Worked at the Central Planning Board, went on to become professor of economics and 
longtime director of the Wokshop of economics at the Polish Academy of Science. 
241 Minc, Bronisáaw, 1948a. "O konkurencji i metodach jej badania". Ekonomista.p.141 
242 Ibid.p.141 
243 Konstanty Turowski (1907-1983), a school friend of Cardinal WyszyĔski, studied economics at Lublin Catholic 
University. The book under review was published in 1947, and its subject was catholic conceptions of planned economies: 
Gospodarka planowa w koncepcji katolicko-spoáecznej. 
244 Minc, Bronisáaw, 1948b. "(Turowski, Konstanty) Gospodarka planowa w koncepcji katolicko-spolecznej". Ekonomista.
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Wincenty StyĞ argued for a modernisation of agriculture which would maintain close links 
with the established structure of family holdings.245 He discarded both the English and the 
Danish types of modernisation as being unsuitable for Polish conditions. "Neither can we 
follow the Soviet pattern,” he added. “In Poland the PKWN Manifesto (the political 
programme of the Lublin Government), and pronouncements by qualified representatives of 
the Government, demonstrate unanimous approval of the principle of individual holdings in 
agriculture."246 StyĞ’s views were shared by others. Later in the same issue, another authority 
on the field of agricultural economics, A. ĩabko-Potopowicz, gave StyĞ’s book on the 
modernisation of agriculture a positive review. This harmony in the opinions of the scientific 
establishment and the regime would not last. 
Ekonomista 1948:3 
Between the publication of the 1948:2 issue in July and the 1948:3 issue in November, there 
was another decisive turn of political events. The breakdown of relations between Stalin and 
Tito was augmented on the domestic scene by a conflict between the PWP Politburo and 
Secretary-General Gomuáka. The latter opposed the growing tendency towards the 
homogenising of the satellite states, and of increased control from Moscow. Gomuáka called 
for a 'Polish way' to socialism and absorbed PSP slogans of 'socialism and independence'. 
Stalin’s men in Poland, Berman, Bierut and Hilary Minc, however, responded promptly by 
removing Gomuáka from power and announcing that the Soviet example would now 
determine the course of Polish economic policy, notably by launching the collectivisation of 
Polish agriculture despite repeated promises to allow private ownership of land. Also, during 
condemnation of Gomuáka’s ‘deviation’ at the infamous PPR August plenum, signs of a 
revision of the PWP’s policy in higher education and science appeared in Bierut’s speech: 
245 Wincenty StyĞ (1903-1960) economist, before the war in Lwów where he studied and conducted research. Did futher 
studies abroad with at Rockefeller Foundation fellowship in 1932-34. W. StyĞ conducted research on family farms in Galicia. 
After 1945 he worked at Wrocáaw University. Trzynadalowski, Jan (ed.) (1980) Uczeni Wrocáawscy, Wrocáaw: Zakáad 
Narodowy im. OssoliĔskich, Urban, Stanisáaw, 1986. Z Husowa po berla rektorskie : Wincenty StyĞ--czáowiek, uczony, 
dzialacz spoleczny Warszawa: Ludowa Spóádzielnia Wydawnicza,. 
246 StyĞ, Wincenty, 1948. "Problems of Mechanization in Agriculture". Ekonomista.p.49
90
The weakness of Marxist-Leninist propaganda in the party went with a tolerance of 
ideological confusion amongst the party intelligentsia, leading to the neglect of a 
marxist perspective on problems of literature, art, science (…) This situation had 
an especially negative effect on the cultural offensive within our party, which 
slowed down, and continues to affect the work of our higher education institutions, 
where non-Marxist, pseudo-scientific ideological premises still dominate, 
especially in the domain of the humanities.247
 The period of ‘mild revolution’ was coming to an end, and as the remnants of political 
opposition were removed, the attention of the Party leadership could now be devoted to new 
areas.
Since the last issue (sometime between July and November) changes had been made in the 
running of Ekonomista. Although his title was unchanged, Edward LipiĔski no longer bore 
full responsibility for the journal. An "Editorial Collegium" had been instituted,248 and on the 
inside of the journal’s jacket it was proclaimed in large print that Ekonomista was now "edited 
by the Editorial Collegium" with LipiĔski's position as editor being announced further down 
the page in small print. The composition of the new Editorial Collegium was made public in 
issue 1949:3: E. LipiĔski, B. Minc, W. TrąmpczyĔski, and Z. Wyrozembski.249 B. Minc and 
Z. Wyrozembski were the most active Marxist-Leninist authors in Ekonomista in 1948, and 
represented PWP interests in the Editorial Collegium from mid-1948 onwards. The changes in 
Ekonomista were followed by radical alteration of the membership of the board of the Polish 
Association of Economists. While the 1948 board was still recruited from among the founders 
of the PEA, in 1949 the board was expanded to include several from the group representing 
the PWP at the CPB debate, the Marxist-Leninist economists’.250
247 Bierut’s speech quoted in KochaĔski, Aleksander (ed.) (1998) Posiedzenie Komitetu Centralnego Polskeij Partii 
Robotniczej 31 sierpnia - 3 wrzesnia 1948 r. Stenogram. Stalinowskim kursem., Pultusk, Warszawa: WyĪsza Szkoáa
Humanistyczna w Pultusku 
Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów PaĔstwowych. p.41-42 
248 I have not found any documents which could shed light on who made this change or when and how. Nor have I 
information as to the composition of the Editorial Collegium in its first year. 
249 Witold TrąmpczyĔski (1909-1982) was a representative of the established professional economists, but was considered 
to be loyal by the PWP, retaining the post of director of the Central Bank. He was a founding member of the PTE, student of 
E. Taylor (docent), director of the National Bank of Poland, and he had acted as head of the Komisja Rewizyjna and 
approved the PTE's accounts since 1945. 
250 From 1945 to 1947 the composition of the PEA board was unchanged: Edward LipiĔski, Stefan Zaleski, Witold 
KrzyĪanowski, Zygmunt Filippowicz, Kazimierz Secomski. In 1948 two new members replaced Zaleski and Krzyzanowski 
Konstanty Dabrowski (PSP) and Stefan JĊdrychowski (PWP), while E. LipiĔski, Z. Filippowicz and K. Secomski continued. 
In 1949 the number of members went from 5 to 11 and former PSP members were in the majority: Edward LipiĔski, 
Konstanty Dabrowski, Stefan JĊdrychowski, Wáodzimierz Hagemejer, Bronisáaw Blass, Jan Drewnowski, Zygmunt 
Filipowicz, Oskar Lange, Bronisáaw Minc, Adam Rapacki, and Stanisáaw Rączkowski. Orlowska, Janina & Oráowski, 
Tadeusz, 1987. Zarys Historii Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego. W stulecie spoleczno-zawodowego ruchu 
ekonomistów w Polsce. Warszawa: PTE. 
91
The 1948:3 issue contained only three articles, where five had been the rule previously.251 In 
issue 1948:2 the exclusion of scholars who were not considered loyal and 'progressive' had 
created a vacuum. The new Editorial Collegium clearly found it difficult to find articles for 
publication now that the majority of contributors had been rejected, and Marxist-Leninist 
articles were not forthcoming in numbers sufficient to fill the gap.
An article by Leon Rzendowski, an official involved with the PWP’s agricultural policy, was 
brought in because of the re-orientation of this area.252 The decision to start collectivisation 
was to be announced and explained, and its opponents criticised. Rzendowski’s article in 
Ekonomista, a critique of views presented in the last issue by W. StyĞ, was part of a campaign 
to inform on the new party line in this matter.253 The critique was conducted in a level, almost 
friendly tone. Rzendowski noted that Professor StyĞ wrote his piece before the PWP made its 
U-turn on the issue of collectivisation, and avoided ad hominem arguments and aggressive 
rhetoric.254 However, the publication of StyĞ's article in issue 1948:2 (signed off for printing 
in July) has overtones of a cat-and-mouse fight. 255  The decision on collectivisation had 
already been taken by the Politburo in June, but had not yet been made public.256 It seems that 
StyĞ's article was allowed to appear in an issue from which many other ‘bourgeois’ 
economists had already been banned, so that Rzendowski could criticise it. 257  Whether 
premeditated or merely coincidental, the publication of StyĞ's article provided the PWP with a 
demonstration piece. The practice of allowing selected representatives of the 'bourgeoisie' to 
publish their views simply in order to subject them to authorised criticism is reminiscent of 
what was being done in other fields, for instance in the case of the philosophers Tatarkiewicz, 
KotarbiĔski and Adujkiewicz.258
251 Edited by Editorial Collegium, Editor E. LipiĔski, Editorial Secretary Jerzy Jedruszek. The same printer was used as for 
the last issue. 3000 copies. "Signed for print 19.11.1948 - D-034027" 
252 Rzendowski Leon (1915-1997) an agricultural engineer before the war. A PWP member who held important positions in 
PWP agricultural policy organs. After the CPB debate he became director of the agricultural section of the CPB, and in 1950 
vice-minister of agriculture.  
253 Rzendowski, Leon, 1948. "Problems of agricultural economy". Ekonomista. A footnote revealed that Rzendowski's article 
was part of a bigger work, sections of which had appeared in Nowe Drogi (nr.8) The references in this article are to Lenin and 
Marx. 
254 It is impossible to ascertain whether it was unease about such tactics, personal bonds or Rzendowski’s personal style that 
kept the critique mellow. 
255 StyĞ, Wincenty, 1948. "Problems of Mechanization in Agriculture". Ekonomista. This article was commissioned by the 
Regionalna Dyrekcja Planowania Przestrzennego (Regional Centre for Local Planning) in Wrocáaw. StyĞ estimated that 
industrialisation and urbanisation would lead to a  workforce shortage in agriculture, thereby increasing the need for 
machines. His main argument was that Poland should not follow the examples of England, Germany, Denmark or the Soviet 
Union but retain family-farms as the basic structure. 
256 Garlicki, Andrzej, 1993. Stalinizm Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.p.15, 44-45 
257 H. Minc was party to the policy-reversal and his brother B. Minc was active in Ekonomista, so it does not seem far-
fetched to surmise that the latter was well informed. 
258 Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." Minerva, 34, 323-346. 
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Articles which were controversial from a PWP point-of-view were still accepted, but they 
were now given commentaries that signalled the divergence between the views of the author 
and the approved editorial line. This is important, because it means that the opinions of the 
authors were now measured against a standard of truth that was defined by an as yet unnamed 
higher authority, and implemented by the Editorial Board.259 Aleksy Wakar's article on Soviet 
foreign trade was accompanied by a commentary stating that the Editorial Board (Redakcja) 
did not share Professor Wakar's view that Soviet foreign trade was monopolistic.260 Zagórski's 
article on the origins of capitalism was also accompanied by a rider, and the editorial com-
ment announced that responses to both articles were being prepared by PWP economists. 261
A final, key novelty in this issue of Ekonomista was the publication of a detailed summary of 
a report from a meeting in the Institute of Economics at the Soviet Academy of Science, held 
shortly before the CPB debate.262 The report provided the Polish scholars with insights into 
the institutional politics of Soviet science and relayed news of the massive critique raised 
against the Institute of World Politics Economics and its leader E. Varga, and the Institute of 
Economics – both of which were merged and placed under the leadership of K. W. 
Ostrovitianov.263 Critics claimed that the work of the two institutes before the merger was 
marred by “anti-marxist errors” and that it had failed to fulfil the plan for 1947. Publications 
by its employees were criticised, as in, “the author [P. T. Masáow] distorts marxist 
methodology, dealing with it in the spirit of bourgeois economists.”264 In this debate the 
impetus for criticism came not from scholars, but from party periodicals such as The
Bolshevik and Pravda. The scholars’ criticisms followed Pravda’s, not the other way around. 
One of Varga’s colleagues, who had earlier supported him, now retracted publicly: 
259 In the post-war issues, one such note had appeared, in connection with the controversy over a review authored by E. 
Taylor, to which the author in question (A. Tokarski) objected strongly. The Editor's note then stated that both the defence 
and the response were published, but that the Editor considered that Tokarski had not addressed the criticism voiced by 
Taylor. It did not however go so far as pronouncing on the correctness of the views of any of the parties, merely on whether 
the same questions had been addressed. 
260 Wakar, Aleksy, 1948. "International Trade in Soviet Union". Ekonomista.
Wakar, Aleksy (1898-1966), habilitated at the Main School of Commerce, joined the PPR and was appointed rector of the 
ANP (Academy of Political Science). 
261 Zagórski, Józef, Ibid."Origin of the capitalist system".“Because the deliberations of Dr. J. Zagórski caused doubts of a 
theoretical nature, the Editorial Board considers the article to be a discussion piece. In connection with this it will publish the 
work of Z. J. Wyrozembski in the next issue, and this will counter the theses of Dr. Zagórski. By the Editorial Board.” 
Zagórski’s references in this article were to: Marx, Sombart, Day, Dobb, Clark, Edgeworth, Robinson and Childe. 
262 “Nowe zadania Instytuty Ekonomiczneog Ak.Nauk ZSRR”, Ekonomista (1948:3) summary of a report printed in Iswiestia 
Akademii Nauk - Otdielenie Ekonomiki i Prawa (1948:3), translated into Polish by Jerzy Jedruszek. 
263 For a recently published study of this controversy see Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars Princeton, 
N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
264 “Nowe zadania Instytutu Ekonomicznego Ak. Nauk ZSRR”, Ekonomista (1948:3) In my translation I have retained the 
Polish spelling of Russian names as they appeared in Ekonomista.
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W. A. MaĞlennikow admits that during the discussion of Varga’s book, he defended it 
instead of making a wide critique of the book’s false premises. He explains that this 
was due to the influence of Varga’s authority.
However MaĞlennikow now says that he has understood his own errors and fully 
agrees with the critique of Varga’s book on the pages of the daily Prawda.265
The language and form of the debate were alien to the norms observed by the Polish scholars. 
The motives behind the inclusion of this report are unclear, and the effects it had on 
Ekonomista’s readership among the established economists even more so. The report gives 
such a grim picture of academic infighting interfused with politics that it is difficult to avoid a 
feeling that the publication might have been as much a warning as a shining example, 
depending on one’s perspective. No doubt it provided the Polish public with an interesting 
insight into the way academic culture was functioning in the Soviet Union. 
Ekonomista 1948:4 
The weeks preceding the Unification Congress in December 1948 culminated in the PWP’s 
final propaganda campaign, which was followed by arrests and political trials targeting both 
the PPP and the PSP. Although the Polish United Workers’ Party was in theory a free union 
of equal partners, in practice it meant the annexation of the PSP. From now on controversial 
subjects in Polish politics would be discussed within a centralised, disciplined party which 
banned all organised differences of opinion, whether inside or outside its confines. The last 
1948 Ekonomista, approved for printing in January 1949, after the Unification Congress, 
marks the end of the evolution from a pluralist to a monopolist discipline. The 1948:4 issue no 
longer accommodated advocates of a ‘western Marxism’, as this was now condemned as 
“eclecticism”, or a perversion of the true doctrine. 
For the first time Ekonomista opened with quotes from Marx and Lenin, followed by an 
editorial studded with footnotes referring to the ‘great four’ (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin).266
The editorial provided a redefinition of the goals of the discipline and of its methods. 
Everything was now linked to recent political events and the new role of the discipline in ‘the 
construction of socialism’. The permission to use ‘bourgeois economics’, a term which 
included all approaches except the Marxist-Leninist one, granted to LipiĔski by the PWP only 
a year before, was withdrawn. The editor of Ekonomista had publicly to proclaim: 
265 “Nowe zadania Instytutu Ekonomicznego Ak. Nauk ZSRR”, Ekonomista (1948:3) p.73.  
266 Issue 1948:4 was edited by the Editorial Collegium, Editor E. LipiĔski, Secretary Jerzy JĊdruszek. Other information on 
the jacked included: Print: Spoádzielnia Wyd. "Prasa"  (3000 copies) "Signed off for printing 31.1.1949 - D-019255" 
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We reject bourgeois economic science, because it is a class science, apologetic, 
searching for measures to salvage capitalism.267
The bridges to western economics were now burning. LipiĔski had to give up his most 
cherished idea, that of a marriage between western tools and socialist policies. The 
redefinition of the tasks of the discipline and its role in society had also become important. It 
was now discussed in terms of ‘partyjnoĞü’ (its subordination to the policy defined by the 
Party leadership) while at the same time a central role in conscious, planned development and 
modernisation was being promised to the discipline.  
Science is a means for knowing the world with the goal of controlling it, subjecting 
it to human will, changing it, acquiring tools for the harnessing of the blind forces 
of nature… Science has to serve that construction. That is the sense of the 
‘partyjnoĞü’ of science, and ‘partyjnoĞü’ thus understood gives science a new sense 
of dignity and import, flowing from the conscious co-operation in the greatest deed 
in mankind’s history.
(…) The science of economy, if it merely schematised accomplished fact, would 
lose its historical sense, for; its final goal is the co-creation of reality, the solving 
of problems raised by the development of life.268
Although the debate over the possibility of combining neo-classical and Marxist-Leninist 
economics was closed, LipiĔski had not given up completely. He still strove to make the best 
of the situation. Something of the achievements of western economics might still be used: “In
concordance with Lenin’s approach, we reject the general economic theory, but not its 
practically applicable results.”269 He also argued that orthodox Marxism-Leninism did not 
preclude discussion, supporting his case with quotes from Lukács, Stalin and Lenin, and 
elaborating on the intellectual challenges and passion for knowledge demanded of the truly 
Marxist-Leninist researcher.  
The content of the journal reflected that of the editorial. The condemnation of views deemed 
unorthodox took on a new, more personal and menacing tone in the belated response to 
Zagórski’s article penned by Wyrozembski. Directed at both Zagórski and Wakar, it was more 
than a personal attack: it was the final shot at ‘bourgeois’ economics, and the last time that the 
PWP’s economists deigned to engage in a debate with their opponents. From now on the 
debate would be replaced by unidirectional critiques. 
267 Editorial, (Signed: The Editor) in Ekonomista (1948:4) p.17 
268 Editorial Ekonomista (1948:4) p.9 
269 Editorial, (Signed: The Editor) in Ekonomista (1948:4) p.17 
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At the CPB debate LipiĔski had refused to be relegated to the ‘other side of the barricade’, to 
the cold, silent political vacuum from which his and other economists’ voices would no longer 
be heard. A large proportion of his colleagues now found themselves there, but a few, 
LipiĔski among them, had so far escaped it. Their symbolic capital – the prestige they 
continued to enjoy in Polish society – made holding on to them worthwhile for the PUWP. 
They were not trusted by the PUWP to hold much power, as true loyal Marxists-Leninists 
were. LipiĔski clearly no longer controlled the Ekonomista, and would soon loose control 
over his department at the Main School.270 As with other ‘progressive’ scholars in the middle 
category between ‘bourgeois’ and Marxist-Leninist, he had to be seen to be endorsing the 
PUWP line. Antoni ĩabko-Potopowicz, a professor of Agricultural Economics, who had 
endorsed StyĞ’s preference for individual holdings, modified his style of writing, references 
and conclusions. His article on “Problems of class differentiation in villages” referred to 
Marx, Lenin and Stalin, and other Soviet authors. The only reference to a westerner was to a 
British work entitled “Why farmers are poor.”271 LipiĔski and ĩabko-Potopwicz’s articles 
served as illustrations for readers that the Party not only demanded the disappearance of 
‘bourgeois’ economists, but also absolute obedience from the ‘progressive’ scholars it 
graciously allowed to retain some influence.  
270 AAN/PTE/20 Sprawozdanie Zarządu Gáównego PTE 10.06.1956-27.05.1958 p.25 
The report of the Main Board of the PEA for the years 1956-1958 mentions work undertaken with the aim of restoring the 
PEA’s control over the composition of the editorial board of Ekonomista and over the content of the journal. The report does 
reveal who controlled it. Nor did PEA in 1956 control the economy of Ekonomista, PWN took care of the financial aspects of 
publishing.
271 ĩabko-Potopowicz, Antoni, “Zagadnienia rozwarstwiania siĊ wsi.” Ekonomista (1948:4) Some references were made to 
Marx, many to Lenin and Stalin and other Soviet authors, and only one to a westerner, a Briton, Rochester, whose article was 
entitled “Why farmers are poor.” 
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Table  1: Authors contributing to Ekonomista more than once 1947-1953 
Author 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 Entries Articles 
Bolland, Stefan 1 1 2 1 
Fabierkiewicz, Wacáaw   3      3 0 
Hagemejer, Wáodzimierz 2       2 0 
Iwaszkiewicz, Wacáaw 1 2 3 0 
Nowicki, Józef 2 2 3 7 1 
Oyrzanowski, Bronisáaw 1 2      3 1 
Rawita GawroĔski, Zygmunt 1 1      2 0 
Skrzywan, Wacáaw 2       2 2 
Strzeszewski, Czesáaw 1 1      2 0 
Taylor, Edward 2 2      4 2 
Vielrose, Egon 1 1      2 1 
Zagórski, Józef 4 4 1 9 4 
Dobb, Maurice 1 1     1 3 3 
Lange, Oskar 1 1 2 2 6 6 
LipiĔski, Edward 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 15 11 
Secomski, Kazimierz 2 1   2 1 1 7 7 
Wakar, Aleksy 1 2   1 4 2 
ĩabko-Potopowicz, Antoni   2 1 1 2 1 7 3 
Bettelheim, Charles    1    1 2 2 
Bialer, S.        2 2 1 
Brus, Wáodzimierz   1 2 1 2 1 7 6 
Dietrich, Tadeusz   1 2 3 3 
Fedak, Z.   1 1 2 0 
Fiszel, H. & Kagan, A.       1 2 3 1 
Górski, Janusz        3 3 1 
Grodek, Andrzej *   1 1 1 3 3 
JĊdrychowski, Stefan   1 1 1 3 3 
KuziĔski, Stanisáaw       1 1 0 
àychowski, Tadeusz   3 1 1 5 4 
Minc, Bronisáaw   2 2 1 1 2 1 9 6 
Orthwein, Kazimierz      1 1 2 0 
Piekarczyk, Stanisáaw       2 2 0 
Pohorille, Maksymilian   1   2 3 2 
Rakowski, Mieczysáaw      1 1 2 1 
ĝleszyĔski, Aleksander   1 1 2 1 
Sokoáow, D.       1 1 2 2 
Stachiewiczowa, Krystyna   1 1 2 2 
Tepicht, Jerzy      1 1 2 0 
Varga, Eugeniusz 1 1 2 0 
Wyrozembski, Zygmunt Jan 1* 2 1 4 3 
Zawadzki, Józef      4 4 1 9 7 
ĩurawicki, Seweryn       2 1 3 0 
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Changes at the journal manifested themselves in the composition of its contributors. The work 
of thirty-nine Polish economists was published in the 1947 and 1948 issues. Only three 
among them, (Fedak, Wyrozembski and Bronisáaw Minc) can be classified as Marxist-
Leninists. For another thirty one of this group there would be no more publishing 
opportunities before the onset of the Thaw in 1956. A few (five) still appeared in 1949, but 
then disappeared from the journal’s pages. We find the same tendency if we look more 
closely and examine only those authors who made more than one appearance in the journal. 
Of these fourteen, eight were not published again until 1956. The group of economists barred 
from access to publication included prominent members of the discipline such as Adam and 
Witold KrzyĪanowski, Edward Taylor, Wincenty StyĞ and Stefan Zaleski. 272 Some personal 
continuity was maintained as five established economists (O. Lange, E. LipiĔski, K. 
Secomski, A. ĩabko-Potopowicz and A. Wakar) continued to be published. This continuity 
did not include the style and content of their work; the vocabulary, choice of topics and 
approaches, and literature references were all different from their earlier texts. 
272 Among the fourteen authors with more than one entry, the following disappeared from the pages of the journal: S. 
Bolland, J. Nowicki, B. Oyrzanowski, Z. Rawita GawroĔski, W. Skrzywan, Cz. Strzeszewski, E. Vielrose, and J. Zagórski. 
We have of course to take into account the possibility that they could but did not want to publish, but only in the case of B. 
Oyrzanowski does this seem to be an option (in 1952 he appears as member of the editorial board of Ekonomista which must 
have meant he held a measure of political trust). Others among the fourteen were: the PWP’s Wyrozembski, and the five 
authors mentioned above who continued to publish. 
Witold KrzyĪanowski (1897-1972) obtained his habilitation in Wilno in 1930and became professor of economy at the 
Catholic University in Lublin. After the war he settled in Kraków as professor (prof.zw.) of economics. 
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Table  2: Number of articles and reviews in Ekonomista 
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A review of the contents of Ekonomista over several years illustrates the transformation of the 
journal as well as its subsequent development. I shall return to discuss these figures in 
Chapter 5. What matters for the moment are the first post-war volumes of Ekonomista. There 
we can observe a decrease in the number of articles, which was caused by the transition to 
Marxist-Leninist domination of the journal between 1947 to 1949. From 1948 there was also a 
dramatic fall in the number of reviews, which reflects both the cutting of the bonds with 
western scholarship and a decrease of scholarly output in Poland. After the difficult year of 
1948, the editorial board of Ekonomista settled into its new groove, producing very thin issues 
composed of Marxist-Leninist contributions. In 1949, the places of those who were no longer 
allowed to publish were taken by new authors. The type of text that was being written after 
1948 also changed, and Ekonomista increasingly came to resemble the PWP ideological 
periodical Nowe Drogi, which was in turn inspired by Soviet publications. Ekonomista  was 
now involved in all the grand propaganda campaigns: in 1949 one of the issues was devoted 
to the celebration of Stalin’s seventieth birthday, while another was devoted to the new 
constitution. The content was dominated by reprints and summaries from Soviet publications, 
while contributions from Polish economists were limited to those by a small group of trusted 
comrades. Most of these new names are the same as those of the PWP group which appeared 
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at the Central Planning Board discussion: W. Brus, T. Dietrich, S. JĊdrychowski, and B. 
Minc.273
Conclusion
The CPB debate had shown economists that the communist regime would no longer accept 
their active role in policy making. Now, the gradual transformation of Ekonomista into a 
journal mirroring the ideological standard-bearer Nowe Drogi, charged with the transmission 
of political messages, made it clear that economic theory would also be subjected to the needs 
and preferences of the regime.  
The dramatic turn in the political situation heralded by the establishment of the Kominform, 
and completed by the merger of the socialist and communist parties, changed the relationship 
between economists and the regime. Discretion over important decisions was reserved for the 
Soviet leadership in matters of international policy and the overall direction of development, 
and left to the Polish communist leaders in most other matters. The margin of freedom of 
action for other actors, individual or collective, was radically restricted in the period 1949-
1955.
273 They were joined by M. Pohorille and T. àychowski, the former being from the PWP economists group, and the latter 
having previous links to the pre-war Gospodarka Narodowa circle around Bobrowski. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
THE TAMING OF THE CHAIR,  
ECONOMICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1948-1950 
In 1951 the PUWP proclaimed a “breakthrough” on the “science front”, congratulating itself 
on having put an end to the reign of “bourgeois professors and their legitimisation of the 
capitalists’ exploitation of the proletariat”. 274  The aim of the next two chapters is to 
investigate how and to what extent the PUWP effected such a “breakthrough”. The reform of 
training in economics at institutions of higher education will be focussed on first, and in the 
next chapter I will deal with political attempts to redefine the content of research. When 
analysing the reform of higher education I shall concentrate on measures aimed at reducing 
the power of chair-holding professors, and then look in greater detail at the changes 
introduced in the Main School of Commerce. 
From 1948 onwards, the amount of accessible sources relating to higher education increases 
considerably. While scarcity of documentation has been the main problem so far, from now 
on the immediate visibility of institutions such as universities, ministries, and party 
organisations, and the extensive documentation produced by their bureaucracies, poses a 
methodological challenge.  Although most available documents were produced by such 
institutions, we should not forget less noticeable collectivities, such as the professional and 
disciplinary communities of economists.  Even the one-person institution of the academic 
chair deserves more attention. At the same time, while the sources from the first post-war 
years are in many ways scarce and unevenly distributed, there is at least a range of 
communist, socialist and academic perspectives on the developments of this short period. 
From 1948 sources tend to give only the official communist version and it becomes 
274 This claim was made both in speeches at the First Congress of Polish Science and in internal party documents such as the 
memo written by Petrusewicz ( AAN/237/XVI-10 p.55) I am here paraphrasing rather than quoting directly. 
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increasingly difficult to document alternative views and attitudes. Despite a conscious effort 
to counteract this bias, Party matters will dominate the subsequent chapters in terms of 
numbers of documents discussed and the length of the narrative. This does not mean that they 
were more important than the view of individual scholars. However, to create a more 
balanced narrative I would need many more private sources (letters, diaries) than I have at my 
disposal.
The primary objective of universities and other institutions of higher education was to provide 
an institutional framework for the instruction and examination of students. Professors from 
different disciplines collaborated to ensure funding, and to organise both teaching and the 
general administration of their academic institutions. However, the other important function 
of these institutions, research, was seldom a collective enterprise. It was the domain of the 
professorial chair, the katedra, the true foundation of Polish scholarship. Scholarly 
achievement was judged by peers who were not always members of the same institution. 
Inasmuch as knowledge creation was concerned, the basic institution was the individual chair, 
while the disciplinary community provided the framework which took care of communication 
and evaluation of new knowledge.
Polish professors personified the power of their Katedry so strongly that the individual 
character of their prestige overshadowed the institutional aspects of their Chairs. A common 
narrative of PUWP dealings with Polish academia focuses on the fate of individual professors, 
and treats each case as an instance of the political persecution of an individual person. The 
modification of the institution of the Chair had wide ranging consequences even after the 
original cohort of professors had been removed from their positions. It affected the 
distribution of power in academic institutions and changed the role of the professor from that 
of an absolute monarch to one of a subordinate state official. 
Professors had quasi-papal status, deciding what to teach, how to teach and who their 
successors should be. Once appointed, the chair-holder remained professor even after his 
death.275 The power of the Chair, however, depended on more than the institutional position 
of its incumbent, as it was also a function of his scholarly authority.  Finally, chair-holding
professors inspired the respect upon which the social prestige of academic institutions was 
based. After the war their prestige was also enhanced by the halo of wartime resistance. The 
275 As far as the interwar period is concerned, the most thorough treatment of the discretionary powers and the conditions of 
professors is to be found in Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II 
Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet àódzki.
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PUWP was by 1948 in control of the State apparatus, and so changes which could be 
introduced by decree posed no great difficulty. Many aspects of the discretion of the Chair 
could indeed be modified by administrative reorganisation. However, the prestige of the 
professors, and hence their influence, could not be easily done away with, nor transferred to 
the Party. I shall argue that this made the power of the chair the main obstacle to Party control 
over science.
By late 1948 communist control of Polish society had left few reaches of society free of the 
direct presence of Party officials. The academic year of 1949/1950 was the period when the 
PUWP concentrated on bringing about the transformation of universities and other institutions 
of higher learning. Extensive reforms were introduced quite suddenly, and in order to 
implement change the PUWP relied on administrative measures and decrees which were then 
formalised ex post in a new law on universities promulgated in 1951. Without doubt, this was 
the most dramatic and radical upheaval that Polish academic institutions had ever experienced 
in peace time. However the elaborate and ambitious nature of the communist leadership’s 
strategies and goals should not deter us from questioning their achievability, since from 1948 
onwards, despite building up a bureaucratic machine to control and direct science, the PUWP 
faced great challenges. 
The PUWP’s efforts to deal with the power of the Chair will be the main focus of the first part 
of this chapter. The middle section will be devoted to a preliminary assessment of the 
centralised and many-layered Party organisation - the structure which aspired to take over the 
powers wrested from the old professorial caste.276 Finally, to address the question of how 
relations between the established scholars and the Marxists-Leninists who were imposed on 
their institutions by the Party evolved in this first and crucial phase, I will look in greater 
detail at the Main School of Commerce, which in the academic year of 1949/1950 underwent 
far-reaching changes in its staff and study programmes.  
Communist ambitions and goals 
Communists considered social sciences, and economics in particular, as an important tool in 
their efforts to transform society.277 The political economy of socialism was identified by 
276 Regrettably research on the Party organisation has not yet thrown up any studies of the Division for Science of the PWUP 
Central Committee or of its regional, local or institutional agencies. The closest we come is Fijaákowka’s study from the 
1980s on cultural policies and which also covers the activities of the Division of Science. Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. 
Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959). Warszawa: PWN. 
277 While announcements to that effect were common in contemporary political statements in Poland, the focus on social 
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Party ideologues as the scientific foundation of the economic policy of the regime. The road 
towards Utopia was to be staked out by Marxist economists, meaning that particular efforts 
would be made to transform economics into a ‘Marxist-Leninist science’. 
The science of political economy has a particularly strong importance in the 
socialist system. Under socialist conditions the economy is transformed from the 
sphere of the activity of blind natural forces into the sphere of conscious, planned 
human activity. Conscious planned direction over the totality of the national 
economy multiplies many times the capacities of man to control and utilise the 
forces of nature.278
The PUWP sought control over all aspects of scholarship, from the political ideas of the 
youngest research assistant, the criteria for the evaluation of research, and the choice of 
problems and the methods to solve them, to the anointment of the coryphées of each 
discipline though the distribution of state prizes. To put it briefly, they wanted to be 
everything and do everything in science.
With idealist zeal, a strong sense of legitimacy, and utopian goals, the main assets of the com-
munists in their efforts to incorporate science and higher education into the nascent political 
and societal order were strong determination and a willingness to carry out harsh and unpop-
ular measures. The principal obstacle was the conservative outlook of Polish academic com-
munities and the virtual absence of self-declared communists among the ranks of professors. 
sciences was evident even in the early years of the Soviet regime and continued to dominate the Soviet attitude to the issue 
after the Second World War. Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 1979. Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934
Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press. 
278 Brus, Wáodzimierz & Pohorille, Maksymillian, 1951. Zarys ekonomii politycznej socjalizmu. Skrypt wykladów., 2nd ed. 
Warszawa: PWN. p.7 
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Table  3: PUWP membership among staff in higher education institutions 279
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
non members 333 309 317 395 46 66 453 1031 674 1301 1796 3677
PUWP members 18 25 40 63 1 4 103 330 54 168 141 541
f.prof. 
1949
f.prof. 
1953
as.prof
. 1949
as.prof
. 1953
docent
1949
docent
1953
k.s.p.n
. 1949
k.s.p.n
. 1953
adiunk
t 1949
adiunk
t 1953
asyst. 
1949
asyst. 
1953
The table is constructed on the basis of data gathered by the PUWP, so even if the reliability 
of the figures were to be questioned, it still gives us a picture of what the Party’s leadership 
knew about the situation. In 1949, only fifty eight out of 708 professors belonged to the 
PUWP. It is important to note that many PUWP professors had originally started out in the 
socialist and not the Communist Party. Interestingly, the figures from 1949 show the result of 
the first round of  the PUWP’s pro-active staffing policy in academic institutions, and very 
little headway was made over the subsequent four years. Even at the height of stalinism in 
Poland, the PUWP’s presence in academic spheres remained minimal. 
The extent of the professors’ influence, and their lack of submission to party discipline, were 
the reasons why the PUWP concentrated on reducing their power. In December 1949, 
Education Minister Skrzeszewski identified and explained the main challenge facing his 
Party: “… I shall not hide from you the fact that at the bottom of this lie political tendencies 
(…) in the present situation; each professor is the master and commander of his chair and 
279 AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-12, p.101 „Wzrost kadry naukowej w szkoáach wyĪszych podlegáych Ministerstwu Szkolnictwa 
WyĪszego z uwzglednieniem przynaleĪnoĞci do PZPR w/g danych z grudnia 1949 i z grudnia 1953 r.” 
Figures as of December 1949 and December 1953. (Full professor – Assistant professor – Docent – Independent scientific 
staff member on contract (k.s.p.n) – Adjunct - Assistant) 
The document also provides calculations of percentages of PUWP members in each category for 1949 and 1953: Full 
professors 5.1%-7.5% , while at the same time their total number declines; Assistant professors 11.2% - 13.7%; Docents 
2.0%-5.7%; Independent scientific staff on contracts 18.5%-24.2%.  The average for all independent scientific staff was 
calculated at 12.3%-1.,0%. The average for ancillary scientific staff (adjunct to assistant) was 7.3% - 12.5%. 
I have included the data pertaining to junior researchers (in the statistics called ancillary scientific staff), but these should be 
interpreted with caution, as many were too young for membership of the Party and were instead members of the Union of 
Polish Academic Youth and from 1950 the Polish Youth Union (ZMP). Also, note that the category of deputy professor (z-ca 
prof.) was included in the independent scientific staff category (non-tenured positions).  
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can do and say whatever takes his fancy (…) 280 The PUWP worked towards its goals through 
the intermediary of two institutions: the Ministry of Education (from April 1950 the Ministry 
of Higher Education and Science) and the PUWP party organisation. The Ministry had been 
operative from 1945, and communist control over its policies had gradually increased, until by 
1948 it was fully subordinated to the communist leadership. The PWP and PSP party 
organisations only had token presences in academic institutions before a PUWP organisation 
network was established from late 1948 onwards. As for the relations between the Ministry 
and the Party organisation, there is little evidence of significant conflicts or differences of 
opinion even during Czesáaw Wycech’s (PPP) time as Minister, and even less after 
Skrzeszewski’s (PWP) return to the ministry. Other than the substitution of the Government 
by the Politburo as the highest authority, the role of the ministry bureaucracy as such does not 
seem to have been significantly altered. Ministry bureaucrats continued to implement political 
decisions regarding higher education and research, meaning that established patterns of 
interaction and negotiation between the academic institutions and the state may not 
necessarily have been changed. A novelty in these relations was the establishment of a party 
organisation which had active local cells at all academic institutions, an issue we shall return 
to. First, it is important to provide some basic information about the so-called reforms 
implemented by the Communist regime from 1949, which amounted to the abolition of the 
teaching of economics at Polish universities. 
“Reform” of academic economics 
The universities of àódĨ and ToruĔ, and the Lublin Catholic University, were the first to 
experience the onset of reform. Their chairs in economics were abolished by ministerial 
decrees in September 1948.281 In March 1949, lectures considered politically unsuitable at 
PoznaĔ University were suddenly cancelled by the Ministry. From the start of the following 
semester, no new students were admitted to economics. The decree ordaining the closure of 
the study programme in economics was dated October 1949, which tells us that while 
decisions about the changes may have been made earlier, they were promulgated at the last 
280 AAN/RG-18/III, quoted after Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu.
Wrocáaw: Ossolineum. pp.490-491 Minister of Education Stanisáaw Skrzeszewski’s speech on 17.12.1949 before the Council 
of Higher Education and selected guests: politicians, rectors, state prize laureates and representatives of academic societies.
Stanisáaw Skrzeszewski (1901-1978) educated at Jagiellon University (1924) member of the Polish Communist Party from 
1924, PWP from 1944. Member of CC PUWP 1948-1959, Minister of Education 1944-1945, 1947-1950, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 1951-1956. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991 Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN. 
281 Rozporządzenie Ministra OĞwiaty 27.09.1948 Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myĞli 
ekonomicznej w latach 1945-50.  p.220 
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moment. Staff and prospective students were informed when the new academic year was 
already under way. PoznaĔ University’s Department of Political and Economic Studies was 
gradually phased out as students who had enrolled in previous years graduated and left. 
Modifications were made to their study programmes: for instance, the subject of the political 
economy of socialism replaced sociology. Parallel measures were implemented at other 
universities, leaving no masters or doctoral programmes in economics outside Warsaw. In one 
brisk move an unprecedented centralisation of the discipline was enforced. For the next seven 
years the study of economics outside Warsaw was restricted to the undergraduate education 
provided at Economic Colleges (WyĪsze Szkoáy Ekonomiczne).  
During debates about the future shape of research and higher education in Poland after the 
war, the Main School of Commerce also contemplated plans for reform. In 1948/49 a 
proposal was made under the aegis of the rector, A. Grodek, to divide the school into two 
departments, one of general economics and the other of the economics of enterprises. The aim 
was to provide future economists with a broad education, by enabling them to gain a general 
understanding of economic processes.282 Grodek’s plans were not realised. Instead, in the 
autumn of 1949, the Main School of Commerce was radically reorganised, and inaugurated 
under a new rector as the Main School of Planning and Statistics.  According to Brus, Hilary 
Minc played a central role in the formulation of the restructuring plans for the Main School, 
with decisions being made in closed fora, over which no economists with links to the School 
had any influence.283
We shall return to the Main School later, to investigate how it fared under its new name. The 
situation of other centres of economics can be summed up as a state of paralysis, which in 
282 DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw 
School of Economics. p.375-6 
283 AAN/ KC PZPR 237/XVI/27 pp. 2-3 Projekt uchwaly Biura Politycznego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej o 
upanstowieniu S.G.H. i zmiane na Szkole Gáówna Planowania i Statystyki. 
Dz.U. 1949 nr.48 poz.368: Dekret z dnia 16 sierpnia 1949 r. o przeksztaáceniu Szkoáy Gáównej Handlowej w Warszawie na 
SzkoáĊ Gáówną Planowania i Statystyki w Warszawie. 
Documents relating to the nationalisation and transformation of the Main School of Commerce in Warsaw suggest that the 
decision was prepared by the Central Committee apparatus and sanctioned by the Politburo, then passed by the Government. 
It seems that the group of Marxist-Leninist economists (especially trained in Moscow for the task of taking control over the 
Main School) witnessed some of the process behind the reform, but had only marginal influence. According to information 
supplied by W. Brus during an interview I conducted with him in 2001, the only evidence of their influence was the 
suggestion by Wyrozembski that the first part of the name, ‘Main School’ should be kept on account of tradition. It is 
possible some other members of this group played a more active part than Brus, but no available evidence supports that. We 
also need to consider the timing, as the designation of that group and their stay in Moscow took place only a few weeks 
before the transformation of the Main School. To my knowledge, none of them had held prominent positions in the decision- 
making organs of the PUWP. A.W. Haugstad interview with Wáodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001 
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time would lead to atrophy. A few professors remained, but subsisted in marginal subject 
areas, isolated from students and publication opportunities.
The decision by the central PUWP leadership to close down ‘bourgeois’ economics at 
universities and to start building up Marxist-Leninist economics at the Main School 
represented only a fraction of the changes introduced at academic institutions during this 
period. It may seem a little beside the point to devote time to the evolution of the 
discretionary powers of Chairs, now that no influential chair-holder were allowed to continue 
teaching and research, but Chairs did continue to exist, both at the Main School and in the 
universities. We should not content ourselves with simply stating that they lost their 
influence; we should also try to find out how this happened.
The power of the Chair 
Ever since Polish universities had in the nineteenth century adopted a form influenced by 
Austrian universities, a university chair had been the basic unit. Only chair-holding professors 
had a vote in the department council and university senate, and they were therefore the 
masters of the institution. Assistants and adjuncts were ranked beneath the professors, their de 
facto employers, and were subordinated to their authority.284 The professors also reinforced 
each others’ influence through cohesive social bonds and shared cultural norms, as 
demonstrated by J. Connelly in his discussion on the importance of the academic “milieu” 
(Ğrodowisko).285 The power of the chair consisted of several elements. It was a position for 
life and hence not subject to any sanctions. This guaranteed the individual professors’ 
discretion over the choice of topics and methods of research, as well as over the content of 
lectures and study programmes. As a result of their evaluation of student work, individual 
professors also exerted control over the academic standards demanded, and through their 
employment of assistants they influenced academic recruitment. Finally, professors evaluated 
the scientific output of their students and peers. Reputation control was concentrated in the 
hands of academic department councils, made up of professors. Before the war ministerial 
approval had been a formality, and even when, exceptionally, conflict arose, the power of the 
Ministry had been negative: it could only deny a chair for political reasons, without 
284 Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet 
àódzki.
285 See Chapter 9 “The Meaning of Milieu” in Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, 
Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
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questioning the scientific competence of the candidate.286 Generally, the right to identify 
qualified candidates for university Chairs had been firmly in the hands of professors.   
The communist challenge to the power of the Chair targeted three central aspects of 
professorial power: firstly, the admission of candidates to the rank of professor; secondly, 
decisions about teaching and research; and thirdly, the evaluation of students’ performance, 
and recruitment to junior research positions. 
To consider these problems only as a struggle for power would be to neglect their far-reaching 
consequences for knowledge production. The result of a controversy over a promotion or the 
content of a lecture series was more than a gain or loss of power for a given individual or 
group, and the outcome had a direct effect on the criteria for excellence and relevance in the 
discipline, and on the kind of knowledge about economic processes that would be generated 
by scholars.
Deciding who was to sit in the Chair 
The indignant impatience with professorial independence that is apparent in the quote from 
Strzeszewski’s speech was voiced publicly only after the decisive political battles (between 
the PPP and the PSP, and the ‘rightist-nationalist deviation’) had been won and the 
communist reform process had been launched. Previously, in the years between 1945 and 
1948, communist rhetoric on the professoriate had been more cautious, and moves made in 
these years had been much less conspicuous. A purge of the professoriate, or a radical 
restriction on the discretion of the Chair, would have been seen as a declaration of war, and 
thus not easily undertaken before the communists had strengthened their general position.
During this first phase, the PWP implemented measures which aimed to include new scholars 
sympathetic to the regime among chair-holders. The Ministry could propose its own 
candidates for academic posts, while the President of the Republic was granted the right to 
appoint professors for two years, and was only required to hear the opinion of the relevant 
faculty council.287 Shortcuts in academic career paths were created, as a presidential decree 
even made it possible for candidates without a habilitation to be appointed to a professorship. 
286 See Chapter 1 of Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej
àódĨ: Uniwersytet àódzki. Jaczewski, Bohdan, 1978. Polityka naukowa paĔstwa polskiego w latach 1918-1939 Wrocáaw: 
Zakáad Narodowy im. OssoliĔskich Wydawnictwo PAN. 
287 Decree dated 16.11.1945 „O zmianie przepisów dotyczących szkóá akademickich i stosunku sáuĪbowego profesorów i 
pomocniczych siá naukowych tych szkóá.” Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza 
systemu. Wrocáaw: Ossolineum. p.146-148 
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Further decrees were passed to make it possible to appoint individuals lacking formal 
scientific qualifications. The use of academic titles, such as that of ‘contracted professor’ and 
‘deputy professor’, which did not require the same qualifications as ‘full’ professors, became 
increasingly frequent.288 Flexibility was invoked in support of another element of this decree, 
which also targeted the established professors, namely the President’s right to move 
professors from one institution to another. This measure was to become immensely 
unpopular, forcing whole families to move or to endure long-distance commuting at a time 
when public transport and infrastructure was still only slowly recovering after the war.289
These measures affected the power of the Chair in several ways. Firstly, the independence of 
the chair-holder from political pressures was undermined, both by the abolition of immunity 
from personal consequences arising from controversial opinions, and through the introduction 
of professors who owed their promotion to Party or Ministry patrons. The professors’ control 
over the selection of new chair-holders and over the definition and assertion of required 
qualifications was also diminished. Political merit could now replace the scientific 
qualifications recognised by the established academic hierarchy. 
Having made the introduction of Party-loyal scholars into academic institution possible, the 
PUWP started looking more closely at the established academic staff. In general, it used three 
categories when evaluating the attitudes of professors and junior scholars towards the regime: 
unredeemable reactionaries; neutral but reliable, or progressive fellow travellers; and true 
Marxist-Leninists. There were many shades within this scale, and differentiation of the hues 
of the political auras listed here was a major preoccupation.  
Some professors of the older generation, like A. KrzyĪanowski and Taylor, had throughout 
long careers expressed opinions that could in no way be reconciled with a Communist regime. 
They felt the pressure bearing down upon them as soon as the Communist regime had 
stabilised its power base. In their cases, the opportunities for deals or reconciliation with the 
regime were not only precluded by divergence of opinion and avoidance of situations which 
would demand compromises with the scholars’ beliefs, but also by the fact that the logic of 
288 Ibid. p.147-148 While they are commonly seen as a communist invention, both deputy and contracted professors existed 
already before the Second Word War in Poland. Baranowski writes that deputy professors were appointed for the period of 
one year in cases when no applicants with habilitation presented themselves. Deputy professors did not participate in faculty 
councils or senates and were at some universities not allowed to supervise doctoral theses. They were expected to habilitate 
as soon as possible but there were cases of scholar employed as deputy professors for several consecutive years. The category 
of contracted professor was used for temporary employment of foreigners.Baranowski, Krzysztof, 1981. Kadra naukowa z 
zakresu dyscyplin spolecznych w II Rzeczpospolitej àódĨ: Uniwersytet àódzki.pp.187-8
289 On professor forced to commute, see Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, 
and Polish higher education, 1945-1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.p.137 
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the regime’s militaristic propaganda rhetoric demanded results. Toppling obscure docents was 
not enough: illustrious heads had to roll. It seemed that at least one major economics figure in 
each academic centre was pilloried by the PUWP as an unredeemable sinner, an enemy who 
had to be excluded. These included Professor Wincenty StyĞ in Wrocáaw, Edward Taylor in 
PoznaĔ, Adam KrzyĪanowski in Kraków, Wacáaw Fabierkiewicz in àódĨ, and Stefan Zaleski 
in Warsaw. Their lectures were cancelled, they were banned from teaching, and then moved 
to other departments or even institutions, or forced to retire. 
From 1949-1950 the PUWP undertook “verification”, a comprehensive check-up on the 
political affiliations of academic staff. 290  Everyone, from professors to assistants, was 
subjected to scrutiny of their past careers, family background and political sympathies. A 
verification of the political stance of junior staff was prepared and carried out locally, whereas 
the verification of professors was directed by the PUWP and implemented by the Ministry of 
Education.291
I have not come upon any sources suggesting that economists were victims of political murder 
after KatyĔ. Several economists were imprisoned, but from the available information it is not 
possible to establish whether their scholarly activities were the reasons behind their arrests.292
For the most part, repressive measures were relatively mild, and their degree depended on 
one’s classification within the three categories. Scholars regarded as reactionary risked the 
290At the meeting of rectors and deputy rectors in February 1950, Krassowska called for more vigorous ‘verification’ 
measures. 
 Fik, Marta, 1989. Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981. London: Polonia. pp.133-134. 
291 There is uncertainty concerning where exactly the decisions were taken. While Suleja uses the term ‘centrally’, which 
would imply the Central Committee Science Division or the Politburo, according to DrabiĔska decisions regarding Main 
School staff were made in the Warsaw Regional Committee. DrabiĔska refers to information obtained in an interview with Z. 
Morecka. However, Morecka was at that time pursuing her studies in Moscow and it is therefore difficult to evaluate the 
reliability of that information. I have found traces of Regional Committee activity gathering opinions about Professor 
Grodek, which could have been used in the verification process, but I would place my bet on Suleja’s version, with decisions 
about Chairs being taken above Regional Committee level. APMW/KU SGPIS 214/III-1 (1949-50) Protokol of meeting on 
11.1.50, Suleja, Teresa, 1995. Uniwersytet Wrocáawski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955. Wrocáaw: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocáawskiego. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-
gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. p. 127  Bauer, Romuald (ed.) (2004) Ksiega SGH. 
Pracownicy i absolwenci - kto jest kim?, Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa. 
292 The first victim of Soviet repression among Polish economists was Kraków docent Janusz Libicki, who was killed during 
the KatyĔ massacre. After the war, the nature of the repressive system was such that often even the victims and their families 
were unable to say why they were arrested. This is the case both for W. Hagemejer, who according to information provided 
by his son Krzysztof Hagemejer was arrested in 1949/1950 and detained without charge for about a year and a half, and for 
Prof. Aleksy Wakar. The latter came to Poland in the early 1920s, so was treated as a ‘white’ Russian immigrant, not a Polish 
citizen. He was arrested on the street in August 1952, handed over to the NKVD, and then spent three years in the Gulag. 
ASGH/ Aleksy Wakar personal file  
Other economists and employees of the Main School who were arrested included:  Warsaw University Prof. Stanisáaw
Gorzuchowski (geography), who died in prison, and lecturers Aleksander GruĪewski, Wiesáaw Chrzanowski, Kazimierz 
Studentowicz, Tadeusz Przeciszewski, Zbigniew Heidrich and Józef Zagórski. “Jubilatka. ZbliĪa siĊ 100-lecie SGH” 
http://www.sgh.waw.pl/ ogolnouczelniane/100lat/Jubilatka accessed 26.08.2005 Drewnowski mentions also Andrzej 
Swiecicki, and Antoni Wilder 1998. Walka o Losy Centralnego Urzedu Planowania. Konferencja Historyczna PTE. 
Warszawa: Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne. 
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loss of their jobs. Bans on teaching and transfers to Chairs considered less important by the 
PUWP were used to discipline ‘progressive’ scholars who either showed too much 
independence or were not considered trustworthy for other reasons. Marxist-Leninist scholars 
were on occasion expected to perform self-criticisms (samokrytyka) and demonstrate their 
readiness to follow the Party line in publishing texts such as eulogies of Stalin. From what I 
have come across in my studies of economists, the highest form of punishment for them was 
expulsion from the Party and the subsequent loss of the right to use the appellation Marxist-
Leninist.293
The individual hardships of professors who experienced different forms of pressure or 
repression have already been dealt with in biographies and collections of students’ and 
professors’ reminiscences, where the focus is often on the identification of the victims of 
repression.294 At the Main School, for instance, DrabiĔska reports that four people lost their 
jobs.295 Lately, attention has shifted towards a discussion of the severity of the Polish purge of 
scientific institutions. Connelly has argued, based on a solid comparative study, that the case 
of the Polish professors is an illustration not only of the limits of the PUWP’s revolutionary 
zeal in the sphere of culture, but also of its ability to implement radical change. Furthermore, 
the Polish case, when compared with other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, can be 
characterised as a “mild” purge.296 No doubt the study of the frustrating and sometimes 
traumatic individual experiences of Polish scholars is important. However, if we perceive 
what happened exclusively as repression of individuals, we will miss how these measures 
targeted not simply individuals but the institution of the chair which provided professors with 
293 Jan Drewnowski, once a central personality in the CPB and in diverse science policy organs, was expelled from the Party 
in 1950. The loss of his position as director of the part-time study programme at the Main School and that of professor at the 
àódĨ Economic College (WSE) left him with the very low basic salary of a professor, without the additional incomes from 
teaching.  Odd lectures at the Technical University of Warsaw (Politechnika) and translations were the only extra sources of 
income he could find until the onset of the Thaw. Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". Kwartalnik Historii 
Nauki i Techniki, 35, 451-489.A revised edition is posted on http://www.pte.pl, accessed 18.12.2007. p.20 
 p.18 
294 We should also be aware that nowadays this tendency is further exacerbated by the propensity of former students to 
elevate “their” professors to the prestigious category of political martyrs of the Communist regime. Knakiewicz, Zenobia 
(ed.) (1997) Byli wsrod nas. Wspomnienia i biogramy. 70 lat Akademii Ekonomicznej w Poznaniu, 1926-1996., Poznan: 
Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu., Urban, Stanisáaw, 1986. Z Husowa po berla rektorskie : Wincenty StyĞ--czlowiek, 
uczony, dzialacz spoleczny Warszawa: Ludowa Spoádzielnia Wydawnicza,., StruĪycki, Marian & KamiĔski, Marek B. (eds.) 
(2004) Leon KoĨmiĔski. Patron WyĪszej Szkoáy Przedsiembiorstwa i Zarzadzania., Warszawa: WyĪsza Szkoáa
Przedsiebiorczosci i Zarzadzania im L. KoĨmiĔskiego. and others. 
295 Professor J. Loth’s economic geography chair was disbanded, and the lectures of J. Makowski (international law) 
cancelled. Two lecturers without tenure lost their jobs: Prof. E. Dąbrowski and deputy professor S. Janczewski (who had 
lectured on the now obsolete topic of shares). DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-
gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. p.135 
296 Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-
1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
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control over their disciplines. There were no massive and spectacular dismissals of professors; 
what took place was rather a radical circumscription of their powers.
From gilded throne to crowded bench: ‘collective chairs’ 
Returning to the December 1949 speech, we see that Minister Skrzeszewski went beyond 
identifying professorial independence as a political problem. Addressing the issue of the 
limited number of Party members in academic institutions, and using the militaristic idiom 
favoured by the communists, he claimed:  
“…since we have a limited number of such chairs and such people, it is necessary 
to deploy these people in an appropriate manner: it is necessary to conquer the 
decisive posts, the strategic posts in our science, and it is to that end that the 
collectives and institutes will work.”297
By “the decisive posts, the strategic posts” Skrzeszewski meant professorial chairs. The 
positions of rectors and deans had been “conquered” three months before this speech was 
given, and the difficulty of having rectors and their teams oversee and control the work of all 
the professors was already becoming apparent.298 The ‘collectives and institutes’ referred to 
measures devised to further erode the power of the Chair: firstly the merger of several chairs 
into a ‘collective chair’, and secondly the subordination of chairs (both single and collective) 
under the direction of a larger formation – the institute. The collective chair was seen as an 
intermediary step towards the organisation of all chairs into institutes, a final step which had 
to wait until all academic chairs were under PUWP control.  
Czesáaw NowiĔski,299 rector of the Main School of Planning and Statistics, enthused over 
these reforms as follows: 
297 AAN/RG-18/III quoted by Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu.
Wrocáaw: Ossolineum.p.490-49.1 Minister of Education Stanisáaw Skrzeszewski’s speech on 17.12.1949 
298 We shall return to this in more detail towards the end of this chapter. 
299 Czesáaw NowiĔski (1907-1981) completed a doctorate in law at Wilno University in 1934, joined the PWP in 1946 when 
he also was appointed Vice-minister of Trade and Approvisation. Was the first rector of the Main School appointed, not 
elected, in 1949. Continued in the post until 1952. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen 
spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. pp.367-370 
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 “Comrades, I can inform you that we are this year moving forward far more 
boldly than even I previously imagined. Thanks to the resolute intervention of the 
Ministry and of comrade Pawáowski among others, we are moving towards the 
formation of collective chairs. [… here he lists collective chairs planned for the 
Main School – AWH…]. Such chairs are emerging, headed by chair-directors with 
much greater competences than those of the previous leadership of the chair 
groups (zespoáy).” 300
NowiĔski made explicit the aim of the measure: the installation of ‘collective chair directors’ 
directly above the professors, with mandates to make day-to-day decisions about teaching, 
research, the selection of assistants and other such matters. Collective chairs were particularly 
useful in situations where it was not easy to remove the established professor and replace 
them with candidates who were politically more suitable but academically less qualified. Such 
was the case with Edward LipiĔski, holder of the chair of political economy at the Main 
School of Commerce (now the Main School of Planning and Statistics). LipiĔski’s activity as 
Chief Editor of Ekonomista, and his public interventions in favour of a version of Marxism 
that did not fit with the prevailing Party line, made him enemies. However, due to his track 
record of socialism and wartime resistance, as well his involvement in a web of former 
students stretching across the Party (of which he was also member), he was difficult to 
remove outright. DrabiĔska suggests that LipiĔski was allowed to continue at the Main School 
because he was supervising the doctoral theses of PUWP economists.301 The solution chosen 
was to ban him from teaching and move him into a collective chair of which not he but his 
doctoral student Wáodzimierz Brus was made director.302 What qualified Brus to become his 
academic supervisor’s superior was the fact that he had studied political economy in the 
Soviet Union during the War, and had worked as editor of the economic section of the 
communist ideological journal Nowe Drogi. Analogous situations also existed elsewhere, for 
instance with the collective chair of Planning. There, Drewnowski, who held the title of 
‘extraordinary professor’, was superseded by Bronisáaw Minc, who was merely a “deputy 
professor”, but who was regarded as being far more reliable politically.303
300 AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego “Referat tow. NowiĔskiego na zebraniu partyjnej 
organizacji profesorow SGPS z dn. 25.IX 50 (skrócony stenogram)” p.19 
301 LipiĔski supervised the doctorates of W. Brus, B. Minc, Z. Wyrozebski, M. Pohorille and J. Zawadzki, all of whom we 
shall be hearing more of, as they constituted the lion’s share of the group of PUWP economists sent by the Party to reform 
the Main School in 1949. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych 
Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. s.142 (based on information provided by Irena Kostrowicka) 
302 Skáad osobowy i spis wykáadów, SGPiS 1950/51.  SGPiS, Warszawa 1950 
W.Brus was “z-ca prof., mgr.”, meaning he was appointed to the makeshift post of deputy professor before he obtained his 
doctorate in 1951.  Edward LipiĔski was “profesor zwyczajny” – full professor. 
303 He was however the younger brother of Hilary Minc – the Minister of Industry, then chairman of the Planning 
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What was the status of a professor within a collective chair? He no longer decided on lectures, 
or even about his own research. Planning was introduced, so that both teaching and research 
were now to be conducted according to plans drafted at the Planning Commission, far above 
the heads of the ‘collectivised’ professors. The new directors of collective chairs held 
considerably less power over their own teaching and research, and that of their ‘employees’, 
than single chairholders had held only a few months earlier. 
Decisions about teaching 
The traditional institution of habilitation included a public lecture and defence which, once 
approved by the academic establishment, resulted in the ‘veniam legendi’ or ‘right to lecture’. 
An unalienable aspect of this right was discretion over the content of the lecture. After 1945, 
Polish professors encountered a gradual increase in political pressure that aimed to restrict the 
exercise of this right when the topic of the lecture turned to new political taboos such as 
Polish–Soviet relations. In 1947, following heavy criticism of the political perspective in his 
lectures on colonial policies, Jerzy Loth, a professor of economic geography, felt obliged to 
redesign his course, and turned to the subjects of natural resources and industry in the USSR. 
Despite his willingness to adapt, his lectures were cancelled and his Chair abolished in 
1949.304 In PoznaĔ, Edward Taylor later related the cancellation of his lectures thus: 
 With the decree of March 12th 1949, Nr. IV SH-3287/49, the Minister of Education 
pronounced the lectures in economic subjects in Sections I, II and III to be non-
compulsory, and not part of the exams to be taken at the end of 1948/49“due to the 
non-adjustment of the content of lectures on political economy to the Polish 
planned economy”. …305
A ban on teaching was widely applied from 1949. In fact, the PUWP leadership decided to 
cancel all lectures in subjects related to political economy, save those which received 
approval from the central authorities. It is important to remember that in the summer of 1948, 
before the merger of the communist and socialist parties, the conflict between the ‘national 
road to socialism’ and ‘stalinist’ factions had radically restricted the room for ideological 
manoeuvre for party members. Although ‘eclectic’ and creative efforts (especially those of 
socialists) had been accepted up to this point, from the autumn of 1948 strict adherence to the 
Commission and the absolute number one person in Poland as far as economic policy was concerned at the time. 
304 DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw 
School of Economics. P.129 
305 Biuletyn ze Zjazdu KoleĪeĔskiego i Sesji Naukowe Ekonomistów Absolwentów UAM, Poznan 1960, Edward Taylor’s 
testimony p.18 quoted after Gazda, Zbigniew, 1988. Reorientacja polskiej akademickiej myĞli ekonomicznej w latach 1945-
50.
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Party line was demanded. As the consequences of deviation from the narrow path of 
orthodoxy were demonstrated in the political show trials of the time, so the principle of ‘better 
safe than sorry’ came to be applied in that area of economics that was considered to be an 
integral part of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine – political economy. The director of the Central 
Committee Science Division, biologist Kazimierz Petrusewicz, reported to his superiors in 
1951:
The overwhelming majority of lectures in political economy that had been given in 
a totally false manner were cancelled, and the right to teach this subject was 
granted by the Ministry only to those persons who could guarantee a Marxist 
perspective. Hence, lectures in political economy were held only in a few higher-
level schools. In the current academic year a revolutionary breakthrough has been 
achieved on this front. In all academic schools the following ideological subjects 
have been introduced on the basis of a permanent programme for the first year and 
a temporary programme for later years: the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and 
political economy.306
Petrusewicz further stated that since all students had to attend these courses, lecturers in these 
subjects would now become the most numerous group of teachers in higher education. This 
offered a possible solution to the problem of the low proportion of PUWP members among 
academic staff. For the time being, Petrusewicz had to concede that a majority of those who 
lectured on the ‘Foundations of Marxism-Leninism’ were not employed in academic 
institutions but in the Party apparatus, the press, the state administration and suchlike 
institutions. Lecturers in political economy on the other hand, were mainly employed in 
academic institutions, and although they had received a crash course in Marxism-Leninism 
arranged by the Ministry in Otwock, few among them were PUWP members.  
The category of ‘persons who guaranteed a Marxist perspective’ as defined by the PUWP 
Central Committee, did not simply exclude obvious ‘reactionaries’ such as Taylor or potential 
‘progressives’ such as StyĞ. Many PUWP members were deemed unworthy of involvement 
with the subject. E. LipiĔski, professor of political economy at the Main School since before 
the war, was banned from teaching in 1949, and only after 1952 was he allowed to teach the 
history of economic thought. While it is possible to explain this individual case with reference 
to LipiĔski’s outspokenness and frequent critiques of official party policies, even politically 
docile scholars, like Oskar Lange, found themselves barred from teaching political economy. 
306 AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-10 p.1-3 “Notatka dla Sekratariatu KC w sprawie nauczania przedmiotów ideologicznychw 
szkoáach wyĪszych”  According to the archive’s descritption of the folder, this material dated from 1951. 
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It would seem that their socialist past disqualified them from being proper Marxists-Leninists. 
The PUWP leadership chose not to make use of the well-qualified and experienced group of 
economists in academic positions, since these were of PSP and not of PWP extraction. Instead 
the PUWP preferred to establish their own presumably more loyal and orthodox cadres. In the 
summer of 1949, as the result of a Politburo decision, a group of PUWP economists was sent 
to Moscow for two months, to study at the Plechanov Institute. This group was to become the 
‘marxist spearhead’ at the Main School of Commerce.307
Political economy was endowed with an exalted status by PUWP rhetoric, and it was soon to 
become an obligatory subject for all students in higher education and, in conjunction with the 
subject “The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism”, the ideological core of academic teaching. 
Preparations for the creation of the new academic subject of political economy only started in 
1949. In formal terms, it was the Ministry of Education which supervised work on the new 
national curriculum and study programme in political economy. In practice, the task was 
delegated to those PUWP economists who had been sent to Moscow for two months to 
acquaint themselves with Soviet political economy. W. Brus and M. Pohorille used the 
information and experience they had gathered in Moscow to work out a programme for 
teaching the political economy of socialism at university level.308 Sanctioned by the Ministry, 
this programme was very explicit, and provided a detailed outline for the entire lecture series 
in political economy. The introductory lecture, entitled “The subject of political economy”, 
was scheduled to be presented over a four-hour period. The lecturer was obliged to present the 
following issues: 
The subject of political economy. The production of goods - the basis of human 
society. The forces of production and the relations of production. The modes of 
production. Class and the class struggle. 
Five basic types of relations of production. Transition from one type to the next by 
way of revolution. Political economy - a historical science. 
307 According to information provided by W. Brus, besides himself the group included Kazimierz Owoc, Ludwik Pawáowski, 
Maksymillian Pohorille, Józef Zawadzki, Seweryn ĩurawicki, and Zygmunt Jan Wyrozembski. A.W. Haugstad interview 
with Wáodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001 
308 ASGH/ Wáodzimierz Brus personal file /12.11.1952 “Autorecenzja niektórych prac” manuscript, signed by W.Brus 
„Wedáug potrzeb. Z prof. Maksymilianem Pohorille rozmawia Jacek Poprzeczko” Polityka  issue 27, 6.07.1985 
Maksymilian Pohorille ( 1915- ) before the war leftist youth activist, spent the war in the Soviet Union, taught economics at 
Szczecin Economic College (AH).  
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Political economy as the economic explanation of laws governing the development 
of social production from lower to higher levels. Political economy as the 
economic explanation of the necessity of a socialist revolution and the dictatorship
of the working class.  Communism as the highest and most progressive mode of 
production compared to all the preceding modes. 
Dialectical and historical materialism and political economy. 
The methodology of political economy. Unity and difference in production, 
distribution, exchange and consumption. The primacy of production. The historical 
character of the laws of political economy.309
Centralisation of control over curricula and teaching programmes was a measure already 
recommended by Lenin as a way of using the services of ‘non-Marxist’ lecturers, and 
ensuring that they taught in an ideologically correct manner.310  The programme detailed each 
lecture sequence for the ninety hours of the course. Combined with a standardised curriculum, 
it left little freedom for lecturers in their presentation of the material. With this programme at 
hand, even the least knowledgeable local party official could verify that what was being 
taught conformed with the wishes of the authorities. The effort to ensure a centrally-
controlled and uniform transmission of the Marxist-Leninist credo did not end there. Over the 
next academic year (1949/1950), Brus and Pohorille applied their material in lectures at the 
Main School, and the manuscripts from these lectures were published in the form of a 
textbook on the political economy of socialism.311 Revised teaching material was needed, not 
only for this subject area but also for several others, such as national economic planning and 
specialised branches of economics, and the expedient of publishing manuscripts of lectures 
was adopted there too. Evidence from the Main School shows that heavy workloads, 
temporary solutions and much haste were the order of the day, and that measures to ensure the 
quality of the work were planned but not always realised. For instance, the principle that 
lecture-notes should be reviewed and edited before they were published had to be abandoned, 
as reliable reviewers could not find time for it. The local Party cell (the Basic Party 
Organisation) at the Main School tried to limit the amount of potential political and 
309 AAN/MSzW/1668/pp.3-32 Organizacja toku studiów uniwersyteckich w roku akademickim 1950/51. Ekonomia. Program 
wykáadów. 
310 S. Fitzpatrick, after  M. N. Pokrovsky, ’What Lenin was for our higher school’ Pravda, 27.01.1924Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 
1979. Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934 Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres. p.69 
311 The textbook in political economy co-authored by Brus and Pohorille appeared before the Soviet textbook in this subject, 
which had been delayed again and again because of changes in official views on political economy. Brus, Wáodzimierz & 
Pohorille, Maksymillian, 1951. Zarys ekonomii politycznej socjalizmu. Skrypt wykladów., 2nd ed. Warszawa: PWN. On the 
difficulties of publishing a Soviet textbook on political economy, see Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the Soviet Science 
Wars Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
119
ideological misconceptions by making one trusted comrade read all the manuscripts.312 These 
published lecture-manuscripts later served as the basis for national textbooks.
Attending courses in Marxism was made obligatory for all academic teachers, from assistants 
to professors.313 One assistant reported that in 1948/49 she attended a course in Marxism for 
assistants from the Main School and then in 1949/50 a course organised by the Ministry of 
Education for professors and assistants. 314  Two documents prepared by the Central 
Committee Science Division in concert with the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres 
entitled “A list of the topics of which knowledge is required by assistants” and “Reading list, 
obligatory for assistants”, give some idea of the content of these courses. The list of topics 
was more or less a copy of the table of contents of the History of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union Bolsheviks: Short Course, to which had been added topics from the history of 
the Polish communist movement. The list of obligatory literature contained 58 items, starting 
with the works of Marx, passing through a long list of texts by Stalin, and ending with 
speeches and articles by Polish communist leaders.315
To sum up, the professors’ control over teaching was undermined by the PUWP from 1948/ 
1949 onwards. Since the Party organisation had only limited human resources at its disposal, 
however, some discretion over the transmission of knowledge was retained by professors. The 
degree of Party control depended on the ideological relevance of the subject at hand. A 
greater amount of attention and resources was given to the subject of the political economy of 
socialism, while improvisation and confusion, as well as a dearth of lecturers, meant that 
PUWP officials tolerated the fact that lecturers considered to be lacking in Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy could have contact with students during classes devoted to less ‘ideological’ topics. 
This loophole was in some cases used by professors to uphold their independence. For 
instance, students later reported that Edward LipiĔski’s lectures on the history of economic 
thought, and Leon KoĨmiĔski’s lectures on the ‘techniques of trade’, allowed these teachers to 
initiate small, trusted groups of advanced students and assistants into the realms of ideas, 
312 AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego SGPiS, Pp.3-5 Letter from Executive Committee of 
the Basic Party Organisation of the Main School of Planning and Statistics to the PUWP CC Science Division, 18.12.1950. 
Signed Romana Zawadzka, (1st Secretary of the Executive Committee BOP PUWP). 
313 The task of organising ideological education was first given to the Polish Youth Union (ZMP) and later to the trade 
unions. Suleja, Teresa, 1995. Uniwersytet Wrocáawski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955. Wrocáaw:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocáawskiego.  
314 AUW/K1228/personal file of  Mgr. Helena Tatar -Zagórska-Hagemejer: ĩyciorys (CV) dated 1.10.1950 
The course organised by the Ministry was held at Otwock, and Soviet economists were brought in to lecture.  
AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-10 p.1-3 “Notatka dla Sekratariatu KC w sprawie nauczania przedmiotów ideologicznych w 
szkoáach wyĪszych” According to the archive’s description of the folder, this material was from 1951. 
315 AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-10 p.46-49, folder dated 1951. 
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approaches and methods that could not be included in closely-monitored lectures on the 
political economy of socialism.316 Control over teaching had been one of the mandates that 
made up the total power of the chair. In practice, professors did retain some influence over 
teaching. However, the chair’s sovereign authority over this area was abolished the moment 
that the Ministry started issuing decrees that interfered with the competence of individual 
chairs to determine the availability and content of particular lectures.
Recruitment  
Another element of the power of the chair was the professors’ customary right to choose their 
assistants. Although such appointments were theoretically subject to approval by collegiate 
authorities, in fact professors were reluctant to interfere in each others’ business. For young 
scholars an assistantship was a means of supporting themselves while working on a thesis, of 
keeping in touch with the discipline, and of establishing a special relationship with a patron-
professor. For professors, assistantships offered a way of preparing and influencing 
succession to their chair. 
As young people are generally open to change and radical ideas, the communist leaders 
naturally enough placed their hopes on students. The PUWP also devoted much attention to 
junior scientific staff, and one source was explicit about their influence on younger students: 
The existence of ancillary scientific staff (...) has always been an important factor 
affecting the formation of a student’s political, social and scientific opinions. The 
role of ancillary scientific staff increases strongly as new forms of students’ work 
organisations, based on Soviet patterns, are introduced.317
Seen in this light, the low share of party members among junior research staff apparent in 
Table  3 (page 105) was a challenge to the PUWP and its aim of educating students in a 
strictly Marxist-Leninist world-view.  
316 Helena T-Z-Hagemejer’s intervention at the Second Convention of Economists in June 1956  
317 AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55 Proposal for the recruitment of ancillary scientific staff prepared by the Inter-
institutional Council of Academic Schools, attached to a letter from J. Noskówna (Warsaw RC Propaganda division) to 
Petrusewicz (director of CC Science Division) dated 21.2.1950. “For consideration and possibly application”. 
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Table  4: Overview of junior scientific staff’s political affiliations in late 1949.318
National total of junior staff (asst - adjunct) 2665 100% 
 - of them PUWP members 195 7.3% 
Number of assistants in 7 Warsaw schools 1187 100% 
Total of affiliated assistants in Warsaw, thereof: 133 11.2% 
 - PUWP members 70 5.9% 
 - Members of the Union of Polish Academic Youth 63 5.3% 
The percentage of affiliated junior researchers was 7.3% in December 1949 and reached 
12.5% in 1953. While these figures did not include membership of the Union of Polish 
Academic Youth (ZAMP) controlled by the PUWP, there is a document which provides a 
clue as to the portion of students affiliated with the PUWP through the ZAMP.319 The figures 
cited there are based upon an investigation into seven academic schools in Warsaw in 
1949/1950, and show that only 11.5% of junior staff had the desired political affiliation.320
This low figure is at odds with the presumed greater propensity of younger people to become 
involved in radical political programmes such as Marxism. It is only 0.3% higher than that for 
assistant professors, and much lower than that for junior researchers (the ‘independent 
scientific staff on contracts’), the juniors staff members’ immediate elders in the academic 
hierarchy. The best explanation for the conservative outlook of assistants and adjuncts is the 
fact that they were recruited by professors. Also, in terms of their backgrounds, junior staff 
did not conform to the PUWP’s stated aims of including more children of peasants and 
workers in higher education and research. Professors naturally preferred the well-read 
students with an intelligentsia background to peasants’ and workers’ children fresh from 
special preparatory courses designed to deal with their lack of secondary education.321
The first breach in the professors’ control over the recruitment of junior staff had already been 
made in 1945, when a decree gave the Ministry of Education the right to appoint assistants. 
318 National figures based on AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-12, p.101 
Warsaw figures based on AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55 
319 The Union of Polish Academic Youth (Związek Akademicki MáodzieĪy Polskiej) was created in 1948. Between 1948 and 
1950 it was an autonomous part of the Polish Youth Union, whereupon it was fully integrated into the Polish Youth Union 
(ZMP). Build up upon the pattern of the Komsomol, in academic institutions the ZAMP and later the ZMP had the task of 
ensuring the ideological education of students and junior academic staff. Representatives also had a say in the admission of 
new students and the employment of junior academic staff. For the sake of simplicity I shall not specify whether it is still the
ZAMP or the ZMP that we are dealing with, and refer only to the ZMP, that is, the Polish Youth Union. 
http://portalwiedzy.onet.pl accessed 13.11.2007 
320  AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55 
The sources specify that 70 were PUWP members and 63 belonged to the Union of Polish Academic Youth (ZAMP)  
Also, note that the total figure for assistants in Table One is not very far from the total for Warsaw provided in this document.
321 On the opposition of professors and fellow students against students with worker background, see Connelly, John, 2000. 
Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-1956 Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press.pp.224-248 
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However, the figures in both tables show that this was not enough. Presumably, ministry 
officials were too far removed from the actual processes of candidate selection to make any 
significant impact. Thus the first efficient measure that the ministry made was the political 
screening, known as the ‘verification’ of all junior staff, and the discontinuation of the 
contracts of those who failed to pass. Suleja reports that at Wrocáaw University thirty of the 
379 ancillary staff were removed in the ‘verfication’ process. Activists from the Polish Youth 
Union, who later evaluated their own efforts in the ‘verification’ campaign in Wrocáaw,
complained that the results were very uneven. 322  They suggested that this was because 
thorough preparations had not been made in all departments. It was the Polish Youth Union 
which took care of the preparations, while decisions were taken by a Commission for the 
Verification of Ancillary Scientific Staff, composed of representatives of the University 
(rector, deans and administrative directors), the local party cell (BPO), The Democratic 
Professors’ Clubs, trade unions, and the Polish Youth Union. Within this commission, the 
interests and opinions of the radical Polish Youth Union clashed with those of the professors, 
and Polish Youth Union activists complained that the professors and rector had made their 
situation difficult. PUWP professors had sided with their colleagues rather than with party 
comrades, and even after the Ministry had approved the Polish Youth Union’s list, the rector 
and other professors intervened successfully to save assistants from being dismissed, and the 
rector had even gone to Warsaw to present the matter at the Ministry personally. The tension 
between a Polish Youth Union eager for change and professors protecting their assistants 
became so great that the Ministry had to send a delegation to Wrocáaw to douse the flames.323
Suleja’s short account of these events does not answer all the questions about how the 
verification had unfolded or why some sections of the University were more successful than 
others in protecting their assistants. What is clear enough, however, is that the removal of less 
than ten percent of junior staff, even if followed by replacement with candidates affiliated to 
the Party or the Polish Youth Union, still left the Party very far from ensuring that the 
majority of assistants were loyal communists.  
Meanwhile, at the Main School of Planning and Statistics, the verification also gave variable 
results in different sections, but here the differences appear to be closely related to how 
relevant a given chair’s topic was to communist ideology. Thus, all assistants were dismissed 
322 It was only prepared thoroughly at the Department of Medicine; at other departments the changes made had been very 
small.Suleja, Teresa, 1995. Uniwersytet Wrocáawski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955. Wrocáaw:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocáawskiego. p.176 
323 Ibid. p.178-9 
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from Chairs of Political Economy (there were two collective chairs) while other chairs saw 
lesser changes. The least ideological of them, Accounting, retained all its assistants.324 Just as 
in Wrocáaw, professors at the Main School tried to mitigate the severity of the purge of young 
economists. DrabiĔska reports that in 1948/49, Grodek, the rector of the Main School, was 
aware of the planned verification and acted in concert with Aleksy Wakar, the professor of 
Political Economy. Grodek suggested that Wakar’s gifted assistants change specialities, and 
the direction in which they moved indicates which sub-disciplines were perceived as being 
‘less ideological’. Edward LipiĔski’s son Jan left Political Economy for Planning, while 
others went to Statistics (W. Sadowski), Accountancy (T. Peche), and Trade Organisation and 
Technique (J.  Kurnal).325 Edward LipiĔski, the other professor of Political Economy, lost his 
two assistants, Z. Sadowski and Helena Zagórska-Hagemejer. Both were popular with their 
students but failed to pass the Ministry’s verification.326 The minutes of a meeting of the Main 
School PUWP executive committee show that the Ministry demanded Z. Sadowski’s removal 
on the grounds that he had been active in the rightist resistance movement (NSZ) during the 
war. The minutes also show that he was defended by two of the recently-installed, 
handpicked, Moscow trained PUWP economists, whose leverage in this affair was in fact very 
limited. Their efforts could not prevent both assistants from being dismissed from their posts, 
even when, as Brus remembered, they argued that the move would be very unpopular with the 
students and that from a political point of view this would lessen the popularity of the PUWP 
at the school. Their only achievement was that a job was found for Z. Sadowski at the Main 
School library. We are then left with the paradox that established professors in Wrocáaw and 
at the Main School were sometimes able to negotiate the continuation of the careers of their 
students, while the apparent new masters of the field, the directors of the chairs of political 
economy, failed to be heard. 
324 DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw 
School of Economics. pp.138-139 
325 All stayed in the discipline and later went on to have successful careers in economics.  
326 The question of how, and with the participation of which agencies, the Ministry prepared its lists, has not been studied. 
Given the nature of the information which formed the basis of the decisions, the security police may have been involved in 
the process, something which would account for the failure of the patronage of local party members. 
Zdzisáaw Jan Sadowski (1925- ) economist. According to information provided by Sadowski during interviews in 2001 and 
2005, he served a one-year prison sentence on a charge of political conspiracy against the regime in 1946/47. The reason, he 
believes, was not directly related to his activities during the war, but to the fact that he participated in an independent student 
organisation (Bratniak) which came to the attention of the Security Police because many of its activists had been Scout 
Instructors. E. LipiĔski’s patronage was vital in making it possible for him, with a prison past, to pursue an academic career. 
After LipiĔski was moved to the University, Sadowski followed him there as an assistant. A.W. Haugstad interview with 
Zdzisáaw Jan Sadowski, Warsaw 2000 
Helena Zagórska-Hagemejer (1921-2001) had studied with LipiĔski during the war, and completed her Masters thesis 
under his supervision in 1948. She also later worked as his assistant at the University. AUW/K1228/personal file: ĩyciorys 
(CV) dated 1.10.1950 
124
Disposing of junior researchers who did not fit the PUWP’s ideological and political criteria 
could easily have been the end of the matter. After all, most (and in time all) chairs would be 
in the hands of PUWP’s trusted cadres, and their professors would implement Party decisions, 
such as those regarding the proportion of workers and peasants among junior researchers, and 
their political views. However, in late 1949 the PUWP pushed the matter on by designing an 
elaborate proposal which aimed to deprive the institution of the chair of its former 
“sovereignty” regarding the recruitment of future researchers and academic teachers. 327
Drafted by a committee that in early 1950 brought together representatives from all academic 
institutions in Warsaw, the proposal suggested investing the local Party organisation with the 
right to suggest and approve candidates for assistant jobs.  The Party and the Polish Youth 
Union were to conduct a broad recruitment campaign among their members, and then present 
the candidatures to the professor in question. 
The principle that the candidate for assistantship should discuss the matter with 
the professor in question is retained; however, the cases of the candidates 
suggested by the Party and the Polish Youth Union  are discussed with the 
professor by the Party representative responsible for the campaign in the 
department. It is important to attend to the necessity of displaying a tactful manner 
when conducting this conversation.328
Professors were still allowed to suggest their own candidates and to have a role in the 
recruitment, but the School Party Committee would have the final say.329
The professors’ discretion was further diminished when regulations on “the socialist work 
discipline” were applied to students. Disciplinary boards controlled by local party officials 
could override professors, punishing or even excluding any students found lacking in political 
credentials by PUWP and Polish Youth Union watchdogs. The links between a professor and 
his students were weakened, inasmuch as the former’s influence and power over the latter and 
their conduct was strongly restricted. The good opinion of professors was no longer enough to 
secure academic success, and the chair now no longer controlled recruitment to the discipline. 
327 AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55. The inter-institutional council (visible on ill.4) gathered representatives of the 
BPOs of academic institutions in Warsaw. The language of this proposal contrasts with other party documents from this 
period – both at BPO and CC level, in being written in a clear and intelligent prose. 
328 AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55 
329 The decision would depend on the opinions of candidates furnished by the professor, the Polish Youth Union (ZMP) 
Organisation and the School PUWP Committee, all outnumbering the professor. AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-100, pp.53-55 
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The Party organisation in academic institutions 
The main beneficiaries of the powers lost by chairs were not the new Marxist-Leninist 
professors who would now take their places, but the emerging Party organisation. Our 
knowledge about this new structure, about how it functioned and how it interacted with its 
academic host institutions and the scholarly communities, is restricted. The part of the Central 
Committee apparatus which is most relevant to this study, Science Division, has not yet been 
the subject of research. Some studies of the activities at lower levels or in Regional and Local 
Party Committees have been made, but none of them happen to deal with academic 
institutions. 330  Fijalkowska’s pre-1989 work on cultural policies provides some useful 
information, but its main focus is on art and culture, and science and scholarship are treated 
only marginally.331
330 See Kula, Marcin (ed.) (1997) Komitet Wojewodzki ogniwem wáadzy ludowej, Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych 
PAN, Instytut Historyczny Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, TymiĔski, Maciej, 2001. PZPR i przedsiĊbiorstwo. Nadzór 
partyjny nad zakáadami przemysáowymi 1956-1970. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TRIO.Some institutional histories written 
before 1989 also include chapters on the activities of the local party cell, as is the case for instance in the history of PoznaĔ
University. Zakrzewski, Zbigniew (ed.) (1976) Akademia Ekonomiczna w Poznaniu 1926-1976, Warszawa - Poznan: PWN. 
However, none of the institutional histories written after 1989 and dealing with important centres of economics in this period 
treat this aspect in depth or make use of archival sources left by the local party organisation. 
331 Written in the relatively mild climate of the 1980s, Fijaákowska’s book provides much interesting material, despite its 
outward political correctness. Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959). Warszawa: PWN. 
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Ill.  4: Party organisation in higher education 1949-1952.332
The set-up of the Party organisation has been charted by Fijalkowska and the above diagram 
is based on her presentation. At the bottom came the Basic Party Organisation (BPO), which 
grouped together all Party members working in a given institution. The BPO reported to a 
district committee, which again was supervised by a Town Committee reporting to the 
Regional Committee (RC)333 and finally through that to the Central Committee (CC).334 This 
332 Based on Ibid. This illustration does not show the levels of Town or District Committee. Although these existed, and were 
a formal part of party science and higher education organisation, they hardly ever played a significant role. 
333 The Regional (county) Committees had their own sections responsible for education, propaganda and so on, just as the CC 
did. In theory science belonged to the education or propaganda sections. In practice little attention was paid to matters of 
science and higher education in the RC, as concerned reports from the CC Division show.  
KC PZPR 237/XVI/25/pp.34-37: „Informacja o pracy Komitetu Warszawskiego na odcinku szkolnictwa wyĪszego”. Signed 
T.Bratkiewicz, 1950 
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many-layered hierarchical structure was supplemented by horizontal inter-institutional 
Councils and a Central Council. Impressive as this structure looks, the question arises as to 
what extent it functioned and how far its activity brought the results the Party leadership was 
expecting from it. My own archival investigations into sources relating to the first phase of 
their activity (1948-1952) from the Central Committee, the Regional Committee in Warsaw, 
and the Basic Party Organisation of the Main School, indicate that the levels between the 
BPO and the Central Committee hardly functioned as far as science and higher education 
were concerned. Absence of evidence of activity at the intermediate levels, and repeated 
complaints formulated by the Central Committee Science Division both support this claim. It 
would appear that until 1952 this imposing structure existed only on paper. 
Basic Party Organisations were invested with the task of controlling institutions in which 
Party members were an unpopular minority. I shall turn later to the tasks and concerns of the 
BPOs as revealed by archival material from the Main School of Planning and Statistics, but 
for the time being it will suffice to point out some of the challenges inherent in the BPOs’ 
work, as perceived when they were criticised and reorganised in 1952, only a few years after 
their creation by the PUWP leadership. In order to address the principal problem, that is, the 
poor Party presence in academic institutions, all party members employed in more than one 
institution were instructed to make the academic BPO their primary party cell. This would of 
course do nothing to improve the overall number of Party members, but would mean that 
more people would turn up at academic BPO meetings. The 1952 Orgburo resolution also 
criticised the internal organisation of the BPOs, which had been divided into sections 
covering academic staff, students, and administrative and technical staff. 335  Moreover, 
departments where there were no scholars with Party membership would not be represented at 
meetings in the BPO academic staff section. In 1952 the Party leadership also became aware 
that scholars had encountered problems in combining academic and party work. Consequently 
the Orgburo proposed to limit the length of meetings and party work to five hours weekly, a 
proposal which implies that many party members devoted more than one day a week to Party 
work.
334 The original terms in Polish: Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna, Komitet Uczelniany, Komitet Dzielnicowy, Komitet 
Miejski, Komitet Wojewódzki, Komitet Centralny.  
Note that Warsaw was an exception, being a Region of its own, so there was no Town Committee, but instead the Komitet 
Warszawski held RC rank. 
335KC PZPR 237/XVI/33/ pp.31-33: August 1952 “Uchwala Sekretariatu Biura organizacyjnego KC PZPR w sprawie 
struktury organizacji partyjnych na wyĪszych uczelniach”  
The argument used to justify internal BPO organisation was that this set-up made it difficult to link party work to the daily 
running of the chairs and institutes, and masked the Party’s weakness in or absence from some departments. 
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At the level above the BPO, the Regional Committee (RC) education and propaganda section, 
there is little evidence of any ideological supervision of BPO work. RC officials working with 
academic institutions spent most of their time dealing with student-related matters, from 
housing and canteens to recruitment and employment. 336  They also failed efficiently to 
channel upwards information about the situation in their constituencies. In December 1950 the 
CC Science Division complained to the First Secretary of the Warsaw PUWP about the 
situation in the capital:  
For some time, the Propaganda, Education and Culture Division of the Higher 
Education Section in the Regional Committee has been doing badly. (…) We 
informed the Comrade Secretary about this some time ago, but alas, to this day no 
change for the better has taken place. The result is that the Science Division (of the 
CC – AWH) is less informed about the situation at the academic schools in 
Warsaw than about those in the most remote centres. Very often we have to contact 
the School Committees directly, as the RC does not usually respond to our letters. 
The RC Higher Education Section does not control the situation at the academic 
schools, and does not control the work of the BPOs, but leaves them to fend for 
themselves.337
This quote shows that the problems at RC and BPO level had consequences for the work of 
the Central Committee’s Science Division, established in 1948. 338  All the problems 
encountered by the bottom and middle levels of the Party organisation meant that instead of 
the elaborate five-layered cake (Schwartzwaldtorte) outlined in the diagram, the situation 
between 1949 and 1952 resembles more the kind of chocolate cake you might find at 
children’s parties, a dry BPO sponge cake with a colourful but randomly-scattered CC 
topping.
336 I have consulted the archival collection of the Warsaw Regional Committee held by the Warsaw State Archive and housed 
in the Otwock section. However, neither the folder on Party work at academic schools (APMW/PZPR/KW/714) nor that with 
material pertaining to the Main School (APMW/PZPR/KW/716) contains any material from the early 1950s. The protocols of 
the RC Executive Committee in late 1949, that is during the first hectic months following the extensive reform of higher 
education, show traces of RC activity in selecting and approving the candidate for the post of Secretary of Warsaw University 
BPO, but no other traces of RC activity in higher education could be found. (APMW/PZPR/KW/153) Furthermore, there is 
no mention of the role and activities of the Regional Committee in the letters from the Main School to the CC Science 
Division held in the CC archival collection at the Archiwum Akt Nowych. 
337 AAN/KC PZPR/ 237/XVI-100 p.1 Letter from M. Kowalczewski at the CC PUWP Science Division to the First Secretary 
of the Warsaw Committee of the PUWP (the Warsaw RC was frequently just called the Warsaw Committee.) Date 
14.12.1950. 
338 Directly attached to the CC Secretariat and subject to supervision by those at the utmost height of the power pyramid, it 
was overseen by Politburo member Edward Ochab between 1948 and 1952, then for a short period by Berman (1952-1954) 
and then once again by Ochab. Biologist Wáodzimierz Petrusewicz was the first director (1948-1952) along with Zofia 
Zemankowa. Zemankowa alternated between several roles during her time at the Division (1948-1959), from ‘senior 
instructor’ to director, and appears both to have provided the division with continuity and to have infused it with orthodoxy 
on the Party line. Between 1955 and 1959 there was a series of reorganisations throughout which the division was alternately 
merged with and separated from the sectors of culture and education. From 1960 the situation stabilised, until in 1968 it 
became the Science and Education Division, under the leadership of Andrzej Werblan.Janowski, Wáodzimierz & KochaĔski, 
Aleksander, 2000. Informator o strukturze i obsadzie personalnej centralnego aparatu PZPR Warszawa: PAN ISP. 
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The CC Science Division’s internal memos, and the reports submitted to the leadership, have 
been my principal source,339 and they give a picture of an agency with grand ambitions but 
limited means. The task of the Division was to supervise Party organisation and State 
agencies active in academic institutions, and inform the Party leadership about the situation in 
this sector. 340  The CC’s Science Division oversaw appointments to important academic 
positions,341  and their reports also tell of proposing and approving people for a variety of 
roles, from students travelling to the USSR, to editorial boards, and the higher echelons of the 
Ministry of Higher Education.342 The division also oversaw the verification campaigns, and 
controlled the activities of the Central Qualifications Committee, as well as committees 
responsible for the evaluation and employment of university and academic school graduates. 
In 1953 work was also progressing towards the establishment of a register of all scientists.343
From their own reports, it seems that Division apparatchiks spent most of their time on 
student-related work such as recruitment, the selection of students for trips and further study 
in the USSR, and the distribution of accommodation. International scholarly contacts were 
also a central task for the Division. All in all, there was hardly any aspect of scientific activity 
that the CC’s Science Division did not consider its business. However, according to their own 
reports, the Division was chronically under-staffed, overworked, burdened with time-
consuming report-writing, and suffering from the lack of a well-functioning secretariat.344 In 
the first years, several positions were constantly vacant. Economics, however, was given 
339 Since one important function of the reports was to prevent, or respond to, criticism from above, it is not surprising that 
they were by turn triumphant and plaintive. This feature greatly undermines the reliability of these reports. Moreover, as they
are written in rigid and formal organisational jargon, the reports are not explicit about the measures used. Typical expressions 
include “helping” or “providing guidance and assistance”, but leave us guessing as to how that was done. 
340 This description of the tasks of the Science Division was included in the annual report covering the period from 
September 1950 to December 1951. AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/4 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, Sprawozdania z 
pracy Wydziaáu, 1950-51. pp.2-7 
341 There is lack of precise information, but analogy with the CC’s Culture Division suggests that from the early 1950s 
decisions on all leading positions had to be approved by the Division Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. Polityka i twórcy (1948-
1959). Warszawa: PWN. s.164. For this she refers to AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVIII-23 
342 Whilst this raises the issue of nomenklatura, I have not been able to find documents indicating that formalised lists of 
nomenklatura-bound positions were systematically used. This system was in Poland formalised on a later stage. Paczkowski, 
Andrzej, 2003. System nomenklatury. In A. Paczkowski (ed.) Centrum wáadzy w Polsce. Warszawa: Instytut Studiów 
Politycznych PAN, 115-140. 
343 AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/4/Sprawozdanie Wydziaáu Nauki za okres od 20.II do 28.II.1953 r./pp.59-60 
344 Barbara Fijalkowska, who has focused her research on the CC Culture Division, reports that the division was overloaded 
due to the extreme demand for reports for the top leadership. My archival research confirms that the same was the case with 
the Science Division. AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI-4  Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959). Warszawa: 
PWN. 
The turnover of staff was considerable, and qualifications fell short of the ambitious aim of combining party competence with 
an active participation in scientific life. A one-year party school was established to remedy this. That a one-year course was 
considered a prospect for improvement is perhaps the most eloquent indicator of the level of staff competence. In January 
1951, three years after the establishment of the Division, the director, Petrusewicz, berated his staff for working too little 
compared to other Divisions and for signing letters on behalf of the Division without proper authorisation. He pointed out the 
chaos in the secretariat, the lack of clear distribution of tasks, and responsibilities, and the dearth of clear directives as to what 
kind of decisions the Division was to take, and into what depth of detail they should go. AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/1 
Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego “Protokóá z zebrania Wydziaáu Nauki KC PZPR z dnia 16.1.1951. 
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priority and Zemankowa, the vice-director of the Division, dealt with discipline from 1950 to 
1952, and probably subsequently as well. From 1953 onwards Division work gradually gained 
momentum, but the advent of the Thaw saw the passing of their zenith in that decade, and 
instead of growing, the power of the CC’s Science Division declined. After 1955, with the 
Party in crisis, the collegial academic bodies reclaimed control over their institutions and 
disciplines – a shift in power which occurred at the Party bureaucracy’s expense. Then from 
the early 1960s the Party apparatus reasserted its power, backed by an efficiently-organised 
bureaucracy. It is quite possible that the impact of the Party organisation on academic activity 
was as great or even greater in the 1960s than before; however, Party ambitions never 
regained the level of the early 1950s.
In the first years of the Division’s activity, the disparity between resources and ambitious 
goals led to strong variations in control over academic institutions. The highest echelon of the 
leadership intervened directly in times of crisis, but on the whole local party officials were left 
to their own resources. There is some evidence of those direct and personal interventions of 
the kind that leave little trace in documents: from informal meetings with and telephone calls 
to local party representatives and rectors, to the participation of CC representatives in 
discussions at local BPOs. Using such methods, the Division may have managed to make its 
presence felt in academic institutions, yet there is quite a distance between such a presence 
and systematic control over the sector. It is important to stress that despite the fact that the 
system did not work as well as intended, both the CC’s Science Division and the local party 
secretaries and their aides made a great impact on the institutions in their charge.
The Main School of Planning and Statistics 
The marginalisation of university economics strengthened the relative position of the Main 
School. The former private business school was to become the leading centre in research and 
education in economics.  
The forge for cadres for the planned economy, the forge for young scientific 
cadres, the centre of progressive economic science in Poland – that is what the 
Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw is to become.345
345 This definition of the goals of the ‘new’ Main School was published in the 1950/51 booklet containing lecture plans and a 
staff list. 1950 Skáad osobowy i spis wykáadów na rok 1950/51, Szkoáa Gáówna Planowania i Statystyki, Warszawa: Szkoáa
Gáówna Planowania i Statystyki, p.6
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The choice as new rector of NowiĔski, a legal scholar who had recently turned to Marxist-
Leninist philosophy, suggests that initial plans were for the Main School to become a hub of 
Marxist-Leninist economics and ideology. From this ideological centre, scores of trustworthy 
lecturers in political economy were to emerge, enabling the launch of new research 
institutions and ensuring the teaching of political economy to students of all disciplines. The 
task which came to dominate the Main School’s activities during the following years, and 
which displaced research, was that of producing specialists for the expanding planning 
bureaucracy.346 To make this possible, the organisation of the School was modified. At the 
behest of the Politburo, the Main School was divided into four sections specialising in 
planning in industry, planning in trade, planning in finance, and statistics. Students were to 
choose a narrow specialisation which would prepare them for work in a specific branch of the 
planned economy, such as transport, housing or industry. The number of specialisations 
gradually increased, reaching a peak in 1953/54, when they could be counted in tens.347 A 
draft for a Politburo resolution, prepared by the PUWP CC Science Division in co-operation 
with the Ministry, provides two reasons for why this organisational solution was chosen:
(...) specialisation and diversification are greater in a planned economy than in a 
capitalist economy, where everything is based on the principle of trade. This leads 
to the need for a radical and decisive reorganisation of economic and social 
education leading to specialisation in institutions of higher learning. 348
By choosing a structure modelled on the Gosplan division of the economy into branches, 
Polish Party officials at both lower and high levels were demonstrating their commitment to 
the Soviet example, demonstrations which had been prescribed ever since the repudiation of 
the ‘national way to socialism’ in mid 1948. This organisational solution also offered a 
method for dealing with the lack of trustworthy Marxist-Leninist scholars. 
The specialisation of institutions of higher learning is on the one hand justified by 
greater specialisation and diversification in the planned economy as mentioned 
above, and on the other hand by the fact that it is easier to conquer a specialised 
higher school, for instance through the leadership of relevant ministries, 
connections to practice, etc. … 349
346 The main thesis of DrabiĔska, who studied the history of the Main School during the period of the communist 
transformation, is that teaching displaced all other activities.DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych 
przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. 
347 Ibid.p.82 
348 AAN/ KC PZPR 237/XVI/27 pp.7-9
349 AAN/ KC PZPR 237/XVI/27 pp.7-9
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The fact that students would now be channelled directly into specialisations that prepared 
them for work in corresponding Planning Commission departments and Ministries would 
make it easier for these agencies to influence the education of their future workers. This 
arrangement would compensate for the fact that practically all PUWP members with 
economics training and experience had been sucked up by the State and Planning Commission 
bureaucracies. Now some of them could be leased out to teach their narrow specialities, and 
lists of lecturers active at the ‘new’ Main School show that this was indeed the case. The 
radical break with the former organisation, and also with the reforms envisioned by Grodek, 
made it easier to circumvent the established academic hierarchy. Lectures by unsuitable 
professors became superfluous, while PUWP-loyal specialist-bureaucrats were drawn in. 
The reformed Main School harboured rivalries and conflicts. There was conflict between the 
old staff and the new, as the reforms had practically dispossessed the cohesive group of 
established Main School staff. The latter’s hard feelings were exacerbated by the arrogance 
with which Marxist-Leninist scholars had entered the institutions. There was also potential for 
the Main School to become the scene of rivalry between the economic and agit-prop sectors 
of the Party bureaucracy. Péteri affirms the existence of such a conflict in Hungarian 
economics in the same period.350 The economics of planning was the domain of Hilary Minc 
and the Planning Commission, while political economy was dealt with in the agit-prop sector 
directed by Jakub Berman. How would these two powerful sectors co-operate within the 
reformed Main School? In fact, as we shall see, they hardly had time to disagree, as they did 
not stay together for long. As is implied by the name “Mincówka” (the popular appellation 
for the reformed Main School in these years) it was the demands of Minc’s planning 
bureaucracy that prevailed. Shortly after this, however, all those new responsibilities under 
Berman’s jurisdiction at the Main School were removed to a fresh institution, the Institute for 
Training of Scientific Cadres. This was attached directly to the PUWP CC, and took charge of 
both ideological training and the development of theoretical Marxism. 
Plans and practice, students and research 
For the new rector of the Main School, the first priority was to produce graduates for the 
hungry planning apparatus. After one year of the new order, at the beginning of the 1950/51 
350 Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) Academia
and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe. New York: 
Atlantic Reseach and Publications. 
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academic year, he evaluated the School’s progress and challenges in a speech given to party 
professors.351 Achievements were now measured against the demands placed on the school by 
the Planning Commission. The Six-Year Plan had decreed that the Main School of Planning 
and Statistics should deliver approximately 5,000 students between 1950 and 1955. Not only 
were the numbers prescribed, but also the relative distribution between specialisations in 
industry, commerce, finance and statistics, and even the percentages of students expected to 
fail their exams. The confrontation of these expectations with reality was not easy. Figures 
quoted by NowiĔski reveal serious problems with those first-year students who had enrolled 
at the reformed Main School on the basis of new recruitment policies favouring worker and 
peasant origins. Meeting the Plan’s demand for 5,000 graduates in six years meant that the 
school would have to allow about 830 economists to graduate each year. Although the school 
had exceeded the Ministry’s directive by accepting as many as 900 students, only 848 were 
actually enrolled in the autumn of 1949. Of these, only 668 were admitted to the spring term 
examinations and their results indicated that only 600 would pass into the second year. As 
further losses had to be expected during the third year, the target of 830 per year was 
becoming a distant one.  
Given these numbers, it is not surprising that only 2,500 students left the Main School of 
Planning and Statistics with diplomas in their pockets in the period 1950-1955.352 Whilst this 
was an important increase compared to the interwar years, the number of graduates was a 
mere 50% of the original plan, hardly a success in a political setting where over-performance 
in a Stachanovite spirit was called for.353 Moreover, even to reach this more modest goal, the 
quality of education had been sacrificed so greatly that the level of competence among the 
graduates was far below original expectations. NowiĔski admitted as much to his colleagues:
The fact is that to a large extent we had to lower the level of the exam 
requirements. The general level of the students’ knowledge was so unsatisfactory 
that we had to choose between a general massacre and a lowering of standards.354
351 AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, pp. 6-23: “Referat tow. NowiĔskiego na zebraniu 
partyjnej organizacji profesorów SGPiS z dn. 25.IX 50” 
352 Chodakowska, Janina, 1981. Rozwój szkolnictwa wyĪszego w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1944-1951 Wrocáaw: Ossolineum. 
p.148
353 DrabiĔska mentions that the planned targets were scaled down to a more realistic level, disguising the embarrassing 
failure to reach the original targets. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-
gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. 
354 AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, pp.6-23: “Referat tow. NowiĔskiego na zebraniu 
partyjnej organizacji profesorow.” SGPiS z dn. 25.IX 50” 
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The quality of instruction suffered from the scarcity of competent and experienced lecturers 
approved by the PUWP. The new students were less equipped to excel at exams than earlier 
cohorts entering the Main School, both on account of their peasant and worker backgrounds, 
and because their primary education had been disrupted by the war and they still had to cope 
with difficult material conditions. According to DrabiĔska, teaching improved in time, so the 
difficulties described by NowiĔski in 1950 gradually subsided; but recruiting enough students 
would become increasingly difficult.  
Tensions: old staff and newcomers 
How was the ‘fist of revolution’ (the group of Moscow-trained deputy professors introduced 
into positions of power at the Main School) received by the ‘old’ Main School academic 
staff? How did they interact, and how did they view each other? In one of several interviews I 
conducted with W. Brus, a newcomer at the Main School, he recounted an occasion which he 
remembered vividly, and which was most probably the inauguration ceremony of the ‘new’ 
Main School at which H. Minc was honorary guest. The staff and students were gathered in 
the great auditorium, waiting for the school leadership to enter in full academic apparel and 
splendour. There was no marked reaction to the entrance of the new marxist rector NowiĔski, 
a legal scholar with no former ties to the school, but at the entrance of the former rector and 
now pro-rector Andrzej Grodek, all those present rose and applauded him.355
Party membership at the ‘new’ Main School in 1949/50 was decidedly above the national 
average for academic institutions.  Half of the professors were PUWP members, but most had 
come to their membership via the Socialist Party.356 Socialist sympathies were so common 
that, reportedly, when A. Wakar chose to join the PWP rather than the PSP in 1945, his 
colleagues could not understand his choice.357 Among the junior staff, 24 of the 56 were 
PUWP members. This group was divided, since all deputy professors bar two were members, 
355 A.W. Haugstad, interview with Wáodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001 
356 Professor party members were: J. Drewnowski, O. Lange, E. LipiĔski, E. Makowski, Cz. NowiĔski, A. Wakar, A. Weryha 
DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw 
School of Economics.  
357 According to a student of A. Wakar, prof. Janusz Beksiak, Wakar’s decision was influenced by his experience of the 
Russian Revolution in 1917 and his conclusion that the PWP was going to win the struggle with the PPP and the PSP. It was 
generally believed that this decision was his undoing. As a rare PWP academic, he was appointed rector of the Academy of 
Political Sciences (ANP), later renamed Main School of Foreign Trade. In that position, the argument went, he attracted too 
much personal attention, and a close examination of his past by the PUWP and the security services led to his arrest and 
deportation to the USSR in 1952.  The real reason behind the arrest was not clear even to Wakar himself. Possible reasons 
that have been suggested include his brief spell in the medical corps of Denikin’s army and a mix-up of names. A.W. 
Haugstad, interview with Janusz Beksiak, Warsaw 2000, Beksiak, Janusz & Al., Et, 1997. Materialy z konferencji 
Wakarowskiej, 7.12.1996. Roczniki Kolegium Analiz Ekonomicznych. SGH, Warszawa: KAE SGH. 
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while only four of the 18 lecturers belonged to the PUWP. The high percentage of PUWP 
members among Main School professors does not mean that the newcomers were able to fit 
easily into the established order. The old staff at the Main School were closely bound 
together, most of them having spent nearly all their careers there. The cohesion of the 
established staff could well have posed difficulties if the newcomers had entered the 
institutions ‘legitimately’, which was hardly the case here. At the CPB debate, where 
newcomers had been pitted against ‘old’ Main School staff, a chasm had already emerged 
between PUWP members of PSP origin and those backed by the PWP. The Main School had 
been nationalised suddenly, along lines which radically differed from those thought up by the 
established Main School staff. This had led to the dismissal of several senior economists, a 
purge of young talent, and the displacement from influential positions of those who up till 
then had considered themselves the legitimate leaders of the institution, and this had created 
much resentment and bitterness over thwarted careers. Many among the ‘old’ staff blamed the 
newcomers for the way the transformation was carried out, and disapproved of the 
institution’s new approach, which stressed the quantity rather than the quality of graduates, 
and left no time for research. Witnesses testify that there was hardly any communication 
between the political economy section, staffed by newcomers, and the domestic trade section, 
where ‘old’ staff were in the majority, and that the sections lived separate lives under the 
same roof. Any staff homogeneity apparently indicated by the high PUWP membership was 
misleading: there were two distinct and polarised groups.
An interesting source on the newcomers’ views of the situation upon arrival can be found in 
the report of the executive of the local party committee two months into the first academic 
year of ‘the marxist offensive’. In this report both the successes and the problems were laid 
out for the inspection of the CC Science Division.358 Among the successes, the local PUWP 
activists included the fact that 64% of the 824 students who enrolled that year were of worker 
or peasant origin, and that, by November, 600 of these new students belonged to the Polish 
Youth Union, and 80 to the Party proper. The leaders of the Main School party cell further 
congratulated themselves on having successfully drawn up and implemented a schedule of 
lectures and study programmes, and on having helped students with housing and material 
needs. Despite this, these successes were followed by a list of the problems that the Party 
358 AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109/ Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Basic 
Party Organisation of the Main School of Planning and Statistics” Signed: 2nd Secretary Zawadzka, Romana, 25.11.1949. 
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faced. The school party committee’s interpretation of these troubles was symptomatic of the 
political atmosphere of the time, and merits an extensive quote. 
The setting-up of a standard-bearing Marxist school has undoubtedly provoked a 
deliberate, organised and hostile reaction, which will in all likelihood continue to 
increase. The weakness of the youth organisations, especially of the Union of 
Polish Academic Youth opens up the possibility of infiltration by the enemy into 
our area. Alongside the systematically-selected group in the 1st year, there are the 
2nd and 3rd year groups, the majority of which belong to an alien class. Their 
presence at the school creates exceptionally fertile ground for all kinds of hostile 
actions, and for the drawing of the worker-peasant youth (even those in the ZAMP) 
towards hostile elements. This creates the need for swift and decisive action to 
strengthen the youth front and establish particular vigilance in this section.359
The local activists in the Polish Youth Union had so far failed to reach the majority of 
students, who did not take part in any activities, or display any inclination to demonstrate 
ideological commitment. The older students in the second and third years were worse than 
uninterested, they were described as “hostile and reactionary elements”. The interpretation of 
the local PUWP was an exact reproduction of the interpretation of the international and 
domestic situation drawn up by their superiors: the ‘marxist offensive’ had provoked the 
enemy forces to launch a ‘counter-offensive’. The report lists four ways in which this 
‘counter-offensive’ manifested itself. Firstly, students openly engaged in religious activities 
on school premises and demonstrated their adherence to the Catholic Church, drawing crosses 
on the walls of the seminar rooms, giving out information with ‘clerical content’, and 
organising prayers in the dining hall. Secondly, the report notes the existence of an anti-
semitic campaign, consisting of derogatory remarks and graffiti. In particular, the report refers 
to a list scribbled on the wall in a toilet identifying some of the lecturers teaching the second 
year as Jews. The third element of the '‘counter-offensive” was expressions of allegiance to 
the old Main School of Commerce, seen for instance in students wearing their “SGH” pins. 
The inauguration of the new academic year at the new Main School of Planning and Statistics 
was mentioned as another example of the “apotheosis of the Main School of Commerce”. The 
last element of the ‘counter-offensive’ was “the deliberate undermining of the authority of the 
school’s leadership”. Indeed, senior students did not recognise the authority of the new 
359 AAN/KC PZPR 237/XVI/109/Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, “Report of the Executive Committee of the Basic 
Party Organisation of the Main School of Planning and Statistics” Signed: 2nd Secretary Zawadzka, Romana, 25.11.1949. 
pp.1-2
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school leadership, and the sentiments of the old staff were no warmer, although they acted 
more cautiously. 
The report conveys a high degree of concern about matters which in other contexts might 
have been seen as trivial. All symptoms of a lack of acceptance of and submission to the ‘new 
reality’ on the part of the old staff and student body were taken very seriously in this report. 
That the communist leadership should loose sleep over graffiti in the toilets or students 
wearing their old school pins can be read as evidence of a high level of insecurity, social 
alienation and stress. It is obvious that references to this issue created a sense of unease 
among Polish citizens who had been classified by the Nazis as Jews (regardless of their 
personal attachment to the Judaic religion). The report, however, was first and foremost a 
political statement, and only incidentally a possible indication of the state of mind of the 
author and her comrades. Communist propaganda readily identified all its political opponents 
as fascists and anti-semites, as the writer of the report was undoubtedly aware. Allegations of 
anti-semitism in this report served to create a negative view of the ‘old’ Main School of 
Commerce, while the juxtaposition of the stereotypes ‘Communist Jew’ versus ‘Anti-Semite 
Catholic’ allowed the authors of the report to pose both as defenders of Jews and as victims, 
while the catholic students reproached for their religious practices were cast in the role of 
reactionary, organised racists. The strong bias of this report precludes any judgement about 
the true attitudes of the Main School’s staff and students to Jews as based on the other sources 
retrieved and used for this study.360 Nevertheless, this document gives a glimpse of how 
political and cultural stereotypes played a part in the redefinition of the disciplinary landscape 
of economics. To reinforce the division into ‘bourgeois’ and Marxist-Leninist economists, 
officially based on different choices of problems and methods, stereotypes from the agit-prop 
tool-kit were applied.361
360  While the students involved in catholic practices are reported to have participated in activities that involved groups, the 
extent of the anti-semitic incidents is not specified, apart from mentioning remarks and grafitti, which could have been the 
work of many students or just one or two. Information about the conditions of Jewish students at Main School in the interwar 
years can be found in Mróz, Maria Wanda, 1994. DziaáalnoĞü  dydaktyczna WyĪszej Szkoáy Handlowej - Szkoáy Gáównej 
Handlowej w latach 1915-1939 Warszawa: Szkoáa Gáówna Handlowa. See Brus’ account of the difficulty of gaining 
admission for Jewish students and the atmophere at the Main School compared to the Free University in Brus, Wáodzimierz, 
1993. "The Bane of Reforming the Socialist System". Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 187, 363-405. 
361 While it would seem that to some extent both parties subscribed to the catholic-communist division, the long history of 
this pair of stereotypes makes it particularly difficult to disentangle the layers of interpretation and the ascriptions of 
identities. The polarisation which started in these years has been complicated by the events of 1968, when a Jewish identity 
was again ascribed to academics and made the basis of a purge. The present Polish political landscape has also had an effect 
on how the situation in the early 1950s is portrayed in contemporary witness accounts. The unwillingness to ‘confess’ 
anything which in today’s’ post-communist, ‘lustrationist’ environment could be construed as evidence of ‘collaboration’ 
with the Communist regime, reinforces the tendency to subscribe to these time-worn stereotypes. While explicitly anti-
Semitic attitudes are virtually absent from academic contexts in which statements about the history of the discipline are made 
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Among the ‘old’ Main School staff, strong bonds still existed, and new students continued to 
be assimilated into the ‘old’ community, although that would only become apparent from 
1956. According to the testimonies of students who witnessed these years, the ‘old’ Main 
School staff managed to maintain pockets of relative freedom. Scholars now barred from 
prominent positions came together with students from politically ‘dubious’ backgrounds. One 
example was the Internal Trade Section at the Main School, headed by the ‘old’ Main School 
graduate KoĨmiĔski.362 These groups were able to serve as fora for discussions of banned 
Western economics.363
All in all, the transformation of the Main School had created a situation where the ‘old’ staff 
felt powerless, where the newcomers faced a hostile environment, and where demanding 
employers called for results it would take a miracle to produce. 
The ITSC threat 
As for research and theory development, the ‘new’ Main School was unable to profit from the 
abolition of university economics, as practically no research was conducted at the Main 
School between its transformation in 1949 and the coming of the Thaw.364 This development 
was not the result of a plan, but of a combination of conditions. To begin with, the specific 
intellectual climate of these years was not conducive to critical thinking. The demand that 
research should be Marxist-Leninist and loyal to the political leadership virtually excluded 
established economists with ‘bourgeois’ pasts from this area, and from publication. The 
newcomers, on the other hand, struggled with their lack of qualifications and research 
experience, and with the increasing secrecy surrounding economic data. What is more, the 
rapid expansion of student numbers completely swamped those academics still allowed to 
teach, leaving them little or no time for research. Indeed, the demand for lecturers was such 
that teaching duties were even assigned to individuals whom the responsible party 
functionaries deemed to be ‘unsuitable’.  
(I have not come across any), we might note the tendency to underline catholic identity in former-student reminiscences from 
these years. (I was a catholic – ergo I was not collaborating with the Communist regime.) Among economists, this is 
achieved through reference to methodological preferences. (‘I always believed in Western economics, even when paying lip-
service to Marxism’). 
362 StruĪycki, Marian & KamiĔski, Marek B. (eds.) (2004) Leon KoĨmiĔski. Patron WyĪszej Szkoáy Przedsiembiorstwa i 
Zarzadzania., Warszawa: WyĪsza Szkoáa Przedsiebiorczosci i Zarzadzania im L. KoĨmiĔskiego.
363 ZarĊba, Janusz, 1985. Reforma w testamencie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem, 1.ed. Warszawa: MáodzieĪowa Agencja 
Wydawnicza. p.134 
364 In her unpublished doctoral thesis, Danuta DrabiĔska argues that teaching dominated the activities of the Main School in 
the period she studied. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 
1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. 
139
In addition to the hostile atmosphere and numerous initial problems, it soon turned out that 
the Party and Ministry’s concentration on the Main School of Planning and Statistics was to 
be of short duration. What now followed was the establishment of a series of Higher Schools 
of Economics (WSE), based on the old Economic Colleges, with some being created in towns 
taken over from Germany. By 1950 there were ten WSEs with varying specialisations. The 
hardest blow to the future of the Main School as the principal ‘forge’ of Marxist-Leninist 
social scientists, however, was the establishment of the Institute for Training of Scientific 
Cadres (ITSC). In November 1949, just months after the ‘take-over’ of the Main School, the 
key Party functionaries dealing with higher education, and Adam Schaff, one of the most 
active ideologues, discussed the need to concentrate the Party’s forces on ideologically 
significant social science subjects.365 From the perspective of the Main School leadership, 
however, such targeting would mean a dispersal of the PUWP’s scarce human resources in 
Marxist-Leninist economics. 
Following decisions taken at a Politburo meeting in January 1950, the new institution opened 
in October that year.366 The ITSC was attached directly to the PUWP CC and run by Adam 
Schaff, who started a vigorous campaign to carve out resources for his new fiefdom. As a 
result, the majority of Marxists-Leninists sent to Moscow by the Politburo in the summer of 
1949, in preparation for their work at the ‘new’ Main School, were now moved from the Main 
School to the ITSC. In his article on the ITSC, Connelly looks at why Schaff was successful; I 
would like to concentrate on why NowiĔski failed to protect the Main School from a loss of 
strategic resources.367 After all, he had the advantage of having taken up his position first.
DrabiĔska draws a deeply sympathetic portrait of NowiĔski, but portrays a man disliked and 
alone, unable to engage his colleagues at the Main School, or even those from PWUP, in a 
positive way.368 Documents from the CC Science Division throw some additional light on 
NowiĔski’s position in the Party, and if indeed there was a contest between the newly-
founded ITSC and the Main School, then the capacities and influence of their respective 
patrons would have been important. In September 1950, the Warsaw University BPO wrote to 
Edward Ochab, the Central Committee Secretary, demanding that the Party deal with the 
365 Adam Schaff (1913- ) graduate of Lwów University, studied political science in Paris, joined the Communist party (KPP) 
in 1936. During the war he studied Marxist philosophy in the Soviet Union. After the war he lectured at the Party School and 
was made professor of philosophy at Warsaw University. 
366 Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." Minerva, 34, 323-346. 
367 Ibid. 
368 DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw 
School of Economics.pp.366-367 
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‘problem of NowiĔski’ as a matter of urgency. The main areas of complaint were his attitudes 
to the Soviet Union before the war, his avoidance of teaching duties at the University, and his 
behaviour towards comrades on the executive committee. Following this complaint NowiĔski
had to submit a self-criticism or ‘samokrytyka’ (18 typed pages) at a meeting held at the CC 
Science Division. Among other things he had to admit that in his pre-war comparative study 
he had found strong similarities between the Soviet and Nazi legal systems. In line with the 
genre of ‘samokrytyka’, NowiĔski condemned all such work undertaken before 1948 as 
“devoid of scientific value and politically harmful”. 369  His repentance must have been 
accepted, for he continued as rector of the Main School for two more years. The whole affair 
was dealt with confidentially, and I have not come across any evidence that any aspect of the 
case was disclosed outside the room. Yet among those present at the meeting was Adam 
Schaff. The available sources do not allow us to draw any conclusions as to who had pushed 
for this ‘samokrytyka’, or why, but it is clear that NowiĔski’s past and this affair must have 
affected both his ability to defend the Main School and his credentials for the task of 
controlling the centre of ideological training and research in political economy.370
The move of the centre of ideological gravity away from the Main School of Planning and 
Statistics was soon felt. In December 1950 the Party secretary complained that the situation 
had deteriorated drastically: 
The school is experiencing serious staff difficulties at a time of considerable 
growth … due to the departure of a large group of comrades, who have been 
directed to undertake other important work. Thus comrades Brus, Pohorille and 
Zawadzki are primarily occupied in the Institute for Training Scientific Cadres. 
ĩurawicki has been called to the Main School of Foreign Service and the Institute 
for Training Scientific Cadres, and Pawáowski to the Ministry of Science and 
Higher Education. Hochfeld is very busy at the Main School of Foreign Service, J. 
Rzendowski has fallen seriously ill, etc…371
ĩurawicki was supposed to hold the chair of political economy in the part-time study 
programme, but was busy at the ITSC. One of the effects of this was that his job fell to 
someone who was in the words of the school party secretary, “unprepared for such a 
369 AAN/KC PZPR/XVI-16 p.20  
370 According to DrabiĔska, NowiĔski was deeply disappointed that it was the ITSC and not the Main School which became 
the Polish version of the Institute of Red Professors. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen 
spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. p.370 
371 KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, SGPiS. pp.3-5 Letter from Executive Commitee of the 
PUWP BOP at the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw to CC PUWP, Science Division, 18.12.1950. Signed by 
1st Secretary of the Executive Committee of the BOP PUWP Romana Zawadzka. There is a handwritten comment on the 
letter, “Com. Zemanek. This must be dealt with directly” which was probably made by Petrusewicz. 
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responsible job, being a graduate of the bourgeois school of economics, and, what is more, an 
active (praktykujacy) catholic”.372 Drewnowski, whom the document now referred to as 
‘citizen’ not ‘comrade’, was running the part-time study programme despite the fact that the 
school’s party secretary now described him too as “a politically unsuitable person”. This 
description is not surprising considering he had just been expelled from the PUWP. Things 
got worse as Julian Hochfeld soon moved to the University following a bitter conflict with 
rector NowiĔski, who in his turn also stepped back due to ill health and (according to 
DrabiĔska) disappointment over failing to reach his goals as rector of the Main School.373
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the efflux from the Main School of Planning and 
Statistics to the ITSC might also have been augmented by the personal preferences of the 
staff. The work conditions and opportunities to do research offered by Schaff were more 
appealing than the overwhelming teaching load at the Main School. Furthermore, at the ITSC 
Marxist-Leninist scholars were among their own, in isolation from the hostile audience of the 
‘old’ Main School staff and students.374
In summing up the experiences of the Main School, I would first like to emphasise the amount 
of energy expended by many of those concerned, and the extreme levels of stress that both the 
old and new staff members experienced in this period. Secondly, even here, where the PUWP 
had concentrated its forces to ensure the transformation of existing institutions, there is ample 
evidence of continuity, both in terms of the staff and of the community spirit and ethos of the 
‘old’ Main School of Commerce. Contact between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ staff was for years kept 
to a minimum and integration seems to have gained momentum only after 1956.   
372 KC PZPR 237/XVI/109 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, SGPiS. pp.3-5 Letter from Executive Commitee of the 
PUWP BOP at the Main School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw to CC PUWP, Science Division, 18.12.1950. Signed by 
1st Secretary of the Executive Committee of the BOP PUWP Romana Zawadzka. 
The person referred to was Adjunct Józef Nowicki. 
373 Oskar Lange was appointed as the next rector. 
374 On working conditions at the ITSC, see Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." 
Minerva, 34, 323-346, BiĔko, Beata, 2001. Skąd przychodzili dokąd zmierzali... aspiranci pierwszego rocznika IKKN KC 
PZPR. In T. Szarota (ed.) Komunizm. Ideologia, system, ludzie. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo NERITON, Instytut Historii 
PAN. 
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Conclusion
How successful was the PUWP’s transformation of higher education? There is no doubt that 
the regime achieved a great deal. For economics, the changes introduced between 1948 and 
1950 meant that graduate studies in economics were abolished in university departments, 
apart from the Main School and, from the autumn of 1950, the ITSC. All prominent 
representatives of ‘bourgeois’ economics were removed from influential positions, including 
those with PUWP membership cards in their pockets. 
The question arises, however, as to why the PUWP stopped short of full success. Why did it 
allow for the tenuous but real continuity of ‘bourgeois’ economics by continuing to employ 
scholars whom the Party did not trust? John Connelly points to the enormous prestige that 
professors held in Polish society. This made them awkward opponents for the communists, 
who would have preferred the prestige to rub off on themselves rather than to be held against 
them. Letting “unsuitable” scholars survive on meagre pensions, isolated from students and 
research opportunities, was not seen as problematic by Polish communists, argues Connelly, 
as they felt confident that time would work for them, and that there was enough time.375
Secondly, several Polish economists were scholars with unquestionable socialist and anti-
fascist backgrounds, such as Oskar Lange and Edward LipiĔski. In the face of a massively 
anti-soviet and anti-communist society, the PUWP could not afford to waste such allies, even 
if they could not be trusted with the teaching of ideologically-sensitive subjects.  
Forbidding activity by established economists had been the easy task, and one for which the 
repressive Communist regime was well equipped, but when it came to creating new structures 
there was a wide distance between ambitions and implementation. The problems reported by 
the Science Division are at odds with the generally-accepted view that the Party quickly 
established a far-reaching degree of control over academic institutions. In fact, the activities 
of the Party organisation in this first period were characterised a lack of structure, a failure to 
implement systematic control, and weak communication between the different levels of the 
hierarchy. Furthermore, it seems that it was not the ‘visible’ structures of the Party 
organisation that had the strongest impact on academic institutions, but the ‘invisible’ direct 
interventions of influential Party officials. Control was not based on a bureaucratic 
management of science and higher education through established channels with clear task 
375 Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-
1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
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divisions and responsibilities; it was the result of a series of ad hoc personal interventions. 
This interpretation can account for the gap between the perception among non-party 
academics as to who wielded power on the one hand, and documents and testimonies from the 
Party side on the other. The usual view, which prevails among economists even today, is that 
it was the new Marxist-Leninist professors who decided on the careers of non-party scholars, 
and who were generally responsible for the transformation of the discipline. Instead, both 
documentary and interview evidence indicates that although they were the executors of party 
policy, the PUWP’s trusted scholars were mostly foot soldiers in the Party system, with 
important decisions being taken in higher quarters. The upper circles of the Party leadership 
were inaccessible not only to non-party academics, but even to the Marxists-Leninists 
perceived by their peers to be the incarnation of power. 
From being undisputed masters of Polish science, ruling as kings of their own domains, 
commanding the loyalty of hand-picked research students, judging new contributions and 
evaluating reputations along with their peers, chair-holding professors were reduced to 
subordinate positions. They were subjected to the whims of young loyal party iconoclasts 
equipped with centrally-formulated and approved plans for lectures and curricula. Authority 
based on the recognition of education and research output by one’s peers was replaced with 
party recognition of political loyalty, ideological orthodoxy and organisational merit. 
However, professors were not altogether stripped of authority or opportunity to influence. 
They retained some of their former powers, the loyalty of some of their students and 
colleagues, and pockets of private liberty. Although their losses as a group and as individuals 
were considerable, it was important that this tenuous continuity existed, as in the longer term 
it would allow economists to construct narratives of continuity that bridged the difficult 
stalinist years. The power taken from chairs was sluiced into the Party organisation, and more 
research is called for in order to establish a precise picture of how power was distributed and 
transformed within that many-layered structure. There was, however, a portion of authority 
which remained with the old professors, and it may be the key as to why PWUP failed to gain 
full control over academic institutions. This authority was based on symbolic capital, which 
Bourdieu affirms is not easily transferred or transformed. The material presented in this 
chapter suggests that although administrative power succeeded in transforming the nature of 
the institutions (including that of the Chair), it failed to reach its goal of full control over the 
field of economics.  
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Since two more chapters will be devoted to economics in the stalinist era, it is necessary to 
stress that a critical assessment of the PUWP’s work in the field of economics was not part of 
contemporary public discourse. In fact, none of the problems mentioned in this chapter 
hindered the PUWP from proclaiming triumphantly in a speech made at the First Convention 
of Economists that its goal of a new order in higher education in economics had been reached; 
an event which will be central to the next chapter. 
The establishment of the Main School of Planning and Statistics opened up a new 
stage in the development of higher education in economics. A school was created 
which aimed to educate cadres for our planned economy, in contrast to the 
practices of the old higher schools of commerce that were structured according to 
outmoded capitalist patterns. The teaching programme was based on Marxist-
Leninist methodology, and the structures and programmes of the courses 
(patterned on the Soviet schools of economics) were adapted to the needs of the 
practices resulting from a planned economic management.376
376 Brus, W., 1951 “O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce” Ekonomista, 1, p.35 
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C h a p t e r  4  
REMOULDING ECONOMICS, 
 THE FIRST CONGRESS OF POLISH SCIENCE 1950-1951 
By 1950 the reform of higher education had revolutionised teaching and curricula, and 
professors too had been called upon to re-orient their research towards Marxism-Leninism. 
However, few at this time believed that any transformation could have been accomplished by 
the limited number of improvised courses in Marxist-Leninist political economy organised 
between 1948 and 1950. There had been little change either in the norms of academic conduct 
or in the way scholars selected research areas and methodologies. Since there were 
insufficient numbers of economists whom the Party felt it could trust, a way had to be found 
to convert those scholars whom it at least considered to be “progressive”. The cadres of the 
Central Committee Science Division wanted to “mobilise” scholars to accept and actively 
pursue the goals of the regime. It was to this end that a gathering of representatives of all 
academic disciplines, the First Congress of Polish Science, was organised in Warsaw in the 
summer of 1951. 
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Ill.  5: The festooned exterior of the Warsaw Polytechnic, where the Congress was held.377
One of the intentions of the Party leadership at this time was to demonstrate its commitment 
to science by organising this widely-publicised and lavishly-funded event. In return, by 
participating in the tightly scripted performance, scholars would lend prestige to the regime. 
1,800 participants joined the proceedings: scientists, foreign delegations, Party and 
Government officials, stachanovite workers, and teachers, and they all listened to solemn 
speeches and attended a grand banquet hosted by the prime minister on the last day.378 The 
deliberations of the Congress concluded with the creation of the Polish Academy of Science 
(PAN), modelled upon the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and destined to initiate a new era in 
Polish science by introducing planning to research.
However, the aims of the Congress went beyond the desire to enhance the regime’s legitimacy 
by association with prestigious professors. Propaganda dominated the Congress itself, but 
during the preparations for the event, other key measures were implemented in an attempt to 
remedy the lack of “Marxist-Leninist science” in Poland. As part of these preparations, the 
history of the discipline was rewritten to suit the new dominant theory, the place of economics 
among other social sciences was redefined, and the structure of the discipline was modified by 
the introduction of a new hierarchy of sub-disciplines. The Congress was to create conditions 
where a Marxist-Leninist critique could be performed from a position of authority, and not, as 
had been the case previously in debates and journals, from a challenging position. It was to be 
377 ADokMech/13442-8 „ I Kongres Nauki Polskiej. Przed Politechniką” CAF-Dabrowiecki 
378 In 1951 the mathematician Hugo Steinhaus noted in his diary: “Towards the end of June I was at the so-called Congress of 
Polish Science. It was a great fair with free food, gifts in the form of leather briefcases, books, coloured pencils and diverse
speeches.” Steinhaus, Hugo & Zgorzelska., Aleksandra, 1992. Wspomnienia i zapiski London: Aneks. p.407  
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a crowning ceremony, marking the beginning of the reign of Marxism-Leninism in 
scholarship. 
The main target of the “mobilisation” measures was the preponderance of scholars classified 
somewhere in between the agit-prop sobriquet extremes of ‘reactionaries’ and ‘spearheads of 
the Marxist revolution’. The preparations for the Congress served as rehearsals where the 
‘progressive’ scholars were drilled in the new norms of behaviour valid in Marxist-Leninist 
science: they had to be shown that the official version was not to be challenged. Congress 
preparations involved an important element of psychological pressure, as scholars were under 
the threat of an imminent ending of their careers if they refused to demonstrate their 
allegiance through public self-criticisms (samokrytyka) and eulogies of Stalin and Lenin. 
Through such means scholars were initiated into Marxist-Leninist science and assigned their 
places and roles in the new hierarchy. The manner of their enrolment would have important 
consequences for their identification with and support of the regime’s science project. 
The archival sources relating to the First Congress of Polish Science yield a more systematic 
and complete set than those of the Party apparatus.379 This chapter focuses on documentation 
pertaining to meetings where discussions connected with economics took place. While 
discussions inside the PUWP (particularly those at the top level, where decisions were taken) 
are not well documented, this is not the case for many of the meetings at lower levels. 
Particularly interesting are the transcripts of Section and Sub-section meetings as well as 
discussions at conventions of economists, which were recorded in shorthand and transcribed. 
As for scholarly literature on the Congress, this has been the subject of a monograph by Piotr 
Hübner, who has studied the role of the Congress in supplying the means of implementation 
for the PUWP’s science policy.380 His main thesis is that despite contemporary official claims 
that the Congress was a democratic institution which expressed the will and interests of 
scientists, it was in reality directed and controlled by the top ranks of the PUWP. He claims it 
served to subordinate research to political control and to the needs of a planned economy. 
Hübner devotes much space both to the historical evolution of general science and scholarship 
congresses in Poland, first in the inter-war years, and then throughout the rapidly changing 
political landscape of the first three post-war years, when different political groups each had 
379 Congress documents are held in the Archive of the Polish Academy of Science, unlike the PUWP collection, which was 
subjected to political manipulation when lodged at the Party HQ, and rationalisation upon its transfer to Archiwum Akt 
Nowych, Congress material appears to remain arranged  as it was when put away in the early 1950s. 
380 Hübner, Piotr, 1983. I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji zaáoĪeĔ polityki naukowej paĔstwa ludowego.
Wrocáaw: Zakáad narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich. 
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their own concepts and objectives when it came to national congresses of science and 
scholarship. The main body of this analysis is in fact devoted to the structure of the Congress 
organisation. While Hübner’s work provides necessary background information on Congress 
apparatuses and organisation, it addresses different questions from those asked in this chapter. 
The PUWP’s strategy 
The Politburo defined what the Congress was to achieve, and how it was to do this: 
II. The aims and tasks of the Congress 
The basic goal behind the convocation of the Congress of Science is: to draw the 
masses of hesitant Polish scholars closer to the present social reality, to mobilise 
them to meet the needs of the life of the nation as regards the Six Year Plan, and to 
isolate decidedly reactionary elements, mainly through the preparatory activities 
of the Congress. The Congress should activate our scientists, provoke a major 
shake-up of Polish science and push Polish science in the direction of Marxist 
science. In certain disciplines, it should cause an ideological breakthrough. The 
Congress of Science should oppose the cosmopolitan tendencies in Polish science, 
connect with the traditions of progressive Polish science and create a bond with 
the experiences and accomplishments of Soviet science. 
III. Methods of implementation 
1. In the preparatory period, resulting mainly from congress actions, an increase 
in activity in the scientific movement should take place, and our ideological 
offensive should be conducted in the following directions: … 
2. Under the pressure of our offensive, ideological fermentation should increase, 
and should accelerate the split among scientists. It will reveal and isolate 
decidedly reactionary elements and attract to us the decisive majority of scientists 
because of: 
a) the connection of science with real life, and the active inclusion of scientists in 
the work of realising the Six Year Plan; 
b) an emphasis on the peaceful and progressive role of science; 
c) an understanding and acknowledgement of the need to plan scientific research 
activities. 381
This text was adopted by the Politburo in June 1949, before the inauguration of the first 
‘reformed’ academic year, meaning that the PUWP leadership was simultaneously dealing 
381 Quoted after Ibid. p.79 
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with the transformation of both higher education and research. The PUWP hoped to 
compensate for the lack of Marxist-Leninist scholars, apparent in the difficulties encountered 
by the Party in academic institutions, by enrolling ‘progressive’ scholars in academic 
communities to support their policies, and by isolating ‘reactionary elements’.  
This document reveals how the Politburo, and the CC apparatus which undoubtedly prepared 
this text, planned to attract non-communist scholars. The Communists assumed that 
academics would want to contribute to economic growth by participating in the Six Year Plan. 
They also felt confident that scholars could be persuaded that the communist system would 
create better conditions for researchers, and that the application of rational planning would 
make more resources available. In addition to economic motivation, they also planned to 
appeal to feelings, firstly to the desire for peace, a most urgent and universal feeling during 
these years, and secondly to national pride. We may note that in this text ‘science’ was in 
most cases preceded by the adjective ‘Polish’. By contributing to the communist project, 
scholars would be making a contribution to Polish national culture. 
The primacy of ideology and loyalty to Party policy was more than a slogan. The PUWP was 
imposing both a new balance of power and a new mode of negotiation, where ideological 
arguments and the political will of the PUWP overruled all others. The preparations for the 
Congress educated scholars in the new rules for communication with the political elite. The 
organisation of the Congress of Science followed the logic of “democratic centralism”, the 
principle of organisation upon which the PUWP was founded. The objective was the 
establishment of a transmission belt which would efficiently convey the decisions of the Party 
leadership to the rank and file scholars. Democratic centralism meant that whenever the Party 
leadership decreed a substantial change in policy, it was conveyed down the hierarchical 
ladder. Officials at each level had to demonstrate that they had mastered the new orthodoxy 
and were able to apply it to their areas. The importance and novelty of the Congress lay in 
democratic centralism being applied to scholarly communities in Poland for the first time.  
Overseeing the preparation and execution of the Politburo’s decision was the Congress 
Executive Committee, which created its own apparatus in the form of a permanent secretariat, 
just as the PUWP CC had done. Most of the work was carried out by the Presidium, led by 
biologist Jan Dembowski,382 who was assisted by geographer Stanisáaw Leszczycki383 and 
382 The group leading this work remained stable, despite the changing names of the top organ (Organisation Committee, 
Presidium). Ibid. Pp.89-99 
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biologist Wáodzimierz Michajáow.384  Representing the Ministry of Higher Education and 
Research were Henryk GolaĔski385 and Eugenia Krassowska; and last but not least came the 
director of the PUWP CC Science Division, Kazimierz Petrusewicz 386  The over-
representation of biologists is related to the Lysenko affair, which made biology the 
ideological dernier cri in academic circles. Participation in these debates provided an 
opportunity for biologists to prove their ‘partyjnosc’, or loyalty to the ideological orthodoxy. 
Meanwhile, by elevating right-thinking biologists the PUWP leadership could demonstrate to 
their Kremlin superiors that that they had understood the importance of the Lysenko 
campaign. 
The Congress of Science was preceded by over a year of information-gathering on the state of 
each scientific discipline, an analysis of these data, and discussions on plans for future 
developments. The Vice-Minister of Higher Education and Science, Eugenia Krassowska, 
responsible for ensuring that the Congress would produce the results stipulated by the 
Politburo, stressed the importance of the preparations: 
… the centre of gravity in the totality of the work of the Congress lies in the 
preparatory work. That should be understood to mean that the Congress will be 
only an exposition of work accomplished. The primary working unit of the 
Congress is the Sub-section, and the Section report constitutes the sum of the 
results achieved in the work of each Sub-section.387
If we concentrate on the case of economics, three distinct stages can be discerned: firstly, the 
preparations behind closed doors; secondly, a national convention of representatives of 
economics; and thirdly the propagation of the national convention’s decisions and ‘teachings’ 
383 Leszczycki, Stanisáaw Marian (1907-1996) 1945-1947: assistant professor (prof.nadzw.) of Anthropo-geography at UJ; 
1948-70; professor of economic geography at Warsaw University. Deputy to the Sejm 1945-1949; Vice-minister of Foreign 
Affairs 1946-1950; from 1948 member of Main Council for Science and Education. Leszczycki, Stanisáaw M., 1991. 
"Autobiografia". Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 36, 1-54. 
384 Michaáow, Wáodzimierz (1905-1994) in 1946 he was deputy director of Department of Reform of Education and 
Upbringing at the Ministra of Education KochaĔski, Aleksander (ed.) (2001) Protokoáy posiedzen Sekretariatu KC PPR 
1945-1946., Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN 
WyĪsza Szkoáa Humanistyczna w Pultusku. 
385 GolaĔski, Henryk (1908-1995) electrical engineer, PWP and later PUWP member, Vice-Minister of Industry (and Trade)  
1945-1949,  Vice-Minister of Light Industry 1949-1950, Vice-minister of Higher Education and Research 1950-59. Dudek, 
Antoni, KochaĔski, Aleksander & Persak, Krzysztof (eds.) (2000) Centrum Wáadzy. Protokoáy posiedzen kierownictwa 
PZPR. Wybór z lat 1949-1970., Ibid.: ISP PAN. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991 Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN. 
Eugenia Krassowska (1910-1986) teacher, member of Democratic Party (Stronnictw Demokratyczne) from 1945. Studied 
and worked at Wilno University, Vice-minister of Education 1946-1950, Vice-minister of Higher Education and Research 
1951-1956
386 The Congress Executive Committee took an active part in the disciplinary discussions in the Sections, and its secretariat 
prepared and oversaw the preparations for the Congress. 
387 APAN/IKNP/128, „Protokóá Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych I KNP” 21.3.50 p.167 
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to the whole profession by way of regional conferences. Only after this did the widely-
publicised and closely-choreographed public ceremony, the Congress itself, take place. 
Redefining the discipline 
Even before the process of preparing for the Congress commenced, important changes were 
made in the discipline of economics. As the framework of using Sections and Sub-sections for 
Congress work had already been determined, the place of economics among other disciplines 
was now re-defined. Initially, the organisers of the Congress had given economics its 
traditional place, as one among several sub-sections of the Humanities Section, but following 
discussions in the PUWP and in Congress, economics ended up being promoted to a position 
independent of other social sciences and humanities. The final grouping was as follows: 
1. Social Sciences and Humanities 
2. Economics 
3. Mathematics, Physics and Astronomy 
4. Energy and Electrical Engineering 
5. Machine Construction  and Mechanical Technology 
6. Engineering and Construction Sciences 
7. Chemistry and Chemical Technology 
8. Earth Sciences 
9. Biology and Agricultural Sciences 
10. Medical Sciences 
Economics was not the only discipline whose status was elevated through being singled out as 
a section, in contrast to its traditional position in university departmental organisation. The 
division into sections allowed for more attention to be paid to natural and technical sciences, 
at the expense of humanities, which were now amassed in a single section. In a country where 
humanities had up till now been the ‘big brother’, dwarfing natural and technical sciences in 
terms of numbers of both students and staff, this amounted to a revolution. Representatives of 
the natural and engineering sciences had campaigned for such a revision since before the 
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war.388 For economics, however, it may be argued that the elevation exceeded the ambitions 
of its practitioners, whose goal of gaining full independence from legal studies had been 
rather more modest. This revision of the established hierarchy of disciplines opened up an 
opportunity for interest groups which drew their support from interpretations of the Marxist-
Leninist ideology. Congress organisers saw “a fluidity of opinions as to the structure, 
division, content and even the terminology” of specific sub-disciplines. 389
As economics was upgraded, another disciplinary group was downgraded, from being a 
‘Production Methods and Organisation’ Section in the first draft to being a sub-section in the 
Economics Section. The discussions leading up to the decision to exchange Economics for 
Organisation Studies in the Congress hierarchy throw some light on PUWP ideas about the 
role of economics in relation to other social sciences and to Marxist-Leninist ideology. The 
claim of Organisation Studies to be a distinct discipline was examined at a Party conference in 
October 1949.390 It seems that the decision in favour of the Economics Section was taken 
following a conference organised by the CC Science Division and attended by the directors of 
both the Economics Sub-section and the Production Methods and Organisation Section, at which 
the two lobbies and their patron politicians confronted each other. Those for allowing 
Organisation Studies its own section were GolaĔski, JastrzĊbski and Epsztejn. 391  Their 
opponents, arguing for the subordination of Organisation Studies to an Economics Section 
were JĊdrychowski, Lange and Blass.
The supporters (of the Production Methods and Organisation Section- awh) are of 
the opinion that new methods for the organisation of socialist work, and especially 
socialist competition (wspóázawodnictwo) and socialist rationalisation 
(racjonalizatorstwo), occupy such an enormous part of the process of production 
that they demand separate focus and attention, something that can be expressed 
tangibly through a separate report at the Congress plenum.392 
388 See Rolbiecki on the interwar efforts of those from the fields of natural and technological sciences to promote the status 
and funding of their disciplines.Rolbiecki, Waldemar, 1990. Geneza Polskiej Akademii Nauk (1930-1952) Wrocáaw: Zakáad 
Narodowy im. OssoliĔskich, Wydawnictwo PAN. 
389 APAN/IKNP-118, p.14 “Notatka organizacyjna” 
390 AAN/KC PZPR/237/XVI/1 p.1-6 
391 JastrzĊbski, Wincenty (1885-1977) member of PSP, later of PUWP. Participated in the October Revolution and in the 
organisation of the first economic plans for metal industry of Petrograd from 1918, where he also published a pioneering 
work on the application of scientific work organisation in socialism. He continued work with these subjects on his return to 
Poland. Vice-director of the Business Cycle and Price Institute in 1929, appointed vice-minister of Treasury in 1930 and 
Vice-minister of Social Welfare in 1934. In France during the war, appointed vice-minister of communication on his return to 
Poland in 1945, vice-minister of Treasury from 1948 (later of Finance).JĊdruszczak, Hanna (ed.) (1983) Wizje gospodarki 
socjalistycznej w Polsce 1945-1949. Początki planowania. Materiaáy Ĩródáowe. Warszawa: PWN.p.8 Tych, Feliks (ed.) 
(1987) Slownik biograficzny dziaáaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego E-J, Warszawa: KsiąĪka i Wiedza. pp.678-680 
392 APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ „Protokóá Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych I KNP, 21.3.50”, pp.167-169  
This quote comes from one of the first meetings of the Economics Section in March 1950, where the future of the Production 
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It was thanks to the argument that Organisation Studies had a particularly important role in a 
socialist economy that these lobbyists almost managed to outflank the economists. For 
Economics the separatist tendency of the Organisation Studies supporters constituted 
something of a threat, as it could have entailed the diversion of important resources that were 
coming in from industry-related ministries. It is likely that this was the motive behind the 
strong opposition on the part of Economics representatives to Organisation Studies being 
classed as a distinct discipline.393 On the other hand, it may have been the audacity of the 
Organisation Studies lobby that emboldened economists to fight for an independent Section. 
Organisation Studies scholars were not alone in their disappointment at being placed under 
the tutelage of economists. Statisticians too, as we shall see, were upset that their subject was 
not treated as a discipline in its own right, and also challenged the idea that their place was 
with economics, rather than mathematics. 
Although the arguments which allowed Economics to prevail over Organisation Studies are 
not quoted in the protocols from these meetings, it is clear from the course of action chosen, 
and from later statements, that the ideological import of economics, and of political economy 
in particular, was judged to be superior to that of organisation studies. 
The basis of all economic science is political economy, which constitutes an 
inherent part of the science of Marxism-Leninism. 394
Changes were also made to the inner structure of economics, with a range of specialist 
branches of economics being introduced. We have already looked at this development in 
Chapter Three, as it was applied to study programmes and the structure of the Main School. 
The inspiration and justification for this new arrangement was traced to Soviet practice: 
Methods and Organisation Section was sealed.
393 APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ „Protokóá Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych I KNP, 21.3.50”, pp.167-169  
The documentation of the composition of the two groups in this conflict is incomplete, but on the side pushing for a separate 
section for Economics, we find Lange backed by JĊdrychowski and Blass, while the Production Methods and Organisation 
lobby features Ilja Epsztejn, director of the newly-founded Main Work Institute, supported by vice-minister JastrzĊbski and 
vice-minister GolaĔski. The central role of the PUWP in this discussion is suggested by both by the presence of party 
officials at decisive meetings, and the fact that meetings were held in CC PUWP offices. 
3941951.  Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. 1-szy Kongres Nauki Polskiej. Warszawa: PWN, p.145 
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During the period of the existence of Soviet power, a great diversification of 
economic sciences has taken place, especially in the domain of the study of 
socialist industry and agriculture. Alongside political economy, a range of 
economic disciplines has taken shape, with the aim of studying the different 
branches of our national economy (industry, agriculture, the distribution, etc.). 
This diversification in economic science reflects the deep processes of 
specialisation and division of labour which are occurring in our national economy 
and which reflect the tempestuous growth of productive forces. It is undoubtedly a 
positive phenomenon.395
The Section of Economics was divided into seven and then nine sub-sections, of which eight 
would eventually be active. The final ordering of the sub-sections was the result of several 
revisions. To show what changes were made, the rank held by the different sub-sections at an 
early phase in April 1950 appears in brackets. 
1. Political economy and planning      [1] 
2. Economics and organisation of industry and work   [2] 
3. Economics of agriculture      [4] 
4. Economics of trade       [5] 
5. Finance         [6] 
6. Statistics         [7] 
7. Economics of construction and communal housing   [3] 
8. Economics of international trade      [-] 
9. Industry and transport (inactive)      [-]396
The list reflects the order of priority. “Political economy and planning” was placed first, and 
was then followed by increasingly specialist ‘branch’ disciplines. The number of 
professionals involved in each sub-section varied. The Sub-section of Trade represented a 
large number of scholars, while the Sub-section of Industry and Transport atrophied, because 
it was impossible to find the dozen experts needed to make it operational. It is important to 
realise that the above-mentioned list of sub-divisions does not reflect the situation in 
economics in early 1950, rather the PUWP plans for the discipline.  
395 K. Ostrowitianow quoted by W. Brus during the deliberations of the Economics Section at the First Congress of Polish 
Science 30.06-01.07.1951, published in: Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. 1-szy Kongres Nauki Polskiej. PWN, 
Warszawa, 1951, p.144 after Ostrowitianow, K. in Woprosy ekonomiki, nr.8, 1948, p.69 
396 The International Trade and Industry sub-sections were created later. Industry and Transport was originally grouped with 
Construction and Communal housing, then moved away to form a new sub-section. However, due to the impossibility of 
finding staff, Industry and Transport never functioned, and was subsequently abandoned. All desirable candidates were much 
too occupied by work on the Six Year Plan.  
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Once the PUWP-controlled Congress leadership was satisfied with the framework, the next 
step was to choose the right people to sit in the various sections and sub-sections. The 
selection of Congress participants was an opportunity for the PUWP to come a step closer to 
the aim of changing the composition and hierarchy of economics, an opportunity, however, 
which was fraught with difficulties. The first challenge was to find a balance between the aim 
of converting the ‘hesitant masses of Polish scholars’ as the Politburo put it, and the need to 
control the discussions and conclusions. Conversion could not happen in absentia, meaning 
that ‘progressive’ scholars had to be present in important numbers, while control of 
discussions demanded a strong, loyal supporters’ contingent. The head of the PUWP CC 
Science Division therefore explained to members of the Economics Section why the Party 
was taking such trouble, and why it was important to draw large numbers of scholars into the 
work of the Congress: 
Petrusewicz: (…) After all, what we want is not just having these theses written, 
having one person produce an appropriate text. Really, that is the least of our 
aims. If it had been so, we would have selected the sixty people from all over 
Poland we consider to be the best for the Congress of Science. They would have sat 
down together for two months, written the theses, held the Congress and the matter 
would have been settled. But exactly, this is not what this is about, this is about 
having the broadest possible masses of scientific workers discuss the theses and 
add their comments.
It is about, having them criticise these theses, understand them. Based on the 
example of their own disciplines they should understand what is being repeated ad 
nauseam, i.e. the issues of reactionarism and cosmopolitanism on the example of 
their own disciplines (…) that they should show how our research work has been 
burdened by cosmopolitanism, for it is known that undoubtedly the work of nearly 
all scientific workers has been burdened by cosmopolitanism to some degree.397
Another issue at the forefront of Party and Congress officials’ minds was ensuring that 
scholars would accept the Congress as their own. The officials were concerned about the 
legitimacy of the Congress as a scholarly enterprise, and about its credibility when it came to 
speaking on behalf of the scientific communities. Stefan ĩóákiewski, who supervised Polish 
studies on the PUWP’s behalf, felt confident that he would be able to strike a balance between 
Marxist-Leninist control over the Polish Studies Convention, and the need for it to be 
accepted by the majority of scholars. In a letter to Petrusewicz he wrote: 
397 APAN/IKNP/118 “Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held on 06.07.1950” pp.18-112 
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The convention will not be completely Marxist. We will introduce a couple of 
speeches by ‘honourable’ professors. However, on the basis of the present 
composition of the main board of the A. Mickiewicz Literary Society, we can 
decide on the character of the Convention. Therefore, we will not admit any 
speeches that are ideologically foreign to us, and the Convention will be a 
demonstration of our ideology as regards Polish studies. (…) Despite the fact that 
the Convention will be in the hands of our people, it will represent the majority of 
Polish studies scholars, of whom not one famous representative will be absent. 398
ĩóákiewski claimed that he could both secure control over the event while admitting scholars 
whose political and ideological attitudes were not considered trustworthy, and make sure that 
the majority of scholars would accept the legitimacy of the Convention to speak on behalf of 
their discipline. Further on in the letter, however, ĩóákiewski revealed he was aware that 
established authorities in the field might snub his event, but he dismissed them as marginal 
and hopeless cases: “Only a very few obstinate reactionaries, such as PigoĔ and Górski, 
might refrain from coming.” 399 The sources at my disposal do not allow me to conclude 
whether the PUWP leadership was seriously concerned that scholars might follow their ‘old’ 
leaders into a massive boycott. It is not clear whether those invited to take part in congress-
related activities were free to refuse the invitation. The repressive political atmosphere of 
these years leads me to suppose that the PUWP ensured that scholars did not feel free to 
express their dissatisfaction with the Congress. In April 1950, shortly after the creation of the 
Economics Section, a meeting protocol recorded a motion on the part of Edward LipiĔski,
proposing to replace the chairman in Sub-section One, LipiĔski himself. 400 It appears that he 
was attempting to resign from his post, but the decision was postponed, and in fact LipiĔski
remained chairman until the end of Congress. Sources are silent on LipiĔski’s motives, and on 
the reasons why his resignation was not accepted. If this was a protest action, the Congress 
authorities ensured that it was thwarted and hushed up.401 No opportunities for demonstrative 
boycotts were created. An examination of the lists of economists invited to the Economists’ 
398 KC PZPR 237/XVI/37 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, Wytyczne, oceny, protokoáy zjazdów: 1949-50, p.1-4, 
Letter from Stefan ĩóákiewicz (director, Institute for Literary Studies) to Petrusiewicz (director, WP CC Science Division)  
399 KC PZPR 237/XVI/37 Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, Wytyczne, oceny, protokoáy zjazdów: 1949-50, p.1-4 
Unfortunately the sources at my disposal do not reveal whether PigoĔ and Górski attended the convention. 
400 APAN/IKNP-128, p.156 
401 See Hübner’s report from the discussion in some of the Sections at the Congress itself, where things had slipped out of the 
Congress authorities’ control, only to be hushed up in the official reports. Hübner, Piotr, 1983. I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako 
forma realizacji zaáoĪeĔ polityki naukowej paĔstwa ludowego. Wrocáaw: Zakáad narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich. pp.154-159 
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Convention held the following year reveals that the ‘reactionary’ economists, such as E. 
Taylor and A. KrzyĪanowski, were not invited to this event.402
The selection of the trusted and loyal PUWP contingent that would sit on different bodies in 
the Congress was riddled with other problems. Even here, the PUWP leadership faced the 
issue of loyalty and reliability, as the PUWP population was even at that point already a rather 
motley crew: from old communists who had experienced Stalin’s extermination of the 
KPP403 before the War and veterans of the Spanish Civil War, to a mix of loyal and resentful 
socialists and new members on the lookout for career opportunities. Things were far from 
calm within the Party, but these undercurrents were not the subject of open discussion in 
Congress-related fora. What was openly discussed was the Congress organisers’ efforts to 
balance ‘praktycy’ and academics. 
The terms ‘praktyk’ and ‘praktyka’ translate as practitioner and practice (or praxis in Marxist 
terminology). They were frequently used in the discussions of economics, and are central to 
the relationship between the established scientific communities, the PUWP leadership, and 
Party and government officials. For Marx, “praxis” denoted action, the opposite of 
philosophical speculation, with a focus on material production as the most fundamental 
characteristic of human society.404 The terms ‘praktyka’ and ‘praktyk’ came to Poland via 
Russian ‘newspeak’, where they had acquired new connotations. Nikolai Krementsov, who 
has studied these in the Soviet scientific context, gives the following description of the 
Russian equivalent of ‘praktyka’: 
Practicality (praktichnost’) – one of the characteristic traits of ‘Soviet’ science and 
an identification of ‘ours’. Derived from practice. Antonyms: practical sterility, 
fruitless theorizing, academism. 
Practice (praktika) – the “dialectical” opposite of theory; meant “the practice of 
socialist construction” that must lead and direct the theory. In science, this meant 
that practical work (say, in agriculture) must lead and direct research (in 
agricultural science) (…) 
Theory and practice (teoriia i praktika) – a motto from the early 1930s and widely 
used thereafter. 405
402 AAN/PTE/6, p.41-54 
403 The Communist Party of Poland (KPP), dissolved on Stalin’s orders in 1938. The majority of its leaders and activists 
perished in the Gulag. 
404 Definition of “Praxis” based on H. Lefebvre, from The Sociology of Marx, London: 1968, in The Penguin Dictionary of 
Sociology, 3rd ed. (1994) 
405 Krementsov, Nikolai, 1997. Stalinist Science Princeton: Princeton University Press.Appendix A: Stalinist Scientific 
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In the Poland of the early 1950s, being a ‘practitioner’ meant implementing under the 
PUWP’s leadership policies aiming at revolutionary societal and economic changes. The 
actual occupations of those described as ‘praktyk’ ranged from minister to factory manager, 
but Party officials too were included.406 Economics had always been characterised by close 
links between scholars and the professionals employed in business and administration. The 
concept pair “theory and practice”, however, was not just a new way of expressing this fact. It 
allowed the PUWP to discredit both the established profession and individual scholars. 
Professional economists were not ‘praktyk’ unless they had been enrolled by the PUWP in 
work on the Six-Year Plan. Work in private business or in the pre-war state apparatus was 
collusion with capitalism, not ‘praktyka’. The PUWP claimed that the qualifications of 
established economists in academic positions were outclassed by experience gained in 
constructing a new revolutionary economy, as this provided a more fruitful and instructive 
source for the “creative development of Marxism-Leninism” than a career at an academic 
institution. The juxtaposition of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ provided a justification for the 
devaluation of the qualifications of professional economists and the replacement of 
‘bourgeois’ theoreticians by politicians and economic administrators boasting a closer tie to 
‘praktyka’.  
Nevertheless, an over-heavy reliance on ‘praktycy’ had its dangers. It could empty the 
Congress of academic character and endanger the aim of changing the way knowledge was 
produced by scholars.
Minister JĊdrychowski once more defined the tasks of the Congress, and on this 
basis expressed fear about the appropriateness of the engagement in the workings 
of the Congress of an excessive number of workers, activists and leaders in 
practical economical life. The danger is that the supervision of reports by leading 
directors of economic agencies, and not by professional scientists, could distort 
and consequently annihilate the aims of the Congress.407
The goals the PUWP had set for the Congress were contradictory. There was a conflict 
between a wish for the conversion of the majority and a reluctance to allow this non-Marxist 
group to dominate the discussions. A stronger presence of PUWP-loyal participants would 
have provided control but could have undermined both the potential for conversion and the 
”Newspeak”: A Glossary, p.297-8 
406 See lists of guests invited to the First Convention of Economists. 
407 APAN/IKNP/128, p.167 Protokóá posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych, 21.03.1950 
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academic character of the Congress. To see how these dilemmas were resolved in practice, we 
can look into the documents that detail the invitations to the Convention of Economists in 
1950. More than 300 people were listed, in six separate lists.408  The first list contained 
representatives from Parliament and the State Council, and thirteen ministers and fourteen 
vice-ministers from economy-related ministries and other state agencies. Also included in the 
list of high-level state officials were nine directors of CC Divisions and their deputies from 
the PUWP CC.409 List “B” was composed of high-ranking bureaucrats from ministries and 
other central state agencies, co-operatives and banks, and editors of important periodicals and 
journals. The contingent of those expressly invited from without academic institutions thus 
comprised 83 names. Then came 57 ‘praktycy’ who had participated in Congress work in the 
sub-sections and who were therefore included in a list of participants in the preparations (list 
“D”), which featured another six vice-ministers and ministers. Only 29 of them accepted their 
invitations: for instance, only three of the eleven members of the sub-section of statistics 
announced their presence.
Lists “C” and “E” contained a total of 179 professors, lecturers and assistants, and reflected 
the already-altered academic landscape described in Chapter Three. Here too were many 
‘praktycy’, disguised as academics thanks to their contracts for specialist lectures, but there 
were very few scholars whose professorial titles pre-dated the rush of politically-motivated 
promotions. My count yields only nine ‘old’ professors.410 Several famous economists were 
not invited, while others appear to have been invited originally, to have accepted their 
invitations, but not to have been counted as participants. Among those not invited we find 
professors who had already been forced to retire, or who had seen their chairs removed and 
lectures cancelled: Edward Taylor, Adam and Witold KrzyĪanowski, Stefan Zaleski, Adolf 
Tokarski and Wacáaw Fabierkiewicz. Wincenty StyĞ and Feliks Máynarski had originally been 
invited and had accepted their invitations but, in the end – for unknown reasons – did not 
attend.411
408 AAN/PTE/6, p.40-54 
409 List A: “Representatives of the Highest State Offices” AAN/PTE/6, p.41-42 
410 Oskar Lange, Edward LipiĔski, Aleksy Wakar, Marian Nadobnik, Jan Zdzitowiecki, Stefan RosiĔski, Antoni ĩabko-
Potopowicz, Andrzej Grodek and Jerzy Lubowicki. AAN/PTE/6, p.45-48 
411 Marks on the lists indicate responses, and handwritten numbers on the left indicate a final count of participants. 
AAN/PTE/6, p.40-54 
Feliks Máynarski (1884-1972) professor of economics first at the Main School of Commerce and later at Jagiellon 
University. Specialised in finance and monetary policy, held many influential state positions in the 1920s such as Deputy 
director of the Polish Bank, and dept.director at the Ministry of Treasury.  
160
The list of docents and older assistants (41) was supplemented by a list handwritten by W. 
Brus with a large batch (29) of aspirantura students from the recently-opened Institute for 
Training of Scientific Cadres. This Institute’s leadership also mobilised their students, and 
made sure they all attended.412 Meanwhile younger academics from other institutions appear 
to have been carefully screened – only nine of the above fifty adjuncts and older assistants at 
the Main School of Planning and Statistics were invited. Even if those included in other lists 
are added, the count of junior economists from outside the ITSC ends at fifteen. It would 
seem that the eldest generation and the youngest were most thoroughly screened, while the 
middle generation was the target of the missionary efforts.  
Discussions in Sections and Sub-sections 
The aim of the Congress preparations, as stated by the Politburo, was to enable and provoke 
discussions that would lead to a breakthrough for Marxism in all disciplines. How was this 
aim realised?  
The task of the sub-sections was to gather information, to set up problem-groups, and to 
commission discussion papers addressing questions relevant for an evaluation of the current 
state of affairs, and for plans for future research. In the course of the discussion and revision 
of the drafts of problem papers, sub-sections were to carry out three tasks: firstly, to produce 
reports containing critical analyses of the situation in their respective fields; secondly, to 
consider how to implement research planning in their particular disciplines; and finally to 
prepare a list of the most important topics to be dealt with by scholars over subsequent years. 
The Section provided the framework for the co-ordination of the Sub-sections’ efforts. The 
Section executive committee, and the Executive Committee of the Congress, called plenum 
meetings where Sub-sections reported on their work and were instructed on their future 
course, and also held extra meetings with the heads of Sub-sections whose work was deemed 
less than satisfactory. 
Oskar Lange, the president of the Economics Section, had the rare combination of both 
scholarly and political authority, as he was an internationally-renowned economist and a 
member of the PUWP Central Committee. The vice-presidents were politicians, with seats in 
Parliament and top positions in the Planning Commission. In addition, Stefan JĊdrychowski
was a member of the PUWP CC, and Franciszek Blinowski was vice-director of the CC 
412 They are all counted as participants on the list. AAN/PTE/6, p.53-54 
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Economic Division.413 The important post of secretary (referent) of the section, with the task 
of preparing drafts of reports for discussion, went to Wáodzimierz Brus. The remaining seats 
in the Economics Section were filled with ‘practitioners’, that is, state and party functionaries. 
This pattern was followed in the composition of most sub-sections: a co-operative progressive 
scholar with a respected academic record at the head, and a trusted Marxist-Leninist in the 
decisive position of secretary.
Presiding over the Political Economy and Planning Sub-section was Edward LipiĔski.414 He
was seconded, or rather supervised, by the vice-president B. Minc, now employed at the 
Planning Commission (PKPG), and the referent, W. Brus. Four other members hailed from 
the Moscow-trained ‘spearhead of revolution’ group at the Main School. To this already-
strong PUWP contingent were added one veteran communist activist and two individuals 
about whom little is known, but who may have been representatives of the Polish Youth 
Union (ZMP). (They certainly did not come from the academic establishment.) Besides 
LipiĔski, only one person with an academic record and a socialist rather than communist 
background was admitted to this subsection: J. Drewnowski. The intention to break with the 
field’s past is clear. This sub-section was to produce the chief condemnation of the entire 
body of ‘bourgeois economics’: the theory, the premises, the methods and the research 
practices.
I will concentrate on two meetings: a general meeting held in July 1950 which brought 
together representatives from all sub-sections, the leadership of the Economics Section, and 
representatives of the Congress Executive Committee; and a meeting in the Political Economy 
and Planning Sub-section in late September that same year, recorded in an extensive protocol. 
The problems raised at these meetings can tell us something about the way the new 
relationship between scholars and the political, budget-controlling authorities was formed and 
negotiated. How did academics present the problems and needs of their sector, and what was 
the response on the part of the representatives of the regime? Equally interesting is the 
evolution of the discussion, including as it does the struggle for control over the discussion 
agenda and the style and dynamic of the debate.  
413 Blinowski was also keeping a close eye on the Main School of Planning and Statistics, attending the meetings of its 
School Committee. APMW/KU SGPIS 214/III-1 Protokoáy posiedzen Egzekutywy POP PZPR w SGPiS 1949-50
414 Judging both from the composition and the work of the sub-section, it is puzzling that planning was added to political 
economy, especially since a much larger contingent of representatives of the Planning Commission was to be found in the sub-
section devoted to industrial economics. 
162
At the general meeting in July, after each sub-section had presented the achievements it had 
made in the two months since the beginning of their work, W. Brus (secretary of the Section) 
gave a critical assessment of most of the sub-sections. Only three sub-sections were praised 
for their efforts, and these were the ones which had based their work on ministerial research 
institutes (agrarian, labour organisation and trade). Those who were criticised admitted that 
they had not had time to do all that had been asked of them, and claimed that the criticism was 
unjust because it disregarded the severe problems the sub-sections were contending with. In 
Chapter Three, we looked at some of the social tensions produced in meetings between the 
new and old hierarchies from the perspective of the newcomers at the Main School. In the 
verbatim transcripts of the sub-sections’ discussions we can catch a glimpse of something 
similar. How to criticise scholars double his age, who had been professors for decades, seems 
not to have been obvious or easy for the 28-year old Brus. Even with the backing of the 
PUWP and the Congress authorities, he felt he had to excuse and justify the sharpness of his 
critique:  
I submit my conclusions to the discussion and I am aware that they are sometimes 
sharply formulated. Let them be an exaggeration, in the words of Stalin, who said, 
on bending a stick, “Sometimes it is necessary to bend a stick too far.” In my 
opinion, it is necessary to “bend the stick too far” to stimulate discussion and 
work. 415
LipiĔski patronised Brus, reminding all present who was the Master and who was the student: 
“Despite the fact that I have the fond feelings of an old teacher towards Professor Brus, his 
report provoked a sensation of disappointment in me...” 416  Professors and ministers 
disregarded Brus’s authority, refusing to submit humbly to his criticism. Indeed they mounted 
quite an opposition, as the following excerpt from an interchange between Brus, 
Kaczorowski, and Kurowski illustrates:417
415 APAN/IKNP/118 p.71 
416 APAN/IKNP/118, p.77 
417 Kaczorowski, Michaá (1897-1975) economist, member of PSP then PUWP. Minister of Reconstruction 1945-1947, 
chairman of the Central Statistical Office 1946-1949, moved then over to scholarly work and was the organiser and director 
of Institute of Housing (until the 1970s) and of the Institute of Urban Architecture and Architecture. DziewoĔski, Kazimierz, 
1979. Michal Kaczorowski : czlowiek i dzielo Warszawa: PWN, Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN. 
Leon Kurowski (1907-) doctorate at Wilno University before the War; 1945-1953 professor at ToruĔ University, 1949-1984 
Prof. of financial law at Warsaw University; Prof. at Main School of Planning and Statistics 1951-1962; member of 
Economics and Business Studies Section of Rada Szkóá WyĪszych established in 1946; vice-minister of Treasury 1945-1950; 
vice-minister of Finance 1950-1951. Was not member of any party. Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN. Kolarzowski at www.racjonalista.pl/kk.php/s,4759 accessed 31.06.2006;  
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Prof. Kaczorowski: I have some doubts, however, as to the charge of objectivism, 
as far as the choice of topics is concerned 
Prof. Brus: It is not about the choice, but the approach. The choice is correct. 
Prof. Kaczorowski: I am sorry but I have not said a word about the approach. And 
I shall venture to tell you, Professor, that what you reported on the results of the 
work of the Sub-section of Agrarian Economics, and about which you were so 
enthusiastic, was equal to what I myself submitted. (…) 
Vice-minister Kurowski: (…) The accusations regarding other sub-commissions 
were not always grounded. (…) Suffice it to say that if one reads Professor 
Oráowski’s remarks attentively, one will know that such accusations should not be 
addressed to the Finance Sub-section.. 
Prof. Brus (…) Suffice it to say that if one had listened attentively to what I was 
saying you would know that such accusations were not made.  
Vice-minister Kurowski: As far as the theses formulated by Professor Brus are 
concerned, these were mostly reminders of things that are known to us, such as the 
issue of the sharp formulation of ideological problems, and the issue of the 
relationship with the Six Year Plan. Here one must agree with the position of 
Professor LipiĔski, that reminding us about these matters is a waste of time.418
The response of the sub-sections’ representatives to the critical assessment of their work 
formulated by Brus was not what the congress leadership had wished for. The first to respond 
on the PUWP’s behalf was J. Zawadzki, a member of the Political Economy Subsection and 
one of the Marxist-Leninist economists.419 He stated that Brus’s critique was correct and 
should be submitted to. The representatives of the Congress central leadership, GolaĔski,
Leszczycki and Petrusewicz, then took turns to express their dissatisfaction both with the 
work done and with the reactions to the criticism, and Petrusewicz gave a long speech in 
which he first he addressed the style of discussion: 
(…) this reaction, applied just now by Professor LipiĔski and Professor Kurowski, 
has the characteristics of an attempt to explain everything away. (…) It appears to 
me that the effort of explaining things away is not necessary here, for many things, 
even everything, can be explained, giving rise to the saying “to explain everything, 
is to forgive everything.” But this saying has nothing to do with the principles of 
Marxism, for it has grown out of the principles of Christian ethics, not Marxist 
ones, and is wholly alien to us Marxists.420
418 APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950
419 Józef Zawadzki ( 1905- ) after the war he worked in PWP party schools, lecturing on the political economy of socialism 
at the Main School, worked from 1954 as professor of economics at Warsaw University. 
420 APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950 
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By describing the logic behind LipiĔski’s and Kurowski’s responses as “Christian”, 
Petrusewicz was refusing to take notice of any reasonable attempts on their part to identify 
potential for improvement. Instead, he was creating a potential conflict between the Marxist 
discussion style that was fit for true scientists, and an unscientific, unconstructive ‘old’ style. 
As an example, he held up the situation in the Humanities Section and among younger staff at 
the Medical Academy. 
Petrusewicz: (...) I would even say that the situation is worse than in the 
Humanities Section. After all, a discussion did get going there, and became lively 
and sharp, and the participants at that meeting began to admit to a series of things, 
began to accuse each other, while here it was said that the accusations that have 
been set forth should not be repeated, because that bores us, because that takes up 
our time. (…) Professor Zawadzki’s characterisation is right, that so far in the 
work of the Section one can spot only objectivism, eclecticism, the drive toward 
making inventories and encyclopaedism, but no class approach, no party-minded 
attitude to science. (…)Professor Brus spoke of drawing youth into our work and 
discussions, to which Professor Kurowski responded with great outrage. (…) as far 
as I can tell, the convention of young medics was at a higher level than all the 
conferences of professors of medicine, not only from an ideological perspective, 
but from the perspective of the sharpness of the formulation of problems, and the 
perspective of the political, class orientation of problems. (…) for three days they 
fought, for three days they leapt at each others’ throats. Truly, at none of the other 
meetings where the ‘grown-up’ professors were speaking have I ever heard these 
problems formulated so well, or so politically.421
Another important theme was the competition for the right to speak on behalf of the dominant 
Marxist-Leninist position. It was becoming clear that only those who could claim a Marxist-
Leninist identity would wield power, so it became necessary for anyone with any hope of 
continued influence over the discipline to ensure that he was defined as one of the ‘we’ group 
in power. LipiĔski responded with indignation when Brus questioned his and the other sub-
section members’ competence as Marxists-Leninists: 
 Professor Brus’ reminders bear on fundamental, elementary, abc-like matters 
which are obligatory for every Marxist, and all the ideological issues that need to 
be combined with praxis – it is not proper to remind us too often, for these matters 
are basic and we should already have digested and absorbed them completely.422
 LipiĔski had presided over a transformation of Ekonomista, had edited an anthology of Soviet 
economists’ writings, and had been through the ordeal of samokrytyka in front of the Main 
421 APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950 
422 APAN/IKNP/118, p.18-112: Stenographic report from the general meeting of Economics Section held 06.07.1950 
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School party organisation.423 His report on the work of his subsection at the start of the 
meeting shows that he considered himself to be well within the ‘we’ of the Marxist-Leninist 
position.
LipiĔski: (…) I took part in a seminar organised for the new recruits – but there 
were older ones as well, and there I observed something: only a few individuals 
had learned or got near to the correct concept of the new Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist 
method of economic research, to the Marxist-Leninist Stalinist approach to the 
consideration of specific problems. The objectivist point of view still prevails, as 
does some sort of search for quantitative solutions. Despite long discussions and 
great efforts on the part of the teaching staff, the majority of these students had not 
managed to understand what our approach to scientific problems consists of. 424
After this first intervention, in which Edward LipiĔski spoke as one of the Marxists-Leninists, 
he was pushed into a defensive position. When LipiĔski was denied his Marxist-Leninist 
credentials by the Marxist-Leninist scholars who spoke on behalf of the Congress authority, 
and thus on behalf of the PUWP leadership, he became a passive object of evaluation, not 
someone who could be an active Marxist-Leninist protagonist, able to evaluate the level of 
others’ Marxism-Leninism, as he had done in the quote above. The same trend continued two 
months later, at the September 22nd meeting of the Political Economy and Planning 
Subsection. On the agenda was a problem paper appraising Ekonomista, written by J. 
Zawadzki.425 The minutes of the discussion provide an example of how PUWP Marxist-
Leninist scholars responded to Petrusewicz’s calls for a ‘sharp and courageous’ discussion. 
The debate over the merits of Ekonomista turned into a discussion about LipiĔski and the 
efforts he had put into in 'improving' the journal's ideological profile. On the whole, 
interventions were critical, with only a few comments to the effect that the editor of
Ekonomista had worked hard to rectify the lack of Marxism-Leninism in himself and the 
journal, but "was not quite there yet".426  No-one defended LipiĔski directly, and many of the 
discussants came up with their own suggestions as to the direction Ekonomista should take. 
Grodek wanted more material on higher education, while Pohorille wanted the journal to 
address the "masses'. The objections raised by the Marxist-Leninist professors Wyrozembski, 
423 APMW/ PZPR/2705 KU SGPIS 214/III-1/ Protokoáy posiedzeĔ Egzekutywy POP PZPR w SGPiS 1949-50, p.20: Minutes 
of meeting of the Executive Committee of the BOP of the Main School of Planning and Statistics held on 27.11.1949.  
424 APAN/IKNP/118 Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950, p.18-112 
425 My source here are minutes of the discussion, not the problem paper itself. APAN/IKNP/II- 128/pp.181-184/22.9.50 
426 APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ Protokóá posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej 22.9.50,
Brus and Wyrozembski’s interventions. p.182/ 
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Minc, Brus and Zawadzki, however, paled in comparison with the criticism voiced by two 
members of the Political Economy and Planning Subsection unknown to me:427
Mgr. Zatorski: The need for a sharp critique of Ekonomista is more than urgent, 
our economic literature lacks a combative political party language, and there is a 
tendency to separate economic and political issues from one another. (…)    
Mgr. Nowik: It is necessary to have a self-critical discussion of the articles that 
have appeared; the authors should do this themselves. (…) In order to move 
science forward it is necessary to clear the way, and build new things, there should 
be no returning to the old ones.428
In Lange’s intervention one can sense an indirect defence of Ekonomista and LipiĔski, as he 
praised the evolution of the journal and expressed the hope that the evaluation report would 
show more of “the ideological development of economics,…the broadening of the Marxist 
approach, because bourgeois economics does grab hold of questions”429 Notwithstanding 
Lange’s apparent attempts to turn the discussion away from a critique of LipiĔski towards 
questions about the general development of the discipline, criticism of named individuals was 
the order of the day. Indeed, quite a period of time was also devoted to a critique of Zawadzki 
and to the form of the report. Nearly all participants urged Zawadzki to be more critical and 
sharp, and his prose was criticised for being too journalistic in style, and for lacking authority, 
quotes from Stalin and Engels, and precise references to the examples used. B. Minc, whose 
article was criticised in Zawadzki’s report, deemed it ‘unconvincing’ and lacking a Marxist-
Leninist base, while Wyrozembski found it too unsophisticated: 
(…) the critique of certain articles makes too vulgar an impression, which lowers 
the tone of Professor Zawadzki’s remarks. There should be more precision in the 
examples cited.430
Reservations were even voiced about the organisation of the Zawadzki report, which had 
consisted of a critique of a limited number of articles that had appeared some time before. 
Marxist-Leninist economists showed that their commitment to criticism also included their 
own comrades, and that they had already assimilated the debating techniques prescribed by 
427 Mgr. stands for Magister, the equivalent of a Master degree. Edward Nowik published an article in Nowe Drogi: Nowik, 
Edward, 1949. "The sources of the military strength of the USSR". Nowe Drogi.. No further information has been found 
regarding his or Aleksander Zatorski’s education or institutional affiliations,  
428 APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ Protokóá posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej 22.9.50,
pp.181-183
429 APAN/IKNP/II- 128/ Protokóá posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej 22.9.50, 
p.182
430 APAN/IKNP/II- 128/  Protokóá posiedzenia Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej
22.9.50, pp.182 
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the PUWP. This critique of Ekonomista, or a revised version, was later published in Nowe 
Drogi.431 Since I have not been able to locate the draft submitted by Zawadzki to this meeting, 
it has not been possible to evaluate how far the criticism influenced the published text. 
Controversy over the evaluation of Ekonomista did not end there, and we shall consider its 
1953 sequel in the next chapter.
Returning to the general meeting in July 1950, LipiĔski, Kaczorowski and Kurowski had not 
only contested the conclusions of Brus’s critique, but had also used the occasion to inform the 
leadership of the Congress on the important shortcomings and problems their sub-disciplines 
struggled with, calling on them to help to solve those deemed most urgent. Representatives of 
several sub-disciplines asked for the establishment of new research institutions. LipiĔski
criticised the quality of research training, and claimed that the composition of the Section was 
too homogeneous to allow for genuine discussion. Sub-section discussions, however, did 
function as sounding boards for clarification, on which the postulated problems would be 
acknowledged by the PUWP and Congress authorities, and which in the end would be denied. 
One important problem, raised by LipiĔski but ostensibly ignored by the Petrusewicz, was the 
effect the repressive and aggressive debating style was having on the production of scholarly 
publications. Explaining why so few good Marxist-Leninist articles appeared in Ekonomista,
LipiĔski said:
People do not have time [for writing], but I suspect that some avoid writing on 
purpose, on the assumption that it is always dangerous, and that while writing one 
might slip. (…) I think that the last article by Stalin, and the passage on the 
necessity of struggle and criticism, will aid us in overcoming these kinds of inner 
hindrances.432
The appeal to Stalin refers to a passage in a recently published article on linguistics, where 
Stalin condemned the monopoly of one theoretical school in that discipline. LipiĔski
expressed the hope that this would be the start of a more liberal development. Although this 
would turn out to be far too optimistic, LipiĔski did demonstrate that he had understood the 
central premise of the new system; that innovation could only originate from the highest 
echelons, and that the sole way to overcome local party bosses was to appeal to even higher 
ranks.
431 Zawadzki, Józef, 1950. "O wlasciwy kierunek rozwoju "Ekonomisty"". Nowe Drogi, 205-220.)
432 APAN/IKNP/118 Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950, pp.81-82 
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In his response to LipiĔski’s concern that fear was paralysing scholarly production, 
Petrusewicz denied the existence of such problems: he had seen no such fear, he said.433 Not 
long afterwards, however, in a report written for the Politburo in 1951, he too expressed 
concern about fear among scholars, although for a different reason. Petrusewicz was worried 
that fear worked against the goals PUWP had set for the Congress. He had by then observed 
that the pointed discussions that the PUWP wanted to provoke among scientists were made 
difficult by fear: “some scientists expressed the reservation that they will not discuss 
anything, because they fear that repressive action might be taken against them (dismissal, 
suspension etc.)”434 He added that wherever ‘deeper and more courageous’ discussions had 
taken place, the aim of “segmentation” (rozwarstwianie) of the professors had been reached, 
and economics was mentioned among the disciplines where this objective had been 
achieved.435 For Petrusewicz, fear was a problem inasmuch as it made scholars hold back 
from criticism of each other.  
In the course of the Section and Subsections discussions, the Congress authorities actively 
sought to introduce a discussion style hereto unknown in scholarly contexts in Poland. This 
style included the practice of self critique (samokrytyka), a change of rhetoric, and the 
imposition of PUWP political taboos and agendas. Congress preparations aimed at making 
scholars understand the necessity of adjusting to the PUWP’s politicised communication 
style: “economists have to tune themselves to the general pitch” as Grodek put it.436
While discussions in the general Section and Political Economy and Planning Subsection 
meetings concerned the entire discipline, the work of other Subsections was more limited in 
scope. By introducing new categories and hierarchies for the sub-groups in economics, the 
regime hoped to modify the discipline, in order to reflect its own priorities. We now need to 
consider what strategies were deployed to ensure Marxist-Leninist control over different sub-
groups in the discipline. 
The constituencies of the Sub-sections of Agrarian Economics and Trade Economics were 
well-established and well-populated. With these communities, the PUWP used a strategy 
analogous to the disarming of opposition parties, by establishing communist-controlled 
factions or subsidiaries. The reform of these sub-disciplines was carried out using state 
433 APAN/IKNP/118 Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950, p.100 
434 Quoted in Hübner, Piotr, 1983. I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji zaáoĪeĔ polityki naukowej paĔstwa
ludowego. Wrocáaw: Zakáad narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich. p.123 
435 Quoted in Ibid. p.122-123 
436 APAN/ IKNP/ 128 p. 187 Protokóá Podsekcji Ekonomii Politycznej i Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej, 30.05.1950 
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research institutes as the basis for the new Marxist-Leninist orientation in the field. The third 
sub-section belonging to the group of research-institute-based sub-sections is that of 
Organisation Studies, as already discussed.437  Its case differs from both the trade and the 
agrarian economics communities, in that it was building on fresh ground, as no strong group of 
scholars or institution had previously existed in Organisation Studies. The Industry and Work 
Organisation Sub-section faced no competition and had no large group of established scholars 
to be controlled and criticised. Having secured an institutional base, it would suffice for it to 
make a show of activity and submit its report.  
The Agrarian Economics Sub-section was dominated by employees of the Institute of 
Agrarian Economics,438 which had been set up as recently as January 1950. It had begun its 
activities as the Bureau of Studies at the CC Agrarian Division, and had been given a central 
role in the transformation of teaching in agricultural colleges.439 Given that agrarian problems 
were a well-established area involving numerous specialists in several universities and higher 
schools, the absence of any economists with academic positions in this sub-section amounts to 
an attempt to establish from scratch a new research group to deal with the problems of 
agrarian economics. It is difficult to say much about the activities of this Sub-section, for 
despite the favourable verdict it received in Brus’s speech at the general meeting of the Section 
in July 1950, there are few traces of its activities in the sources. An explanation is provided in 
Lange’s final comments at the general meeting in July 1950, when he referred to the three sub-
sections with research institutes: 
437 2. The Industry and Labour Organisation Subsection of was chaired by W. JastrzĊbski (Ministry of Finance), I. Epsztejn, 
and two more representatives from Epsztejn’s institutional stronghold, the Main Institute of Work. A strong contingent from 
the Planning Commission (5) was joined by representatives of the Heavy Industry and Mining ministries and other state 
agencies concerned with work. The small and provincial academic contingent (3) appears to have carried little weight. For 
full list of names, see in Appendix. 
438 3. Agriculture Sub-section: chaired and dominated by representatives of the Agrarian Economics Institute (7), this sub-
section was first of all concerned with the recently-begun collectivisation. The strong contingent of academic institutions (5),
the Higher Education and Science Ministry, and the journal “Polish Peasant”, spoke of concerns about education and 
propaganda in this field. Also present were the centres for policy-making in agriculture, the Agriculture and Land Reform 
Ministry (2), the Planning Commission (2) and Main State Farms Union. No-one who had openly questioned collectivisation 
was present in the sub-section. For full list of names, see in Appendix. 
439 It was then merged with two reformed research institutes, Wydziaá Ekonomiki Rolnej PINGW and Dziaá Rolny 
Spóádzielczego Instytutu Naukowego 
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Lange: (…) in this case, it is not that these Sub-sections work better; only the 
institutes work well, and these Sub-sections profit from the ready-made work of the 
institutes. This is the case of Agrarian Economics. I must say, and here I disagree 
with my colleague Brus, that this subsection does virtually no work at all. The best 
proof of this is that no-one [from the Subsection- AWH] came today. After all, the 
Subsection does not maintain contact with the Presidium of the Section, so it is 
impossible to see anyone or make an appointment with anyone.440
Business economics had traditionally held a central position in the discipline, but in the new 
socialist economic order, this was lost. Unlike the case of agriculture, it was no longer a 
burning political issue, after nationalisation and the ‘battle for trade’ had eradicated legal 
private business. Furthermore, the difficulty of combining domestic and international trade led 
to the creation of a sub-section devoted to foreign trade, leaving the Trade Sub-section to deal 
purely with domestic problems. Incidentally this meant that the politically sensitive issues of 
international trade were removed from the Sub-section, reducing somewhat the PUWP’s urgent 
desire to control it. Compared with political economy and agriculture, trade was graded as 
requiring less political and ideological control. That seems to be the reason why the Trade Sub-
section and that of Agricultural Economics were not treated in the same way.441 There was an 
important similarity though: a central, Party-controlled research institute was set up early in 
1950, and given a central role in the Sub-section. The Scientific Institute for Research on 
Trade and Communal Eating did not dominate the Sub-section, as it had only two 
representatives there. The impact of the Institute, however, was very strong in terms of which 
problems in trade economics were defined as core activities. To make trade economics more 
ideologically relevant it was to be coupled with the very communist idea of ‘communal 
eating’ (replacing cooking at home with meals in canteens), and work to provide plans for the 
rational distribution of goods. One of the first tasks of the Institute was to plan the network of 
shops in Nowa Huta. From working on problems of market and demand, the focus of 
economics of trade shifted towards providing tools to make consumers fit into the planned 
economy.  
440 APAN/IKNP/118, Stenographic report of the general meeting of the Economics Section held on 06.07.1950, p.111 
441 4. Trade Sub-section: headed by L. KoĨmiĔski, a scholar with leftist sympathies from the younger generation, trained in 
‘bourgeois’ economics and chaperoned by T. Dietrich - a socialist who had proved his loyalty to the PUWP in the CPB debate. 
The referent was, as in other sub-sections, taken from the ‘fist of revolution’ group. The two representatives of the Institute for 
Scientific Research on Trade and Communal Eating were to form the basis of a reorientation of trade studies towards new 
problems and a Marxist approach. Educational institutions in Warsaw, PoznaĔ and Katowice were represented, but were 
outnumbered by the large contingent of ‘praktycy’ representing state agencies concerned with trade. For full list of names, see in 
Appendix.
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In addition to the reduction of the political relevance of trade, the Trade Sub-section also 
differed from the Agricultural Economics Sub-section in that its presidium and other members 
were very active. This sub-section excelled in fulfilling its Plan: travelling to all institutions that 
taught trade economics; commissioning and submitting problem papers; organising a national 
conference; and organising discussion meetings. The question arises as to whether this diligence 
was a calculated strategy, or a consequence of the fact that since neither its head Professor 
KoĨmiĔski, nor any other members belonged to the core of fully-trusted Marxist-Leninist 
economists, they did not suffer from an overload of functions and positions, and were thus able 
to find time for Sub-section work. It is also possible that KoĨmiĔski was making sure that the 
Sub-section conformed meticulously to the demands of the Section and Congress leaderships, in 
order to shield trade economics from excessive criticism.  
At the general meeting of the Section in July 1950, the sub-sections of Political Economy and 
Planning, Statistics, Finance, and Trade were defined as being the ‘rear-guard’. The 
Economics Section’s leadership called the representatives of these Sub-sections to extra 
meetings, in order to remedy the situation. In addition, separate conferences were planned for 
Statistics and Trade in order to put these communities on the ‘right’ track. Trade responded to 
the criticism by conscientiously carrying out the directives, and appears to have succeeded in 
convincing the Congress leadership that it was making a genuine effort. The case was different 
for the Statistics and Finance Sub-sections. 
The strange case of Finance and Statistics 
The composition of the sub-sections of Statistics and Finance suggests that in their cases the 
stress was placed on the modification of existing structures. To control these disciplinary 
communities, the communist authorities did not deem that they had to establish rival research 
centres, for they already had a hold over the National Bank of Poland and the Central Bureau 
of Statistics.442 Furthermore, it seems that demand for genuine expertise and experience in 
statistics and finance was so strong that a number of non-party, bourgeois economists were 
included in their ranks.
442 These two central institutions still await their historian. The best existing source on the National Bank of Poland is the 
memoirs of one of its employees, A. Ivanka. The GUS had an exhibition during the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the 
institution, and the material from the exhibition was published, with some articles, but no detailed historical account has been
published. Ivanka, A., 1964. Wspomnienia skarbowca 1927-1945 Warszawa, 1993. Gáówny Urzad Statystyczny 1918-1993. 
75 lat GUS, 200 lat statystyki polskiej Warszawa: Wyd. GUS. 
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Both these sub-sections received similar ratings during the evaluation of their work at the 
general meeting of July 1950, when Finance and Statistics were criticised for their lack of a 
properly ideological approach to their work. To quote the protocol: “The Subsection of 
Statistics was presented with the charge of limiting its preparatory work to narrow formalism 
and technicalism.” 443  Translated from ‘newspeak’, that meant an absence of ideological 
orientation. The main task of the sub-sections was to formulate a critical review of research in 
their respective areas, but the PUWP wanted this criticism to be based on ideology, while 
“formal and technical” responses meant that the number rather than the political outlook of 
scholars was noted. Despite their similarity in July 1950, the paths of these two Sub-sections 
diverged. Statistics continued to implement a ‘formalist and technical’ strategy throughout the 
Congress process, and to insist that ideology was not compatible with statistical analysis. The 
Finance Sub-section, on the other hand, produced a thorough ideological assessment which 
criticised most of the prominent ‘old’ economists and was the most ideological of all the sub-
section reports. Given their similar starting points, this difference is intriguing. 
Finance was a touchy subject for the communists. The flow of money associated with capital, 
profit, and everything a communist must abhor, continued to be of importance. Control of the 
currency, currency exchange, and of the banking and insurance systems, was a complex task 
for which neither Marx nor Lenin could provide sufficient guidance. Looking at the list, we 
see a large body of experts in finance that the regime needed as badly as they needed to 
control them.444 This desperate requirement for expertise probably explains the presence of 
several experts with ‘bourgeois’ pasts.
For several weeks after the general meeting in July, the Sub-section members were too busy 
elsewhere to have time for Congress work. In fact, when the Extraordinary Meeting between 
Congress leaders and the presidium of the Sub-section of Finance was held in October 1950, 
only Kurowski attended. He no longer defended the Sub-section or promised amendments.445
How could he have done so? Neither his nor the other presidium members’ pressing duties 
were likely to lessen. Indeed, TrąpczyĔski, in addition to the presidency of the National Bank, 
443 APAN/IKNP/128, Protocol of meeting held 28.07.1950 attended by presidiums of the Section and the Sub-section of 
Statistics. p.51 
444 Finance Sub-section was headed by Witold TrąmpczyĔski, the president of the National Bank, student of Professor 
Taylor, who was seconded by Bronisáaw Blass, another participant in the CPB debate (on the PWP side). Members included 
representatives of: the National Bank (3), Ministry of Finance (2), and Ministry of Treasury (1). The academic contingent (5) 
was divided between younger supporters of the PUWP and older staff. For full list of names, see in Appendix. 
445 APAN/IKNP-128 “Protokóá wspólnego posiedzenia prezydiow Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych i Podsekcji Finansow, 
5.10.50”
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had recently also joined Kurowski as vice-minister of Finance. The Sub-section was neither 
holding the extensive discussions expected by the Congress leadership, nor carrying out any 
of the eight tasks specified by the Section presidium. The Finance Sub-section did not 
organise any conferences for the mass of finance economists, as the Sub-sections of Trade and 
Statistics did. Its members even failed to attend the conference on financial law organised by 
the Law Sub-section. 
The remarkable absence from the October meeting of M. Oráowski, the Secretary of the Sub-
section, was explained by his trip to the Soviet Union. The initial reluctance to accept 
ideological criticism, and the later admission that Sub-section members did not have time for 
Congress work, suggests that the final report of the Finance Sub-section was the work of its 
secretary. This text excels in aggressive newspeak rhetoric, and there is frequent use of terms 
like ‘cosmopolite’ and ‘pseudo-scientific’, terminology only occasionally appearing in other 
sub-sections’ material. The accusations of cosmopolitanism were also made about economists 
identified by name, a practice which was either partially or totally avoided by other sub-
sections. To illustrate what was the ‘right’ and what was the ‘wrong’ approach, individual 
economists’ work was drawn in as examples. JĊdrychowski and ĩurawicki were praised, the 
former for his doctorate on financial planning in the USSR, and the latter for a book review, 
while the loyal socialist Dietrych was shown partially to be erring by committing the sin of 
‘eclecticism’. At the ‘reactionary’ end of the scale were KrzyĪanowski, Fabierkiewicz, and 
Máynarski.446
Cosmopolitanism is still noticeable in more-or-less cloaked form in a line of 
interventions by representatives of our science in 1950. A classic example is the 
activity of the Polish Academy of Letters. In a PAL report, Vol.51/1950/nr.6, p352 
we read that member of the Academy F. Máynarski presented and discussed his 
own work on “The modification of Irving Fisher’s equation”. A summary of the 
paper, sent out in 1951, testifies to the fact that at least as late as 1950 in the 
Kraków community, there were cases of isolation from progressive, Marxist 
financial thought, cases of living on in the sphere of bourgeois doctrine, and not 
the most updated [bourgeois doctrine] at that.447
The most striking information in this quote is perhaps not the ideological condemnation of 
Fisher, but how recently the Kraków economists had found it possible and advisable to 
engage in such obviously politically incorrect activities. The sub-title of the report filed in the 
446 APAN/IKNP-18 “Referat generalny Podsekcji Finansów. 6th version.” March 1951 
Others singled out for criticism were Ignacy Czuma, Zdzisáaw Morawski, and Czarkowski. 
447 APAN/IKNP-18 “Referat generalny Podsekcji Finansów. 6th version.” March 1951
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archive was “Sixth Version”, suggesting that Oráowski’s drafts were repeatedly criticised 
(most probably by Congress leaders, as Sub-section members had no time to do this). 
The Statistics Sub-section was unusual in that with one exception its contingent of ‘praktycy’
came from a single institution, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), which had a considerable 
tradition of continuity among its personnel. The leadership of the sub-section was composed of 
present and former, even pre-war, presidents and vice-president of the CBS. To this were added 
at least two other employees of the CBS; four representatives of academic institutions, including 
the famous mathematician Hugo Steinhaus; and one representative of the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Science. The secretary, Professor Dr. A. Weryha, was a PUWP member and a 
fully qualified statistician.448
While the political context affecting PUWP policy towards agricultural economics was that of 
collectivisation, for statistics it was the secrecy surrounding statistical information in all 
communist countries.449 Difficulties in teaching and research caused by secrecy, and insecurity 
regarding what should be kept secret and what could be discussed openly, were key topics in the 
subsection’s discussions.450
The amount of ideological jargon in the Finance Sub-section report is remarkable when read 
in isolation. When compared with the material from the Statistics Sub-section, the contrast is 
even more striking. In the report drafted by the statisticians (and I have to assume that the 
drafts filed in the archive were the final drafts submitted by the subsections) it is difficult to 
find any PUWP influence on the rhetoric or vocabulary, and the criticism by the sub-section 
of the discipline was hardly a critique. No names were mentioned, and the only people to 
receive a critical assessment were the opponents of the use of advanced mathematics in the 
discipline.  
448 Weryha, Aleksander (1894–1971), statistician and mathematician. He worked mainly on problems of insurance and the 
theory of statistics. 1946–55 professor of statistics at the Academy of Political Sciences, Main School of Foreign Service and 
Main School of Planning and Statistics. Professor at Warsaw University between 1955 and 1966.  
Steinhaus had noted in 1951: “…Weryha, a former National Democrat (statistician) and Volksdeutsch, presently a Party 
member, has fallen from favour. (His behaviour as chairman of the conference of statistics in Wrocáaw in the spring caused a 
scandal. He took the liberty of disqualifying my and Marczewski’s presentations ex praesidio, after the discussion had 
ended.)”Steinhaus, Hugo & Zgorzelska., Aleksandra, 1992. Wspomnienia i zapiski London: Aneks.p.407. While further 
information on the fate of Weryha is not available, the PUWP is known to have used German and National Democrat 
backgrounds to ensure compliance, Piasecki being the best known example. 
449 See chapter ”The Politics of Statistical Information and Economic Research in Communist Hungary, 1949-1956” Péteri, 
György, 1998a. Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and 
Eastern Europe. New York: Atlantic Reseach and Publications. 
450 APAN/IKNP – 128 p.52 Protocol of meeting of presidums of Economics Section and the Statistics Subsection held 
28.07.1950 Representing the Planning Commission, JĊdrychowski promised the boundaries of secrecy would soon be clarified. 
If they were, it was on the side of secrecy. No statistical yearbooks were published until 1956. 
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The deficiency of statements and publications devoted to mathematical methods in 
statistics, caused perhaps by the disorientation provoked by an erroneous 
interpretation of statistical discussions in the Soviet Union, has been overcome. 
Some of our statisticians (albeit recruited among economists who did not 
understand mathematics and were unable to apply its methods in concordance with 
the principles of dialectical materialism) were ready to see in these discussions a 
call for a ‘crusade’ against mathematical methods in general and in statistics in 
particular.451
Related to this was a conflict over the interpretation of the Soviet example, and how it should 
be followed in Polish statistics. It is remarkable that the interpretation championed by the 
young challengers was dismissed by the Sub-section report. As the report pointed out, the 
Congress leadership could not have been totally against the inclusion of mathematics-oriented 
statistics within the scope of the sub-section, since one of the members appointed to it was the 
renowned mathematician Hugo Steinhaus. Oskar Lange, who held a chair in statistics at the 
Main School and who presided over the Section, was also in a position to exert some 
influence and protection.452
Without more information on the history of the Central Statistics Bureau, it is very difficult to 
provide a conclusive explanation for the apparent success of the statisticians in repelling the 
Congress authorities’ efforts to introduce ideological rhetoric and Marxist-Leninists into their 
discipline. Elements explaining the specific development of statistics might be effective 
patronage, and a trade-off where established statisticians offered expertise, loyalty, and 
secrecy, demanding in return that they retained their autonomy in intra-disciplinary matters. 
Did they manage to persuade the PUWP leadership that both parties would be better off if 
they agreed that statistics was classified as a non-ideological discipline? The information 
provided by the Congress archive files does not provide adequate evidence. At the final 
session of the Congress, Statistics was criticised on behalf of the PUWP for having failed to 
produce an ideological breakthrough. Nor was Statistics unaffected by ideological purges. It 
would be naive to imagine that the PUWP leadership would allow the CSB to operate 
independently of its control.
On the other hand, we cannot know whether or not the agit-prop language of the finances 
subsection was the result of a deliberate strategy, rather than passivity. Did the ‘old’ experts in 
451 APAN/IKNP/18, p.181 
The original text is written in archaic spelling (publikacyj, dyskusyj) and is characterised by the absence of newspeak even 
when evoking Marxism. 
452 Lange was at that time member of the Central Committee of the PUWP as well as a prominent member of the Parliament. 
Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991 Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN. 
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finance let the PUWP-appointed referent, fresh from his journey to the Soviet Union, have his 
way in the report, avoiding further criticism and gaining some room for manoeuvre? Was 
there an understanding that outward compliance would pay off in terms of influence? We still 
know very little about the way the PUWP interacted with professional communities in which 
it did not have a majority presence. Studies of the political and social histories of both the 
CSB and the NBP may in time allow us to answer more questions. Still, the different 
trajectories of the economists specialising in trade, finance and statistics suggest that their fate 
was shaped by various factors: the political relevance of their specialist knowledge; different 
strategic choices; access to resources such as time and qualified practitioners; and patronage 
and political alliances.
The last two sub-sections that should be mentioned briefly were the Construction and 
Communal Housing Sub-section453 and the International Trade Sub-section. Both were, so to 
speak, on the margins of the discipline, the former overlapping with engineering and 
architecture, and the latter with trade and the study of international relations. Both these sub-
sections arose from the re-organisation of the discipline into narrow specialisations, rather 
than from any ideological crusade against strong ‘bourgeois’ academic communities. They 
had been put together as an afterthought and were manned by their respective ministries and 
the Planning Commission. In many cases their members were already members of other 
subsections, and thus demonstrate the limits of the resources the PUWP was able to muster. 
Before we leave the area of Congress preparations that were made in the sub-sections, we 
need to look into how far the ambitious and elaborate processes had indeed been carried out. 
There had already been indications of problems with members of the sub-sections delivering 
what had been ordered by the Congress leadership, and in extension by the Politburo. Table 5 
lists the activities relating to problem papers (reports), discussions and participants in the 
Economics Section. 
453 The Construction and Communal Housing Sub-section was dominated by the Planning Commission and institutions related 
to construction such as the Housing Construction Institute and the Construction Industry Ministry. 
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Table 5: Sub-section activity as reported to the Congress Secretariat and the Politburo.454
Sub-sections of the 
Economics Section 
Reports Problem 
groups
Meetings Conferences Members Associates
Political Economy and 
Planning
11/11 - 6/8 1 11 - 
Industry and Work 
Organisation
42/29 6 5/7 1 15 30 
Agrarian Economics -/2 - - - 18 - 
Trade economics 14/13 5 10/12 1 14 190 
Finance 10/4 - 10/11 - 11 7 
Statistics 8/23 - 12/14 2 11 12 
Construction
Economics 
20/10 - 5/27 - 13 60 
Economics of Foreign 
Trade
-/1 - -/7 - 11 - 
In fact many of the planned tasks were never carried out. Despite the impressive statistics 
assembled by the Congress Secretariat, a close analysis of the work of the subsections and 
Section reveals so many major shortcomings that claims of successful mobilisation need to be 
regarded with scepticism. According to a report dated as late as mid February 1951, the Trade 
Subsection had formally registered seven problem papers at the organisational office of the 
Congress of Science, another five had not yet been sent over, and three had been promised but 
not delivered. The problem papers were supposed to be the basis for the synthesising report 
from each sub-section, and in turn to provide the basis for the general Section report. 
However, fewer than half of them were ready at the time the final grand synthesis was made 
public at the First Convention of Economists. Worse still, in late August 1951, well after the 
Congress of Science itself, the Trade Sub-section had to answer for its failure to deliver six 
454 Hübner, Piotr, 1983. I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji zaáoĪeĔ polityki naukowej paĔstwa ludowego.
Wrocáaw: Zakáad narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich. p.114-116 
Hübner’s table is based on two different reports, one prepared for internal use by the Secretariat of the Congress, and one sent
by the CC Science Division to the Politburo. Although they cover the same period, the two reports do not always conform, 
and when two figures are cited, the first is from the internal Congress report and the second from the Party report. 
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problem reports, and among the authors who had not delivered there was a high percentage of 
bureaucrats. There are testimonies and pieces of evidence from throughout the process 
showing that participants did not give a high priority to the preparation work for the Congress 
of Science. The Trade Sub-section held a conference shortly before the First Convention of 
Economists, at the end of November 1950. As with the problem reports that had come as 
“mustard after dinner”,455 the timing of the conference, merely two weeks before the First 
Convention of Economists, meant that there could be no time for the incorporation of the 
results of this conference into the material for the First Convention of Economists. The 
notorious statisticians held their conferences even later. Overall, the sequences and timing of 
the various stages and types of preparation indicate that the process was not an orderly 
procession of evaluations and discussions at successive levels. After the First Convention of 
Economists, most of the sub-sections’ activities ended, as the main weight of Congress 
activities shifted towards dissemination of the final report. 
Stalin’s contribution to the social sciences 
Before we look at the First Convention of Economists, it is necessary to interrupt the narrative 
of the preparations for the Congress of Polish Science with an account of another important 
event that occurred in the process of redefining economics to match the PUWP concept of a 
Marxist-Leninist science. This was the December 1950 conference devoted to Stalin’s article 
on linguistics: the article Edward LipiĔski was appealing to when he called for tolerance of 
different opinions during a meeting in the Economics Section in July that year. Apart from the 
assertion that scientific debates required freedom of expression, the only other part of Stalin’s 
intervention which was relevant to economics concerned the position of science in the base-
superstructure relationship. 
455 Expression ascribed by BiliĔski to P. Lortsch, quoted in a report from a meeting of heads of sub-sections evaluating the 
progress of their work. Lortsch argued that starting work on the sub-section reports before the ‘referaty problemowe’ were 
available would reduce the importance of the latter, turning them into ‘musztarda po obiedzie’ (as meaningless and out of 
place because of the delay, as having mustard served after dinner) 
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Ill. 6: Conference devoted to Stalin’s article on linguistics, Warsaw 04.12.1950. 456
From the left: J. Berman,  
K. Petrusewicz, F. Fiedler,
A. Schaff, A. Rapacki,  
and J. Dembowski. 
Ethan Pollock, who has studied Stalin’s interventions in science, argues that while the motive 
behind Stalin’s intervention (in a debate on the linguistics theories of Nicolai Marr in June 
1950) was to strengthen the scientific communities’ claim to discretion over what went on in 
scholarly debates, the effect was the opposite. Pollock goes on to wonder whether Stalin 
himself was aware that he was exacerbating the problem he wanted to cure. The reception 
given to this intervention in Poland allows us to observe how Party ideologists used Stalin’s 
statements to support the message they considered to be the most urgent – the priority of 
ideological authority over scientific authority.
Following the publication of Stalin’s article, a conference was organised by the 
ITSC on December 4th 1950, in cooperation with Nowe Drogi. The aim was to 
discuss the importance for scientific disciplines of Stalin’s most recent text. Invited 
to the solemn occasion were “the Party’s ideological front workers” and scholars 
representing philosophy, linguistics, economics, law, history, the theory of 
literature, psychology, art theory, and musicology. There, from his position at the 
centre of the presidium table, Adam Schaff officially de-fused Stalin’s potentially 
disruptive statement about the importance of free critical discussion in the 
development of scientific disciplines. The following excerpt is from a report on the 
conference printed in the main party daily Trybuna Ludu: 
456 ArchDokMech/11297-6 “Sesja naukowa Stalin o jezykoznawstwie. Sala Rady PaĔstwa, prezydium” photo: CAF-
Dabrowiecki. 04.12.50 
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Stressing the meaning of Stalin’s words that “no science can prosper and develop 
without a clash of opinions, without the freedom to criticise” the speaker shows 
that this statement not only has nothing in common with ideological liberalism, as 
the vulgarisers of Marxism would have this thesis interpreted, but on the contrary 
presumes there will be a hard struggle with hostile ideologies. “We must 
remember,” the speaker states, “that in relation to bourgeois ideology we are 
obliged to hold fast to the principle of unconditional struggle against the enemy; of 
hostility towards any hostile, reactionary ideology; and of the hastening of the 
victory of the only consistently progressive and consistently scientific ideology – 
Marxism. That is the only correct path in the development of science and societal 
progress.”457
Oskar Lange was assigned the task of defining the limits of creative interpretation of the 
Marxist canon. The message was as clear as it was simple: only Lenin and Stalin had the 
necessary qualifications needed for this task; everything else was decried as ‘revisionism’. 
‘Eclecticism’, as understood in the economics context as an effort to combine elements from 
western and Soviet economics, was especially condemned.458
The task of the next speaker, Brus, was to discuss the implications of Stalin’s re-definition of 
language for economics. While language had until then been considered to be part of the 
superstructure, and hence subject to alteration following changes in the base, Stalin had now 
said that it was neither part of the superstructure nor of the base. The question arose as to 
whether the same could be said for science: could it be detached from ideology? Were there 
elements in it which could transcend the division between capitalist and socialist science? A 
most uncomfortable question, given that since 1948 much of the Party’s energy had been 
expended on driving home the message that science under socialism was not compatible with 
capitalist science. Pollock draws attention to a number of issues where Stalin’s intervention 
brought more confusion than clarity over the relationship between science and ideology. 
While Schaff and Lange proclaimed that Stalin’s call for creative and free discussion of 
Marxism meant that no such thing should be contemplated by mere mortals, Brus avoided the 
difficult but interesting implications of the re-definition of the status of language mentioned 
above. Instead he focused on what economics should cover. 
457 Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 “Przebieg sesji naukowej poĞwiĊconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o jĊzykoznawstwie.” 
The intervention of Adam Schaff.
458 Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 “Przebieg sesji naukowej poĞwiĊconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o jĊzykoznawstwie.” 
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The Stalinist definition of the base and superstructure and their mutual relations 
brings total clarity to the issue of the nature and extent of economic sciences. 
Economic sciences, by studying the economic base, deal with the social relations of 
production, relations between humans, making them clearly different from the 
technical sciences. Hence the important deduction regarding the necessity of 
struggle against a narrow technical orientation (technicyzm) in economic science, 
against any abstraction from division into classes, the class struggle, etc. The 
Gomuákist conception of supporting the “good farmer” in agriculture, (in practice 
the kulak), was an example among us of this kind of false, restricted attitude to one 
of the cardinal problems of agrarian politics in Poland.459
The definition of the subject of economics as the study of relations between humans may 
appear to be based on a degree of common sense. However, in this context its political and 
socially-related aspects would receive all the attention, at the expense of natural resources and 
technology. Political economy was to concern itself with ideology and economic policies, the 
former providing the correct approach, and the latter the empirical data, along with 
opportunities for the application of theoretical studies. Their main focus would be economic 
policies rather than any economic processes conceived of as being autonomous of the will of 
the policy-makers. “Underestimating the role of states and parties in the direction of 
economics – that is the greatest error that economic science can commit under the conditions 
of the construction of socialism.”460 In short, macro-economics, or political economy, was to 
deal with ideology and the study of political decisions, and micro-economics would 
concentrate on specialist technological production issues. Branch-economists were now to 
concentrate on the economic and technological issues of a single sector: transport, housing 
construction, dairy production or industry, and to avoid generalisations that would intrude into 
other sectors. This re-definition of the topic and aims of the discipline was given maximum 
authority by the political establishment: it was derived directly from the words of Stalin, and 
was announced in the hall where cabinet meetings usually took place in the presence of the 
highest Party and State leadership. In the picture (Ill.6), in addition to Berman, one of the 
three key PUWP leaders, we can clearly distinguish at the bottom of the frame the 
characteristic profile of Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz. 
The Conference on Stalin and Linguistics was held less than a week before the First 
Convention of Economists. This means that on the day the Convention was opening the report 
459 Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 “Przebieg sesji naukowej poĞwiĊconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o jĊzykoznawstwie.” 
Extracts from W. Brus’s speech. 
460 Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 p.8 “Przebieg sesji naukowej poĞwiĊconej pracom towarzysza Stalina o jĊzykoznawstwie.” 
Extracts from W. Brus’s speech. 
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from the Stalin Conference had already appeared in the papers, spelling out the accepted 
limits of criticism, the conditions for creative thought, and, last but not least, what the 
discipline was to study. Indeed, there was nothing left for the economists assembled at the 
Convention to discuss. What could they contribute now that Stalin had spoken and the Party 
had interpreted his Word? Scholars played the part of the “party’s ideological front workers”, 
as the Trybuna Ludu termed them. Their new, subordinate relationship to the regime had been 
demonstrated not only to economists but also to the wider public.461
The First Convention of Economists
The Convention held in Warsaw in December 1950 was assembled to approve the Section’s 
final report for the Congress. The preparation of the Convention was a joint venture between 
the Congress administration462 and the Polish Economics Association. In a letter from Brus, 
the secretary of the Section, to the Central Committee (CC) Science Division, the distribution 
of responsibilities and control is clearly spelt out: 
The practical direction of the organisation of the convention rests in the hands of 
Professor LipiĔski and the Board of the PEA, although it is formally comrade 
Lange who heads the Economics Section. Comrades B. Minc, Pohorille and Brus, 
and also comrade JĊdrychowski, take part in the preparations of the content as 
much as possible. It seems that the Science Division ought to select a group of 
(preferably three) party people to be responsible for the Convention, and 
especially its ideological-political aspects (speeches, preparation of at least a 
couple of discussion interventions, the exhibition of the history of economic 
thought in Poland, etc.)463
The real power rested with a cluster of people from different but relevant institutions who 
held collective responsibility for the process, and who answered to the CC Science Division, 
and in the last resort to the Politburo. The Polish Economics Association and LipiĔski were 
left with the task of arranging the refreshments and hiring someone to mind the cloakroom. 
With the advent of the Convention of Economists, the work of the Congress changed 
character and direction. Although it had involved a great number of people, the process had 
not been made public up until this point. Despite the many short cuts taken, the main task of 
the preparations – to produce a synthesised evaluation of the discipline using a Marxist-
461 Trybuna Ludu 9.12.1950 
462 A great number of agencies had a say in the organisation process: the Ministry of Higher Education, the Orgburo of the 
Congress of Science, the Presidium of the Economics Section, the Political Economy Sub-section, and finally the PEA. 
463 KC PZPR 237/XVI/37Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, Wytyczne, oceny, protokoáy zjazdów: ... ekonomistów, 
1949-50 p. 25-29. Letter or memo (notatka) from W. Brus (handwritten) to Tow. Zemankowa. 22.9.1950 
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Leninist perspective – had been fulfilled. The focus now turned to the dissemination of the 
final evaluation, with this second part of the Congress procedures being as elaborate as the 
first. While the Section Report was the summit of a gradual progression from bottom to top, 
the second part of the process went the other way. It started centrally, at the top, with a First 
Convention of Economists, and continued with repetitions of the central Convention in the 
other cities.
One important achievement of the Congress in Economics was a radical re-interpretation of 
the discipline’s history. To illustrate the ‘new past’, an exhibition was organised during the 
First Convention of Economists under the title “Progressive economic thought in Poland – an 
exhibition of prints” in the Polish Economics Association’s House of the Economist where the 
Convention was being held. 464  The preparation of a script for the exhibition had been 
allocated to A. Grodek, a recognised authority on the history of economic thought. He was not 
trusted to do it alone, however, and a comrade from the Institute for Party History was also 
seconded, with the results being approved by the censor’s office. The script allows us to take 
an imaginary tour of the exhibition.465 All the quotes from the exhibition in the following 
discussion are taken from this document. 
The visitors were greeted with a Stalin-quote on the wall: “There are different social ideas and 
theories. There are old ideas and theories that (…) slow down the development and progress 
of society. There are also new progressive ideas and theories, that (…) facilitate the 
development and progress of society.” The visitor then proceeded to a presentation on 
economic thought. On display in the chronologically-arranged showcases were portraits of 
scholars who had addressed economic issues from the fifteenth century onwards. This section 
opened with Renaissance thinkers from whom ideas compatible with Stalin’s vision could be 
extracted: for example, anti-clericalism, economic centralisation, condemnation of aristocratic 
privileges, and opposition to the exploitation of the peasantry. Thus even Copernicus could be 
included as a proto-Marxist. Visitors moved between glass boxes filled with portraits of 
scholars, books and prints, and commentaries pointing out the ‘progressive essence’ of their 
ideas. Over their heads, suspended above pictures of Polish economists in glass showcases, 
hovered quotes from Stalin, Lenin, Bierut and Marx, with the great four being the guides who 
provided the commentary on Polish economics. The treatment of the eighteenth century for 
464 AAN/PTE/6 pp.108-124 
465 AAN/PTE/6 „Katalog napisów” pp. 116-121 
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instance, was placed under the patronage of Lenin, who admonished: “We should not forget 
that in the period in which the representatives of the Enlightenment and the eighteenth century 
were writing… all questions came down to the struggle against serfdom and its remnants.” 
Since Lenin had already said that all economic issues during the eighteenth century concerned 
serfdom, what remained now was to show that Polish scholars were following in Lenin’s 
direction. Scholars who had spoken up against serfdom and the feudal order were duly noted 
for doing that. There is a marked change when the exhibition’s narrative reaches the Marxist 
era. After the proud presentation of a Polish adherent of the classical school who had the 
honour of being the only Polish economist to be quoted by Marx, the exhibition focused 
exclusively on the burgeoning Polish communist movement. No other trend was presented, be 
it scientific or political, meaning that the main part of Polish economic thought was totally 
ignored. Since it was not possible to find communists in academic positions, someone had to 
be found to fill the empty spaces that came after the historical and neoclassic schools. Some 
of those chosen as representatives of Polish communist economic thought may come as a 
surprise. The romantic national bard Mickiewicz was included, with the short commentary: 
“Pronounced his socialist views in lectures and articles on literature.” Further along, and 
relevantly, the leftist sociologist Ludwik Krzywicki was reclaimed as ‘progressive’ 
economist. ‘Progressive’’ meant not fully Marxist-Leninist, so Krzywicki was honoured by 
being included but also criticised:
Ludwik Krzywicki (1859-1941). A prominent scientist, economist and sociologist, 
he was a participant in the workers’ movement in first part of his active life. He 
attracted considerable merit in the area of the propagation of Marxism in Poland, 
and fought against agrarian and co-operative ideas. However, the later evolution 
of Krzywicki’s ideas, which moved progressively away from Marxism and the 
workers’ movement, proves that he did not grasp the revolutionary essence of 
Marxism.
Quotes from Lenin, Bierut and the Communist Manifesto predominated in the final section, 
with increasing focus on political issues. The conclusion of this progress through the history 
of Polish economic thought was a PUWP programme-statement: 
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The people’s democracy, in developing towards socialism, has … to incorporate 
the grand products of progressive creators from all sections of Polish culture; it 
has to create a link to the progressive, humanist and democratic traditions existing 
in our culture, and create a link with the periods of progress in the national 
culture, that were durably linked with the struggle of the progressive forces of the 
Polish nation against backwardness.466
Polish scholars had long presented their activities as making an important contribution to the 
national cause. The novelty was the combination of Marxism, an internationalist creed, with 
an appeal to nationalism through pride in the cultural heritage. While it may not have figured 
on the Politburo’s list of ways to attract scientists, we might recall that in the text of the 
Politburo decision to hold the Congress, the marriage of Marxism-Leninism and nationalism 
were clearly apparent. The exhibition may have been important in that it presented to the 
public the sections of the past that the PUWP sanctioned, but its omissions were as important 
as that which it did show. Most of what had until then been mainstream economics was 
ostracised by the new historians of the discipline. The biased selection of scholars included in 
the exhibition was amplified through the selective and simplified presentation of their work. 
There could be no future for ‘bourgeois’ economics in Poland, as it had now had no past. 
Once the old professors had died it would disappear, leaving no trace. The excision of all 
heritages save the Marxist, a practice introduced in the exhibition, was repeated in texts and 
verbal presentations during the Convention. 
Sub-sections were custom-made to encourage and control discussion with the objective of 
uncovering and criticising opinions that diverged from the central party line. During the 
public part of the Congress – both the First Convention of Polish Economists and the 
Congress deliberations in 1951 – discussions were no longer desired. If any unexpected 
discussions did emerge during Convention or Congress proceedings, they would have been 
hushed down, and will not be visible in the official account. The central focus of the 
Convention was the meticulously planned presentations. 
466 AAN/PTE/6 „Katalog napisów” p. 120 
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Table 6: Speakers and topics during the First Convention of Polish Economists467
Lange, Oskar Key-note address 
Brus, Wáodzimierz On the state of economics in Poland 
Tepicht, Jerzy Some problems in the struggle for a socialist transformation of the 
countryside 
Dziewicka, Maria The social structure of the countryside in the mid-western region 
Minc, Bronisáaw On the efficiency of investment in socialist economy 
Secomski, Kazimierz Issues of efficiency of investment in socialist economy 
LipiĔski, Edward The Physiocrats in Poland 
Grodek, Andrzej The state and key tasks of the history of economic thought in Poland 
JĊdrychowski, Stefan On the tasks of economics in Poland in connection with the Six Year Plan 
The key-note speech by Lange which opened the Convention was stilted and full of ready-
made formulae from the newspeak lexicon. Lange had been given a seemingly prestigious 
position, but he was not given space to present his research or ideas. The eight presentations 
covered only three topics (agricultural policy, the efficiency of investment, and the history of 
economics), which is surprising given that work had been conducted in eight sub-sections. It 
has to be said of the speakers that despite the presence of four economists whom the ‘old’ 
establishment would recognise, it was the Marxist-Leninist economists hand-picked by the 
PUWP who addressed the key issues.468 Only one of these presentations made a lasting 
impression; the final, synthesised report of the Economics Section. It was the central 
document on economics prepared under the auspices of the PUWP. 
According to Brus’s testimony, the report was a collective work by the sub-section, with 
direct interventions from Petrusewicz, who demanded harsher formulations and a sharper 
ideological tone. It was nevertheless delivered in first person singular mode, and was 
perceived and remembered by the economists who witnessed it as ‘Brus’s speech’: an 
accusation against established economists made on behalf of the PUWP.  
Expressions and rhetorical devices borrowed from the vocabulary of propaganda were 
frequently used. One example was defamation by association. It was claimed that pre-war 
Poland, was capitalist and thus fascist, so it followed that pre-war economics was capitalist 
467 All the speeches were printed in Ekonomista (1951:1) 
468 AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI-33, p.11 The only exception was K. Secomski, who represented the Planning Commission. The 
speakers on the history of economic thought had pre-war records in economics. The presence of LipiĔski had been the object 
of controversy, but Brus argued successfully for the inclusion of his academic supervisor. This suggests that there were 
conflicting forces within the Party, some pushing for a more radical ideological line, excluding all participants except those 
most loyal, and others more concerned with the legitimacy of the undertaking in the eyes of the academic community. 
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and fascist. Another example of overspill from propaganda rhetoric was the appearance of 
accusations of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in economics when the anti- cosmopolitanism campaign 
started, and its disappearance as the campaign came to an end. The use of derogatory and 
vulgar vocabulary when describing opponents in an academic setting was at odds with the 
prevailing norms of behaviour among Polish scholars. A cultivated, elaborate and flowery 
language had been the intellectual elite’s contribution to the Polish national identity during the 
Partition period, and the aggression and assumed plebeianising of newspeak was perceived as 
vulgar; it shocked and offended. While Marxist-Leninist rhetoric was by that time familiar to 
the audience, and had been used by PUWP’s supporters at the CPB debate two years earlier, 
the use of such language in an academic setting, before an audience of scholars, still made a 
strong impression. 
The report opened with an exposition of the geopolitical and ideological backdrop to the 
assessment, stressing the importance of the great systemic changes in economics that had 
taken place since 1945. Triumphalist claims were made about economics, mirroring the 
depiction of the Utopia accomplished in socialist realist art and propaganda. Brus then went 
on to announce that the criterion for the evaluation of Polish economics would be the degree 
to which Marxism-Leninism was applied, and added that, “the complete bankruptcy of 
bourgeois pseudo-science, no matter what forms or names it takes, is today, in the light of 
praxis, more evident than ever.”469 The report stressed Marxism’s claim to be the exclusive 
prism for the assessment of other disciplinary positions.  
It was the inherent superiority of Marxist theory that provided the argument as to why it 
should dominate the discipline. For loyal Party members it was an article of faith, but for non-
believers it would take history to prove it. The central argument for convincing the “hesitant 
masses of scientists” was the assertion that science was not apolitical, and that it had never 
been and would not ever be so. From that followed the conclusion that official science in a 
capitalist order had been capitalist, and therefore an enemy to social justice, and that this 
‘bourgeois’ science had no right of existence in a socialist country.470 ‘Bourgeois’ economics 
was unsuited to the study of socialist economics and was irrelevant to the needs of 
contemporary society.  
469 Brus, Wáodzimierz: “O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce” Ekonomista nr.1, 1951, p. 10 
470 Brus’s report attacked those who claimed that science was apolitical, asserting that this was only a mask. Economics 
Professors mentioned as using the apolitical argument were: Taylor, Máynarski, Fabierkiewicz, RosiĔski, and 
ZakrzewskiBrus, Wáodzimierz, 1951. "O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce." Ekonomista, 8-46. pp.9-46 
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After the announcement of the primacy of Marxist ideology, political logic demanded that 
what followed next would be an assertion of the role of the PUWP leadership: 
In the works of Bolesáaw Bierut and other leaders of the Party and the 
Government, in the reports and decrees of the First Congress of the PUWP and the 
plenary meetings of the CC, and in our economic plans, especially in the Law on 
the Six Year Plan, the basic problems in our economics were posed and solved in a 
scientific manner. The workers in Polish economic science thus received 
invaluable help and a firm basis for their scientific and research activities,… 471
The CPB debate, discussed in Chapter Two, was quoted as an example of how economists 
had received help and guidance from PUWP politicians.  
Only then did the report turn to the issue of the new roles and possibilities that the regime 
offered economists. Quoted as evidence of PUWP commitment were: the establishment of a 
separate section of economics in the structuring of the First Congress of Science, which had 
secured a privileged place for the discipline among other sciences; the establishment of a 
network of institutions of higher education devoted to economics; and the plans for new 
university departments and research institutes. Finally, the promise held out by the PUWP 
was that the superiority of Marxist doctrine would open new theoretical perspectives for the 
discipline: 
At the same time, even the limited experience we have in pedagogical and research 
work shows that a reliance on Marxist-Leninist theory opens entirely new 
possibilities and extremely wide new horizons to economist researchers. Only 
Marxist-Leninist economic science allows economists truly to know and hence also 
to transform reality, allows them truly to connect with the practice of socialist 
construction and to add their input to this construction.472
The report asserted that the regime had not only promised to place economics at the centre of 
policy making (it would ‘forge a strong link between theory and practice’) but had also 
offered the planned economy as an experimental laboratory for economists.473 Passing on to 
the evaluation of economics, Brus presented a sober picture: 
471 Ibid..11 
472 Ibid.p.43 
473 Lange, Oskar, Ibid."Zagajenie". 3-7. p.6 
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It would be wrong to claim that our special centres of economic science have made 
no achievements. It is not so, and we note clear and considerable successes at a 
number of teaching or research institutions, especially lately. Nonetheless, the 
overall balance of work we bring to the Congress of Economists and the First 
Congress of Science is not auspicious, and is very far from corresponding with the 
possibilities and tasks to be dealt with.474
This claim was substantiated with examples from Sub-section reports, and with the reminder 
that no economists had yet received a State Prize. Also read out was a list of the topics and 
questions that should have been addressed and solved by economists, but had not been.475
Next, Brus turned to the past, regretting the active suppression, by Western-fixated bourgeois 
economics, of the “progressive traditions” –  meaning the communists, and those segments of 
Polish cultural life which had been included in the new hall of fame after careful examination 
and trimming: 
However, during the rule of big capital, and land-ownership, especially in the 
inter-war period, progressive economic thought in Poland was pushed 
underground. On the surface, in university chairs and research institutes, was the 
undivided rule of a vulgar apology for the capitalist system –pseudoscientific, 
bourgeois political economy, which directly served the interests of the 
exploiters.476
Another accusation brought against ‘bourgeois economics’ was that it lacked originality. It 
was claimed that Polish economics before the Marxist-Leninist reforms had comprised mere 
copies of foreign ideas.477 The diversity of the field in the inter-war period was ascribed to the 
fact that different western theories were followed, creating division among national 
scholars.478 There was a nationalistic resonance to this charge: Polish ‘bourgeois’ economics 
had failed society not only by helping the capitalists to exploit the masses, but also by not 
contributing to national glory. Economists selected to represent ‘bourgeois’ economics were: 
Taylor, Máynarski, Zaleski, RosiĔski, BarciĔski, Zagórski, Drewnowski and Rączkowski. 
They had to endure a humiliating public denigration of their professional qualifications, and 
were then admonished and asked to repent and expiate their methodological sins in public: 
474 Brus, Wáodzimierz, Ibid."O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce." 8-46.p.13 
475 Ibid.pp.14-15 
476 Ibid. p.16 
477 Ibid.pp.9-46
478 Actually the term used was not schools, but the diminutive “szkóáki”, which in this case has a derogatory effect. 
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 “It should also be expected of a number of scientists who have recently been 
under the influence of bourgeois economics that they express their current position 
through a self-critical relating of their own errors and a sharp critique of the 
contemporary apologists of imperialism.”479
The report then worked its way systematically through all the sub-sections, extracting 
examples of what was now considered to be bad research. In Organisation Studies, for 
instance, economists who had used Fredrick W. Taylor and Henry Ford were chastised for 
failing to base their work on the “new character of our socialist enterprises and the new 
attitude to work”. In industrial economics, A. SkowroĔski was accused of writing too little 
about Soviet industry compared to his coverage of Western countries, of failing to refer to 
Marx or Soviet science, 480 and of masking his adherence to old ideas by using “declarative 
formulations about the achievements of Soviet science (…..) as ‘camouflage’”. The latter was 
an increasing problem, according to the speaker.  
To all this was added the accusation which had cost Socrates his life, the charge of corrupting 
young people, which was laid at the doors of academic institutions active before 1949. The 
accusation was based on the results of an analysis carried out by young Marxist-Leninist 
economists, who had looked at 933 Masters theses submitted between 1946 and 1949 in 
Warsaw, Kraków, PoznaĔ, Wrocáaw, and Szczecin; an estimated two thirds of the total.481
“The hostile bourgeois methodology limited the development of research in 
Poland, directed it onto false tracks, corrupted many honest and gifted young 
researchers, and led to a waste of time and effort. In a number of cases we can 
undoubtedly talk of a conscious damage aimed at the systemic foundations of our 
state. In the case of some institutes, a closer look at their ‘achievements’ raises the 
suspicion that they simply aimed at an accelerated production of reactionaries 
with scientific titles.” 482
The PoznaĔ University economics seminar led by Professor Taylor (and later by RosiĔski)
was criticised for having as many as fifty per cent of students working not on Marx but on 
such scholars as Keynes, Wicksell, Walras, Schumpeter, and Say. What was even more grave, 
Brus added, was that these theses were not even critical of the ‘bourgeois’ economists they 
handled. At the Main School of Commerce, the audience was told, only two of 165 Masters 
479 Brus, Wáodzimierz, 1951. "O stanie nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce." Ekonomista, 8-46. p.18 
480 Instead SkowroĔski’s references were to Stigler, Heydel, Lemann, Zaleski, Kuznets, Taylor, Schmalenbach, Adamiecki 
etc. Ibid. pp.9-46 
481 In the report, Brus acknowledged the help of assistants from the Political Economy Department at the Main School of 
Planning and Statistics. The reports of the Sub-sections of Agrarian Economics and Trade Economics were also used in the 
analysis. Ibid. pp.9-46 
482 Ibid. p.31
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theses had the economic conditions of the Soviet Union as their subject, while what was in 
fact being studied even included the Congo, Cameroon and Nazi Germany. 483  The
condemnation of the situation in higher education justified the closing down of all of the 
above-mentioned study programmes, a reform which was, in the words of the report, “a 
turning point in the struggle for the right direction in economic sciences in Poland”484 Things 
would be different from now on: the Main School and the new Higher Schools of Economics, 
it was announced, had been given the task of delivering 14,000 graduates of economics during 
the Six Year Plan. In Chapter Three we have already seen some of the problems caused at the 
Main School by the drastic expansion in student numbers needed to meet this ambitious 
target. The authors of the report were particularly well aware of the fact that the principal 
challenge in higher education was the lack of qualified academic teachers, and though the 
report encouraged the “bold” promotion of young cadres to academic positions, it was 
admitted that it was still necessary to use the ‘old’ variety. The report defined the PUWP’s 
policy and plans thus: 
 The general policy of the Party and the Government towards scientific cadres has 
been reflected in the reform of higher education in economics. All honest, valuable 
workers among the old scientific cadres have been given full opportunity to exert 
their creative abilities. A substantial number of the old scientific cadres have lately 
been through a significant and positive evolution. The task is to deepen this 
evolution and complete it, while decisively cutting off all those who openly or 
secretly persist in holding on to old bourgeois positions.  
This can only be attained through a sharp and uncompromising struggle against 
all manifestations of a bourgeois world view and against all forms of expression of 
this view in economics, through a more extensive use of the appropriately-tested 
weapon of critique and self-critique than has so far been the case. This applies 
especially to sector economics (ekonomiki szczegóáowe) where in some cases 
bourgeois economists ousted from chairs in political economy try to ‘take 
refuge’.485
The last sentence in particular has a threatening ring, for economists who had previously held 
chairs in political economy had been moved to less ideologically sensitive areas, where they 
were now being told that they should not feel safe. It is also clear that the inclusive and open 
483 Others academic supervisors criticised for supervising and accepting ‘incorrect’ works included: Fierich, Máynarski, 
Dederko, Paszkiewiczowa, Schram, Staniewicz, Inglot, Szubert, and Dąbrowski. Ibid. pp.9-46 
484 Ibid., p.34 
485 Ibid.p.37 
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attitude to ‘old’ staff declared here is at odds with the picture revealed by examination of the 
staffing policies and verification campaigns discussed in Chapter Three. 
Finally, the report assessed the research capacities and activities of the research institutes. 
Only the three research institutes connected with sub-sections were said to show potential in 
economics research.486 The institutes attached to ministries were dismissed as un-coordinated, 
with little capacity in economics, and no visible scientific production.
As a conclusion, the last part of the report was devoted to the enumeration of what were 
considered to be positive and promising trends that would allow Marxist-Leninist economics 
to overcome any difficulties: 
 As a result of this ideological offensive, led under the aegis of the Party, we can 
mention a number of considerable successes that will create a favourable climate 
for the development of centres of economic science.487
As proof of the success of Marxist-Leninist economics, the audience was informed of the 
number of ‘classics’ and translations from Soviet scientific literature published, and reminded 
that the “shattering of the gomuákowszczyzna” (the rejection of the national way to socialism 
policy fronted by Gomuáka in the summer of 1948) had introduced “clear perspectives”. 
Further evidence of success lay in the fact that the Party Schools had organised courses in the 
political economy of socialism for the administrative, educational and economic apparatuses. 
Help from the Soviet Union, by way of Polish economists’ journeys there and visits from 
Soviet economists, was mentioned as being very important, but no numbers were quoted to 
substantiate this claim. Once more the need to overcome the “last vestiges of hostile, 
bourgeois, so-called theories” was asserted and admonitions were repeated that this could 
only be achieved through reliance on the “weapons of criticism and self-criticism” and the 
“ingenious directions” given by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, especially Stalin’s work 
on linguistics, and the experiences of Soviet science. Now that it had completed the operation 
of dethroning established economics and proclaiming the supremacy of PUWP-sponsored 
Marxist-Leninist economics, the report ended with a quote from Bierut and a battle cry: “We 
are not and do not want to be ‘neutral’ towards the struggle for socialism in Poland, or 
towards the battle against imperialism, the battle for peace and freedom on an international 
486 The three institutes were the Institute of Agricultural Economics (IER), Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Handlu I Zywienia 
Zbiorowego, Gáówny Instytut Pracy. The Institute of Foreign Relations, and the Central Statistical Bureau, which also did 
some research relevant to economics were not assessed. The report implied that this is due to a lack of information on their 
activities, which is not surprising given the secret nature of their work. Ibid. pp.9-46 
487 Ibid.p.32 
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scale.” Now this message had to be spread nationwide: first through Ekonomista, where the 
proceedings of the Convention were published, and then through provincial replicas of the 
Convention.
Provincial show-trials 
Regional conventions were organised in all the major academic centres of economics: 
Kraków, PoznaĔ, Katowice, Wrocáaw, àódĨ, Sopot and Szczecin. Each followed the same 
pattern, and all but one were held on the same day, March 18th 1951.488 Common ingredients 
were the reading-out of a local version of the ‘Brus report’ analysing the local economists, 
and of the text on the tasks of economics in the Six Year Plan. In each place there were also 
attacks directed at professors who heretofore had been leading ‘bourgeois’ economists, 
demanding of them a public confessions of their ‘sins’. The local party functionaries who 
were employed to criticise and chastise the erring economists used more aggressive and 
propagandist language than had been heard in Warsaw. The difference may be accounted for 
by the fact that outside Warsaw there were no Marxist-Leninist scholars, and the task of 
criticising local economists was shouldered by Party officials without academic experience. 
The regional conferences were conceived of as being closer to ground level, and to local 
economic problems, and therefore focused on concrete examples of how academic economists 
should participate in the economic development of the region, with reports on co-operation 
with factories or farming co-operatives. In the well-established industrial centre Katowice, for 
instance, where academic economics was only starting up, these practical issues dominated 
the discussion.
The only stenographic report I have found from a regional conference is from Wrocáaw. It 
provides detailed information about the public accusation of Professor StyĞ, his 
‘samokrytyka’, and the critical discussions about his efforts. The document makes for a 
gripping read, as it conveys the desperate position of the professor, standing alone, and 
accused in aggressive terms of being an enemy of the regime. His attempts to balance the 
need to prove his loyalty and goodwill with that of retaining his dignity are vividly realised. 
StyĞ’s speech certainly did not conform to the communist idea of a ‘samokrytyka’; he did not 
488 APAN/IKNP/148, p.1 On March 18th 1951 conferences were held in Kraków, PoznaĔ, Katowice, Wrocáaw, àódĨ, and 
Szczecin. The exception was Sopot, where a two-day conference was held earlier, 3-4.03.1951. 
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even accuse himself, but instead explained his motives and actions. Indeed ‘samokrytyka’ in 
Professor StyĞ’s edition was not so much a self-criticism as an accusation against his critics. 
According to the official report sent to Warsaw, the regional conference in PoznaĔ stimulated 
interest in Marxism among those who had “vacillated”, and showed that some of the older 
professors were unable to adopt Marxism.489 The way this report mimics the aims defined by 
the Congress leadership almost word for word suggests that it was more a reflection of 
centrally-issued targets than of what had really transpired in PoznaĔ. Indeed, according to one 
report, the audience in PoznaĔ had demonstratively supported the professor under attack, and 
even the official report notes that of the 120 economists attending nearly half left after the 
break.
The personal attacks brought in made within the framework of regional conferences in March 
1951, and on other occasions, introduced an atmosphere of fear which was not at all 
conducive to creative research or scholarly discussions. The practice of public shaming 
through obligatory samokrytyka put the targeted scholars – and their friends, students and co-
workers – under unprecedented psychological stress, creating lasting resentment. The 
personal wounds and grudges caused by this practice would heal very slowly, if ever. One 
long-term effect was to introduce a chasm between the challengers and the establishment 
under attack, which would later be a hindrance in the integration of Marxist-Leninist 
economists into the traditional academic establishment. 
Throughout the period 1948 to 1950, the PUWP-sponsored attacks were aimed primarily at 
individuals rather than at theories, conclusions or research results. This choice underscored 
the breach between the two positions, suggesting that they could have no common language 
and no dialogue. This also meant that ‘bourgeois economics’ was not so much defined by its 
content as by its practitioners. Adherence to the current Party policy was the definition of 
correctness, and no other external, unchanging principles formed the basis for where the line 
was drawn between friend and foe. Thus, although the lists of Marxists-Leninists and 
‘bourgeois’ economists remained generally stable from 1947 to 1956,490 amendments could 
be made when needed. Aleksy Wakar, for instance, was re-defined from Marxist to ‘enemy’, 
489APAN/IKNP-148, p.264-265 Notatka sprawozdawcza z przebiegu konferencji ekonomistów w Poznaniu. Signed: 
Z.Tomaszewski, date: 20.03.1951 
490 In the evaluation of economics made for the First Congress of Polish Science and first given publicly by Brus at the First 
Convention of Economists in December 1950: examples of ‘bourgeois’ works and scholars included: Taylor, Mlynarski, 
Zaleski, RosiĔski, BarciĔski, Zagórski, Drewnowski, and Rączkowski. Brus, Wáodzimierz, 1951. "O stanie nauk 
ekonomicznych w Polsce." Ekonomista, 8-46. pp.9-46 
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even earning the label ‘fascist’ after his arrest and extradition to the NKVD in 1952.491 When 
the ‘Party Line’ changed, criticism of individuals was used to clarify which statements, 
positions or perspectives would now be condemned or redeemed. These fluctuations were 
noticed and invoked by those few who dared. When Wincenty StyĞ was forced to perform a 
samokrytyka at the regional conference in Wrocáaw, he spent much time arguing that the same 
kind of economics that he now was being criticised for had not only been tolerated by the 
Party, but had even been encouraged in him only a short while before. Responsibility for past 
actions that did not conform to the present party line applied to party-members too, as the case 
of NowiĔski illustrates. However, while both Professor StyĞ and rector NowiĔski had to 
perform a self-criticism, the latter was kept secret. His humiliation was performed in front of 
party comrades, not in public. Also, having gone through the Party’s purgatory, he continued 
to enjoy Party patronage, and was allowed to keep his post of rector. StyĞ, on the other hand, 
was isolated from research and students and contaminated with the stench of being an enemy 
of the Party.
The grand finale: the Congress 
There is not really very much to say about the final stages of the Congress process. The 
Economics Section session at the Congress itself, held in the presence of a number of Soviet 
economists, was stiff and pompous and brought forth nothing new.492 In the final document 
published by the Economics Section, the authors not only claimed that Marxist-Leninist 
economics was the heritage of all ‘progressive’ thinkers throughout history, as in the 
exhibition,493 but also boasted of recent achievements which consisted solely of the economic 
policies of the Communist Party. The final list of sub-sections differed from what it had been 
during the preparatory stages. Finance and Statistics were now downgraded and put at the end 
of the list, and Communal Housing was dropped altogether. The report states that although 
both Communal Housing and the Economics of Industry and Transport were considered 
important for the national economy, no one was to be found working on them. The final 
evaluation of economics was negative:  
491 Wakar personal folder held by the ASGH contains Wakar’s own account of his arrest and deportation. Also consider 
Wyrozembski’s intervention on March 1st in 1953 during a discussion on Stalin’s next publication when responding to an 
intervention by Zurawicki ,who had put him in the same group as ‘bourgeois’ economists, argued: “It was I who took the 
stand against Wakar, the enemy of our People’s Poland who had stolen in under the guise of a Marxist!” AAN/ANS/42-44 
492 The Soviet economists present were Professors Niekrasov, Osadko, and Romanchenko. In addition, the Austrian professor 
Prager.  
493 „Referat Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych” in Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. I Kongres Nauki Polskiej. 
(PWN, Warszawa, 1951) p.130 
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In the assessments done by the different sub-sections there are regrettably very few 
items that could be called achievements in the field of research. There are some 
publications by the Institute of Agrarian Economics at the end of 1950 (carbon 
copied), some statistical studies (especially the calculation of the national income for 
1947), a dozen or so more substantial theoretical articles, and finally, some books. 
Among these one should mention the work of Bronisáaw Minc, Problems of national 
income, which in itself is not devoid of numerous deficiencies. That is about all that 
can be included in the column “scientific production” in economics. (It is clear that 
we have not taken into consideration the number of worthless, false works written in 
the spirit of bourgeois economics and published in the years 1945-1949.) 494
It should also be noted that the final report overrode some sub-section reports –  notably that 
of Statistics. Where the sub-section had failed to oblige with a radical criticism of statistics, it 
was ‘corrected’ in the main report. 
Conclusions on the Congress process 
Piotr Hübner’s main thesis is that there was a gap between the officially-stated aims and 
structures of the Congress and the real aims of the regime. Hübner’s work in the 1970s and 
1980s was informed by the desire to strip the propaganda varnish off the history of communist 
science policy. While the motives and aims of the PUWP are interesting, it is the effects of the 
Congress that are of the most importance in this investigation of the evolution of the 
discipline of economics. My study leads me to conclude that the effects of the Congress 
differed from both the announced and the secret ambitions of the PUWP. 
If we take as the basis for the evaluation of success the aims stated in the Politburo decision to 
organise the Congress, it was to a large extent a failure. The work of the Congress did little to 
mobilise academics to take an active part in the communist modernisation project. Despite the 
impressive numbers presented by the Congress secretariat, few economists took an active part 
in the sub-section’s activities, and neither this work nor the grand, carefully-choreographed 
conventions and gala sessions reveal any mobilising effect. Some assumptions in the 
Politburo decision were correct, such as the willingness of scholars to participate in the 
reconstruction of the economy, and that economists would find the argument of the 
494 “Referat Sekcji Nauk Ekonomicznych” in Stan i zadania nauk ekonomicznych w Polsce. I Kongres Nauki Polskiej. (PWN, 
Warszawa, 1951) p.130 
197
‘connection of science with life’ appealing. However, the appeal associated with active 
participation in the reconstruction of the country and its modernisation in fact worked 
independently of the Congress preparations and the grand final sessions, and had been 
informing the choices and the activities of economists ever since 1945. This was also the case 
for the appeal of the idea of contributing to Polish national culture. 
The Congress process forced people to take part, however reluctantly, in discussions of the 
situation in their discipline. They were also forced, by the nature of the political process, to 
form a consensus behind a conclusion which was far removed from their earlier perception of 
the situation described, and which was to an extent in conflict with their professional interests. 
Partly despite their own wishes, they were enlisted to support and legitimise a radical 
reappraisal of their discipline. It is impossible to give a precise figure of the number of 
economists involved in Congress work. Each sub-section of the Economics Section had 
between eleven and eighteen members, amounting in total to 108 people actively involved in 
the first stage of the process. In addition to this, the sub-sections commissioned problem-
paper writers, and so involved more people in their work. The Congress secretariat, eager to 
show their efficiency, placed the total of economists involved in the preparatory phase of the 
First Congress of Polish Science at 407,495 The gap between the 108 and the 407 figures can 
be explained by the inclusion of the participants at the Convention of Economists in 
December 1950, and at the regional conferences in the latter sum. 
The PUWP had sponsored the extensive Congress process in order to establish a new 
hierarchy, where their chosen and trusted people would propagate exactly the kind of 
Marxism-Leninism that the PUWP leadership and the key authorities in the Kremlin asked 
them to do at any given moment. This led to the emergence of a double hierarchy, since the 
‘old’ economists did not lose their authority in their own and their students’ eyes – a fact 
which was not very visible in 1950 but which would become apparent in 1956. Many, most 
probably the majority of practitioners, continued to consider the entrance of the Marxists-
Leninists into their field to be an usurpation of power, and their presence in chairs and other 
positions of power to be illegitimate.  
An examination of the different stages and levels of Congress work, from sub-section 
discussions, through the first central Convention, then regional conventions and the final 
495 Hübner, Piotr, 1983. I Kongres Nauk Polskiej jako forma realizacji zaáoĪeĔ polityki naukowej paĔstwa ludowego.
Wrocáaw: Zakáad narodowy imienia OssoliĔskich.p.114 
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Congress, shows that the issues of control, conversion and representation were all solved 
differently. The composition of sub-sections was strictly controlled, but ensured at least a 
token representation of established communities. It also varied strongly according to the sub-
discipline: Political Economy was placed under special surveillance; Agriculture and Work 
Organisation were based in already-established rival Marxist-Leninist research institutes to 
the exclusion of the ‘old’ agricultural economists; Trade and Statistics were dominated by 
established communities; and new specialisations like Transport Economics were dominated 
by ‘practitioners’, as there was hardly any academic base to draw upon. Centralised control 
ensured that the critiques and conclusions presented at the First Convention, before a 
carefully-screened audience, adhered to the directives set by the Congress leadership along 
guidelines formulated by the Politburo. At regional conventions, the representatives of 
‘bourgeois’ economics formed the majority of the academic audience, but were not allowed 
by the Congress organisers to have decision-making powers. Instead these meetings became 
arenas for staged personal attacks on prominent economists.  
Lastly, the structure of the discipline was much affected by its fragmentation into small, 
specialised compartments. It entailed the separation of political economy from empirical and 
technical issues, and introduced a division of labour where theory became firmly linked with 
ideology and empirical problems were sent out to ‘sector’ economics. The next chapter 
investigates the development of Polish economics after the Congress. 
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C h a p t e r  5  
A BRAVE NEW WORLD?  
MARXIST-LENINIST ECONOMICS 1951-1955 
After the tumultuous re-ordering of the scientific disciplines which culminated in the First 
Congress of Science of mid 1951, academic life gradually settled into new routines. Scholars 
attended a succession of May Day parades and agit-prop meetings where they 
“spontaneously” voted for motions in support of Soviet efforts to promote world peace, and 
the omnipresent propaganda newspeak soon lost any sense of originality.496 In May 1950 one 
professor noted in his diary: 
The fire engine does not leave the main building of the Polytechnic. Its ladder is 
constantly used for hanging up and taking down slogans, flags and banners. No-
one knows any longer if these are for a festival of peace or friendship, a work 
competition, or some other tragic buffoonery.497
Ill. 7: Meeting of the Union of Polish Youth at the Main School of Planning and Statistics498
496 The studies of Suleja and Kupiecki extensively document the introduction and extent of communist political ceremonial 
into the public and the academic domains.Kupiecki, Robert, 1993. Natchnienie milionów. Kult Stalina w Polsce, 1944-1956.
Warszawa: Wydawnictwa szkolne i pedagogiczne, Suleja, Teresa, 1995. Uniwersytet Wrocáawski w okresie centralizmu 
stalinowskiego, 1950-1955. Wrocáaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocáawskiego. 
497 Steinhaus, Hugo & Zgorzelska, Aleksandra, 1992. Wspomnienia i zapiski London: Aneks. p.395: Diary entry dated 
29.05.1950
498 http://www.shg.waw.pl/ogolnouczelnianie/100lat/Jubilatka accessed 26.08.2005 
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Stagnation and dogmatism became the trademarks of academic life. Fear permeated daily life 
– fear of a new ‘hot’ war, of informers, of accusations and sudden arrests. We need to 
examine what kind of scholarship emerged under the domination of ‘Marxism-Leninism’, and 
what became of the PUWP’s promise to create a better-performing, better-funded discipline 
of economics.  
Policy-makers at the time proclaimed that the Soviet experience was the inspiration for the 
changes introduced into Polish higher education and science. This assertion has been much 
debated by historians, and while a majority agrees that it was between 1950 and 1954 that 
‘stalinisation’ was most pronounced, no consensus seems to exist as to the definition or the 
extent of that phenomenon.499 What ‘stalinism’ consisted of in the Polish academic context, 
and how it related to the Soviet ‘blueprint’, still needs to be examined. In a study tracing the 
development and functioning of Soviet science published in 1997, Krementsov based his 
definition of a “Stalinist Science” on two characteristics: the overlapping of party and 
scientific institutions, and the inability to resolve the conflict in priorities between ideology 
and science.500 These two characteristics were very pronounced in the Poland of the early 
1950s. Since Chapter Three has already broached the issue of the overlap of party and state in 
academic institutions, discussion in this chapter will focus on the conflict between ideological 
and scientific authority in Marxist-Leninist economics, and in particular on how this conflict 
affected scientific communication and reputation control. 
Marxist ideology placed science at the very centre of its world view: it was because Marxism 
was scientific that it was the only true ideology. Yet neither Soviet nor Polish communists 
openly recognised the potential for conflict between scientific truth and doctrinal truth. Ethan 
Pollock argues that by 1948 leading Soviet party officials were aware that both the 
development of scientific disciplines and the ability to provide innovative results were 
constrained by ideological rigidity. The Kremlin was in fact unable to decide who should have 
the last word when research results clashed with dogma – the Party, or scholars. Stalin’s 
interventions in linguistics and political economy, Pollock argues, were intended to support 
scholars.501 A brief look at how Stalin’s articles were brought into play in Poland confirms 
499 For a discussion of the different views on stalinism among Polish historians, see Andrzej Friszke’s contribution ”Polish 
Communism in Contemporary Debates” in World Congress for, Central, East European, Studies & Kemp-Welch, A., 1999. 
Stalinism in Poland, 1944-56 : selected papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European studies, 
Warsaw, 1995 Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp.144-157 
500 Krementsov, Nikolai, 1997. Stalinist Science Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
501 Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
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that the effect was the opposite of that intended: PUWP ideologues used them to reinforce the 
supremacy of Party-controlled ideology in the social sciences.
The third aspect of the ‘stalinist’ years in Polish economics which deserves exploration is the 
co-existence of the Marxist-Leninist and pre-existing hierarchies. The Marxist-Leninist 
position dominated the field by controlling resources, publication outlets, education, 
recruitment, and reputation control. By claiming to be the only scientific method, Marxism-
Leninism denied all other economic schools the right to be delineated as part of the discipline. 
Marxists-Leninists insisted on their exclusive right to define the boundaries of the discipline, 
a right given by the political leadership. So from the Marxist-Leninist point of view, the 
discipline now consisted solely of the Marxist-Leninist position, to the exclusion of 
everything else, which was now termed ‘bourgeois’ economics. However, if we conceive of 
the field of cultural production as being defined by the mutual acceptance of its practitioners, 
the Marxist-Leninist view loses validity. In fact, economists classed by Marxists-Leninists as 
‘bourgeois’ were not only present, but constituted the majority. This majority was aware that 
in Western countries non-Marxist approaches continued to dominate the discipline, and they 
persisted in considering ‘capitalist’ science to be acceptable. While some wished to use 
certain elements and techniques of ‘capitalist’ science to reinforce Marxist-Leninist science, 
others went much further, considering Marxist-Leninist science to be mere propaganda, and 
denying it the status of scientific knowledge. Thus the discipline of economics was split into 
two factions, each refusing to acknowledge the other as a legitimate area of the field. 
However, daily intercourse at academic institutions, and some degree of shared experiences 
and background, ensured that there were points of contact between individuals occupying the 
‘dominant’ and ‘inferior’ positions in the field. Bourdieu argues that positions within a field 
of cultural production influence each other even when they are making a point of their non-
cooperation.502 There are few sources that reflect the perspectives of the silent ‘bourgeois’ 
economists, as contemporary reports are virtually non-existent. Yet despite the fact that in this 
chapter non-Marxist professors may appear to be a nearly extinct species, their continued 
presence and influence becomes clear once we appreciate what transpired among economists 
once the silence was broken in 1956. 
This chapter opens with an overview of the new, post-Congress and post-reform situation 
within the field of economics, followed by the case study of a Marxist-Leninist debate on 
502 Bourdieu, Pierre, 1993. The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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economics. The last and most extensive part of the chapter is devoted to an investigation of 
the activities of the Central Qualification Committee (CQC).  
A discipline divided 
The reform of higher education had re-shaped the institutional landscape in economics. The 
new organisation provided for a more even distribution of economic colleges throughout the 
country, thereby easing access to undergraduate studies. Yet graduate studies were closed 
down in most places, resulting in a radical centralisation of research training. On an 
institutional level, the PUWP appeared so far to have been successful in carrying out its will. 
However, subsequent changes in the institutional landscape of economics reveal that the 
PUWP’s ambitious plans were disrupted by a lack of scholars considered trustworthy by the 
cadres responsible for the political clearing of all candidates for important positions. The 
creation of the Institute for the Training of Scientific Cadres (ITSC) had already strained the 
PUWP economists’ ability to cover all the important positions. As the heads of the different 
institutions vied for scarce resources, institutional rivalries appear to have gained in strength.
The success of the new colleges depended on their ability to attract qualified staff. This was 
relatively easy for colleges that had been solidly established on the basis of the well-run 
business colleges of PoznaĔ and Kraków, where human resources from the now-closed 
university economics departments could also be brought into play. In addition, the colleges in 
Sopot and Katowice were able to continue to rely on co-operation with active maritime and 
coal industry centres. Yet before 1949 these four most vibrant institutions had aspired to step 
through the portals of the academic club by offering doctoral studies, ambitions which were 
now frustrated. As doctoral programmes were closed down, and replaced by the new 
aspirantura programmes leading to a kandydat nauk degree offered at the Main School of 
Planning and Statistics and the ITSC, the provincial academic centres now had to send their 
students to Warsaw to complete their training. They now neither received funding and 
positions related to graduate training, nor controlled course formation and theses topics, nor 
were able to offer protection to their students, whose fate would be decided by the faculty of 
other institutions.
The ITSC, this hot-house established to create a new Marxist-Leninist elite in social sciences, 
was by design set apart from the academic community in general. According to Sitek, it was 
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an intellectual ghetto where isolation reinforced the bonds among its graduates.503 In all other 
academic institutions, however, the new Marxist-Leninist staff had to co-habit with a majority 
of non-Marxist academic and administrative staff, as well as with their students. Many 
testimonies dwell on the animosity with which the newcomers were treated. Drewnowski 
recalled the conditions at the Main School thus: 
The old staff of the School and the PUWP newcomers constituted two separate, 
mutually alien societies – maintaining only professional contacts. 
(…) on receiving the news of Stalin’s death the members of the old staff (probably 
over 150 people) openly expressed their joy in conversations among themselves, 
and related scornfully how a “comrade” started crying in the office when 
receiving the news. No repression followed, because PUWP members were never 
told of this behaviour. This division into old and new of the staff of the Main 
School of Planning and Statistics started to fade only during Professor A .Grodek’s 
rectorship, after October 1956.504
Generally “professional” contact is considered to be the appropriate level of interaction at a 
workplace, but for the ‘old’ Main School staff who had formed a tightly knit community even 
before the war, and who had grown used to sharing their meagre bacon allowances, tilling the 
garden to produce vegetables, and facing harsh war and post-war realities together, 
“professional” was the equivalent of an ice-front. In some cases the division lines coincided 
with those of the institutional organisation, with the sections devoted to political economy 
now controlled by ‘PUWP newcomers’, while at the Domestic Trade Department, KoĨmiĔski 
was able to create an ‘oasis’ for those students and staff with politically-questionable views 
and curricula vitae.505 In the specific context of the early 1950s, when a joke about Stalin 
could cause serious problems, the conditions for the discussion of economic problems using 
‘bourgeois’ concepts and methods, and for asking critical questions about economic policy, 
could only exist in private or semi-private circles of trusted colleagues and students. Of 
necessity difficult to document, such private ‘oases’ continued to exist until 1956, when they 
could resume public activity. It seems that professorial patronage allowed the creation of 
semi-public spheres that escaped the Party organisations’ powers and control mechanisms. As 
503 Sitek, Ryszard, 2000. Warszawska szkoáa historii idei. Miedzy historia a terazniejszoscia. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
naukowe Scholar. p.58 
504 Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 35, 451-489.I am quoting form 
the revised edition posted on http://www.pte.pl and accessed 18.12.2007. p.20 
p.16
505 See the testimonies of L. KoĨmiĔski’s students testimonies in StruĪycki, Marian & KamiĔski, Marek B. (eds.) (2004) 
Leon KoĨmiĔski. Patron WyĪszej Szkoáy Przedsiembiorstwa i Zarzadzania., Warszawa: WyĪsza Szkoáa Przedsiebiorczosci i 
Zarzadzania im L. KoĨmiĔskiego. 
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with KoĨmiĔski at the Main School, when Edward LipiĔski was moved to Warsaw University 
after being demoted from the chair in political economy at the Main School, he was allowed 
to engage with the less ideologically-vital subject of the history of economic thought, and was 
also able to find employment for some of the assistants who had been sacked from the Main 
School for political reasons. Using the cloak of historical studies, he was also able to continue 
teaching selected and trusted students about Ricardo, Pareto and other western economists, 
and ensured that the Polish Economists Association’s house and library in Warsaw remained a 
venue open to economists who had lost access to other academic institutions. 
The actual rate of establishment of new institutions in economics was in stark contrast to the 
ambitious promises made at the Congress of Science. This delay is not difficult to explain, 
given the limited number of Marxist-Leninist scholars, or to put it differently, the continued 
unwillingness of the Party leadership to extend the boundaries of the Marxist-Leninist group. 
Despite the resolutions passed at the First Congress of Polish Science, no Institute of 
Economics was established under the auspices of the new Academy of Sciences. Only a small 
unit, a ‘workshop’ (zakáad) was set up under the direction of Hilary Minc’s younger brother 
Bronisáaw. The potential of the PAN Institute of Economics for conflict with existing 
institutions is readily discernible in the Congress resolution. The PEA and LipiĔski would 
lose what vestiges of control they had over Ekonomista, as it was to become the journal of the 
planned Institute. The ITSC had secured the position of ideological leader of higher education 
in the social sciences, but would now have to yield it to the PAN Institute once the Congress 
resolution became operational. Such a plan could not have gone down well with the ITSC’s 
director, the astute Adam Schaff. I would not be surprised if an investigation into the 
institutional rivalries between the ITSC and PAN  confirmed Schaff’s involvement in the 
decision to scale down economics under the auspices of the PAN. Later efforts on the part of 
B. Minc to obtain the promised upgrade of his unit to an institute were countered by the CC 
Science Division. Zemankowa argued that a concentration of resources was needed in the 
Political Economy Department at Warsaw Universtity, established in 1953. Perhaps the 
PUWP had learned a lesson, having overstretched their human resources in Marxist-Leninist 
economics with the establishment of the ITCS shortly after the transformation of the Main 
School. In any case, the CC Science Division now concluded that there were not enough 
personal resources available for the simultaneous expansion of two new economic centres in 
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Warsaw.506 Regrettably, I have not found any more information on this case, so the question 
remains open as to how and why the aspirations of Warsaw University were realised instead 
of and at the expense of the PAN’s promised expansion. 
After the Congress of Science, the ideological orientation of Ekonomista became more 
pronounced. Few articles appeared that had not been approved by the PUWP as being 
Marxist-Leninist, or at least neutral. From 1952 modifications were made in the traditional 
composition of its issues, articles, reviews, notices, and bibliographies, and Ekonomista
became more similar to the Party’s ideological journal, Nowe Drogi, which in turn was 
patterned on Soviet journals. The most significant alteration was the introduction of political 
editorials and reprints of speeches made by party and state officials. Ekonomista now joined 
the rest of the press in following the rhythm of the communist liturgical year, celebrating the 
ideological campaigns which accompanied Stalin’s seventieth birthday, the anniversaries of 
the October Revolution, elections, and Party congresses. A typical issue would now open with 
the text of a speech by Bierut to the Party Congress, reprinted in respectful italics to 
distinguish it from the lowly matter of the scientific discussions that followed. The role of the 
Party leadership as the economists’ guide was demonstrated in each issue.  
Communist modifications were made both to well-stablished religious practices observed by 
the majority of the population, such as Christmas, and to the rituals of more limited 
communities such as those of scholars.507 At academic institutions this meant that traditional 
gatherings such as those at the start of the academic year were now clad in communist 
apparel. The PUWP also made sure that new celebrations of their own making were added. 
These were often meant to mark the finalisation of some collective effort, such as the 
publication in Polish of the Third Edition of Marx’s Capital (Volume 1) in June 1951, or to 
honour an anniversary the PUWP considered to be important. That was the case with the 
celebrations of Stalin’s seventieth birthday by the entire Soviet block, and the 
commemorations of Copernicus in 1953, and Mickiewicz in 1955. While the motivation for 
the celebrations of Stalin need no explanation here, the commemorations of Copernicus and 
Mickiewicz were related to the exhibition on economic thought organised for the First 
506 AAN/ KCPZPR/237/XVI/8 Letter from Z.Zemankowa (vice-director of the CC Science Division) to Jakub Berman, date 
4.11.1953. 
507 Suleja, Kupiecki, M. Kula,  Religiopodobny komunizm (Kraków 2003), 178. 
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Convention of Economists in 1951. All such efforts attempted to reinterpret the national 
cultural heritage by presenting it as leading up to communism.508
According to the plan formulated at the First Congress of Science, research was to take place 
primarily at the PAN Institute and the ministerial research institutes. The reality was that PAN 
was not sufficiently equipped to launch large scale projects, while the research institutes 
attached to the ministries lacked academic competence and were being kept busy with 
commissions from the ministerial bureaucracies. The First Congress had also announced the 
introduction of research planning. In my archival searches I have not found any material 
suggesting systematic planning of research before 1960. The only exception in the early 
1950s was the ITSC, the model institution as far as planning was concerned. There, topics and 
specific tasks were assigned by plan to individual employees of the chair of political 
economy, and targets and production time limits were set.509 The ITSC also detailed a list of 
260 topics for kand. nauk theses, which were to serve as guidelines for other institutions. The 
role of planning in research would increase from the late 1950s.510
In academic institutions, teaching and administrative duties were heaped on the small number 
of Marxist-Leninist economists, with disastrous results for their research output. It should also 
be mentioned that very few, if any, of the economists trusted by the PUWP had experience in 
conducting research. The thin issues of Ekonomista, and in particular the absence of new 
books worthy of review, were symptoms of this problem. Reviews reappeared as a regular 
feature from the end of 1951, but on a much smaller scale than before (only one or two per 
issue). Based on an analogy with the situation in Soviet science during the same period, it also 
seems possible that extended procedures for the reviewing and clearing of works in and for 
publication delayed the Marxist-Leninist output of books.511 Stamping down on non-Marxist 
scientific production had been a success, but so far Marxist-Leninist economists had been 
unable to fill the vacuum thus created. 
508 Economists were active in the Copernicus commemoration, since he had written on economic questions. See the 
monograph of LipiĔski, Edward, 1955. Poglądy ekonomiczne Mikoáaja Kopernika Warszawa. Also see the discussion in 
Ekonomista in 1952 and 1953 issues. 
509 AAN/ANS/5/79 “Katedra Ekonomii Politycznej. Ramowy plan pracy naukowej na okres 1951-1953.” 1.11.1951. Signed 
W. Brus 
510 A preliminary investigation into the archival collection of the Polish Academy of Scene’s Workshop of Economics, 
suggest that systematic planning was then under way in the 1960s, and that PAN had assumed the co-ordinating role it had 
been originally designed to fill.  
511 Pollock details the many stages of consultations and controls a scholarly publication had go through in the Soviet Union in 
the same period, and the backlog of publications which followed. It is possible an analogue tendency was also affecting 
Poland. Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars Princeton, N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press. p.194. 
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It would seem from its actions that the Bierut regime did not want the now-reformed and 
Marxist-Leninist scholars to conduct research in economics, and  that Hilary Minc was happy 
to run the show with the aid of his own bureaucracy. The active steps taken to suppress 
criticism also suggest that the political leadership did not hanker after independent and critical 
economic analyses. In the Party organisation, economics was the domain of the ideological 
not the economic authorities. What funds the regime spent on economic expertise did not go 
to academic institutions, but in all probability to the Planning Commission’s bureaucracy, and 
possibly to some other agencies like the Central Statistical Bureau and the National Bank of 
Poland. The ITSC received funds for the training of ideologues, and the Main School and 
regional Colleges received funds for the training of planning apparatus and management staff.  
In his study of Hungarian economists, Péteri argues that the reform efforts initiated after 
Stalin’s death in 1953, the New Course, brought a renewed stress on reliable statistics and 
analyses.512 It is likely that an analogous process also took place in Poland, although the 
sources on which this study is based do not shed light on this subject. Brus mentions that for 
him opportunities to study economic developments at first hand only opened up at that 
time.513 Poland did not have an institution equal to István Friss’s Institute of Economics, and 
compared with Hungary, Poland lacked a strong academic research institution with good links 
to management and policy-making experts. It would probably take a study of the materials of 
the Central Statistical Bureau, the National Bank, and the Planning Commission to ascertain 
whether the New Course policies had any significant effect on Polish economics. 
512 “New Course Economics: The Field of Economic Research in Hungary after Stalin, 1953-1956” in Péteri, György, 1998b. 
Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) Academia and State Socialism. 
Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe. New York: Atlantic Reseach 
and Publications. 
513 In particular he referred to an investigation of the overall tax-burden on farmers. Brus, Wáodzimierz, 1993. "The Bane of 
Reforming the Socialist System". Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 187, 363-405.p.378 
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Table 7: Articles and reviews as compared with other texts appearing in Ekonomista.514
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What could be published by economists in the early 1950s is made clear in the contents pages 
of Ekonomista. The table above illustrates two striking features of Ekonomista in this period. 
Firstly a dramatic peak in 1952-1953 of texts that were neither original articles nor reviews, 
and secondly, a slow but steady increase in the number of articles, here not regaining a level 
comparable with 1948 until 1953, and only gaining speed with the advent of the Thaw. 
The slow increase of output in the form of articles did not entail any surge of creativity among 
Marxist-Leninist economists. Many of the texts collated under the heading “articles” in the 
tables of content were not scholarly articles as such but information on the Congress, on the 
tasks of Economic Colleges, or on conferences recently held. The 1950 and 1951 issues drew 
on the preparations made for the First Convention of Polish Economists, and on Congress 
work in general. Thus one of the three 1951 issues was entirely filled with the interventions 
made at the First Convention, and a report on the discussion. Many articles were written by 
politicians and expounded on current economic policies; others were by economists taking on 
ideological subjects. The implementation of the Six-Year Plan was the dominant theme of the 
former, and the application of Stalin’s precepts and Soviet experiences to the Polish economy 
was the main concern of the latter. Reprints of contributions from Soviet scholars and reports 
from their discussions were not counted as “articles” but held apart as a category in their own 
right. In 1950, each issue had on average two or three texts written by or based on Soviet 
514 The figures for this diagram are based on a count of positions mentioned in the tables of content of Ekonomista and are 
here given by year for articles and reviews against all text positions. 1947:34/37, 1948:35/43, 1949:23/31, 1950:23/30, 
1951:30/30, 1952:30/68, 1953:37/88, 1954:35/57, 1955:45/61, 1956:51/69. 
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scholars’ work. A different practice was initiated from the first issue in 1952, when political 
texts were separated out from the category of articles. The 1952 and 1953 issues opened with 
one or more political and ideological articles: reports from Party Plenums or speeches given 
by prominent party or state functionaries. While the political texts in the 1950 and 1951 issues 
dealt with economic problems, and appear to have been customised for Ekonomista, those in 
1952 and 1953 were of a more general nature, with every major Party statement, speech or 
decision now being presented as of direct relevance to the discipline. The issue 
commemorating Stalin’s death (1953:1) contained seventeen pages of official announcements 
and condolences. Ekonomista strongly resembled the ideological organ of the Party, Nowe 
Drogi. New sections were introduced into the journal, such as “Consultations”, where an 
authority on ideology would give the correct assessment of some issue, and “From the life of 
science”, which was the counterpart of Nowe Drogi’s section “From the life of the Party”. 
The year of 1954 brought with it the initiation of the “New Course”, another revision of 
Ekonomista’s profile. The political interventions were now removed from their prominent 
place at the start of each issue and once more made directly relevant to economics. The 
situation changed noticeably in 1955, in terms of both the number of authors and the number 
of contributions. A new generation of economists entered the scene, and in the last issues of 
that year economists even engaged in a discussion on the relationship between consumption 
and accumulation. Stalinism was coming to an end on the pages of Ekonomista.
‘Stalinist’ discussion in economics 
One autumn day in 1952, Zdzisáaw Sadowski was walking down the street towards the 
university campus as usual. Edward LipiĔski’s young assistant, who had spent a year in a 
prison on charges of conspiracy against the regime, and had been evicted from his post as 
assistant at the Main School in 1949, had finally found a refuge at Warsaw University under 
LipiĔski’s wing. To Sadowski’s surprise, the Marxist-Leninist professor Józef Zawadzki 
crossed the street to join him. Conscious of the precariousness of his employment at the 
University, Sadowski observed Zawadzki’s approach with apprehension. Fear turned into 
surprise, however, when Zawadzki initiated a friendly discussion on economics in which he 
said things that were quite the opposite of what his position on the subject had been up till 
then.515 This reversal concerned the question of whether economic laws in a socialist society 
could function independently of the will of the central planners. The official position had held 
515 A.W. Haugstad, interview with Zdzisáaw J. Sadowski, Warsaw 2000 
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that the only economic laws to work under socialism were those consciously applied by the 
political leadership, i.e. the economic Plan. Zawadzki had been one of those hammering in the 
message and guarding the dogma.516 Sadowski’s astonishment lasted only until Stalin’s article 
“The Economic problems of socialism in the USSR”, was published in Poland a few days 
later.517 Stalin himself had occasioned the reversal of Zawadzki’s opinions:  
 Some comrades deny the objective character of laws of science, and of laws of 
political economy particularly, under socialism. They deny that the laws of 
political economy reflect law-governed processes which operate independently of 
the will of man. They believe that in view of the specific role assigned to the Soviet 
state by history, the Soviet state and its leaders can abolish existing laws of 
political economy and can “form,” “create,” new laws. These comrades are 
profoundly mistaken.518
While Stalin’s ideas had been formulated following debates which had gone on for years 
among Soviet economists about the draft of a textbook on political economy, it seems that 
only with the publication of Stalin’s text were the Polish Marxist-Leninist economists thrown 
into turmoil. The Soviet discussion, amply documented and analysed by Pollock, had not been 
a public one, and there is no way of telling how much the Polish economists knew about it. 
What is clear, however, is that Stalin’s intervention raised many difficult issues. Firstly, the 
Marxist-Leninist economists and Party ideologues had to deal with the fact that Stalin’s 
statements proved every single loyal Marxist-Leninist wrong. Since the Marxists-Leninists 
had attacked ‘bourgeois’ economics with the assertion that only they had access to scientific 
truth, it was particularly embarrassing to be reprimanded by the supreme ideological 
authority. During a discussion held in 1953, where Marxist-Leninst scholars were invited to 
debate the import of Stalin’s work, even party members could not hide their wonder at why 
516 As far back as 1947, the editorial manifesto of the first post-war Ekonomista spoke of an investigation into the existence 
of laws in planned economies as being a central issue in the near future. Several ‘bourgeois’ economists tried to address this 
question and were harshly criticised by the Marxist-Leninist economists. 
517 “The Economic problems of Socialism in the USSR” was published in the Soviet Union on October 3, 1952. The Polish 
translation appeared promptly in Nowe Drogi It is not clear whether the time difference in learning about Stalin’s opinions on 
the existence of objective laws under socialism from Zawadzki was due to the short period between the Soviet version and 
the Polish version, or whether Zawadzki was informed of the discussions surrounding the revision of a textbook in political 
economy that went on in Moscow,. The conversation could therefore have taken place just before 3 October, or between 3 
October and the publication of the Polish translation of Stalin’s text in the October issue of Nowe Drogi (1952:10) 
When Stalin’s remarks on economics were published, they were followed by an exegetic article in Ekonomista signed by 
Adam Rapacki, by now a member of the Politburo.
518 J. V. Stalin: The Economic problems of socialism in the USSR. “Publisher’s note: the present English translation of J. V. 
Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. is a reprint of the text given in the English pamphlet published in 
Moscow, 1952. Changes have been made according to other English translations of the pamphlet.” Prepared © for the 
Internet by David J. Romagnolo, djr@marx2mao.org (May 1997) (Corrected and Updated August 2000) 
http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/EPS52.html accessed: 29/10/2002 
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Party economists had been so wrong for so long, since they had the infallible tool of 
Marxism-Leninism at hand: 
Comrade Konopka: It is simply impossible to understand that those who follow the 
thoughts of Marx, who said that his science was first of all critical and 
revolutionary, commit errors in such numbers. (…) why people of the stature of 
Ostrowitianow, the director of the Institute of Economics, the eminent economists 
Leontieff and a whole number of others have erred, and why all have erred in the 
same way (…) Why such illustrious individuals among us as comrade Brus, as 
comrade Zawadzki, as comrade Pohorille, have committed the same errors. (…) 
What is perplexing is that whole groups of individuals in exposed, high positions 
committed the same errors (…) that only our leader, our teacher and guide, who 
has to think of everything, must think about detailed theoretical issues and correct 
errors.519
The newly established Marxist-Leninist hierarchy was under threat of de-stabilisation, since 
the reigning Marxist-Leninist economists, such as W. Brus, B. Minc and J. Zawadzki, who 
had been using their politically-sponsored scholarly authority to propagate the current 
communist position on political economy, were now open to attack. Criticised for having 
previously failed to understand what Stalin now explained to them, B. Minc, W. Brus and J. 
Zawadzki all submitted ritual samokrytyka.
While party ideologues and economists were wondering how to deal with these new 
developments, the Party organisation knew how to react. Based on the Soviet example and 
earlier domestic experiences, a procedure was already in place for what to do when Stalin said 
something of relevance for science,520 just as happened in 1950, following Stalin’s article on 
linguistics, when conferences were organised to discuss his contribution to economics. It is 
worth noting that in the Soviet Union the Party’s reaction to Stalin’s publication was 
immediate, and Pollock relates that the campaign to promote and discuss Stalin’s article took 
place in the very month following its publication. In Poland, however, in the case of both the 
linguistics and the economics articles, the PUWP took several months to organise the 
reception to Stalin’s message. It is possible that this reveals something about the distance 
519 AAN/ANS/5/44, Scientific session devoted to the work of J.Stalin Economic problems of socialism in the USSR (27.2.-
1.3.1953) p.144  
Konopka Antoni (1900-1963), before 1939 a member of the Communist Party and a lawyer defending communists. After 
the war, assistant.professor (prof.nadzw.) in 1947. Organised the T. Duracz Law-school and was its first rector. Worked as 
professor of political economy at Politechnika ĝląska w Gliwicach,(-1948), WyĪsze Kursy Administracji przy Prezydium 
RM, Spóádzielczy Instytut Naukowy (-1949), WSE àódĨ (-1951), University of àódĨ (-1953). Became a member of the 
PUWP in 1956. Tych, Feliks (ed.) (1978) Slownik biograficzny dzialaczy polskiego ruchu robotniczego A-D, Warszawa: 
KsiąĪka i Wiedza. 
520 Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. p.210 
212
between the Soviet and Polish party apparatuses, and about the level of information and 
involvement given to Polish communists in the Soviet debates. 
Ill.  8: Solemn scientific session of the Polish Academy of Science, devoted to Stalin’s “Economic problems 
of socialism in the USSR”. 17.04.53 Speaking: J. ChaáasiĔski521
The official conference celebrating Stalin’s text on economics, as depicted in the photograph, 
was a public event held in the Parliament chamber and reported in the press. It was the same 
type of tightly-scripted and controlled public meeting as the First Convention of Economists 
and the Congress of Science. However, just as the Congress was prepared behind closed 
doors, so too, before the public Stalin session, there was a preliminary conference at the CC 
Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres (27.02.1953 to1.03.1953). This conference gathered 
Marxist-Leninist scholars representing economics, history and philosophy,522 and opened on 
February 27 with presentations by Z. Modzelewski, W. Brus, R. Werfel and S. Ignar.523 On 
the second day there was a general discussion, followed by division into disciplinary sections. 
In the economics section J. Zawadzki and O. Lange gave the opening presentations, and these 
were then followed by a discussion which continued into the next day.524 The discussion 
521 ADMech/29071-1: Uroczysta sesja naukowa PAN poĞwiĊcona pracy J.Stalina "Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w 
ZSRR". 17.04.53, CAF, fot. Dąbrowiecki 
522 AAN/ANS/5/ Sesja naukowa poswiecona pracy J.Stalina - «Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w ZSRR» (27.2.-
1.3.1953) folders nr.42, 43, 44 
523 Stefan Ignar (1908-1992) economist, studies at PoznaĔ University, active in the peasant youth movement „Wici”,  
Assistant professor at Main School of Agriculture (SGGW) from 1949.  
Zygmunt Modzelwski (1900-1954) economist, studied in Paris, member of Polish Communist Party, French Communist 
Party , PWP and PUWP. Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1945, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 1945-1947, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 1947-1954, rector of ITSC 1951-1954. 
Roman Werfel (1906-2003) editor in chief of Nowe Drogi (1952-1955) Moldawa, Tadeusz, 1991. Ludzie wáadzy, 1944-1991
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PaĔstwowe PWN. 
524 AAN/ANS/5/42, There was also a section for philosophy and history 
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sounds similar to a large bar brawl: while this simile might appear disrespectful, the spectacle 
was not for the tender-hearted. Reading the stenographer’s report of the discussion, one 
cannot avoid noticing the high level of emotional involvement, from laughter caused by ironic 
and sarcastic remarks to expressions of warm affection and even of frustration and aggression. 
Firstly, ĩurawicki attacked LipiĔski during a discussion of the history of the discipline to 
which I shall shortly return. LipiĔski answered back and won some points by making the 
audience laugh with him at ĩurawicki. Then Kielski launched himself at Wyrozembski and 
others, so that Bialer decided to assist Wyrozembski, before Zawadzki stepped in to support 
Kielski in his critique of Wyrozembski, who then at last got the chance to speak up for 
himself and attack others. Next, Pohorille hit out at Wyrozembski for pursuing Brus and 
himself, while some comrades repeatedly tried to calm the situation and keep the discussion to 
its intended subject. Of the 23 interventions, I cannot see more than three that could be said to 
have been free from personal attack or self-defence and directly relevant to the subject at 
hand, namely the role of economic laws in socialist economies. Most interventions reeked of 
personal conflict and rancour, and were full of foul rhetorical tricks, such as the distortion of 
others’ opinions and the use of quotations taken out of context. All in all, the transcript of the 
discussion provides a good guide to the conflict lines within Marxist-Leninist economists, but 
reveals that not much was said about the theory of the political economy of socialism. There 
was, however, an interesting discussion on the history of economics.  
Stalin’s intervention meant that not only did the present hierarchy of the discipline need 
review, as its major figures were shown to have erred over fundamental questions, but that the 
past had to be re-examined. Those among the ‘honoured fore-fathers’ of the discipline who 
now turned out to have been in the wrong were chastened and those who had earlier been 
condemned for what now became the orthodoxy were rehabilitated. History was a means of 
control of the present. Seweryn ĩurawicki’s revision of the history of the discipline, which 
aimed to create a cohesive Marxist-Leninist past to match the Party line of the day, was 
important for the reception of Stalin’s work, but was unexpectedly contradicted by Edward 
LipiĔski, who refused to sanction it. LipiĔski objected to the claim that Ekonomista’s
transformation was caused by J. Zawadzki’s critical article from two years earlier. 525
LipiĔski’s version, and the one which fits with the actual content of Ekonomista, was that the 
525 This article was the result of the problem paper commissioned by the Political Economy Subsection in preparation for the 
First Congress of Polish Science, and was discussed in an earlier chapter. Zawadzki, Józef, 1950. "O wlasciwy kierunek 
rozwoju "Ekonomisty"". Nowe Drogi, 205-220. 
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re-orientation of the journal towards Marxism had occurred before 1950, and had been the 
work not of the PUWP’s Marxist-Leninist economists, but of established scholars. In his 
capacity of chief editor, LipiĔski had invited Marxist-Leninists to publish in Ekonomista in 
1947, but they had been passive, and failed to submit papers that could be published.526 He 
even dared to draw the audience’s attention to the fact that the Party line had been different at 
that time. He revealed that he had contacted the PUWP leadership, and was told that “at this 
stage” the Party accepted the publication of ‘bourgeois’ articles.527
To interpret this polemic it is necessary to look beyond the fact that no-one challenged 
Marxism-Leninism’s claim to be the only possible and desirable alternative for economics. 
Nothing else was possible in the 1953 context, and it would be wrong to interpret LipiĔski’s
intervention as a submission, because even then, in the last days of Stalin’s life, and of the 
stalinist epoch, he continued to fight on. The main issue was control over the definition of 
Marxism. Was there only one true Marxist dogma, defined by the central leadership in 
Warsaw on the basis of precepts from Moscow? Was the correct definition of a Marxist 
someone who adhered at all times to the current party line, or was it someone who was fluent 
in Marx’s work, who shared the commitment to social justice, and who employed his or her 
critical senses, as LipiĔski would have it? By representing their ‘bourgeois’ and ‘eclectic’ 
economist opponents as incapable and unworthy of any dialogue, Marxists-Leninists were 
trying to reinforce their claim to a monopoly over the discipline. In 1953 LipiĔski continued 
to oppose a polarised vision in which the Marxists-Leninists were seen to have faced hostile 
reactionaries. He reminded all those concerned that there had been a desire on the part of the
Ekonomista staff to engage in a constructive dialogue. By doing this he implicitly challenged 
the central PUWP leadership’s monopoly over the definition of who and what was Marxist in 
the past as well as in the present.  
The discussion at the Stalin session illustrates that Marxist-Leninist economists had at their 
disposal a politicised rhetoric perfectly suited to attacking enemies both outside and inside the 
Party ranks, but unsuited to analysis or inspiring exchanges of ideas. The second important 
observation is that, as Krementsov and Pollock found in the Soviet case, in ‘stalinist’ 
economics the paradigm shifts did not originate in the inner dynamics of the discipline, but 
526 LipiĔski’s version is in line with the findings presented in Chapter Two, where we saw that the transformation of the 
content of Ekonomista was introduced gradually, and that a decisive change had taken place by the end of 1948. 
527 AAN/ANS/5/42, Sesja naukowa poswiecona pracy J.Stalina - «Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w ZSRR» (27.2.-
1.3.1953) LipiĔski’s intervention in the discussion on 28.02.1953 pp.73 
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were induced by the decisions of the political leadership.528 Marxist-Leninist economists were 
given neither the resources nor the freedom they needed to formulate and develop an 
economic theory of socialism. Instead they were made slaves to the Party line. Nor were they 
let anywhere near -making on economic policy. The promised access to the planned economy 
as a laboratory for experimental economics was not opened up, and even access to data on 
economic development and plans was not given to those outside the inner circles of decision-
makers and the top levels of the planning bureaucracy.  
The politics of academic promotions 
Hardly any reader will need an explanation of the importance of decisions regarding 
evaluation of scholarly work and academic promotions. Likewise the fact that an evaluating 
body’s composition, preferences and outlook may have serious implications for the 
judgements they pass on scholarly output needs no further comment. More to the point, 
perhaps, is the question of how the sum of such individual decisions on the merit and 
relevance of scholarly work affecst the discipline as a whole. The sociology of science 
accords much importance to the processes of reputation control in science. For Richard 
Whitley, sciences are “reputational communities around particular goals and conceptual 
approaches”, and the control of reputation is a central task of scientific disciplines.  
The sciences form a subset of professional organizations, what might be termed 
reputational organizations. That is, they are systems of work in which practitioners 
control the way in which work is carried out and the goals for which it is carried 
out in the light of the particular beliefs and purposes of the reputational 
community of which they are members.529
Likewise, Pierre Bourdieu stresses the importance of mutual evaluation by knowledge-
producers as a key element of his definition of the field of cultural production.530 Reputation 
control is the process through which the qualification of individuals in and the value of their 
contributions to the discipline are evaluated. In academic institutions this process is carried 
out through the conferment of degrees, titles and positions. Control over access to publication, 
especially as far as prestigious journals are concerned, is also part of the reputation control 
process. Since I have not found source materials which might shed light on the process of 
528 Krementsov, Nikolai, 1997. Stalinist Science Princeton: Princeton University Press, Pollock, Ethan, 2006. Stalin and the 
Soviet Science Wars Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
529 Whitley, Richard, 1982. The establishment and structure of the sciences as reputational organizations. In N. Elias, H. 
Martins & R. Whitley (eds.) Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook. Dodrecht: 
D.Reidl Publishing Company. p.315 
530 Bourdieu, Pierre, 1993. The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia University Press. 
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selection and evaluation of the material published, I shall limit the discussion to the subject of 
control over academic titles and degrees. The importance of reputation control extends far 
beyond decisions about individual contributions and careers. It is the vehicle which maintains 
and modifies the intellectual goals of the discipline. It concerns the definition of limits and 
variations within the knowledge area acknowledged to be part of a discipline, and sanctions or 
rejects ways in which problems are selected and research methods applied.531
In the context of Polish economics in the early 1950s, it is not the universal difficulties of 
peer-review that call for our attention, but the question of the presence, form and extent of 
political discrimination. How did the scholars vested by the Party with discretion over 
allocations of academic degrees and titles deal with the dilemma of the political as opposed to 
the scholarly merit of the candidates? Did their views on the matter evolve, and how did the 
solutions they adopted affect Polish economics? 
The University Law of 1933 gave the Minister and the President the right to influence 
appointments to the title and position of professor, an opening which would be readily used 
by the post-war regime. Lower titles and degrees were awarded by the collegiate bodies of 
academic institutions. In the immediate post-war years (1945-1947) the need to re-stock the 
depleted ranks of professors and lecturers led to numerous promotions, allowing a new 
generation to arise with the blessing of the old professoriate. Doctorates and habilitations 
were still in the gift of academic institutions, and their recommendations for appointments to 
chairs formed the basis of Presidential decrees. The President, however, could and did use his 
powers to promote candidates backed by the communists. From 1948, the intensity of 
communist interference in reputation control gradually increased, as illustrated in Chapter 
Three. However, there is still much we do not know about the extent or form of this 
interference, the reactions of academic institutions, or the role of the Council for Higher 
Education (Rada Gáówna do Spraw Szkóá WyĪszych) which had advised the President on 
professorial appointments. The demanding task of gathering information on promotions in the 
first post-war years still awaits its scholar. It would require the analysis of data dispersed in 
the archival collections of universities, the Ministry, and political parties, and such a study 
would preferably encompass more than one discipline. It has not been in my power to conduct 
such a study within the framework of this work, and so in order to gain some insight into the 
531 Whitley, Richard, 1982. The establishment and structure of the sciences as reputational organizations. In N. Elias, H. 
Martins & R. Whitley (eds.) Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies. Sociology of the Sciences a Yearbook. Dodrecht: 
D.Reidl Publishing Company. 
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evolution of reputation control before 1953, I have concentrated on the control of 
publications, notably an analysis of the content of Ekonomista. The Central Qualification 
Commission produced documentation on academic promotions which offers an opportunity to 
study reputation control through the awarding of academic degrees and titles. 
The 1951 University Law formalised ex post the establishment of a new order in academia, 
and established a Central Qualification Commission, with the task of approving or discarding 
candidates for degrees proposed by the universities. The activities of the CQC had 
repercussions for all disciplines, and its workings deserve more attention than has been its 
share. I have found no literature indicating that the Polish CQC material has been studied.532
This source material is extensive and varied, and I have found especially interesting the fact 
that during some periods the discussions in the Commission’s sections were stenographed and 
transcribed. Today these documents provide a unique view of the arguments and 
considerations taken into account in the evaluation of candidates for degrees.533
Where the law of 1933 left all titles and degrees below the professor to the discretion of 
academic institutions, from 1951 all degrees above Master (mgr.) were subject to centralised 
approval. The CQC’s mandate was to confer the scientific titles of ordinary and extraordinary 
professor and docent as well as the new higher degrees of kand. nauk and doktor nauk, which
replaced the doctorate and the habilitation respectively. It was formally introduced in the new 
Law on Higher Education and Researchers of 15.12.1951.534 The CQC was mainly concerned 
with the control of promotions above the level of doctorate, but it also supervised the work of 
the qualifying commission for junior scientific staff. Like its precursor the Council for Higher 
Education, the CQC was attached directly to the Government, but unlike the Council, the 
CQC also had the authority to take final decisions, and had a wider jurisdiction, including the 
approval of kand.nauk degrees and the awarding of docent titles. 
The PUWP expected the Marxist-Leninists who had been offered rapid promotion to excel in 
both teaching and research. The Marxist method, considered to be the only truly scientific 
way, would guarantee their success. It was also expected that this Marxist-Leninist avant-
532 On the Hungarian equivalent of the CQC, the Scientific Qualifications Committee (Tudományos MinĘsítĘ Bizottság), see 
chapter “Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976.” in Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the 
Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) Academia and State Socialism. Essays on the 
Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe. New York: Atlantic Reseach and Publications. 
533 The Central Qualification Commission material is located within the Ministry of Higher Education collection at the 
Archiwum Akt Nowych in Warsaw.  
534 Ustawa z dnia 15.12.1951 o szkolnictwie wyĪszym i o pracownikach nauki. Dziennik Ustaw RP, nr.6 poz. 38, pp.57-63 
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garde would be followed by an army of young researchers educated in the reformed 
institutions and recruited from worker and peasant classes. However, the CQC material shows 
that during the stalinist years only a handful economists achieved the kand. nauk degree and 
no doktor nauk were awarded by the CQC to economists.535 In addition, the number of new 
assistant professors and full professors created remains low compared with the number of 
chairs now directed by ‘deputy professors’. The lack of upward academic movement in the 
stalinist years becomes even more conspicuous when contrasted with the veritable explosion 
of promotions after 1956.  
 From 1944, and on a regular basis, the Party appointed trusted individuals to academic 
positions, thus interfering in reputation control, a task which under the pre-war regime had 
been the domain of disciplinary communities. “Professor” had up to then meant a highly-
qualified expert whose authority and competence were vouched for by the academic 
establishment. The regime’s interference changed this situation. Since the candidates chosen 
by the Communist Party seldom had the necessary academic qualifications, the established 
meaning of the title “professor” was gradually undermined. The CQC members faced this 
dilemma on many occasions when evaluating candidates on the basis of political capital 
earned through loyal service to the Party, and academic capital earned through scientific 
output. I suggest examining the activities of the CQC with the following two problems in 
mind: the failure to confer a substantial number of academic promotions; and the attitudes of 
those scholars appointed by the PUWP to oversee the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist 
hierarchy in social science towards the dilemma of prioritising between political and scientific 
merit. 
At the first plenum meeting of the of the CQC on April 29th 1953, Adam Rapacki,536 Minister 
of Higher Education and a member of the Politburo, instructed CQC members on the criteria 
they were to use to accord promotions.537 The speech concerned two priorities: obtaining 
more qualified scientists for the national economy; and ensuring the highest level of 
535 Based on the CQC decisions published in ĩycie Szkoáy WyĪszej, 14 economists achieved the kand.nauk degree, while no 
dr.nauk have been found. This does not include data for students who took their degrees in the Soviet Union. 
536 Adam Rapacki was the leader of the CQC ex officio as the Minister of Higher Education. He was at that time also a 
member of the Politburo.  
537 AAN/MSzW/2761/ Centralna Komisja Kwalifikacyjna dla Pracownikow Nauki. Informator “Kryteria oceny dzialanoĞci,
dorobku i rozwoju naukowego kadry naukowej.” 1953.  
This source is not a manuscript of the speech, but a version about CQC edited for use in the ‘Informator’. It alternates 
between a synopsis of the speech and direct quotes from it. Although ideological concerns and newspeak could have been 
present in the parts that were cut down, it seems unlikely from the tone of the direct quotes. 
219
qualification. The candidates for promotion had to display both scientific output that satisfied 
the demands of the relevant level, and the ability to increase that output. The only other 
requirements mentioned were honourable pedagogical and moral records. The message was 
packaged in neutral language which contrasted strongly with the recent high tide of 
propaganda and newspeak that had followed Stalin’s death in March, and even contrasted 
with Rapacki’s speech at the conference for academic institution rectors held four weeks 
before.538 There was no mention of ideological motives and no newspeak rhetoric. On the face 
of it, Rapacki was describing a system of traditional reputation control modified only in that 
the final stages of the accreditation would be undertaken at national level. The change was 
justified by the alleged low level of the old doctorate and habilitation degrees: the level and 
prestige of the new kand.nauk and dr.nauk was to be much higher. However, even if Rapacki 
did not say so in this 1953 speech, the message as to what constituted the basic elements of 
good Marxist-Leninist work had been fully communicated to all concerned during the First 
Congress of Science. The more neutral language of Rapacki’s speech was not enough to bring 
about a change of course and it remains an open question whether it was intended or 
understood to try to do so. Futhermore, in this context it is not surprising that the issue of a 
candidate’s party membership was not mentioned in the Section’s discussions until 1956. 
However, discussions in 1956 and thereafter made it clear that the criterion of ‘communist’ 
had always been at the back of the minds of the section members. The ideological neutrality 
of the new central organ for reputation control was nullified by the widespread screening of 
candidates along political criteria, and through the extensive use of an article in the new 
University Law which allowed for exceptions from the formal requirements for promotion. 
As it is not the activities of the CQC as such but their effects on the discipline of economics 
that are the subject of this inquiry, I will concentrate on the work of the four sections of the 
CQC which were devoted to the social sciences.539 Before a candidature for promotion was 
brought under discussion in the Section, it had already made its way through a number of 
stages. The initiative to propose a promotion lay with the collegial academic body, the school 
538 According to BiĔko Polish communist leaders were reluctant to engage in the New Course policy and had to be prodded 
along by their Soviet counterparts. She dates the first signals that some kind of changes on the PUWP’s part were 
contemplated to the 9th Party Plenum held in October 1953.BiĔko, Beata, 1995. "Partia wobec "OdwilĪy". Wyniki kwerendy 
archiwalnej w poszukiwaniu poczatków rewizjonizmu: 1954-1955." Kultura i SpoáeczeĔstwo, 39, 95-106.pp.96-97 Kupiecki 
has analysed the cult of Stalin in Poland and argues that the rhetoric and ritual expressions that made up this cult peaked in 
the spring of 1953. Kupiecki, Robert, 1993. Natchnienie milionów. Kult Stalina w Polsce, 1944-1956. Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwa szkolne i pedagogiczne.p.196 For Rapacki’s speech at the conference for rectors 30.03 – 01.04.1953 see 
Hübner, Piotr, 1992. Polityka naukowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1953. Geneza systemu. Wrocáaw: Ossolineum.p.618 and 
Fijaákowska, Barbara, 1985. Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959). Warszawa: PWN.p.264 
539 Law, history, economics, philology, philosophy, pedagogy, psychology, and art studies. 
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senate, or with the department council. The seemingly important role of the scientific 
practitioners was restricted by the influence of the local party committee, and of the rector. 
The latter, appointed by the Ministry and invested with far-reaching powers, could and in 
some cases did intervene to stop, launch, or moderate the proposal being voted on by the 
school senate.540 A positive decision there moved the case on to the Ministry of Higher 
Education, where once the bureaucrats had examined the case and decided whether the degree 
proposed by the school was justified, it was forwarded to one of the four CQC sections. After 
passing through the discipline sections and the Praesidium, the final decisions were taken in 
CQC Plenum meetings.  
My only source on what the selection of candidates looked like at the level of the Ministry 
comes from an exchange during a discussion on candidates from the Higher Schools of 
Economics (WSE) at a meeting of the CQC Social Science Section in September 1954. There, 
the representative of the Ministry of Higher Education commented on the situation in this 
way:
The schools have sent in 66 applications for scientific titles, out of which we have 
qualified 21 as eligible. The situation is that even if we give at least one person in 
each economic school a scientific title, we will still have problems with 
recruitment. If a school does not have 1-2 docents, then there will be no 
recruitment at all, with the result that we may have to close the schools down. We 
have another 23 applications that came in after the deadline and which have not 
been processed. We might pass 4-5 of them on to the CQC with positive 
recommendations. So, for the over two hundred scientific workers employed in 
economic schools, this will give us about 30 (persons with scientific titles). If we 
add the 12 that are already there, that is forty-odd. That will not even be 20% with 
scientific titles.541
Here, we learn that the Ministry disqualified two thirds of the candidates proposed for 
promotion by the Higher Schools of Economics, established in 1950 on the basis of the old 
Business Colleges (Akademia Handlowa). The new schools were a variable group. Some 
profited from the proximity of economics at local universities, while others were established 
ab initio and without older academic institutions in the vicinity from which they could draw 
experienced staff. Also, all Higher Schools of Economics had experienced an abrupt 
expansion of student numbers after the reforms. This rapid expansion of the numbers of 
institutions and students explains the dramatic lack of well-educated economists, as only 
540 This comes through in the discussions of the CQC Social Science Section.  
541 AAN/MSzW/2781/p.181, CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Spoáecznych 6.09.1954 
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twelve of the 200 scientific employees of the higher schools of economics had the title of 
docent or above. Source material held in the CQC collection does not allow us to conclude 
whether the Ministry’s rejections were motivated by political criteria, or if schools in 
desperate need for docents and professors had put forward candidates who lacked scholarly 
qualifications.  
Having touched on the role of the Ministry of Higher Education in the selection of candidates 
for promotion, we cannot avoid looking in the direction of the CC Science Division. While, 
based on the power distribution between Party and State agencies, we can assume that the CC 
Science Division controlled the work of the CQC, sources illuminating this relationship are 
scarce. Besides traces of a consultation on the composition of the CQC reviewer corps with 
the CC Science Division, I have only found one important piece of evidence: a monthly report 
on the Division for April 1954, which mentions that the officials of the Division had 
completed: “Control of the work of the CQC on the verification of scientific titles and the role 
of the party organisations within it, based mainly on the experience of the Main School of 
Agrarian Economy.”542 This suggests that the candidate’s local party organisation had an 
active role in the reputation control and promotions process, but it does not tell us much more 
than that. How thorough this control was, what corrections the CC Division introduced, and 
what conclusions its officials deduced from their findings, the report does not say. The extent 
and nature of this influence, and of any variations or exceptions, remain unanswered. This 
quote mentions the verification of academic staff titles and positions which was carried out 
locally, in the institutions, under the aegis of the CQC. It could be the reason why it took the 
CQC so long to get started on dealing with the candidates for new titles.  
Faced with the challenge of establishing control over the distribution of scientific titles and 
degrees, the PUWP applied solutions it had already successfully implemented in other areas. 
The first solution was centralisation. Previously, decisions about academic promotions were 
taken in academic institutions, where PUWP representatives were at best represented but were 
not in a position to dominate the process. With the CQC, the PUWP was able to place power 
over these decisions in the hands of a collegium of hand-picked Marxist-Leninist scholars. 
Secondly, as the Party organisation was gradually extended to cover all institutions, the Party 
could also oversee the early local stages of the selection and evaluation of candidates for 
542 AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/178/p.5: “Sprawozdanie z pracy Wydziaáu Nauki KC za miesiac kwiecien.” 21.05.1954 
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promotion at academic institutions through the activity of the local BPO. Centralisation also 
meant that decisions taken at the centre would affect the practice of the academic institutions: 
the choices made by deans and rectors in proposing promotions. The chairman of the CQC 
Social Science Section, Jan Wasilkowski, explained the role of the CQC to his colleagues as 
follows:543
(…) the role of the CQC cannot be reduced to one where it should evaluate and 
assist those seeking a scientific title. Its role is greater, and the CQC should above 
all influence the work at universities and scientific institutions. We do not have any 
other way of influencing the leadership of higher schools. (…) That the leadership 
of a scientific institution should draw a lesson from a given example is far more 
important than the fate of one or other kandydat nauk thesis or the fate of the 
candidate for a title.544
The CQC was provided with a mandate to intervene directly in the institutions by sending out 
inspection teams. Whether the CQC did so, however, remains to be seen. I have not succeeded 
in finding anything on the CQC inspection teams, no details on what exactly they were to 
examine or even whether they were ever sent out to the institutions in question. The only 
source available on them consists of lists of names and institutions that were to be covered by 
the inspectors.545
The legitimacy of the CQC depended on its composition, since the accumulated scientific 
authority of the body conferring a degree or title reflects on the prestige of the titles it confers. 
In the first years of the CQC’s activity, the dilemma of choosing scholars whom the PUWP 
trusted to watch over the ideological purity of the field, and who were also respected by the 
majority of scholars, was solved in exactly the same way as during the Congress of Science. 
After 1956, the situation would change considerably, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
543 Wasilkowski Jan (1898-1977), legal scholar. Professor at Warsaw University from 1937, rector 1950-1952. Member of 
PAN from 1952. 1948-1950 judge. 1956-1967 First President of Highest Court. Co-creator of the legal system of the 
People’s Republic, leader of the Codification Commission which prepared the codes passed in the 1960s. Wielka 
Interaktywna Encyklopedia Multimedialna http://wiem.onet.pl/wiem/00f88d.html accessed 27.02.03 
544 AAN/MSzW/2782/ CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Spolecznych 20.12.54. p.331  
545 AAN/MSzW/2781 Wykaz zespoáów wizytacyjnych CKK, pp.41-44 
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Table 8: Economists in the CQC Social Science Section 1953-1960.546
  1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Lange, Oskar       
Brus, Wáodzimierz       
Zawadzki, Józef   
LipiĔski, Edward     
Brzoza, Anatol     
Drewnowski, Jan     
àychowski, Tadeusz     
Secomski, Kazimierz    
Waszak, Stanisáaw     
In fact the solution was identical, as the two economists who came into the section for social 
sciences, Oskar Lange and Wáodzimierz Brus, were the same pair who had been trusted with 
the most prominent positions during the Congress of Science.547 Józef Zawadzki joined the 
team in 1954, after he himself had received a professorial title from the CQC. Among these 
three, only Lange had a list of academic merits which could command the respect of non-
Marxist economists.548 Brus, at only 33, was by far the youngest member of the Section. In 
1954 the ages of the other section members ranged from 44 to 67, with a majority being well 
into their fifties. While Lange was very often absent, and rather passive when present, it 
seems Brus gradually built up sufficient confidence and competence to make his judgements 
accepted in the discussions of the Section. 
The decisions were taken by majority vote, but the majority of the Social Science Section 
were not economists. The problem this presented for any given discipline was voiced by a 
member of the CQC Technology Section, J.L. Jakubowski, in his letter of resignation in 1956: 
546 Data for the table found in AAN/MWS/2780a 
547 Decisions about the composition of the CQC were discussed by the Ministry of Higher Education and the Central 
Committee Science Division, and formally approved by the President. 
548 Oskar Lange’s reputation had been established in the USA, as no Polish university in the interwar years, save the private 
and leftist Wszechnica, had offered him a job, despite his undisputed qualifications. It has been argued that this was because 
of his leftist orientation. However, the general lack of positions and the ensuing standstill of an entire generation of young 
academics, should also be taken into account. 
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 (…) to my mind the qualification system adopted by the Sections is not right. The 
qualification ought to be based on a detailed evaluation conducted by 
professionals in a given branch of science, who know perfectly the qualifications of 
the candidate. At present this is not the case, and when they vote in the Section, the 
majority of voters does not know about the scientific output under discussion and 
are not competent to judge it. This has led to a large disparity in the decisions, 
something that has been extremely critically received out in the field.549
In the Social Science Section, sociologist Józef ChaáasiĔski, an eternal dissenter, raised this 
problem on more than one occasion, protesting that his vote had to be based solely on the 
opinion of the person presenting the case in the section.550 The structure and practice of the 
discipline sections in the CQC combined to concentrate the effective power to shape decisions 
in the hands of a few representatives of economics in the discipline section.  
549 AAN/MSzW/2780a/p.406/05.11.1956/ Letter of resignation from the CQC of Prof.Dr.inz.J.L. Jakubowski, member of the 
Technical Sciences Section. 
550 AAN/MSzW/2782 CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Spolecznych 16.10.1954, p.20 
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Table 9: Composition of the CQC Section of Social Sciences 1953-1955. 551
Entry year Name Discipline 
1953 Brus, Wáodzimierz Economics 
 Lange, Oskar Economics 
 Arnold, Stanisáaw History 
àowmiaĔski, Henryk History 
 Majewski, Kazimierz History 
 Manteuffel, Tadeusz History 
 Wyka, Kazimierz History of literature 
ĝliwiĔski, Stanisáaw Law 
 Wasilkowski, Jan Law 
 ChaáasiĔski, Józef Sociology 
1954 Zawadzki, Józef Economics 
 JabáoĔski, Henryk History 
 Stefan Kieniewicz History 
 Kula, Witold History 
 BiliĔski, Bronisáaw Language and literature 
 Klemensiewicz, Zenon Language and literature 
 Stieber, Zdzisáaw Language and literature 
 Strelcyn, Stefan Language and literature 
1955 LeĞnodorski, Bogdan History 
 Budzyk, Kazimierz Language and literature 
 Burda, Andrzej Law 
 Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz Philosophy 
 Frizhand, Marek Philosophy 
The Social Science Section was dominated by historians from the outset. Through gradual 
extensions, literature and language-related disciplines became the second biggest group, 
pushing law and economics aside. In 1953, when the Social Science section was first put 
together, it consisted of only ten scholars. However, from 1953 onwards, the Section grew 
steadily every year, reaching 23 members in 1955.552 Only three of the 23 were economists. 
Frequently, only one of the economists was present at a meeting, meaning that the procedure 
of voting by majority gave non-economists the deciding voice. In most cases the opinion of 
the person presenting the case was not challenged or questioned, and the majority of the other 
551AAN/MSzW/2780A/pp.173-174 
552 AAN/MSzW/2780A/pp.173-174  
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section members seldom voiced any opinions on the merit of the cases presented. There was a 
grey zone, however, as representatives of neighbouring disciplines, who felt at least partially 
qualified to evaluate the work submitted, could influence the decisions concerning economics. 
Discussion records reveal that legal scholars and historians in particular (Arnold and Kula 
were economic historians) took an active part in the discussion of candidates from economics. 
Notably, in the first period of the CQC’s activity (1954-1956), the chairman of the section, the 
legal scholar Wasilkowski, often took an active part in the evaluation of the economists 
presented for promotion. I believe his activity reflected the influence of the Praesidium on the 
work of the Section, as well as Wasilkowski’s experience in the Law Faculty of Warsaw 
University, where he had taken part in the evaluation of the work of economists.  
In many cases, a candidature appeared on the Section’s agenda several times. The Section 
often decided that they wanted another reviewer to look at the matter, or needed to consult the 
Praesidium, or simply had no more time for discussion. By adding up the times that 
economists’ cases were on the agenda, I have arrived at a total of 290 occasions between 1954 
and 1960. In 261 of these I have information on the name of the person presenting the case, 
and on the basis of this data, presented in Table 10, we can form some impressions of who 
was setting the tone of the discussion. 
Table 10: Economists presenting cases before the CQC Social Science Section 553
Year Lange Brus Zawadzki Brzoza Drewnowski Secomski LipiĔski Waszak 
1954 12 14 1           
1955   20 1       
1956   23 8   2    
1957   10 16 5 8 17 1 12 
1958   1  2 10 7 1 14 
1959    4 5  7 5 3 
1960    2   4    
Total 12 68 32 12 18 37 7 29 
In the first half of the period we can note the dominant position of Brus, and the 
disappearance of Lange, who after 1954 was either abroad or busy elsewhere. Occasionally 
CQC reviewers were invited to present the candidates they had reviewed at the Section 
553 Based on data compiled from stenographic reports and minutes of Social Science Section meetings held in AAN, MSzW 
collection 
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meetings. Both Brus and Secomski presented cases at Section meetings at times when they 
were not members, but in fact the presentation of nominees by non-members happened 
relatively seldom.554 A major shift in the composition occurred after the crisis of 1956, when 
both Lange and Brus resigned, and six new economists were elected into the Section. In the 
second era of the CQC’s existence the distribution was much more even, and the presence of 
several economists had the effect of making less decisive the views of both the person 
presenting the case and of the representatives of other disciplines. 
Reviewers 
There was nothing in the publicised structure of the CQC which made it obvious that the 
traditional channels of evaluation would no longer form the basis of decisions. Indeed the 
establishment of the CQC did not in itself affect the established channels for reviewing. 
Despite the fact that the opinion of the Party organisation and the Ministry on the political 
suitability of the candidate was important, the reviews of the scholarly output of the candidate 
would continue to be the core of the application. As they sat down to evaluate the 
candidatures, the members of the Section had in their folders not only the opinions of 
reviewers appointed by the academic institution, but also the opinion of an expert appointed 
by the CQC. In the first period (1954-55) this latter was given absolute priority. Other reviews 
were usually dismissed as unreliable and ‘polite’ (grzecznoĞciowe), an expression which 
implied that they contained flaws caused by local loyalties bordering on corruption and 
nepotism. In the Social Science Section discussions, the opinions of the CQC experts were 
presented as being reliably objective, because of their non-participation in these ‘corrupt’ 
networks. In the first years, outbursts against ‘polite’ reviews were the speciality of the 
section leader, Jan Wasilkowski.  
Wasilkowski (Leader): (…) we often have totally incredible and opportunistic 
university professors, who qualify works that are absolutely worthless, politically 
damaging and wrong. They present candidates - even for assistant professorships - 
who do not deserve any scientific title. This especially comes through at the 
Praesidium. We do not conceive the role of the CQC as a factory of scientific titles 
and scientific degrees, but as a certain institution that has an influence on the level 
of work at the universities and other higher schools and scientific institutions.555
554 Between 1954 and 1960, 14 case discussions were presented by economists who were not members of the Section. B. 
Minc and M .Oráowski were the only ones to appear several times. 
555 AAN/MSzW/2782/ 20.12.54/p.332 
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It is clear that the creators and leaders of the CQC did not trust academics to be sufficiently 
critical of each other, and it was no doubt possible to find examples where mutual interests 
caused reviews to be biased. Wasilkowski, for instance, repeatedly denounced the fact that 
two people presenting themselves for a promotion could review each other. However, 
regardless of the sincerity of the accusers and of whether the critique was justified, there is no 
doubt that this argument was used to legitimise the usurpation of power over academic 
promotions by the CQC.  
How did Marxist-Leninist scholars plan to avoid the problem of ‘polite’ reviews themselves? 
They claimed that the Marxist spirit of criticism would purify the discipline. In December 
1954, when discussing the kand.nauk degree of a graduate of the CC Institute for Training 
Scientific Cadres,556 Brus argued that ‘polite reviews’ were not given in the CC Institute for 
Training Scientific Cadres, because a critical spirit prevailed there.557 Given a ready supply of 
truly Marxist, revolutionary spirit there could by definition be no problems. The background 
for Brus’ assertion that the problem of “polite reviews” did not exist at the ITSC was 
Wasilkowski’s irritation with a kand.nauk thesis from that institution which, he claimed, was 
the seventh thesis from the ITSC of which he disapproved. Among other aspects, he criticised 
the work for using propaganda rhetoric, which he thought inappropriate in a scholarly work. 
Clearly, lecturers at the CC Institute for Training Scientific Cadres, and the scholars present in 
the CQC Social Science Section, differed on what were the attributes of a good Marxist-
Leninist thesis. Wasilkowski’s statements later in the same discussion show that the CQC 
used its power to reprimand the CC Institute for Training Scientific Cadres for the excessively 
political and propagandist style of their students. The demand for a combination of a high 
level of scientific quality with political appropriateness caused difficulties to a Party which 
already struggled with a severe deficiency of academically-accredited party members. 
Subsequent developments would show which of the following would prevail: the need for 
large numbers of Marxist-Leninist scholars with academic titles, or the need to ensure the 
prestige of the titles and degrees handed out by the CQC by promoting only truly gifted and 
productive Marxist-Leninist scholars. 
The success of the CQC in establishing a new reputation system depended on the ability to 
muster expert opinions, based not only on sound scholarly knowledge, but also on the new 
556 The Institute for Training Scientific Cadres had by that time changed its name to the Institute for Social Sciences, but had 
undergone no major changes and was still attached to the Party Central Committee. I shall continue to refer to it as the ITSC. 
557 AAN/MSzW/2782 CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Spoáecznych, p.332 
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political guidelines. The list of proposed reviewers who were to provide the Social Science 
Section with opinions on candidates for promotion provides us with an overview of the new 
dominant Marxist-Leninist group in economics. The new judges of the quality and relevance 
of research in political economy were: Maksymillian Pohorille, Józef Zawadzki, Maria 
Dziewicka, Zenon Tomaszewski, Józef Okuniewski, Bronisáaw Oyrzanowski, Zygmunt 
Narski, and Jan MujĪel.558 With the exception of statistics, where long-standing authorities 
were represented, and the presence of a small contingent from the ‘old’ Main School staff,559
the list mostly consists of people who had no history of publishing in Ekonomista, and had not 
held any academic positions prior to 1949. Only four of 37 reviewers in economics were 
professors, (two of them were the statisticians), and several on the list had no higher degree 
than Master (mgr.).  
CQC reviewers were not necessarily Party members, but had been cleared by the PUWP. 
Local Party cells (BPO) and the CC Science Division continually evaluated the political and 
ideological standing of ‘scientific workers’, and in December 1952 an internal report by the 
CC Science Section commented on the progress of lecturers in political economy who had 
recently attended a study conference. Three of the proposed CQC reviewers, Okuniewski, 
MujĪel, and Oyrzanowski, were lauded for showing great progress and promise, but others 
were criticised for ‘falling behind’.560 Since the final preparations for the launch of the CQC 
were taking place at approximately the same time, there is reason to assume that there was a 
relationship between this positive rating and the inclusion of their names on the list of 
candidates for CQC reviewers. 
Decision-making 
When the CQC finally commenced work in 1954, many applications had been kept waiting 
for some time. In the first batch of candidates, there is no record of any discussion:561 the 
candidatures of deputy professors M. Pohorille and J. Zawadzki, both directors of chairs of 
political economy, and of J. Tepicht, the head of the Institute of Agrarian Research, were 
considered to be uncontroversial, and all three became assistant professors in March 1954. 
558 AAN/MSzW/2781/pp.21-25 Lista kandydatów na rzeczoznawcow Sekcji Nauk Spolecznych Centralnej Komisji 
Kwalifikacjyjnej. 
559 AAN/MSzW/2781/pp.21-25. The Main School vetarans were Grodek, KoĨmiĔski, Secomski, and Rączkowski.
560 AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/4 /pp.38-42 “Sprawozdanie Wydziaáu Nauki za okres od 1. do 10.XII.1952 r.” by Z.Zemankowa 
561 AAN/MSzW/2781 The only documentation on the 20.03.1954 plenum meeting is a list of names and titles accorded with 
the information that the stenographic report is missing. p.46 
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The section then went to work on the less obvious cases, and the first gush of appointments 
slowed to a trickle. On numerous occasions decisions over the case put forward to the section 
was postponed, as the members of the Section found it impossible to make up their minds on 
the basis of the material presented. In some cases they considered the question of the absence 
of documentation to be crucial, while in other instances the Section member presenting the 
case disagreed with the reviewers of the candidate, and the case was sent back with a request 
for further reviews. Thus the total number of cases treated in 1954, including repeated 
treatments of the same candidate, amounted to 59, but only 20 final decisions were made. 
After 1954, the postponements decreased, but some cases still dragged on over several years.
Table 11: Degrees and titles awarded to economists by the CQC in its first three years.562
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
1954
1955
1956
full prof. 1
asst. prof. 9 8 5
kand.nauk 1 6 7
docent 10 16 15
1954 1955 1956
Table 11 shows the final decisions on the awarding of titles and degrees to economists as 
approved by the Praesidium and made public. The pre-eminence of the docent title and the 
slow progression of the kand. nauk calls for an explanation, since the PUWP had abolished 
the former with the 1951 law, and introduced the Aspirantura programmes, which were to 
produce kand. nauk degrees instead of doctorates and doctor nauk degrees instead of docent 
titles. Economists, along with economic engineers, were granted extra time, in the form of a 
later deadline for the presentation of old-style doctorates for a habilitation. 
The aim of the flexible transition from the old doctorate-docent system to kand.nauk-dr.nauk
was to increase the number of economists with docent titles and thus hasten the creation of 
professorships. The deadline for the submission of docent applications based on doctoral 
theses of the old type was set for June 1956, with the result that docents were continually 
562 Based on official communiqués of the CQC published in ĩycie Szkoáy WyĪszej.
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appointed in economics throughout the stalinist years. Since the first kand.nauk was defended 
in 1954, there was hardly any time for the emergence of candidates for the new doktor nauk
before the advent of the Thaw, when the old degrees were re-introduced. As a result, only two 
economists were ever awarded the doktor nauk degree in Poland.563 We may also note that 
only one full professorship was ever granted, but only well after the onset of the Thaw.564
To understand the effects of the CQC’s work we need to address the extensive practice of 
evading the criteria for the award of scientific titles and degrees, which the CQC had 
supposedly been created to prevent. In fact, exceptions from the newly-established standards 
and requirements soon became the rule, and were used to promote politically desirable 
candidates who lacked scientific achievements.  
The 1951 Law on Higher Education and Researchers had made way for exceptions to the 
standard requirements for the titles of docent and professor.565 Among the promotions decreed 
in the period 1954-1956, a total of 31% were made with reference to Article 49/3, which 
allowed that in some cases the scientific output requirement could be omitted. For decisions 
taken in 1954, the share of exceptions was as high as 44%. These figures would be even 
higher if kand.nauk degrees, to which Article 49/3 did not apply, were excluded. The 1955 
discussion on whether or not to accord the title of assistant professor to the rector of the 
Kraków Higher School of Agriculture (WSR) may serve as an illustration here. 566  This 
discussion took place at a time when the consequences of giving priority to political merit 
over scholarly qualifications were already making themselves felt. Even the CQC’s own 
reviewers had agreed that rector Kubica’s scientific output did not qualify him even for a 
docent title, far less for an assistant professor title.567 Brus objected that this was not a case 
where the use of Article 49/3 was appropriate, and stated that, considering what was known 
about the candidate’s scientific output, an assistant professorship was too much. The 
representative of the Ministry, however, insisted on an assistant professorship using Article 
49/3:
563 Information based on the official lists of degrees awarded by the CQC. Both these degrees were awarded after 1955. 
564 It was awarded to Kalecki, who then returned to work in Poland. 
565 Article 49§3 in the Univeristy Law of 1951. After the revision of the Law in 1956 it was known as article 56§3. 
566 The Higher School of Agriculture was created in 1953 on the basis of the Department of Agriculture and the Department 
of Forestry of the Jagiellon University. http://www.ar.krakow.pl/arkr/info/historia_50_lat.htm accessed 14.05.2007 
Dr. Józef Kubica (1906-?) AAN/MSWiN/katalog I have not accessed the personal folder the catalogue entry refers to. 
567 Please note that the objective merits of the candidate in question cannot be established on the basis of the information in 
the discussions and documents quoted here. The CQC reviewers might have disregarded any of the candidate’s scientific 
production that was more than three years old or politically questionable. Their assessment was geared towards ‘good 
Marxist-Leninist science’ not ‘good science’. 
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Director Bobrowski: The scientific output of Rector Kubica has been evaluated 
differently by different scholars. I would not like to go into details here as to 
whether this output is [enough] for an assistant professor or not. In any case, 
considering his job, his position as rector, we as the Ministry would beg that the 
Central Qualification Commission should accord him the scientific title of assistant 
professor using article 49 paragraph 3. Considering his very good leadership of 
the school, and his achievements in getting the school to an appropriate level, 
something that is not too easy in the Kraków milieu – because of that we would ask 
that Dr. Kubica be accorded the title of assistant professor based on article 49, 
point 3. For us, his organisational successes and his merits as a good cadre 
[zasáugi kadrowe] are important.568(…) 
Professor Brus: I still oppose this kind of method. I suppose that a positive 
proposal for the scientific title of docent would also need to include his cadre and 
organisational merits. (…) We have already had cases where rectors have been 
positively evaluated, but have not been given any titles, because there was not any 
foundation for that.569
The exchange between Brus and Bobrowski continued in the same vein, while Wasilkowski 
intervened to point out that according to the 1951 law, one did not need a professorial title in 
order to hold the position of rector. Subsequently, he and Brus agreed that the matter should 
be sent on to another reviewer. The representative of the Ministry was not satisfied by this and 
made a final effort of persuasion, thus provoking other members of the Section to intervene. 
Director Bobrowski: We do realise that Dr. Kubica does not have the scientific 
basis for assistant professor. However we also realise that due to the conditions in 
which the school finds itself (because of the situation of the school in Kraków, 
where the school is not treated as a being on an academic level), in the Kraków 
milieu there is an especial problem with scientific titles, and besides, there is the 
issue of getting this school to a certain level, especially since it is evolving in a 
good direction. 570
568 AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37 
569 AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37  
570 AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37  
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Professor Kula: I cannot take a stand in this matter, but I am disturbed by the 
argument. What emerges is a vicious circle, the source of which originates in the 
understanding of a certain hierarchy found within the Ministry, because there are 
cases where someone is a very good rector and so one wants to make him into a 
scholar. The supplementary arguments from the school’s point of view, which I 
heard a moment ago, appear to me to be counter-arguments, as the way to raising 
the authority of the school in the Kraków milieu is not though honour-giving. This 
method of acquiring authority for the school - by according a scientific title based 
on the opinion of the Ministry - does not to appear advisable to me.571
After this discussion no one voted to award Kubica the title of assistant professor. The case 
was sent on to the Praesidium with a unanimous decision that a docent title was the highest 
title appropriate, even based on Article 49/3. However, the case then took on a different 
direction. The Praesidium must have overruled the Section, because twelve days later the 
Plenum approved an assistant professor’s title based on Article 49/3. This case remains the 
most flagrant example of the Praesidium over-riding the section’s decision that I have found. 
It should serve as a reminder of the limits of CQC power. 
The Kubica discussion also reveals that while there had been no controversies in the Section 
at the beginning of CQC activities, by early 1955 a fault line had appeared between the 
Ministry and the Praesidium on one side, and the scholars in the Social Science Section of the 
CQC on the other. They differed on the question of precedence between merit-based and 
political criteria for promotion. Furthermore, as Kula’s discussion with the representative of 
the Ministry showed, there was no agreement on what course to pursue in order to remedy the 
low proportion of professors loyal to the Party. The Ministry’s strategy was aimed at ensuring 
that the individuals who had been placed in influential academic positions with political 
backing had titles corresponding to their level of power. This strategy was considered by 
members of the Section to be ill-conceived. The latter were aware of the futility of imposing 
political will within the merit-based regime prevalent in professional and academic life. It is 
also noteworthy that the ‘old’ academic community in Kraków continued to make itself heard. 
Ministry officials were not only aware of its opinions, but acted on the assumption that it was 
a force to be reckoned with.  
The PUWP strategy for domination over social sciences pre-supposed that the Marxist-
Leninist scholars introduced into academic positions with political backing would, with the 
571 AAN/MSzW/2783/17.01.1955/pp.33-37  
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Party’s help, educate a new generation of Marxist-Leninist scholars combining political and 
academic credentials. The CQC was thus dealing with two different sets of candidates: the 
‘older’ cadres who were already in influential academic positions but who needed a matching 
title, and the ‘young’, who were supposed to acquire excellent political and scholarly 
qualifications during the Aspirantura leading to a kand.nauk degree. The necessity of 
differential treatment of the generations was discussed in November 1954: 
Leader [Wasilkowski –AWH]: We must separate the old and the new cadres 
strictly. We treat the old cadres mildly: if someone works as a scientific worker for 
a number of years, if he has a doctoral degree and has something on the level of a 
kandydat thesis in his work, then we unconditionally accord a docent title, because 
we have an inverted chronology: first he was an autonomous worker, and only then 
did he achieve something …[that could be considered to be of scientific merit – 
AWH]” 572
The young scholars, on the other hand, were expected to go in for a kand. nauk degree, even if 
they had already started their work on a doctoral thesis. Those from the middle generation, 
referred to as ‘stare kadry’, already held positions in academia. Some of them were able to 
produce a piece of work that qualified them for a promotion, but in many cases the candidates 
had no new work that could be considered equivalent to a kandydat thesis. It was primarily for 
them that Article 49/3 had been set up and employed.  
The extensive use of exceptions was established through practice, and evolved through 
precedents. It was thus not entirely comprehensible even to those handling it. I shall take the 
liberty of presenting several extensive passages from the CQC stenographic report of a 
meeting on 22nd October 1955, as it demonstrates the tone of discussion in the Section, the 
strong clashes of opinion, and the lack of consensus on what were the fundamental problems 
of the CQC: 
572 AAN/MSzW/2782/13.11.1954/p.180/Discussion of a title for Dr. M. Frank   
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Professor Brus: (…) I would like to say something that I have brought up a number 
of times, and which in the case of the economists still awaits a solution. Firstly, 
there is the matter of Article 49. Here we have a total confusion of concepts. For 
example, Professor Minc states in one of the propositions that the author does not 
have any work corresponding to a kandydat thesis, so he asks the CQC to use 
Article 49, which states that it is possible to accord an academic title to a person 
who does not have the formally required degree, but has a certain amount of 
scientific output. That is clear. But here the situation is the opposite, the person 
has different degrees, only he has no scientific output, and on this basis one wants 
to use Article 49. I would like to declare that I will give a negative opinion of all 
propositions of this kind, because I believe that this is a total confusion of 
concepts; that when a person does not have any scientific output one begins to 
apply an interpretation that is totally in opposition to the spirit of the law.573
It is revealing of the lack of clarity of CQC work that after nearly two years of activity, and 
after numerous meetings in which candidates had been discussed, it was still necessary for the 
chairman of the Section to present an explanation of how the Praesidium had decided to 
interpret the law. This tells us something about the prevalent uncertainty about norms and 
standards. 
Leader[Wasilkowski –AWH]: A short explanation. This matter has been discussed 
on a number of occasions in the Praesidium and the Plenum, and three ways of 
applying Article 49 have been laid down. Firstly, there is the classic case, 
mentioned by Professor Brus, of this basic case when someone does not have the 
academic degree, but has produced some works. Then we take into account only 
one work on the kandydat level. Second case: someone has a degree, but does not 
have a single work that answers the requirements. Then we take the totality as a 
basis, or we can treat several works as a substitute for a kandydat thesis. In that 
case there can be either a master’s or a doctoral degree – that is of no 
consequence.
Finally, the third eventuality, when someone does not possess a great scientific 
output, but has very considerable organisational merits in the sphere of scientific 
research. Here, most often, one takes into account older professors who could not 
demonstrate such output, especially over the last few years, but who have great 
organisational merits. This is in abbreviation the point r/ - for retired, because it is 
most often applied to elderly persons. We have solved this problem in these three 
ways. That there are excesses is clear. 574
573 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
574 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
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Professor ĝliwiĔski: This has been troubling me for some time too. Everyone 
passes through Article 49. In my opinion, basically for Article 49 Law 1 (sic!) a 
candidate must have the scientific and moral qualifications, and the results of 
scientific work. It appears to me that if someone has no scientific qualifications, 
and has no work to show for himself, then organisational merits cannot suffice on 
their own. That is what the law says. Then, there are the directives of the CQC, 
which is not the same thing, because they are only directions, advice, therefore 
they can in some cases be disregarded. For example, when there is no kandydat 
thesis in the three year period, but he can show us a number of older works, 
smaller ones, and he has scientific qualifications. (...)575
Professor ĝliwiĔski treats us to a legal scholar’s take on the issue. It is interesting that he 
points out the difference between the law and the internal directives of the CQC. It is clear 
that the latter, with its rule insisting on the presentation of a thesis-sized work completed 
within the previous three years, introduced discrimination against candidates who had done 
their research before the Party ‘offensive’ in academic institutions. At the meeting, this 
intervention was followed with one by Brus, who continued his criticism by pointing out the 
consequences of the current practice. 
Professor Brus: I would like to direct attention to the following circumstance: we 
have lately had to deal with the applications of graduates [magistrów] among the 
economists. That is an interesting phenomenon. The result of our policy is that the 
aim of making people pass the kandydat nauk degree has been reduced to a 
minimum. All these three cases [that he is presenting at this meeting – AWH] 
concern graduates, people who have very dubious scientific output, with a master 
degree, without a doctorate, without passing the kandydat nauk. This is happening 
on a mass scale.576
In practice the CQC had created a short-cut to both docent and professorial titles for 
candidates who could muster the support of the Party organisation. It is important to note that 
the Party had on the one hand invested in the establishment of a new research training 
programme, the Aspirantura, and on the other made it possible for students to avoid it 
altogether. The low figures for the total production of kand.nauk degrees ceases to surprise in 
the light of this information. Wasilkowski’s defence is singularly schizophrenic. While 
agreeing with both ĝliwiĔski’s and Brus’s criticisms, he tried at same time to uphold the 
Praesidium’s interpretation of the law. 
575 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
576 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
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Chairman: I just wanted to add that I agree with what Professor ĝliwiĔski has been 
saying, that organisational merits alone cannot be taken into account, because that 
would lead to the distortion of the academic titles. But the thing is, sometimes the 
scientific output is small or non-existent, but there are organisational merits. This 
concerns people with merit, who have lengthy work experience. Professor Brus’s 
remarks are right, we need to clarify our position, in case we bring about a 
situation where the docent title will not give scientific competence.577
Professor Brus: I understand the matter in this way: that if there is a doctorate of 
the old type then we apply the normal scientific requirements. And if there is a 
magister then we should apply especially high demands, but here we have the 
opposite situation.578
Professor Budzyk: It appears to me that our “quarrel” is very much to the point 
and very timely, because I see that in the wider field a marked devaluation of 
degrees and titles has taken place. These are alarming matters, on which there is 
on purpose often no talk in public. If the problem of a marked sharpening of 
demands could have been raised…..579
Professor Brus: (…) Basically, the allocation of academic titles through the 
exception procedure is coming to an end, because there are no new proposals, with 
the exception of the pedagogues, who are coming in. 
Professor BiliĔski: It is not ending. But the deputy professors [z-ca prof. – AWH] 
do not concern us. 
Professor Budzyk: That is not so. I am convinced that the fact that the title of 
deputy professor has been devalued is a result of our work, and that we have 
brought about a devaluation of degrees and titles. Our actions have been too 
unclear and liberal and reflect on this matter. (…)580
The exposition on the three different cases where the use of Article 49/3 was considered to be 
correct by the Praesidium was not received without objections. The members of the Section 
feared the consequences of exceptions: the devaluation of degrees. No efficient solutions to 
the problem were presented, as the Chairman accepted the critique but ultimately pleaded to 
continue the practice of making exceptions. The hope expressed by Brus in his last quote, that 
candidatures demanding the use of Article 49/3 were about to end, as they were part of the 
577 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
578 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
579 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
580 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
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transitional revolutionary measures which would soon be over, was not shared by his elder 
colleagues.
As early as during the first year of fully-fledged CQC activities, the end of the revolutionary 
transition was expected to be imminent. 
Wasilkowski (Leader): (…) From what Professor JabáoĔski has been saying, it 
appears that this work is incomplete. It lacks any use of archival materials. Some 
things have been omitted. We say that the political line is correct. But it would be 
completely absurd and probably practically impossible if the political line of a 
kandydat thesis from the Institute of Social Sciences, which is an adjunct of the 
Central Committee, should be represent an incorrect  political line. As has been 
said by Professor ĩóákiewski, the problem is that works that are politically correct 
do not have the appropriate scientific level. I do not believe that one should 
prolong this period, the period in which if a work were politically correct, then we 
would have to avert our eyes from the scientific aspect. That stage was necessary, 
but it is has passed. There is the very important matter of not applying the criteria 
for a certain stage at a later stage.581
Even for Wasilkowski, who had argued for the importance of an instrumental approach to 
promotions and to awarding titles, there was a ‘normality’ to return to. The Kubica case and 
the reference to the ‘present stage’ in the quote above show that CQC members did not 
necessarily consider the practice of exceptions and political promotions to be something 
acceptable in the long term. Despite the fact that in 1954 there were already voices claiming 
that the period where special arrangements were necessary for reforming Academia was over, 
article 49/3 continued to be used extensively to circumvent the requirement of scientific 
output. At the same time, the great hopes invested in the potentially cathartic effect of the 
introduction of Marxism-Leninism into academia did not last very long. PUWP science policy 
officials and scholars had pinned their hopes on a revolutionary ethos, which was expected to 
cleanse the review system of unhealthy networks of loyalties and of the influence of 
established scholars. We may recall Wasilkowski’s rage against ‘polite’ reviews and the 
expectation that the un-corrupted marxist reviewers of the CQC would do better. Here follows 
another excerpt from the discussion in October 1955: 
Professor Brus: And another thing. There is a view that not only can one not rely 
on the reviews from the schools, but also to a certain degree one cannot rely on the 
reviews sent in by our specialists. More and more often they take on a polite 
character. (…) These occurrences are daily. 
581 AAN/MSzW/2782/p.321/20.12.1954/ Discussion of kand.nauk degree in history for M.Turlejska. 
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Voice: I too have a case like that. 
Leader [Wasilkowski- AWH]: Me too.582
The problems caused by the extensive use of Article 49 Point 3 for the promotion of 
‘politically correct’ candidates did not recede. Rather, as we shall see in the last chapter, from 
1956 onwards the entanglements increased.  
Leniency for candidates who had the favour of the Party was coupled with the meticulous 
observation of all formal requirements in the cases of candidates who were not deemed to be 
politically desirable. Firstly, in order to be eligible for a promotion to docent or professor, the 
candidate had to be an already-accepted cog in the academic system, which meant 
successfully passing the ‘verification’. The lack of a job meant no promotion. In order to 
qualify for promotion to docent or assistant professorship a candidate had to present a 
politically-acceptable work ‘of a quality comparable to a kand. nauk thesis’. A Three Year 
Rule also applied to the evaluation of the scientific output of the candidate, by which all older 
works were excluded. 583 This meant that in 1953/54, when the CQC was starting work, 
candidates were only rewarded for work submitted since 1949. This exclusion of earlier 
works was the instrument used in the rejection of candidates with ‘bourgeois’ attitudes. The 
formal procedure also prevented people with docent titles but without a kand.nauk on their 
CV from proceeding to an assistant professor’s post. 584  As for doctoral degrees, the 
candidates for kand. nauk went through a thorough political screening before admittance to 
the aspirantura programme. 
A closer study of candidates whose formal qualifications were in order, but whose careers 
were restricted by the CQC, is possible in the case of the Kraków economists whose 
candidatures were presented to the CQC in 1954.585
582 AAN/MSzW/2784/ 20.10.55/pp.226-229 
583 AAN/MSzW/2782/ CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Spoáecznych 16.10.1954/ p. 181 
584 AAN/MSzW/2780a/p.406/05.11.1956/ Letter of resignation from the CQC of Prof.dr. inz. J. L. Jakubowski, member of 
the Technical Sciences Section.  
585 Stefan Bolland (b.1910), Wiktor Boniecki (b.1918), Eugeniusz Garbacik (b.1913), Bronisáaw Oyrzanowski (b.1913) 
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Table 12: The procedure of the application of Kraków economists in the CQC: 
 Year Proposed title Title awarded 
Bolland, Stefan 1954 Asst. Prof. Case postponed 
 1954 Asst. Prof. Docent 
  1957 Asst. Prof. Asst. Prof. 
Garbacik, Eugeniusz 1954 Asst. Prof. Case postponed 
 1954 Docent Docent 
  1957 Asst. Prof. Asst. Prof. 
Oyrzanowski, Bronisáaw 1954 Docent Case postponed 
 1954 Docent Docent (art.49/3) 
  1957 Asst. Prof. Asst. Prof. 
Boniecki, Wiktor 1954 Docent Case postponed 
 1954 Docent Case postponed 
 1954 Docent Case postponed 
 1956 Docent Case postponed 
 1957 Docent Docent 
These four, Bolland, Garbacik, Boniecki, and Oyrzanowski, were among the 21 applicants 
from a higher economic school which had not raised the objections of the Ministry. All 
belonged to the Kraków school of economics, and before the war had been considered to be 
among the most promising young economists there. The fact that the Rockefeller Foundation 
had awarded Garbacik a fellowship in 1947 (which he was not free to accept) shows that he 
was a capable and promising economist by Rockefeller standards. Following the abolition of 
economics at the university, their base was the Kraków Higher School of Economics. In the 
opinion of their institution and the Ministry, Bolland and Garbacik were qualified for an 
assistant professor title, and Oyrzanowski and Boniecki for docent. Table 12 shows the date 
when the case of each candidate appeared on the agenda of the Social Science Section of the 
CQC. In 1954, when their candidatures were first presented, the Section postponed all 
decisions. At the next meeting both Bolland and Garbacik’s applications were reduced by the 
Section from assistant professorships, and they were only granted docent titles. The treatment 
of the two candidates for docents diverged, as Oyrzanowski did receive his title and Boniecki 
did not. The explanation behind the difference probably lies in the fact that Oyrzanowski had 
received a positive evaluation from the CC Science Division for his lectures in political 
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economy, and had been appointed as CQC reviewer. Even so, he was not passed through the 
normal procedures but through the exception, Article 49/3, suggesting that his submitted work 
had been dismissed, and that only Party patronage had saved his case. Boniecki apparently 
lacked backing in the PUWP, and in addition the CQC’s appointed expert, Mirosáaw
Oráowski, had written a highly critical evaluation of his work: 
This work is typical of bourgeois economics; it is weighed down by bourgeois 
habits. It is characterised by cosmopolitanism, formalism. (…) The approach is 
idealistic. The author of this central work, for which he received his doctoral 
degree, looks at these phenomena using the categories of bourgeois and even 
reactionary economics such as found in KrzyĪanowski, Rybarski, etc.586
The reviews were seldom quoted in the discussions, since the participants had them on paper, 
but based on what is accessible, it seems this sample was a supreme version of how many 
ideological buzz-words could be fitted into one text. Boniecki was able to obtain promotion 
only after 1956.
Despite the revelations of the above quote, the general impression is that agit-prop vocabulary 
was not actively used in the context of Section work. Moreover, an interesting finding in the 
CQC discussions, confirming an impression formed during the study of the Congress of 
Science material, was the persistence of ‘civilised manners’ in the relations between Marxist-
Leninist scholars. These included, for instance, the predominance of traditional forms of 
address such as ‘panie profesorze’ documented in the stenographic reports, and the continued 
reliance on the traditional academic ideals of ‘civilised’ behaviour as opposed to the 
‘revolutionary style’. There was a marked absence in Congress and CQC source-material of 
the use of ‘comrade’, ‘citizen’ or the plural form ‘you’, associated with communist culture 
and the Russian language. In exclusive party member venues like the Stalin Conference at the 
ITSC, on the other hand, communist forms of address, aggressive debating techniques, a high 
emotional level, and demands for self inculpation, were very prominent. 
Conclusion
Why was it that a system that had been introduced in order to secure the Marxist-Leninist 
character of science was presented to the public in neutral terms, and avoided agit-prop 
rhetoric? (As, for instance, in Rapacki’s inauguration speech.) My first thought was that in 
586 AAN/MSzW/2781/CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Spolecznych 27.06.1954 /p.75 
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order to ensure the legitimacy of the new organ, the political authorities chose to refrain from 
ideological rhetoric in acknowledgement of the fact that a massively non-Marxist academic 
congregation would not respect an ideological set-up. If this was the case, it is evidence of: 
the necessity of relying on an acquisition of legitimacy through association with the old 
system: a demonstration of the Polish Communist regime’s incomplete breach with the past, 
and of its failure to establish a fully-fledged ‘party-loyal’ science. Alternatively, the failure to 
reach the goal of a science wholly merged with ideology may reflect efforts on the part of 
PUWP science policy-makers to accord some autonomy to scholars. This effort was in any 
case limited to official speeches and the wording of the law; it is clear that the practices of the 
CQC were ultimately subject to the demands of the Party organisation, and even the voice of 
the trusted Marxist-Leninist scholars in the Section was disregarded. Sincere as the talk of the 
prioritisation of excellent academic records in all degree and title candidates might have been, 
the persistence of a schizophrenic approach to merit had far-reaching repercussions on 
scholarship. In the Polish context, where the establishment of a system inspired by Soviet 
science was very recent, the persistence of a formally neutral system maintained the idea that 
a ‘normal’ situation in academia was one of political non-intervention into scientific 
reputation control. What was in the Soviet context primarily an internal contradiction of the 
Stalinist science system was differently interpreted in Poland, where it was construed as the 
conflict of Western (or traditional Polish) scholarship with Soviet forms. Furthermore, the 
discrepancy between theory and practice became an embarrassment for the authorities once 
the political regime entered a crisis in 1956, and it was publicly denounced.
Behind the neutral facade, reputation control institutionalised with the establishment of the 
CQC was a tool for political control over economics. The efficient system of discrimination 
over candidates who lacked the backing of the Party made the prospects of non-Marxist 
scholars bleak. The research they had accomplished before the Marxist-Leninist takeover did 
not count in the CQC’s evaluation of their merits. On the other hand candidates who had the 
good opinion of the Party were granted exceptions from the demand for scholarly output. 
Academic degrees became rewards for political accomplishments in the PUWP’s service.  
The repressive nature of the regime made it far more successful in the suppression of 
unwanted activities than in the promotion of desired activities such as the creation of Marxist-
Leninist research and training programmes. The examination of the source material covering 
discussions among Marxist-Leninist economists and among their colleagues from other social 
sciences indicates that the Party’s insistence on the primacy of ideology – a dogmatic 
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ideology defined and controlled by the political leadership – was blocking the path to a 
creative and productive Marxist-Leninist science. The debates organised to discuss Stalin’s 
article on economics, and the material from the work of the CQC, demonstrate different 
aspects of the Marxist-Leninist scholarly life. The seminar organised by the ITSC shows how 
scientific discussions within a party-science context obeyed the cultural norms of communist 
intra-party debate. The confidential discussions in the CQC setting give us an opportunity to 
examine what public discussion could not show, the Marxist-Leninist scholars’ evolution 
towards the view that Marxist science should first be scientific and only secondly party-
minded (partyjna). Marxist-Leninist economics comes through as characterised by intellectual 
stagnation, destructive internal rivalry, and the inability to establish the superiority of scholars 
over the political leadership in the peer-review processes.  
The stenographic reports of the discussions of the CQC Social Science Section allow us to 
observe the evolution of the group of Marxist-Leninist scholars hand-picked by the PUWP to 
control the establishment of new hierarchies in social sciences. Their discussions on the 
merits of candidates for academic degrees and titles show how the conflict between primacy 
of party and scientific merit criteria was played out in the Polish context. In the beginning, the 
attitudes they expressed towards reputation control were founded on the belief that they were 
living in a period of revolutionary transition, and that extraordinary means were justified, as 
the revolution demanded sacrifice for the benefit of a better future. Initially there was not 
much discussion about the candidatures for promotion, as all members of the Section accepted 
the force majeur of the revolution. The fact was, their own recent promotions would not have 
been so swift had the established hierarchy not been challenged. By endorsing the demand 
that scholarly output had to be Marxist-Leninist (as defined by the PUWP) in order to merit 
promotion, they had yielded control of the overall intellectual goals of the discipline to the 
Party leadership. Gradually, however, they grew concerned about the nature of the transitional 
measures, and the fact that these had seemed to take a permanent hold. In the Kubica 
discussion we saw that when Section members attempted to stand firm on their conviction 
that political merit did not compensate for an absence of scholarly output, they found that they 
were powerless, and that the state and party bureaucracies combined were able and 
determined to overrule them. These experiences and the ensuing dissatisfaction played a part 
in the emerging pressure for liberalisation and decentralisation of power following Stalin’s 
death, which will be the main theme of the next and last chapter of this study.  
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Those silent players, the ‘bourgeois’ economists, were more important than their scant 
representation in this chapter may suggest. In spite of extensive political sponsorship, 
Marxist-Leninist economists remained in a minority. This affected both their impact on non-
Marxist scholars and students, and the reverse; the established milieu’s impact on them. These 
beneficiaries of political promotion were always only too well-aware of the opinion the 
majority held of their aptitude: with the advent of the Thaw, incidents of students treating the 
deputy professors with unmasked contempt became common. For Marxist-Leninist 
economists the bonds with the Party were a source of both empowerment and constraint. For 
the others, the Party’s interference constituted nothing but constraint. The breach caused in 
the field by the arrival of a Marxist-Leninist segment was maintained throughout the first half 
of the decade. The re-integration of Polish economics only became possible in 1956, 
following the momentous changes in the regime’s policies. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
THE TIME OF THE ECONOMISTS 
1956-1960
In 1956 the Marxist-Leninist monopoly over economics crumbled under the impact of a 
sudden liberalisation in culture and politics – the Thaw – and the wall of silence and fear that 
had isolated Marxist-Leninists from other scholars gave way. For the second time in less than 
a decade, and at some speed, the field of economics underwent a profound transformation.
The Thaw587 is commonly understood as being the reversal of a trend which had seen the 
central Party leadership assume increasingly tight control over all aspects of political and 
societal life. It affected all the areas where stalinist regimentation and centralisation had 
prevailed. There was a thaw in culture, where dogmatic socialist realism was abandoned; a 
thaw in the judicial system, with amnesties for political prisoners; a thaw in the Party 
organisation, with the ‘rehabilitation’ of individuals expelled during the purges of the early 
1950s; and a relaxation of censorship, allowing for the expression of a wide range of critical 
opinions. This last aspect of the Thaw will be the main concern of this chapter. The Thaw, 
and the events of 1956 in particular, have attracted a great deal of attention in Polish and 
international historiography.588 The relaxation in tension between the Superpowers, and the 
changes in Soviet policy regarding the countries within its zone of influence, will therefore 
587 Although the term “Thaw” (originating in the title of a 1954 novel by Ilja Erenburg) is fairly common in Polish 
historiography and literature, the events surrounding 1956 are most often referred to as the “Polish October”or just 
“October”. The term was first used as the title of the front page article by R. Turski and W. Lasota in the October 28th 1956 
issue of Po ProstuKuron, Jacek, 1990. Wiara i wina. Do i od komunizmu. Warszawa: Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza. 
Bibliotka Kwartalnika KRYTYKA.p.124. “Polish October” refers to events surrounding the 8th Party Plenum in October, 
when the threat of Soviet invasion was deflected by Wáadysáaw Gomuáka, whose return to power had been greeted by 
enthusiastic, chanting crowds. I prefer to use “Thaw” to denote a long-term tendency in political and social development, 
rather than that of “October”. Besides its narrower chronological reference, the term “Thaw” also denotes the spirit of those 
exciting days, the hopes for far-reaching reform, and a sensation of freedom and hope which quickly took on mythical and 
symbolic dimensions, as the hopes were dashed. 
588 Fik, Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981, Machcewicz, Paweá, 1993. Polski rok 1956 Warszawa: Oficyna 
Wydawnicza "Mówia Wieki", Wáadyka, Wiesáaw, 1994. Pazdziernik 56 Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 
Bratkowski, Stefan (ed.) (1996) Pazdziernik 1956. Pierwszy wylom w systemie. Bunt, mlodosc i rozsadek., Warszawa: 
PrószyĔski i S-ka, Kersten, Krystyna (ed.) (1997) Polska 1956 - próba nowego spojrzenia, Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 
Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN. 
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provide a significant backdrop, but will remain in the background, as will the iconic events of 
1956, when demonstrations became street riots in PoznaĔ in June, and in October cheering 
crowds carried Gomuáka to power, and the threat of Soviet military intervention was warded 
off
To understand how the Thaw affected economists, we need first to direct our attention 
towards general developments in Poland, and the internal party struggle. Tracing the origins 
of ‘revisionism’, Beata BiĔko argues that the Polish communist leaders came under pressure 
from the Soviet Union, where modification of stalinist policies was proceeding at a faster 
rate.589 Soviet pressure, not domestic developments, triggered the proclamation of a “New 
Course” and the first, cautious moves towards liberalisation of cultural policies made by the 
Polish regime in 1953 and 1954. In the meantime, problems facing the regime were piling up: 
popular dissatisfaction resulting from the policy of investing aggressively in heavy industry at 
the cost of investments in agriculture and consumption on the one hand,590 and on the other 
hand increasing intra-party criticism, fuelled both by the scandal following a Radio Free 
Europe broadcast of a Secret Police colonel’s confessions, and by the appearance of cautious 
but strongly resonant critical articles in the domestic press.591  With no clear ‘line’ from 
Moscow to follow, and with no obvious solution to Poland’s economic problems available, 
the PUWP split into ‘reformist’ (‘revisionist’), ‘orthodox’ (Stalinist) and ‘centrist’ factions.592
The USSR leadership was at that time heavily fissured, allowing different PUWP factions to 
seek out patronage among the rival Soviet leaders. Adding to the confusion was the issue of 
succession after Khruschev’s repudiation of Stalin’s legacy, and the death of Bierut: 593
Indeed, in the spring of 1956, the dissemination of Khruschev’s “Secret Speech” in Poland set 
off a chain reaction leading to a temporary breakdown in Party control. 594  The most 
589 BiĔko, Beata, 1995. "Partia wobec "Odwily". Wyniki kwerendy archiwalnej w poszukiwaniu początków rewizjonizmu: 
1954-1955." Kultura i SpoáeczeĔstwo, 39, 95-106. 
As for “revisionism” BiĔko accepts the definition provided by L. Koáakowski. According to the latter “revisionism” was a 
term used by the Party leadership and Party ideologues to stigmatise anyone who attacked the various Marxist-Leninist 
dogma from a Marxist position. In general “revisionism” was used about democratic and rationalist tendencies. Kolakowski, 
Leszek & Falla, P. S., 1981. Main currents of Marxism : its origins, growth and dissolution, Paperback ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
590KaliĔski, Janusz, 1995. Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne. Warszawa: PaĔstwowe
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
591 BlazyĔski, Zbigniew, 1986. Mówi Józef Swiatlo, za kulisami bezpieki i partii. London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, Fik, 
Marta, 1989. Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981. London: Polonia, Wáadyka, Wiesáaw, 1994. Pazdziernik 56
Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. 
592 The orthodox faction is commonly known as the Natolin group because of their meetings at the Natolin palace. Their 
opponents were not organised in any way, and the name attached to this formation, “Puáawska” refers to the street in which 
many of the prominent reformers lived. 
593 Kemp-Welch article provides a good overview of the situation. Kemp-Welch, Tony, 1996. "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' 
and Polish Politics: The Spring of 1956". Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 181-206. 
594 While the gradual leaking of the content of Khrushchev’s speech has been the subject of much unconfirmed speculation, 
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immediate and spectacular result of this breakdown was an increased freedom of expression, 
which had a direct effect on social sciences. In the course of a stormy debate at the Second 
Convention of Economists in early June, Marxist-Leninist economists lost their hold over the 
discipline. A series of bold and highly critical interventions allowed the ‘bourgeois’ 
economists, condemned to silence and obscurity since 1949, to reclaim their places as 
legitimate players in the field. PUWP control over the field, and over the distinction between 
‘scientific’ and ‘unscientific’ knowledge, also evaporated. 
If we consider the Thaw from the perspective of the Marxist-Leninist academics, it is apparent 
that at this time they were under pressure from several quarters. To start with, their political 
patrons began showing signs of division and weakness, which motivated a search for an 
alternative basis of power. The challenge of transforming into symbolic, academic capital the 
cruder political currency which had allowed the protégées of the Party to attain high positions 
in the academic hierarchy was not an easy one. As expressions became widespread of 
criticism of the Marxist-Leninist monopoly in economics, and of the competences and 
academic credentials of Marxist-Leninist economists, the Marxist-Leninist academics found 
themselves alone, without political backing, having to confront not only their unpopularity 
with the non-Marxist majority, but also the lack of recognition for their academic merits. To 
put it plainly, they faced the problem of how to hold on to their professorial chairs, as 
candidates with better formal qualifications now reclaimed them. Potentially, a shift towards 
greater autonomy for scientific communities could mean that they would lose much or all of 
their influence. It would be one-sided to omit the fact that the transcripts of discussions in the 
CQC from as early as 1955 display the Marxist-Leninist scholars’ growing dissatisfaction 
with the continued interference of the Party bureaucracy. A reduction in the ideological 
component of their professional lives would not have been unwelcome to many scholars. 
Brus, for example, gave as a partial motive for leaving the ITSC for Warsaw University the 
extra work burden that obligatory participation in agitation and political campaigns placed on 
the staff and students of that institution.595
there is no doubt as to the fact that in Poland, the full text of the speech soon made its way onto the black market. In his 
interview with ToraĔska, Warsaw Party chief Staszewski claims that the Soviet leadership sent one copy to the Polish 
Politburo, which had it translated so that all CC member might read it. The Polish version was printed in several copies 
(kilkadziesiąt might mean anything between twenty and hundred) which were numbered and sent to all CC members, RC 
secretaries and their deputies. Staszewski then personally ordered the printing of an additional 15,000 copies, while re-using 
the numbers of the original series. He names western journalists to whom he personally delivered copies. He also noted that 
the employees of the press undoubtedly made their own copies for sale. ToraĔska, Teresa, 1997. Oni, new revised ed. 
Warszawa: Swiat Ksiazki.pp.226-228 
595 A.W. Haugstad, interview with Wáodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001 
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Another element which weakened the attachment of Marxist-Leninist scholars to the Party 
was the continued presence of an alternative. Connelly has argued that throughout the stalinist 
years, Marxist-Leninist academics and cultural-policy cadres had felt the strong pull of the 
‘old’ academic culture.596 In the freer atmosphere of 1956, Marxist-Leninist scholars were 
able to compare the aggressive, ideologically-oriented and politically-subordinated Marxist-
Leninist science they had helped to install with the example set by still-active, erudite 
“progressive” professors of the old school, and with the memory of academic autonomy and 
prestige they kept alive. Those among them who were gifted, and had an openness of spirit 
which had been chafing under the dogmatic academic regime of the early 50ties, now 
wondered if they would not be better off if they metaphorically let go of their red communist 
ties to don the old-fashioned professorial mantles instead. This change of cultural preferences 
and repertoires chimed with the political evolution of the supporters of the ‘revisionist’ 
faction. Some of the Marxist-Leninist intellectuals abandoned their Party-soldier ethos and 
embraced that of the independent thinker and social and political critic. Many of them adopted 
a ‘traditional’ scholarly identity, and placed priority on academic rather than party interests. 
This opened the field to the emergence of new relationships and the reconfiguration of 
previous alliances, while relations between the field of economics and the larger field of 
politics were also renegotiated. An alliance of Marxist-Leninist revisionists and the non-
Marxist academic majority now allowed the academics to reclaim a number of the 
discretionary powers they had lost since 1948. Professors in the department councils and 
academic senates once again took the decisions about employment and promotions, approved 
doctorates, and ruled over the content of teaching.597 Those who had lost their chairs in the 
early 1950s were returned to their positions. Political censorship of scholarly work was no 
longer exercised, and contacts with Western scholarship were re-established. 
The efforts of the PUWP to promote the establishment of a new hierarchy of reputations in 
economics, which would have included the criterion of conformity with standards of political 
orientation defined by the Party, were also affected by rising open criticism. The rivalry 
between two sets of hierarchies (one based on the pre-1948 world of scholarship and upheld 
in private communication by non-Marxist scholars, the second based on the appointments 
596 Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-
1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.pp.153-156 
597 The senate of the Main School for instance ruled that the lecture programs decreed by the Ministry were no longer valid 
and that each Chair should now elaborate new programs for discussion by the councils of departments (Rady Wydziaáowe)
ASHG/ Senat SGPiS, Protokóá nr. 2/473 15.11.1956 
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made by the President the CQC and on the instructions of the PUWP and the Ministry) soon 
came to a head. As the ideological legitimacy of political promotions crumbled, the two 
hierarchies confronted each other. The realisation that the system was not producing 
competent students, and that research was not developing, served to undermine the new order. 
Even among those who had profited from the new ideologically and politically-inspired
measures, there was a strong sense that the PUWP definition of Marxism had been too 
narrow, the price of its imposition had been too dear, and that this had led to the unjust 
exclusion of many valuable and talented scholars. Even in its weakened state, however, the 
Party was not going to permit the exclusion of its protégées. It was difficult to correct the 
situation without incurring the wrath of those who would become stripped of their authority in 
the process. This dilemma formed the backdrop for the long and heated debates in the late 
period (1956-1960) of CQC activity. 
Paweá Machcewicz argues that the crowds who took to the streets in PoznaĔ, Warsaw and 
elsewhere in 1956, shared with the revisionist Party intellectuals only the negative goal of 
condemning stalinism.598 Academic institutions, however, present us with the possibility of 
exploring a setting where the revisionists came into close contact with the non-Marxist 
majority, and agreed on a minimum programme of common interests which would allow for 
reform of the sector. This exercise in co-operation between a leftist intellectual elite capable 
of addressing the regime in its own language, and the majority anti-communist, academic, 
professional and creative elites.
The economic crisis following the Six Year Plan became impossible to conceal in the new 
open climate of expression, but only the popular dissent expressed in the PoznaĔ riot finally 
forced the Party leadership to make a public show of willingness to reform the economy. The 
economists’ bargaining power was enhanced by the new demands for their expertise and their 
ability to infuse plans for a new economic policy with legitimacy. The return of economists to 
active participation in the drafting of reforms and in the analysis of the economic situation 
made 1956-1960 a radically different period. It was “the time of the economists”. 
598 For a discussion of the width of the division between the reformist intellectuals who considered themselves to be Marxists, 
and the anti-communist, pro-religion oriented crowds on the streets of PoznaĔ and other towns, see Machcewicz, Paweá,
1997. "Intellectuals and Mass Movement, Ideologies and Political Programs". Contemporary European History, 6, 361-382. 
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Thaw – origins and early phase 
It is difficult to date the start of the Thaw, and although it is possible to argue that Stalin’s 
article on economics in 1952 was the first sign for economists, the first indications of a thaw 
in the period 1953-1954 did not dominate the overall picture. The death of Stalin had no 
immediate effect; indeed it brought about a heightening of the tone of propaganda rhetoric, as 
shown by Kupiecki in his study of the Stalin cult in Poland.599 Fijaákowska argues that from 
1953 the sharpened rhetoric had already been accompanied by a relaxation of control over 
culture,600 and indeed Marta Fik’s chronicle of culture cites numerous events from 1954 
which support the view that literature and art were at the forefront of the Thaw.601 In 1955 the 
International Youth Festival, held in Warsaw in August, brought a gust of fresh air after years 
of drab isolation. Intellectual circles were in uproar following WaĪyk’s publication of “A
poem for adults” that same month, and after the Party leadership’s crackdown on the author 
and editor that ensued. Though the restriction on free expression relaxed, it is difficult to 
detect outward signs of any Thaw among economists at this time, although the economists 
involved in confidential discussions within the Central Qualification Committee’s Social 
Science Section were affected by the changing climate, and the resulting shift in the opinions 
and loyalties of the CQC members who controlled the distribution of indicators of academic 
reputation, would be very important in the months to come. Other parts of the academic 
system were also experiencing a gradual relaxation. DrabiĔska notes tendencies towards 
making new critical assessments of the reform of higher education in the Party leadership at 
about the same time.602 In December 1954, Drewnowski, once classed an undesirable person 
and removed from all positions after his expulsion from the Party, was appointed to the board 
of the Polish Economic Association,603 and Wakar was released from a Soviet labour camp 
and allowed to return to Poland and take up academic work.604
The earliest public evidence of a new climate in social sciences is a debate on the subject of 
the barriers hindering the development of humanities and social sciences. This involved 
among others the sociologist ChaáasiĔski and the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres 
599 Kupiecki, Robert, 1993. Natchnienie milionów. Kult Stalina w Polsce, 1944-1956. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa szkolne i 
pedagogiczne.
600 Fijalkowska, Barbara, 1985. Polityka i twórcy (1948-1959). Warszawa: PWN. 
601 Fik, Marta, 1989. Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981. London: Polonia. 
602 DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw 
School of Economics.  
603 Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 35, 451-489. 
604 ASGH/ AleksyWakar personal file 
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director Schaff. 605  It also illustrates the Party’s equilibrist efforts to open doors while 
remaining in control. Although publication of the polemic could not have taken place without 
the sanction of the political authorities, CC officials called a special meeting of ‘Party 
professors’ to monitor and manage Party intellectuals’ reactions. Quoted here is the CC 
Science Division’s report for November 1955 relating to that meeting, penned by the 
seasoned Party official Zemankowa: 
The comrades basically took a correct attitude to ChaáasiĔski’s position. There 
were, however, tendencies to underestimate the achievements in our social 
sciences over the last few years and to identify the Party as the cause of the 
difficulties in their development. 
Economists (Brus) indicated that the main cause of the shortcomings was the 
matter of the secrecy about statistics and the “unsolved” problem of the role of 
scholars in the development of social sciences if the main direction is set by the 
party (…) 
While taking up the matter of a number of fundamental errors in our science, the 
comrades only perceived their own decisive role in overcoming these errors very 
weakly.
The meetings helped the comrades to see where their task lay in the struggle for 
the development of science and the need for initiative and ideological offensives in 
all fields of science.606
Since this was a report for the central leadership, it is not surprising but still worth noting that 
there was a consistent refusal to assume any responsibility for the shortcomings of the Party 
science policy that rank and file Party intellectuals were reporting. Party intellectuals and the 
Party bureaucracy were going in different directions. While Zemankowa felt the need to 
ensure a ‘proper’ reaction and to enthuse Party academics with revolutionary zeal, both Brus’s 
intervention, as reported in the above quote, and other sources indicate that within the group 
which had been the PUWP’s spearhead in academic institutions, there were those who 
increasingly resented being told what to think. How could the Party present a united front 
against the non-Marxist academic majority, indeed against society in general, when its own 
intellectual elite was showing signs of independent and critical thought? The attempted 
605 Fik, Marta, 1989. Kultura polska po Jalcie. Kronika lat 1944-1981. London: Polonia. P.220. The debate ran in Przegląd
Kulturalny, nr. 39 (J. ChalasiĔski), nr.43 (L. Kolakowski), nr.77 (A. Schaff), and W. Bienkowski (13.10.55) On ChalasiĔski’s
relationship to the Party, see Káoskowska, Antonina, 1995. "Bunty i sáuĪebnoĞü uczonego". Kultura i SpoáeczeĔstwo, 39, 57-
68.
606 AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/178/pp.75-76 “Sprawozdanie Wydziaáu Nauki KC za m-c listopad 1955 r.” Signed Zofia 
Zemankowa 12.12.55 
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balancing act of the Party leadership and the bureaucracy, allowing as it did only selective 
criticism and careful monitoring of reactions to this, was a distinctive feature of the months 
preceding the spring of 1956, and over time proved impossible to achieve. The divisions 
between one faction pushing for more open policies and reforms, and another ‘orthodox’ 
group interested in the maintenance of the status quo, were already undermining the unity of 
the ‘Party line’.
The controlled criticism of the early Thaw phase, and the cautious reforms discussed by the 
Party elites in the Soviet Union and Poland in 1954 and 1955, began to change pace and form 
after the 20th Party Congress on February 25th 1956, when Khrushchev gave his “Secret 
Speech” denouncing Stalin. To this was added a succession crisis in the Polish Communist 
Party, following the death in Moscow on March 12th of Poland’s “little Stalin”, Bolesáaw 
Bierut.607 In early March the content of Khrushchev’s speech became known in Warsaw, 
creating confusion and consternation in party ranks. We need to examine how these political 
events affected economists, and will begin by using the medium of a stenographic report to 
observe how the Party leadership tried to deal with the new developments. On March 29th, a 
meeting of higher education sector Party functionaries working at institutional to regional 
committee level,608 was opened by the director of the CC Culture and Science Division, 
Stefan ĩóákiewski,609 who set out to give a summary of the “Secret Speech”. It should be 
noted that ĩóákiewski belonged to the reformist wing of the Party, the loose ‘Puáawska’
faction supported mainly by Party intellectuals. 610  The participants in the meeting were 
607 The first Polish CC meeting after Bierut’s death was held on March 20th, when Edward Ochab was elected First Secretary, 
in the presence of Khruschev. Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1998. Pól  wieku dziejów Polski 1939-1989 Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe PWN. p.298 
608 The meeting was organised by the newly-merged CC Culture and Science Division The list of participants included the 
secretaries of the basic party organisations at higher schools, deputy directors of the Regional Party Committee’s Education 
Division, party members from the Ministries of Higher Education and of Health, and leaders of the Polish Youth Union, in 
order to inform them of the situation. If things went according to plan, there were nearly 200 people present. 
AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/209, p.90 
609 Stefan ĩóákiewski (1911-1991) Studied at Warsaw University before the War, joined the PWP in 1942, editor of journal 
“Kuznica” (The Forge), charged with the introduction of Marxism into Polish studies and founding director of Institute of 
Literary Studies. He was, among other things a member of the PUWP CC from 1954. Deputy professor at Warsaw 
University, ordinary professor from 1954, held leading positions in social sciences within the Polish Academy of Sciences in 
the years 1952-1955. Identified with the pro-reform Puáawska faction. 
When, ĩóákiewski had sent a letter to the Secretariat on March 17th asking permission to arrange a meeting of those in the 
Party actively working with higher education on March 23rd, he had also expressed the wish that someone from the Party 
leadership be present to open and sum up the discussion. This wish was not granted, and the meeting was delayed for another 
week since, as a handwritten annotation on the letter shows, the proposed meeting was not authorised until March 21st.
AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/209, p.8 Letter from S. ĩóákiewski, director of the PUWP CC Division for Science and Culture to 
the PUWP Secretariat, dated 17.03.1956.  
610 Sáabek relates that Jordan classified ĩóákiewski as one of the ‘orthodox’ revisionists, however self-contradictory that may 
sound. Jordan thus described revisionists who were pushing for reforms but accepting of the Party’s ultimate authority to 
determine the boundaries of criticism and change. Oskar Lange was put into the same category. Discussed in Sáabek, Henryk, 
1997. Intelektualistów obraz wlasny 1944-1989: KsiąĪka i Wiedza. 
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already familiar with the content of Khrushchev’s speech, so a summary might appear 
superfluous, but this was how the Party leadership had dealt with problems before. For 
comparison, we may look back to the way the Party responded to Stalin’s potentially 
disruptive comment in his article on linguistics, where he had stated that free critical 
discussion was necessary in the sciences. In 1951 a large scale campaign had been staged not 
only to disseminate Stalin’s words, but also in order to make sure that the message that the 
Party had authority over science was placed before anything else, and that the freedom 
mentioned by Stalin only applied within the limits set by the Party leadership. It seems that 
faced with the explosive contents of the Secret Speech, the Central Committee tried to pull off 
a similar act. ĩóákiewski’s task would then have been not so much to inform his audience, as 
to provide an authoritative interpretation of the “Secret Speech”. In translating the opening 
paragraphs of his speech I have tried to retain an impression of the confused structure and 
spelling of the original: 
Comrade ĩóákiewski : (…) I will try to repeat with my own words the content of the 
speeches at the XX Congress, the content of the speech of comrade Khrushchev, 
and so the material and documents that the comrades know in original versions 
(…)  
Dear comrades, we are most of all under the impression of those historical 
truths,611 that we got to know about - the errors and distortions of the actions of 
our parties, the activity of comrade Stalin, they reach deep and I do not know if 
there is anyone present in this room who would be able at this moment to relate 
completely, to explain all questions. Well, each of us is after all looking into his 
conscience, each of us is examining not only how this happened, but is examining 
his relationship to these matters, is going through great difficulties, is trying ex-
actly to understand these contradictions that were this measure, and a whole range 
of facts, so really I have to look on these matters from my own perspective. There-
fore I cannot answer many questions, a series of why, that the comrades bear in 
their consciousness, answer them in my talk, maybe the discussion can do more for 
us.612
How could ĩóákiewski, an experienced politician, sound so disoriented? Two possible reasons 
come to mind. Firstly, it is possible that ĩóákiewski had personal difficulties in dealing with 
the revelations of persecutions and their implications for the legitimacy of communism. Many 
party members went through severe personal crises when the crimes and atrocities of the 
611 The term “historical truths” is my interpretation of the original document. The precise spelling in the document would 
translate as “historical laws”, but I believe it more likely that a typo changed “prawd” (truths) into “praw” (laws). 
612 AAN/KCPZPR/237/XVI/209/pp.2-3 “Narada w Wydziaáe Nauki i Kultury dnia 29.III.1956” The stenogram transcript of 
ĩóákiewski’s intervention covers over 40 pages, and the last part may not have been recorded. 
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system became public knowledge. Some faced the facts for the first time, others realised that 
what they had taken for isolated incidents had formed part of systematic repression. An 
investigation into the attitudes and reactions of Party members to the information on the 
stalinist terror, conducted by sociologist Renata Tulli, documents how profoundly many of 
them were affected.613 Secondly, the confused opening paragraphs of the speech reflect the 
hierarchical Party’s dilemma in handling criticism of its former top leadership by the present 
top leadership. ĩóákiewski comes through as extremely unsure of how to deal with the issue 
of the causes of the ‘cult of personality’ and ‘deviations from party justice’, the most 
explosive question raised by Khrushchev‘s revelations. (His request to have a senior member 
of the leadership present at the meeting may have been partly motivated by this insecurity.) In 
his speech he failed to provide an explanation of why these many transgressions of the Party’s 
own principles could have taken place. He devoted little time to this question (four pages of 
the stenogram) and was extremely evasive on the subject, invoking the specific historical 
circumstances and achievements of the regime.  
After the fumbling beginning, however, ĩóákiewski warmed up, and continued to speak with 
gusto for a long time. To provide an authoritative response to the “Secret Speech” he had to 
step into the role of critic himself. This was necessary for at least two reasons: firstly, to avoid 
being classified as someone responsible for the present situation; and, secondly, in order to 
maintain control over the criticism. He therefore quickly abandoned the question of the 
disastrous effects of the ‘deviations’ and the ‘cult of personality’, instead dispensing advice 
on how these could be corrected. He painted a picture where an inactive youth union and 
bureaucratically-minded party officials were doing more harm than good in academic 
institutions. He accused the local party cells of unnecessarily alienating scholars who could 
develop Marxist science in an original way, while supporting conformists who readily 
declared unwavering loyalty. He did not hesitate to point out that party members were not 
regarded as the best, most erudite scholars, thereby admitting the Party’s failure to overwrite 
pre-existing hierarchies and values. Making scholars, students and the general public accept 
the Party’s decree that ‘their’ scholars were better than others because they were “true 
613 Tulli, Renata, 1995. "Przesáanki adaptacji intelektualisty partyjnego do stalinizmu". Kultura i SpoáeczeĔstwo, 39, 81-93.
The published article is a chapter of the unpublished doctoral thesis Tulli submitted in 1963 at Warsaw University. 
Wondering why so many people who already knew what was officially admitted by Khrushchev experienced genuine shock, 
Tulli examined the relationship between previous knowledge about repression and transgressions and the effect of the 
revelations. She found a pattern where older comrades who knew more about the transgressions, but trusted and identified 
with the Party, were profoundly shaken, while although some of them knew less in advance younger activists behaved with a 
greater sense of distance and were less affected. 
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Marxists” had been difficult. What ĩóákiewski now revealed, speaking on behalf of the Party 
leadership, was that even Party members doubted the superiority of Marxist-Leninist scholars. 
Being a loyal party member was not enough, and there were other criteria to be met in order 
to claim a high place in the scientific hierarchy. He went on to say that the Party organisation 
had destroyed the climate of friendly and constructive scholarly debates, that research was not 
thriving, and that students were not being taught to think for themselves. ĩóákiewski blamed 
these deplorable facts on dogmatism, which he understood as the mistaken application of the 
right principles. He also dwelt on the successes of the socialist camp, notably on the 
international situation, which since the relaxation of the tension between the superpowers was 
in his view favourable to the socialist camp. According to ĩóákiewski, the interest shown in 
socialism by India, Burma and some African countries was a proof of the success of socialism 
and the reason why the Party could undertake its overdue spring cleaning. In his conclusion 
there was no doubt as to the future course: the Party organisation needed to mobilise, defeat 
dogmatism, and then go on to fulfil its potential.  
The postulates for change that ĩóákiewski based on this analysis of the situation were 
contradictory and cautious, revealing a determination to maintain stability while initiating the 
necessary developments. ĩóákiewski demanded that the Party officials cease making 
“excessive” interventions into science, whilst at the same time ensuring that Marxism should 
retain its leading role. There were faint signals in his speech that the insistence on the 
monopoly of Marxism in social sciences and culture was under re-consideration. Works by 
non-Marxists should not be feared or kept from students, ĩóákiewski said, and the Party only 
needed to ensure that the difference between the valuable and the reactionary parts of their 
contributions be made clear to the young. To illustrate how this could be done, he brought 
Sartre into his exposé of the role of the communist intellectuals, showing where Sartre was 
right and where he erred. The content of the Marxism, so strictly regimented since 1948, was 
also now open for change, and ĩóákiewski called for a return to a ‘pure’ Marxism, one that 
was up for discussion.614 ĩóákiewski advocated a change in accent, rather than a definitive 
solution to the conflict between ideological and scientific control of knowledge production. 
This change of accentuation was in fact to be very important, and would set off developments 
which within a short space of time would transform social sciences in Poland. 
614 AAN/KCPZPR/ 237/XVI/209/p.81 “Narada w Wydziale Nauki i Kultury dnia 29.III.1956” Stenographic report. 
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The discussion which followed displayed the difficulties of controlled criticism to the full. 
One speaker warned that openness in the media was already eroding the Party’s ideological 
monopoly, and another raised the question which ĩóákiewski had carefully avoided; that of 
his and other Party officials’ personal responsibility for the present state of affairs. The 
intervention of a representative of the Polish Youth Union (ZMP), exemplified the 
consequences of the Party’s loss of control over the information flow caused by the leaking of 
Khrushchev’s speech.  
…when we gathered the members of the Warsaw academic school and academic 
department ZMP boards on Friday last week [ March 23rd - AWH] and read 
Khrushchev’s speech out to them, we did that with a certain feeling of doing 
something bold by reading Khrushchev’s speech to a group of about 100 people. 
And in fact at that time Warsaw and other parts of the party active in the town 
districts were being informed relatively more slowly. So, we were doing this, in a 
certain sense taking a courageous step - in our perception at least, and, by the 
way, with certain attempts to stop this bravery of ours on the part of these or those 
instances Then on Friday these students attacked us. We thought that it was a 
massive entrance, they: “You’re only telling us now? We read this on March 17th
and 18th, maybe not in such an extensive form, in The Times.” So it turns out that 
our boldness was met with a kind of very sharp criticism from the students, the 
active ZMPs, (…)615
This quote shows activists at a low level taking their own decisions despite opposition from 
their superiors. It may be they were able to do so because of encouragement or outright 
support from higher quarters, or their youthful impatience alone may have driven them.  
If we compare the dates quoted by the Polish Youth Union representative with those in 
ĩóákiewski’s letter (dated March 17th) requesting permission to hold this meeting, it seems 
likely that the impetus for the session was the fact that news of Khrushchev’s denunciation of 
Stalin had reached Western media. Due to the delay of the central leadership in authorising 
ĩóákiewski’s meeting, the Youth Organisation representatives had to meet students who had 
been already fully informed of the essence of the “Secret Speech” by Western media, without 
instructions from the CC Culture and Science Division on how to deal with the situation.616
615 The grammar and spelling in this quote reflects the original, which is full of misspellings, odd punctuation and repetitions. 
AAN/KCPZPR/ 237/XVI/209/p.81. 
616 Reuters was the first to report on Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, see the testimony of their Moscow correspondent 
Rettie, John, 2006. The secret speach that changed world history. Observer. 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1718125,00.html Guardian Unlimited. 
Rettie recounts how he raced the New York Time correspondent to get the news out of the Soviet Union first. The New York 
Times published the first article by Harrison E. Salisbury revealing the content of the speech on March 16, 1956 with the title
“Secret Khrushchev Talk on Stalin ‘Phobia’ Related” on pages 1 and 6. In Great Britain the story first appeared in the 
Observer. 
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As it transpired, the students had heard the Western media’s version of events before 
receiving the digested PUWP form. The more privileged ITSC students had access to the 
foreign press, but Radio Free Europe broadcasts provided a similar function for others. Other 
interventions in the discussion also indicated that the Party’s delay in disseminating the news 
not only undermined its monopoly on information, but also its grip on interpretation, as 
people heard the news from Western media and turned up at party meetings with critical 
questions. It is clear that in the spring of 1956 the PUWP was losing control over the 
information flow in Poland 617, and over the Party apparatus itself, as even low-level Party and 
Polish Youth Union activists were beginning to display initiative. The political situation was 
more open than it had been for several years, and the increasingly free discussions of 1956 
brought with them opportunities to change power relations within the field. 
“Young Turks” 
The evolution of the relationship between the state and the press in Poland has always 
attracted considerable attention,618 particularly during the events of 1956. Control of public 
communication had been the key element in the establishment and maintenance of the 
“Marxist” monopoly in economics. The re-emergence of arenas for open debate in 1956 was 
bound to affect the discipline. According to Leftowicz-Curry:
…the media system went through a period of rapid expansion from 1954 to 1957. 
Sporadic publications became weeklies. Beginning with student and intellectual 
periodicals like Po Prostu, Student, Nowa Kultura, Przegląd Kulturalny, and ĩycie 
Gospodarcze and ending with the dailies, the press went from being dry, dull, and 
conservative to being major voices in liberalization filled with popular, critical and 
sensational articles. Staffs were changed. Political appointees were pushed out. In 
their place, journalists with writing skills and flair were hired.619
617 Paczkowski, Andrzej, 1998. Pól  wieku dziejów Polski 1939-1989 Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. p.299 
618Perkal, Jakob, 1986. Polityczna historia prasy w Polsce w latach 1944-1984. In I. Lasota (ed.) 40 lat wáadzy
komunistycznej w Polsce. London: Polonia Book Fund, s.151-185.; Wáadyka, Wiesáaw, 1989. Na czolowce. Prasa w 
pazdzierniku 1956 roku. Warszawa: PWN.; Koziel, Andrzej, 1991. Studium o polityce prasowej PZPR w latach 1948-1957
Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski.; Curry, Jane Leftwicz, 1990. Poland's journalists: profesionalism and politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; “Prasa w Polsce Ludowej” MysliĔski, Jerzy, 1988. Prasa w Polsce Ludowej. In
E.A. Jerzy Lojek (ed.) Dzieje prasy polskiej. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. K. Persak provides a thorough and up-to-
date review of the literature and sources covering the evolution of the press from 1956 to 1961 in his recently published study
of the notorious “Holland case”. Journalist, sociologist and ITSC graduate Henryk Holland died in 1961 following a fall from 
the window of his apartment during a search by the Security Police. Persak undertook the ambitious task of solving a case 
which has been the subject of widespread speculation for 45 years. Persak, Krzysztof, 2006. Sprawa Henryka Hollanda
Warszawa: Institut Pamieci Narodowej. 
619 Curry, Jane Leftwicz, 1990. Poland's journalists: profesionalism and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
p.50
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The student journal Po Prostu has become a symbol of the activating of young intellectuals
and the appearance of many young journalists and editors. 620  In economics too a new 
generation emerged: the graduates of the Aspirantura programmes at the ITSC and the Main 
School, and the few who had completed their studies in the Soviet Union. In time their youth 
and idealism led them to go further in their criticisms than the moderate revisionists’ like 
ĩóákiewski. The “Young Turk” economists would play a radicalising role in public 
discussions,621 which took place principally on the pages of ĩycie Gospodarcze (Economic 
Life).
In a study of attitudes to communism among intellectuals, Henryk Sáabek points out that in 
1955 and 1956 the Party was ready to accept public criticism as long as it was performed by 
its supporters. Marxist writers and artists, the Party leadership insisted, should retain a 
privileged position in culture and science.622 The Party leadership tried to contain and harness 
the criticism,by joining the critics, as we saw ĩóákiewski do, while attacking violently any 
outsider who dared to voice unauthorised criticism. The problem was that the credibility of 
ĩóákiewski and other Party intellectuals as critics was not very great, since many of them had 
held high-profile positions in the Party apparatus throughout the early fifties. Searching for a 
vent for the criticisms, and in order to bolster its failing sense of legitimacy, the Party turned 
to its young. Who could be better qualified to overhaul political economy than the graduates 
of the Institute for Training of Scientific Cadres? In the spring 1956 a group of young 
economists on the lookout for a platform which could allow them to take part in the budding 
reform process was granted control over Economic Life. Economic Life had started out as a 
periodical addressing economists working in the state bureaucracy. Up until the spring of 
1956 it had been a drab journal dominated by uncritical and unimaginative compilations of 
figures, and had been only slightly affected by the Thaw. The decision taken by the editorial 
board in December 1955 to adopt a less aggressive, stiff rhetoric meant that Economic Life
was merely catching up with the developments in other media, and was by no means the 
locomotive of criticism.623 Led by thirty-year-old ITSC graduate Tadeusz Kowalik, the new 
620 Among other things, the editorial staff of Po Prostu inspired the creation of discussion clubs for young intellectuals all 
over the country; although it is the Warsaw club, named for its location in Crooked Circle Street in the Old Town, that is best
known. Jedlicki, Witold & Instytut, Literacki, 1963. Klub Krzywego Kola Paryz: Instytut Literacki.
621 The group was referred to as ‘Young Turks’ by one of its members, T.Kowalik. A.W. Haugstad, interview with Tadeusz 
Kowalik, Warsaw 2000 
The original Young Turks were the reformist movement which ended the sultanate of the Ottoman Empire in 1909 and 
intiated the modernisation and industrialisation of Turkish society. www.britannica.com accessed 26.02.2007 
622 See Chapter 6 in Sáabek, Henryk, 1997. Intelektualistów obraz wlasny 1944-1989: KsiąĪka i Wiedza.. 
623 1956. „Po naradzie z czytelnikami ĩycia Gospodarczegow Warszawie “ ĩycie Gospodarcze, 1, pp.11-13 
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team which took over in the spring swiftly transformed Economic Life from an anonymous 
quarterly into a popular weekly. Economic Life became the main arena for debates on 
economic policy and reforms, as well as for the discussion of problems pertaining to the 
discipline and profession of economists. 
The new team took over at a moment when censorship had practically ceased to function. 
Wiesáaw Wáadyka, who has studied the history of the press in 1956, argues that critical 
publications were continually pushing the limits of acceptable criticism, and since the public 
assumed that whatever was published was done with permission, each new critical article 
shifted those limits and generated further criticism, a process which for the moment the Party 
was unable and unwilling to halt.624 While the publication in August 1955 of WaĪyk’s poem 
describing the appalling reality of forced industrialisation had cost the editor his job, (but not 
the author’s, and both had retained their party cards), much more overt criticism was 
published in the spring of 1956 without any apparent reaction from the Party leadership.
On the front page of the first ‘new’ issue (June 1956) was a manifesto entitled “Our position” 
and signed by 31 young economists. 625 Their background was mainly in political economy at 
academic institutions, and in work in the planning apparatus. Many had passed through the 
CC ITSC Aspirantura programme, where they had experienced a strange regime which 
combined a strong focus on ideology with access to unorthodox sources such as foreign 
journals and the works of Trotsky.626 Published immediately before the start of the Second 
Convention of Economists, the manifesto was explicit in its desire to affect the agenda of the 
discussion at that forum. The content of the manifesto deserves attention as it was the first 
public assessment of the situation in the discipline, and the first suggestions for remedies were 
made in it.  
The young economists’ impression of the discipline was catastrophic: “For a considerable 
period of time there has been total stagnation in economic theory.”627 They described the 
scientific output of the stalinist years as exegeses, generalities, narrow studies and quotation-
624 Wáadyka, Wiesáaw, 1994. Pazdziernik 56 Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. P.35 
625 1956. “Nasze stanowisko. Z okazji II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich” ĩycie Gospodarcze, 11, (6.06.56), p.1-2 
The signatories (most were between the ages of 30 and 35) were in alphabetical order: Andrzej Brzeski, Artur Bodnar, Alojzy 
Chlebowczyk, Henryk Cholaj, Maria Ciepielewska, Henryk Dunajewski, Henryk Francuz, Bogusáaw Galeski, Bohdan 
GliĔski, Zbigniew Grabowski, Tadeusz Jaworski, Wáadysáaw JuraszyĔski, Tadeusz Kowalik, Zygmunt Kozlowski, 
Wáadysáaw Krencik, Zygmunt Knyziak, Stefan J. Kurowski, Kazimierz Laski, Mieczysáaw Mieszczanowski, Wadim 
Mietkowski, Zofia Morecka, Jan Niegowski, Marian Ostrowski, Józef Pajestka, Antoni Rajkiewicz, Adam Runowicz, 
Eugeniusz Rychlewski, Wáadysáaw Sadowski, Michal Stalski, Bogdan Szulc, and Edward Wiszniewski.  
626 Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist Poland." Minerva, 34, 323-346. 
627 1956. “Nasze stanowisko. Z okazji II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich” ĩycie Gospodarcze, 11, (6.06.56), p.1-2 
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mania, and they deplored the lack of publications with theoretical ambitions. They also 
demanded freedom of discussion and publication, access to information, and the 
establishment of a large institute of economics at the Polish Academy of Science (PAN). The 
young economists compared the situation they were witnessing with the promises to the 
discipline given by the regime during First Congress of Science events in 1950-1951. Other 
disciplines, they noted, had proper research institutes within the PAN structure, while 
economics had mere ‘ateliers’ with only a few employees. 
The authors of the manifesto had first-hand experience both as students and as teaching 
assistants, and they expressed their dissatisfaction with the way higher education in 
economics had worked for the past several years. They had experienced teaching devoid of 
critical approaches and independent reflection, and students had been left to learn formulae 
and quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism. They drew attention to the fact that 
economics was failing to attract gifted students, or even enough students to fill the plan 
quotas, a problem caused by uninspiring study programmes.628 As for research education, 
several of the signatories had passed through the Aspriantura programme but had nothing 
positive to say about it. Instead they called for more stress on the thesis, a reduction in exams 
and the size of the curriculum, and the decentralisation of decisions about programmes to 
schools and even to chairs. It is a measure of the unpopularity and poor reputation of the 
Aspirantura education system that those holding the new kand. nauk degree declared openly 
against its retention and for reinstatement of the doctorate. The ‘Young Turks’ were also 
concerned by the lack of job opportunities, and criticised the widespread practice by the elder 
generation of holding of two posts. They called for the definition and protection of the title of 
economist, and the reservation of positions in the planning apparatus for holders of this title.  
Furthermore, they challenged one of the cornerstones of the new order, the alleged close 
relation between theory and economic policy. They claimed that despite the promises made to 
the discipline in 1950-1951, economists had been reduced to being apologists for economic 
policy, deprived of influence on its formation. The “Manifesto” called for research 
programmes that would investigate the efficiency of such areas as production, investment, and 
international trade, as well as for the continuation of the ongoing investigation into economic 
laws (especially the law of value), economic incentives, and the law of distribution according 
628 See DrabiĔska on the crisis in fulfilling the Plan. DrabiĔska, Danuta, 1993. SGPiS w latach forsownych przeobrazen 
spoleczno-gospodarczych Polski 1949-1956. Warsaw School of Economics. pp.76-80 
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to input. Lastly they called for urgent start to work on a long-term economic development 
plan, and for the inclusion of economic science in this work. All this, they wrote, was needed 
in order to attain the goal of a unified theory of the political economy of socialism which 
could provide the basis for reform of the economy. Their conclusion was that economists had 
been pushed aside from their advisory functions, institutions of higher education were not 
fulfilling their task satisfactorily, and the production of knowledge had come to a stand-still. 
Both the profession and the discipline of economics were declared to be in crisis. 
The Second Convention of Economists  
The decision to summon a convention of economists was taken by the main board of the 
Polish Economic Association in the first trimester of 1956, and prepared at a time when 
events were outpacing most responses. While the First Convention had been an integral part 
of the Congress of Science preparations, there is no reason to doubt that this time the 
autonomous decision of the PEA was central to the convening of the Second Convention of 
Economists, which was to become a turning point for the discipline. The most important event 
at the Convention was the challenge to the monopoly that the Marxist-Leninist economists 
held over influential positions and economic knowledge production. One of the most radical 
critics stated, “No monopoly can turn a false thesis into a true one, and true theses do not 
need a monopoly.”629
At the 1950 Convention, there had been about 200 hand-picked guests, and the event was 
carefully scripted. In 1956 things took a different turn from the start. The organisation 
committee was swamped by requests for access cards, and, being unwilling or unable to 
withstand the pressure, decided to move to a venue which could accommodate as many as 800 
participants. 630  This also meant moving the assembly of economists from the Palace of 
Culture, ‘Stalin’s gift to Poland’, to the main hall of the Planning Commission, a modification 
motivated by practical considerations, but one that chimed in nicely with one of the main 
postulates presented by economists at this Convention: that the discipline be moved away 
from the domination of ideology and closer to influence over economic policy. Among the 
629 The quote from Kurowski’s intervention at the Second Convention of Polish Economists held in June1956 comes from 
p.132 of the full transcript of the discussion produced by the PEA in a limited number of bound copies. AAN/PTE… 
According to the testimony of one participant, J. Z. Sadowski, Kurowski was the star of the show, because he was the first 
speaker to cross the planned limits of the debate and, for many points, formulated the most far-going postulates. See 
Sadowski’s speech opening a seminar commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Second Convention, and organised by the 
PEA. http://www.pte.pl/243_konferencje_pte.html accessed 18.12.2007 
630 AAN/PTE/7 “Sprawozdanie z II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich” p.20 
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participants were also ‘old’ economists such as Edward Taylor, who was observed during the 
breaks surrounded and celebrated by young economists.631 Their mere attendance represented 
a departure from the concept of economics as it had been defined at the 1950 Convention.
On June 7th 1956 the Second Convention of Economists opened just as the First Convention 
in 1950 had done, with a speech by Oskar Lange. 632  The official programme featured 
presentations by Lange, LipiĔski, B. Minc, Brus and Kalecki, intertwined with discussions 
and social events. Lange’s opening speech did not advertise any great changes; indeed his 
speech was even more ‘newspeak’ dominated than the one he had made at the First 
Convention in 1950. He praised the achievements of the discipline, and listed both the 
numbers of students who had graduated and the names of the academic institutions devoted to 
economics. The dissonance with the already-published Young Turks’ “Manifesto” was 
glaring. Lange had recently come back from a six-month stay in India, and had clearly not 
registered the extent of the changes that had taken place during this time. During the 
discussion which followed, he was accused of delivering a speech which belonged to what 
was now a closed chapter in history. Even Edward LipiĔski, who had been much better placed 
to keep up with the changes, and who had at the last moment changed the topic of his 
presentation from the history of mercantilist thought to “Economic laws and the subject of 
political economy”, was forced to improvise. In addition, although LipiĔski was the first to 
attack Lange for his conservative speech, and to challenge Stalin’s opinions on economics, he 
too was scolded by discussants for speaking in a ‘torpid manner’. Meanwhile, Brus met with 
approbation for being the only speaker to volunteer to take on responsibility for the present 
condition of the discipline. In his presentation, he made his first public steps towards a 
revisionist position.633 Not everyone decided to join the critics’ camp. Even when he saw the 
criticism that Lange faced, Bronisáaw Minc went ahead with the presentation he had planned 
beforehand.634 However, few in fact spoke from an ‘orthodox’ position, and the audience 
responded negatively to their interventions. Michaá Kalecki, only recently re-settled in 
Poland, opted for a presentation which, with its analytical, abstract, ‘pure’ economics, was 
inspiring as well as shocking.635 It made a great impression on the youngest generation of 
631 A.W. Haugstad interviews with Jan MujĪel, Warsaw 2000 and Wáodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001 
632 Oskar Lange’s intervention, “Current problems of economic science in Poland” was published in 1956, Ekonomista, 5,
pp.3-16
633 Brus, Wáodzimierz, 1956 “On the role of the law of value in socialist economics Ekonomista, 5, pp.71-95 
634 Minc, Bronisáaw, 1956 “Problems in the socialist theory of reproduction”. Ekonomista, 5, pp.43-60
The speakers had submitted their papers in advance for distribution among the audience. Minc did not try to change his topic 
and therefore his speech conformed with the text that had been distributed. 
635 Kalecki, Michaá, 1956, “The dynamics of investment and national income in socialist economics.” Ekonomista, 5, pp.61-
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economists, who knew only the PUWP “Marxist” version of political economy, and for whom 
this was a first glimpse into analytical, mathematical economics. Economics in Kalecki’s 
version appeared to be an intellectually-challenging discipline which could give rise to 
original and inspiring perspectives, instead of being a mere transposition of dogmatic 
ideology to the subject of economics. 
Discussion – reconfiguration of the field 
The programmed presentations indicated that changes were under way in economics, but it 
was in the discussion that the important developments occurred, as economics again became a 
discipline embracing several different positions. After several years of a monopoly where 
even the dominant position was restrained in its development and differentiation by political 
control, resuming an open discussion was difficult and confusing. The long absence of an 
unrestrained debate had led to the blurring of positions. Who now was a Marxist-Leninist, 
how many kinds of Marxist-Leninist could exist, and what did it mean to be a ‘bourgeois’ 
economist? 
The split of the Marxist-Leninist position into orthodox and revisionist wings, which had been 
visible in the discussion of Stalin’s article in 1953, now also became apparent to the non-
Marxist public. What for the economists was diversification of their field was a problem from 
the PUWP’s perspective, as it could no longer rely on a single front against ‘bourgeois’ 
economics. The problem was growing even more serious, however, as the PUWP was losing 
control over “Marxism”. During the debate all participants described themselves as Marxists, 
stretching the label so widely that it ceased to have any meaning at all. One argument over the 
issue of who was ‘really’ a Marxist and who had the right to invoke Marxism to support his or 
her position took place between H. Hagemejer and M. Rakowski.  
M. Rakowski636 (…) currently one often speaks under the banner of Marxism, and 
people who do so have nothing in common with Marxism. In such interventions, 
according to the speaker, one should count Mgr. Hagemajer’s speech.637
The ‘Young Turks’ succeeded in the sense that the discussants at the Convention agreed with 
the criticism launched in their Economic Life “Manifesto”. They were also widely noticed, for 
70
Strong reactions to Kalecki’s presentation are noted by Stankiewicz, Wacáaw, 1998. Historia myĞli ekonomicznej Warszawa: 
Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne.p.579, and such was also the personal experience of Jan MujĪel related to me in 
interview (Warsaw, 2000). 
636 The economist Mieczysáaw Rakowski should not be confused with the better-known politician Mieczysáaw Franciszek 
Rakowski.
637 1956, “Dyskusja na II ZjeĨdzie Ekonomistów Polskich” Ekonomist, 5, p.110 
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not only had they published their position in advance, they were also very active in the 
discussion. On the other hand, if they had expected to establish themselves as a coherent 
group and as the most radical critics, then they too failed to gain control over the situation. 
They were outdone by several speakers in terms of radicalism during the discussion. One of 
these critics was Stefan Kurowski, who had originally been one of the signatories of the 
‘Manifesto’, but was promptly and publicly ostracised from the “Young Turk” group for his 
radical stance, in a brisk demonstration of the precarious unity of this formation.638 Also, if 
their political patrons had hoped to pre-empt criticism, they found they had only fuelled it. 
The discussion had slipped from the grasp of the organisers. Lange’s biographer relates that 
there were voices in the Praesidium calling for discipline in the discussions, but Lange reacted 
strongly and ensured that no such action was taken.639
Among the ‘bourgeois’ economists, there were different reactions to this new openness and 
eager criticism, as performed by yesterday’s loyal PUWP Marxist-Leninists. Several ‘old’ 
economists took an active part in the discussion, but not all. Taylor, who was present, did not 
speak in public. According to the testimony of Drewnowski, not all were willing to believe in 
the sincerity of the critics: 
The speeches only slightly let one understand that some changes might be possible 
in economic thinking. But the discussion on each of the following days of the 
Convention became more bold and astonishing. One heard Stalinists who for years 
had fought every sign of independent thought, now proclaiming the need for 
freedom of research. (…) I must admit it all seemed to me to be one great 
masquerade. I did not believe in such a change of convictions on the part of those 
who had destroyed economics in Poland. I did not take the stand during the 
Convention.640
The experiences of the preceding years had created a gap between those in and those out of 
power which could not be swiftly closed. 
638 Following S. Kurowski’s intervention, Józef Pajestka stepped in to clarify what the group behind the Manifesto had meant 
and which were S. Kurowski’s own ideas. AAN/PTE/7 “Sprawozdanie z II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich” p.113-136, 296-
302
Stefan Kurowski (1923- ) studied at àódĨ University (mgr. 1949), worked at the Planning Commission 1949-1953, 
Worshop of economics at Polish Academy of Science (1955-1968).  
639 ZarĊba, Janusz, 1985. Reforma w testamencie : rzecz o Oskarze Langem, Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: MáodzieĪowa Agencja 
Wydawnicza. p.151 
The presidium consisted of the leadership of the PEA, the invited speakers and the chairmen of the regional branches: E. 
LipiĔski, O. Lange, Z. Filipowicz, W. Brus, B. Minc, M. Kalecki, W. Boerner (Wrocáaw), M. Frank (Katowice), A. Grabski 
(àódĨ), W. KrzyĪanowski, H. Michniewicz (GdaĔsk), H. Paszkowski (Kielce), H. Romanowski (Lublin), J. Rutkowski 
(Szczecin), Z. Zakrzewski (PoznaĔ) see “Dyskusja na II ZjeĨdzie Ekonomistów Polskich” Ekonomista (1956:5) p.96 
640 Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 35, 451-489. I am quoting form 
the revised edition posted on http://www.pte.pl and accessed 18.12.2007. p.20 
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The majority of discussants at the Second Convention denounced the atrophy of the 
discipline, complaining about excessive centralisation and the monopoly of a minority over 
research and publications. All the aspects pertaining to the discipline, from the definition of 
its core interests, through problems in education and research, to influence over management 
and economic policy, were examined critically in the discussion.  
The definition of the subject of study of economics established at the 1950 Convention 
claimed that economics consisted in the study of social relationships, thus focusing on the 
political and social aspects of economic processes. Following the challenges in LipiĔski’s
presentation, the prevailing definition was criticised as being too narrow, and was blamed for 
the neglect of a range of problems, such as efficiency of investments and prices, which had 
formed part of the discipline prior to its Marxist-Leninist redefinition. A new definition was 
suggested: the subject of study should be the relationship between people and the material 
world.641
The criticism of higher education in economics launched by the Economic Life team was 
continued and expanded upon during the discussion. Andrzej Brzeski argued that the lack of a 
proper instruction had resulted in “Columbusism”, by which he meant that facts and ideas 
well known in classical economics were now being re-discovered by people who lacked 
instruction in ‘bourgeois’ economics. Helena Hagemajer claimed that the only students to 
have received an education worthy of the name during the previous few years were those 
studying the history of economic thought under Edward LipiĔski. She spoke on behalf of 
another group which had seized the chance to be heard for the first time in public – the 
repressed younger generation of ‘bourgeois’ economists whose career prospects had gone 
from promising to abysmal in 1949.642 While they lacked the backing of the Party apparatus, 
their asset was the approval of the ‘old’ professoriate and their fluency in both western and 
Marxist-Leninist economics. Hagemajer’s vitriolic attack on the qualifications of the “Young 
Turks” made it clear that the latter would meet with competition from other younger 
economists. Their claim to influence within the discipline, which they seem to have taken for 
granted when editing their ‘Manifesto’, was weakened by the return of the ‘bourgeois’ 
economists to the fold. The same would of course be the case for the older generations.
641 See among others LipiĔski’s presentation and Kurowski’s discussion intervention. AAN/PTE/7 “Sprawozdanie z II 
Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich” pp.72-136 
642 She had lost her job at the Main School, finding sanctuary with E. LipiĔski after he was moved to the University. Her 
husband, economist Wáodzimierz Hagemajer, spent one and a half years in prison without charges being pressed, but his 
work at the Central Statistical Office was probably related to his arrest. 
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Several speakers complained that individual researchers had too little discretion over their 
work, and that decisions about academic positions, titles and publications were taken by a 
small group of Warsaw-based Marxist-Leninist economists. The disagreement between those 
who like W. StyĞ, Z. Fabierkiewicz and S. Kurowski advocated ‘absolute freedom’, and those 
represented by B. Minc, Wáadysáaw Sadowski and M. Rakowski, who spoke of a “limited 
freedom”, reflected their positions in the existing power distribution. It also re-opened the 
confrontation, suspended in 1948, between the traditional rhetoric of Polish academics calling 
for “absolute freedom” in research and teaching, and the PUWP-sponsored claim that 
everything was political. A. Brzeski stated that “freedom of science on the basis of Marxism”
would lead to an exchange of opinions among the adherents of only one school of thought, 
and inevitably to the atrophy of critical engagement.643 However, there were no efforts made 
on the part of even the most radical participants to claim the freedom to challenge openly the 
superiority of socialism over capitalism or the adherence of Poland to the Socialist Block.  
The speaker [H. Hagemajer – AWH] considers it is obvious that the principle of 
freedom of science in socialism cannot include the freedom to utter anti-socialist 
statements, and that barren polemic with a standpoint which probably none of us 
wants to defend can only hinder the progress of creative research.644
Even “absolute freedom” was understood as having some limits. Minc ended his speech on 
the second day with an ambivalent pronouncement that Marxists did wish to undertake 
discussions with those opposing Marxism, but “to give bourgeois vulgar economics rights 
equal to those of Marxists, is something that history teaches us cannot be done and should not 
be done … Marxists are for freedom of research (wolnoĞü nauki), but only for such freedom 
of research as unconditionally serves Socialism”.645
Prior to the Convention the young Warsaw economists had condemned the excessive 
centralisation of the discipline, which was suffocating the academic communities beyond the 
capital. The “Manifesto” stated that economists outside Warsaw were disfavoured in terms of 
access to statistical data and publication outlets, and pointed out the need to decentralise the 
study of economic theory. Things were changing, for if we look at the Convention we find 
that all those presenting papers were indeed from Warsaw, but the geographical distribution 
643 Summary of Andrzej Brzeski’s intervention in  1956, “Dyskusja na II ZjeĨdzie Ekonomistów Polskich” Ekonomista, 5, 
p.103-104
644 Summary of Helena Hagemajer’s intervention in  1956, “Dyskusja na II ZjeĨdzie Ekonomistów Polskich” Ekonomista, 5,
p.110
645 Summary B.Minc’s intervention in  1956, “Dyskusja na II ZjeĨdzie Ekonomistów Polskich” Ekonomista, 5, p.105. 
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of discussants was already more even, at least among the professors. 646 During the 
discussions, economists from the provinces no longer needed Warsaw economists to voice 
their complaints. A young economist from Wrocáaw, Popkiewicz, described the discipline as 
being ruled by a ‘clique’ in Warsaw, and protested against their monopoly of research 
training, publishing, and research programmes. ‘Old’ professors from outside Warsaw, such 
as StyĞ and Fabierkiewicz, also made their grievances heard. Witold KrzyĪanowski claimed 
that Kraków was particularly disfavoured as it had no institution devoted to economics, no 
university department, and no forum for debate or channel of publication. In the resolution 
adopted at the end of the Convention, economists called for an even and “just” distribution of 
all kinds of institutions: scientific associations, publishing houses, and economic and cultural 
authoritative organs, in order to allow the whole country to evolve both economically and 
academically.  
Adjusting the history of the discipline 
During the First Convention in 1950, the changes taking place in the discipline’s orientation 
and hierarchy were reinforced by the exhibition, with its visual effects (decorations, slogans 
and portraits) and reinterpretation of the history of the discipline. Whilst the Second 
Convention broke away from the stalinist style of orchestrated public gatherings, this session 
too, as the organisers were well aware, was an occasion where the public image of the 
discipline could be modified, and where a change of power relations within the field could be 
communicated and socially enacted. The commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the death 
of Ludwik Krzywicki was intended to symbolise the reorientation. Edward LipiĔski gave a 
commemorative address which can serve as a gauge of the extent of change: 
Comrades! It is today 15 years since the death of Ludwik Krzywicki. Unknown to 
the younger generation, he was a great scientist who had an enormous influence 
on Polish science. The efforts to lessen this importance have not succeeded. Let us 
honour him …647
When Krzywicki was mentioned in the new official version of the history of Polish 
economics presented at the exposition at the First Convention in 1950, it had been with a 
commentary pointing out what the PUWP then considered to be the grave errors in his 
approach to Marx’s ideas. In 1956 he was not only rehabilitated, but was even hoisted into the 
646 Among the younger speakers, Warsaw dominated. This is not surprising considering it was economically much easier for 
Warsaw dwellers to attend, and since the Economic Life group had been mobilised in advance. 
647 1956, “Dyskusja na II ZjeĨdzie Ekonomistów Polskich” Ekonomista, 5, p.118 
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position of patron saint of the discipline. The choice of a scholar whose main body of work 
was in sociology calls for an explanation. Why did the Polish Economic Association not pick 
an economist: Wáadysáaw Zawadzki or Adam Heydel if the honour was to be accorded only 
posthumously; Adam KrzyĪanowski or Edward Taylor if being at an advanced age was 
enough? The choice of Krzywicki shows that, despite the admission that ‘bourgeois’ 
economics could be selectively and cautiously studied, it remained important to signal the 
economists’ commitment to Marxism. The novel aspect was that economists could now claim 
the right to choose what kind of Marxism they wanted to pursue. Krzywicki had shown 
considerable interest in Marx’s work, and in issues of social justice, but he was not a 
dogmatic stalinist or even a communist. With his elevation, the right to a freer interpretation 
of Marxism was sanctioned by the PEA leadership, and was confirmed by the assembled 
economists as they voted for a resolution calling for the publication of Krzywicki’s collected 
works, and for a renaming of the Main School of Planning and Statistics as the Ludwik 
Krzywicki Main School of Economics.648
Engaging in the act of rehabilitating a scholar condemned by the PUWP during the stalinist 
years in fact provided economics with the status of a victim of stalinism. Such a status was 
becoming a crucial symbolic capital element in a political climate where the main dividing 
line was now drawn between the perpetrators of stalinism and its victims, as seen in 
ĩóákiewski’s attempts to join the victims’ and critics’ side. The idea of renaming the Main 
School also signalled a change in the internal power balance in favour of the pre-1949 staff. A 
new name would have publicly expressed a change in identity for the School, from the 
stalinist- and Planning Commision-subservient institution for “Planning and Statistics” to an 
academic, autonomous Krzywicki “School of Economics” which could also pose as a victim. 
It is important to note that the proposed name change was not made, and that the Main School 
retained “Planning and Statistics” in its name until 1991. 
LipiĔski’s address, quoted above, was held on the last day of the Convention, allowing him 
and the rest of the PEA leadership ample time to modify any draft version to match the mood 
of the audience and the political situation.649 It is therefore interesting that the speech opens 
with “Comrades”, a form of address usually reserved for use between Party members. It may 
648 Szkoáa Gáówna Ekonomiczna im. Ludwika Krzywickiego. 1956, “Uchwaáa II Zjazdu Ekonomistów Polskich w sprawie 
uczczenia pamiĊci Ludwika Krzywickiego.” Ekonomista, 5, p.152 
649 As to the choice of L. Krzywicki, I assume that it was made before the Convention, but I have not found mention of it in 
the PEA files with documentation on the organisation process. 
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appear paradoxical that this term should have been used, given that the use of “comrade’ had 
been omitted by party members on many previous occasions, and replaced by traditional 
forms of address such as ‘honoured professor’. However, the use of ‘comrades’ makes sense 
if one considers that the principal message LipiĔski wished to convey in his address was of 
the desire for a more open-ended Marxism, and for a more inclusive policy towards 
economists who had been kept outside over the previous years. By applying it to a 
congregation which included such obvious non-members as Taylor, LipiĔski was negating the 
division into Party-scholars and others. The operation was made easier by the fact that term 
used for comrade in Polish, “towarzysz”, is not exclusive to communist or even socialist 
jargon. It can also be used of anyone sharing in hardships or struggles: a comrade in arms, a 
fellow traveller, or a partner. (The practice of using it as a form of address rather than a 
description, however, was peculiar to socialist and communist movements.) Finally, in a 
striking demonstration of the ease with which Polish academics returned to their previous 
mode of expression and left behind their stalinist personas, when the time came for Lange to 
make the closing remarks, he changed his rhetoric totally and cast off the constraints of 
newspeak. It was as if a completely different person was talking. 
If the choice of Krzywicki shows how far the organisers of the Convention had judged it wise 
to stretch the line in claiming autonomy from political considerations, then the unofficial 
homage paid to Taylor was a clear transgression of that carefully-drawn line. The unease it 
caused is reflected in a protocol from the PEA board meeting summing up the Convention: 
In the discussion President LipiĔski (…) declared that an opinion exists to the 
effect that an organisation has appeared with the aim of mobilising “old” 
economists for the Convention. Moreover he made allusions to the existence of 
“traces of a certain action on the margins, a partisan action with a strange 
political character.” (…) 
270
Colleague Rączkowski declared that the opinion mentioned by the Chairman [i.e. 
LipiĔski – AWH] about the Convention is not right. The atmosphere at the 
Convention bore testimony to the fact that the major part of the participants stood 
for a socialist economy, and young economic cadres set the tone at the Convention. 
Certain reactions in the audience were caused by factual objections among the 
young cadres, for example, in the reaction of the audience to the interventions of 
Minister Dietrich and citizen Rakowski. The speaker declared that rumours spread 
about the alleged appearance of reactionary elements at the Convention are 
incorrect and harmful, because they are untrue…650
What could have been behind the “rumours” which so upset the PEA board, and who had 
spread them, and where? The mere appearance of ‘old’ economists at the Convention and the 
fact that they took to the stand with lengthy, possibly prepared interventions may have been 
enough to cause concern. The document does not specify the origin of the rumours, but it is 
not difficult to identify the group which felt most threatened by the reappearance of ‘old’ 
economists on the scene. While disillusioned Marxist-Leninists with a reformist bent could 
see them as potential alliance partners (although they did not have to), orthodox Marxist-
Leninists had nothing but trouble to anticipate from their return. I am, however, at a loss to 
explain the obscure reference to ‘partisan action of a strange political character’. While it 
remains unclear, the import of this passage is that the PEA board had to deal with a confusing 
and diversified constituency – a contrast to the ‘clear’ picture of the early 1950s, with its 
repressed ‘reactionaries’ and triumphantly unified Marxist-Leninist position. 
Effects of the Thaw in academic institutions 
In academic institutions, the Thaw resulted in a step back from what had turned out to be the 
most unpopular changes introduced in the early fifties. The Party’s local and central organs 
stopped interfering, and the collegial academic bodies, the faculty councils, and the school 
senates, regained control over appointments, teaching programmes and degrees. These 
changes were perceived as a return to ‘normality’ and ‘justice’, and were applauded by the 
majority of scholars as well as by students. The University law was amended in 1958 to 
reflect the changes made spontaneously in 1956, as academic institutions had reverted to 
exerting the powers they had held prior to 1949. 
When students returned after the summer of 1956, they found that their academic institutions 
had been transformed. Scholars who had been moved away from their core areas were 
650 AAN/PTE/19:Dzial Organizacyjno-Prezydialny, Posiedzenia Zarzadu Gáównego i Prezydium Zarzadu Gáównego/ 
Protokol nr.1 22.6.56/pp.s.139-142 
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allowed to take up their former subjects and to assume positions of authority. Students could 
now attend lectures by Taylor and Adam KrzyĪanowski, and could learn about Keynes and 
Western economics. Oskar Lange was finally allowed to teach political economy. He no 
longer had to hide his knowledge of ‘western’ economics, and gave a lecture series which was 
immensely popular.651 At the Main School, Drewnowski, who had been reduced to earning 
his living by translating and occasional lecturing, now became professor, and was made dean. 
In àódĨ, Fabierkiewicz was re-admitted to a chair, and in Wrocáaw StyĞ returned to his former 
occupation. In Lange, Bobrowski, Brus and LipiĔski, Warsaw University’s Department of 
Political Economy could now boast of a staff with competence in both Marxist-Leninist and 
‘western’ economics, as well as with experience in policy making. At the Main School, one 
group of young economists gathered around Michaá Kalecki, and another around Aleksy 
Wakar, who had been released from a forced labour camp in the USSR. Provincial centres 
started expanding and gaining momentum once more. For those young economists whose 
careers had slumped in the past due to their failure to meet the ideological and political 
demands of the Party organisation, the return to influence of the ‘old’ staff meant new 
opportunities. At least a portion of those who had hoped to pursue academic careers in 
economics before 1949 were now drawn back and allowed to undertake or resume doctoral 
studies and habilitations. 
The students who enrolled in doctoral programmes in 1956 caused the number of doctorates 
in economics to rocket over the next few years. While 33 doctorates were defended in 1959, 
in the next year the figure nearly quadrupled (1960:121) and remained at a high level in 1961, 
with 81, and in 1962, with 91. This gives a total of 326 new doctors in four years, which is an 
enormous increase compared to the fourteen kandydat nauk degrees awarded between 1954 
and 1957. The number of habilitations awarding the degree of docent also increased, although 
not quite as spectacularly. From 1954 to 1957 there were 49 docents, and from 1960 to 1963 
there were 62.652 The tide of complaints about recruitment problems in economics subsided.  
The Main School produced over a third of the 329 doctorates between 1958 and 1963.653 It 
was followed by the Economic Colleges (WSE) in Kraków, PoznaĔ and Sopot each 
651 Ref. interview Sadowski/Brus/Kowalik with AWH 
652 Habilitations in economics 1960:9, 1961:18, 1962:24, 1963:11, total of 62. Numbers based on data published in Katalog
rozpraw doktorskich i habilitacyjnych Warszawa: PWN. vol. 1958-1961, 1962, 1963. 
653 Among the doctorates announced in Katalog doktoratów i habilitacji for the years 1958 to 1962, 120 out of a total of 329 
were submitted at the Main School of Planning and Statistics. Ibid. 
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contributing about 40 doctorates. The Katowice and Wrocáaw Colleges lay a step behind, with 
about 20 doctorates each. Among the universities, only Warsaw’s Department of Political 
Economy produced a significant number of doctors (33). Kraków and PoznaĔ Universities’ 
law departments and the Warsaw Polytechnic had less than five graduates each in these years. 
Not only did research students produce many new theses, but previously inactive academic 
staff also took up writing. The result was a resurgence of publications in the form of both 
books and articles which now filled the pages of Ekonomista and Economic Life.
Last but not least, the isolation from the West ended that year. In 1955 a delegation of French 
economists visited Poland, and in June 1956 a group of British economists travelled around 
the country.654 In fact, the British stumbled into demonstrations and shooting in PoznaĔ,
thereby receiving a rather more acute impression of the Polish economic and political crisis 
than could have been expected.655 The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations established contact, 
and extended fellowship programmes that allowed young Polish scholars to study in Western 
academic institutions. Polish economists became popular consultants on economic policy for 
third world countries such as India, Egypt, Iraq, Ghana, and Algeria, and those whose contact 
with Western scholarship had ceased in 1948/1949 could now travel, receive books, and 
entertain visitors. To give an impression of the changes I will quote from Drewnowski’s 
autobiographic sketch: 
In September 1956, the PEA sent a delegation consisting of over ten people to the 
Congress of the International Economic Association in Rome. This was my first trip 
abroad since the visit to Geneva in October 1948. For the second trimester of the 
academic year 1956/57 I was invited by University of Manchester as Simon 
Visiting Professor. I spent February and March of 1957 there. In June of 1957 I 
took part in a PEA delegation to a convention of Yugoslav economists in Zagreb 
and in a trip round Yugoslavia arranged by the hosts for this delegation. In 
September 1957 I took part in a Polish-British seminar in economy and sociology 
organised by the London School of Economics under the auspices of UNESCO, 
and in June of 1958 in a seminar on the subject of theory of capital organised by 
the International Economic Association at Corfu, Greece656.
654 My informations on the visit of the French economists comes from AMSZ/8 /631/48 Wycieczki i podróĪe 1954-1955. 
Plans and reports from the visit of 14 French economists in Poland 7-20.12.1955. pp.2-65 
The visit of British economists was recorded in AAN/PTE/20 Sprawozdanie Zarządu Gáównego PTE 10.06.1956-27.05.1958 
655 One of the British participants on the trip, Peter Wiles, published his account of the events Wiles, Peter J.D., 1957. 
"Changing Economic Thought in Poland". Oxford Economic Papers, 9, 190-208. One of the group’s Polish guides, Stanisáaw
Rączkowski shared his vivid recollections with me during an interview conducted in Warsaw in 2000.  
656 Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 35, 451-489. I am quoting form 
the revised edition posted on http://www.pte.pl and accessed 18.12.2007 pp.20-21 
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While economists who had started their careers before 1948 resumed their old contacts, for 
many Marxist-Leninist economists this would be a first opportunity to see and study western 
economies and scholarship. However, they had some serious reading to do before they could 
converse with Polish ‘non-Marxists’ and Western economists. Kalecki’s lecture at the Second 
Convention demonstrated the existence of not only a linguistic but also a methodological gap 
between Marxist-Leninist economists and the West. The formalised, mathematically-oriented 
economics he presented must have been as incomprehensible to a Marxist-Leninist political 
economist as to a contemporary historian, though the area would hardly present any problems 
to present-day economists.  
The Thaw and reputation control 
I have already mentioned the increase in the number of doctoral degrees and habilitations 
after 1956, but the effects of the Thaw on reputation control merit more attention. We left the 
Social Science Section of the CQC in 1955, when it was finally beginning to function 
smoothly: that is, in terms of its efficiency in making decisions, of the number of candidates 
processed, and of the number of times each case was discussed. However, an analysis of 
discussions within the Section reveals that the efficiency of the CQC work in 1955 concealed 
severe conflicts inside the CQC, as well as problems caused by the effects of the CQC’s “rule 
of exceptions”. 
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 In 1957, the effects of the Thaw were fully felt, and the numbers inTable 13 show 
unprecedented achievements in all categories: the greatest number of candidates, the longest 
discussions over cases, and the highest number of rejections of candidatures. The subsequent 
stabilisation of the situation lasted until the point when the CQC was dissolved and the final 
four candidates were transferred to the body which replaced the CQC. 
Table 13: CQC treatment of economics: 1954-1960.657
 Cases Candidates Negative decisions
1954 59 41   
1955 23 22 4 
1956 46 42 6 
1957 73 56 9 
1958 42 40 5 
1959 37 33 4 
1960 9 7 4 
1957-1960 161 114 22
The 1951 University Law was amended in 1958, and many of the novelties introduced in 
reputation control were reversed. We may recall that the competences of the CQC included 
the allocation of the titles of professor, doktor nauk and kandydat nauk. Because of the 
extension period allowed for economists, CQC also approved docents. After 1956 both doktor
nauk and kandydat nauk programmes were replaced with the traditional doctor and docent 
degrees, and the right to accord these degrees was restored to academic institutions.658 Despite 
the general assumption that the CQC would be dismantled soon after 1956, it continued 
operating until 1960, although now in a very different climate. Final decisions on professorial 
titles were moved to the Government and a new Central Qualification Commission was 
created under the aegis of the Polish Academy of Science in 1960.  
Measures which had been introduced to make Polish science more like Soviet science were 
abandoned. All kand.nauk degree holders were granted the right to the ‘old’ doctoral degree, 
and dr.nauk holders became docents. The now publicly-infamous ‘zastĊpca profesora’
(deputy professor) title was replaced with that of ‘docent etatowy’ (docent in permanent 
657 The figures in this table are based on a count of a manual count of cases of economists referred to by stenographic reports 
of the CQC Social Science Section. Due to possible errors and omissions they should only be regarded as a indication of a 
trend. AAN/MSzW/2781-2787 
658 “Ustawa z dnia 5.11.1958 o Szkoáach WyĪszych.” Dziennik Ustaw RP, nr.68 poz.336, pp.859-872 
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position), and the condition that the holder should be in possession of a docent degree was 
added.659 A great number of ‘deputy professors’ who merely had Masters degrees (mgr.) 
risked losing their positions unless they supplemented their qualifications; a measure which 
no doubt stimulated the rush of doctorates in the following years. By making the graduates 
from the aspirantura programmes in the ITSC and the Soviet Union indistinguishable from 
graduates with ‘old fashioned’ doctorates and habilitations, the distinction between the Party-
sponsored scholars and others became blurred. This meant a volte-face in the Party’s policy 
regarding earlier plans for the creation of its own elite. The policy between 1948 and 1955 
had aimed at ensuring that the new Marxist-Leninist scholars should be clearly distinguished 
by different diplomas and qualifications from those not approved or backed by the Party. The 
measures adopted from 1956, on the other hand, aimed to blend the Party intellectuals in with 
other scholars.660
For the CQC Social Science Section, the confrontation with the now-vociferous non-Marxist 
scholars following the Thaw meant that their practices were liable for revision. The influence 
of the non-Marxist scholars on the work of the CQC now changed in character and 
importance. References to opinions circulating “in the field” abound in the Section 
discussions, especially from the second part of 1955 onwards. The members of the CQC 
Social Science Section felt their position to be increasingly difficult, as they were identified 
with the decisions of the CQC and burdened with the responsibility for its failings. 
Complaints concerned the centralisation of decisions, the uneven treatment of candidates 
perceived as equals in their milieus, and delays. By the end of 1955, the Social Science 
Section members were admitting to each other that the activities of the CQC had led to a 
devaluation of the degrees and titles it controlled. It is important to recall that, unlike 
bureaucrats, they faced their critics daily, and that there was no institutional or social distance 
between themselves and their ‘subjects’. Over time, as the sense of freedom of expression 
increased, there was a proliferation in the number of recriminations and grievances voiced and 
transmitted to the Section members, and the Section members’ sensitivity to this criticism 
grew. Concern over the impact of decisions perceived as unjust to individuals and 
communities appears to have weighed more heavily on the members than the more abstract 
problem of the devaluation of the prestige of academic titles and degrees.  
659 “Ustawa z dnia 5.11.1958 o Szkoáach WyĪszych.” Dziennik Ustaw RP, nr.68 poz.336, pp.859-872 art.144/1-2 and 1947/3. 
660 The ITSC itself lost its position and influence. See Connelly on Schaff and ĩóákiewski’s certainty that given time their 
new elites would take over the academic communities.Connelly, John, 1996. "Elite Social Science Training in Stalinist 
Poland." Minerva, 34, 323-346. 
276
At the first meeting of the CQC after the Second Convention of Economists in June 1956, 
Brus made clear his realisation that the majority of economists did not back him, and that he 
was no longer willing to shoulder the workload or the responsibility alone. 
Brus: … In addition, the situation is that the decisions of the Section are sometimes 
based on the opinion of the person presenting the case. For instance, within the 
field of economics, no one else comes to the meetings and so I often make the 
decision single-handedly. There are two things: not only does the Section have an 
enormous agenda, but also the person presenting a case does not have the time to 
study it. Basically this means doing bad work. There are huge complaints about 
each one of us; each one of us is hated. The Section ought to be expanded.661
In addition, the call for a renewal of the composition of the CQC, too intimately identified 
with all that now came under criticism, was central in the resignation letter of Jakubowski, a 
member of the CQC Technical Sciences Section. Other CQC Sections also struggled with the 
same kinds of problem: 
In my opinion, under its present composition and management the Central 
Qualification Committee has fulfilled its mission, and it is urgent that people 
proposed directly or indirectly by the totality of scientific workers should take up 
work in it. My opinion is further strengthened by the fact that in the body of the 
CQC there are people whose prestige is not acknowledged by scientific workers.662
Wasilkowski, Lange and Brus resigned from their functions in the CQC in 1956. Wasilkowski 
and Lange justified their resignations by citing health problems and lack of time, while Brus 
argued that it was now the moment to bring new people into the Section. Lange and Brus 
were replaced by Edward LipiĔski and Jan Drewnowski, and the Section was extended to 
include another four economists: K. Secomski, S. Waszak, T. àychowski, and A. Brzoza.663
To have a solid group of economists actively participating in the work of the Section meant 
that the candidatures of economists would now be discussed by those from their discipline.
Before the Thaw, the task of allocation of academic titles was complicated by a conflict 
between the political demand for loyal Party academics and the academic demand for 
scholarly qualifications. The fact that many exceptions were made to these qualitative and 
merit-based requirements resulted in the systematic application of double standards, through 
661 AAN/MSzW/2785/ CQC: Stenographic report of the meeting in Sekcja Nauk Spoáecznych 23.06.56/ p.244 
662 AAN/MSzW/2780a/p.406/05.11.1956/ Letter of resignation from the CQC Section for Technical Sciences of 
prof.dr.inz.J.L. Jakubowski. 
663 Stanisáaw Waszak (1906-1974) at the time of his appointment he was deputy professor at the chair of statistics of the 
Economic College (WSE) in PoznaĔ.
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which party activists received special treatment and non-party applicants encountered special 
hindrances. In 1956-1957 a number of appeals against decisions made in previous years were 
judged in favour of the applicant. This is clearly demonstrated in the last part of the saga of 
the candidates from Kraków discussed in the previous chapter. Three assistant professorship 
candidatures (prof.nadzw.) were scaled down by the Section, and one was refused the title of 
docent. In 1956 their cases were re-opened, and in 1957 the original, higher-ranking titles 
proposed by their home institutions were accorded to all four.  
Kraków and PoznaĔ, the largest centres of economics outside Warsaw, had represented a 
threat to the Warsaw-based Marxist-Leninist economists even during the ‘lean years’ of 1949-
1955. From the Second Convention onwards, they returned to prominent positions in the 
discipline. If the ‘Young Turks’ faced competition from LipiĔski’s students, the PoznaĔ and 
Kraków communities also posed a threat, housing as they did a number of economists with all 
their scholarly qualifications in order and now awaiting a rapid acceleration in the progress of 
their careers.  
The promotion of Kraków economists somewhat optimistically proposed in 1954 was effected 
only after 1956. The economists from PoznaĔ took a much more cautious approach, refraining 
from sending cases to Warsaw and the CQC until they felt completely secure that they had a 
good chance of being accepted. It is very difficult to document actions that were not 
undertaken, but according to the testimony of the PoznaĔ economist WilczyĔski, the school 
authorities held his promotion back during the early 1950s, apparently because they could not 
secure a positive review of his work from Brus. Considering the workload Brus had to 
contend with, and the fact that the work in question was not within his speciality, his non-
acceptance of the task of reviewing this particular case cannot alone be proof of conscious 
discrimination. It was however part of a system where the PoznaĔ WSE authorities rightly 
perceived that, without the goodwill of the individuals at the summit of this highly centralised 
system, a thesis written under the supervision of Professor Edward Taylor would not stand a 
chance.664
After the appointment of Stanisáaw Waszak to the Section, the PoznaĔ group recognised that 
things had changed, and in 1957 the junior PoznaĔ faculty cases were finally heard. They 
serve as a good illustration of the strange, ambiguous regime which followed 1956, and they 
664 My information about this case comes from interviews with WilczyĔski and Brus respectively. As the case was never sent 
over to the CQC, I have not had access to any archival material corroborating or contradicting their statements. A.W. 
Haugstad interviews with Wáodzimierz Brus (Oxford 2001) and Wacáaw WilczyĔski. (PoznaĔ 2000) 
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show how by 1958 the Section had become acutely aware of the reactions to their decisions in 
the field, and had started to pre-empt anticipated responses. Three candidates for the docent 
title from PoznaĔ appeared simultaneously before the Section in March 1958. Dr. 
Jankowiak’s candidature was heard first, and was passed after a long discussion, followed by 
the case of Dr. Wierzbicki. When this candidature met resistance, Waszak argued as follows: 
Professor Waszak: Among these three, we have here Jankowiak, SmoliĔski, and 
Wierzbicki at our local school; we place Wierzbicki at the front, despite the 
paradox that he could appear to be weak in production, especially compared with 
Jankowiak. Without doubt, intellectually Wierzbicki really is someone at the 
school. He has a certain deficiency, which causes an arrhythmia in his work, 
namely he is suffering from a serious lung disease. Besides, he is an extremely shy 
person, he knows the proper order of things, and despite my urging him to submit 
the work that he is now preparing, he has begged me not to present it here. It is an 
unfortunate coincidence that this trio has appeared today, and that one has 
already been dealt with – I can tell how opinion at the school works.665
Arguments in favour of Wierzbicki were that among PoznaĔ economists he was held in the 
highest esteem of all the candidates, and that he refused to mislead by for example adding 
unfinished work to his list of merits. It was enough to have his candidature considered. There 
are some unanswered questions, however. If Wierzbicki did not want to include his unfinished 
work, why was his case placed on the CQC’s agenda at this stage? Why did he not wait until 
he had finished? Was it because the PoznaĔ school authorities feared that the changing 
political climate might make it dangerous for him to postpone his case? We are reminded that 
while the CQC discussions provide us with a great deal of information, they hardly allow us 
to pass fair judgement on the actual merit or motives of the candidates and their academic 
patrons.
Discussion of the third candidate was delayed, as yet another reviewer had to be called upon. 
At the next meeting, however, Waszak continued his offensive: 
665 AAN/MSzW/2787/20.03.1958 
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Professor Waszak: This procedure is beginning to alarm me, for some things must 
be considered not only from our point of view, but also from the point of view of 
the school. There was a group of three. Two have been passed. We did not look 
into them, i.e. we accepted the output as it was, we trusted the reviews we had on 
the table. Now here we decided for an additional review. This additional review is 
here, and is positive. And again we are in doubt and want to postpone the matter. 
The nature of the matter, it is difficult to treat this as a very important argument, 
but it needs to be said: those two non-Party candidates (i.e. Jankowiak and 
Wierzbicki – AWH) were passed, this one is a Party member. Oh, but I already see 
the excuses I will have to formulate, why it is that those two others were passed, 
and this one not…666
Finally, as with Wierzbicki, Waszak also added that another piece of work was under way – 
one he had seen and could vouch for, and the third candidate was approved by the Section. 
The significance of Waszak’s reference to the political affiliation of the candidate is 
ambiguous. It has the sound of a veiled threat, or was at least a reminder to the members of 
the Section that decisions which could appear to be at the discrimination of PUWP members 
could have unpleasant consequences. A month had gone by since the previous meeting, where 
the two non-party PoznaĔ economists had been passed, a month during which Waszak may 
have already received some hints from the Party organisation at home that they would not 
accept such a decision. After all, the reviews had been positive, and the source does not 
mention the reasons why the Section wanted to postpone the matter yet again: there may have 
been a mundane wish to end a long meeting, or misgivings about the quality of the work. It is 
also unclear as to whom Waszak feared he would have to address his excuses if SmoliĔski
was not passed. I do not think he was referring to his fellow scholars; after all, he had already 
made it clear that from the ‘school point of view’ the favourite candidate was Wierzbicki. 
More likely therefore is that the excuses would be addressed to the local party organisation, 
either at the school or in the regional committee. While the 1956 events had upset and 
immobilised the Party organisation, by 1958 it was up and running again, and well capable of 
protecting and promoting the interests of party members vis-à-vis the academic establishment. 
Waszak did not intimate that his position would be intolerable, rather that it would be 
awkward and unpleasant. He evoked the spectre of the local guardians of political orthodoxy 
at the institution, and reminded the Section members that their decisions were not only being 
watched and judged by scholars in their disciplines, but also by the political authorities. It is 
uncertain whether it was this particular argument or an appeal for the equal treatment of all 
666 AAN/MSzW/2787/24.04.1958/p.190 
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three cases which made the Section pass a decision rather than further delay the case. What 
we know for sure is that Waszak, clearly a skilled player, had felt that the political argument 
was worth using, and through careful planning had succeeded in obtaining solutions for his 
protégées. The way in which he first pushed through the candidate who had the strongest 
dossier, and then used this as a lever to promote the candidate he argued was the most gifted, 
and finally the one with the best political credentials, is either due to pure luck or to an 
extremely well-prepared case. I lean towards the latter view, but rather than being a 
compliment to Waszak’s negotiation skills, the significance of this episode is that it shows 
how dependent the outcome was on the goodwill and commitment of the person presenting 
the case. Prior to 1956, the absence of representatives from the provincial communities had 
placed candidates from outside Warsaw in a disadvantaged position. Waszak’s performance 
shows that by 1958 the PoznaĔ economists knew the Warsaw political-academic landscape 
well enough to manoeuvre within it successfully. By comparison, the Kraków candidates who 
tried their luck in 1954 and 1955 found themselves without supporters in the Warsaw 
Marxist-Leninist milieu. The radically different political climates of 1954 and 1958 account 
for much of the difference, but we should also consider the fact that the Kraków academic 
community was regarded with particular suspicion by the Communist regime.667 It had proved 
to be the most resistant to the ‘new reality’ of communism, and had continued to refuse 
legitimacy to the Marxist-Leninist newcomers and to honour the ‘old’ reputation hierarchy. 
The PoznaĔ economists, on the other hand, had many links with people in central positions in 
the capital, and were much more closely integrated into the political elite in Warsaw. A 
number of Edward Taylor’s students, such as TrąmpczyĔski, the director of the National 
Bank, retained bonds with their old milieu and could provide information on and protection 
from those in influential positions in the central state administration.  
Does SmoliĔski’s case suggest continued favouring at the CQC of candidates endorsed by the 
Party? The sources used here do not allow us to draw such general conclusions, but an 
analogy with the pre-1956 period would suggest that discrimination against ideologically-
controversial candidates still took place at lower levels, in academic institutions, and at the 
Ministry. Drewnowski, who was dean of the Main School at the time, recounts how, despite 
his best efforts, the career of a candidate with a ‘difficult’ political record was set back. 
Szynkaruk- Sulmicki’s doctorate, defended in Switzerland during the War, was not 
667 Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-
1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
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acknowledged by the committee established for the purpose by the faculty, forcing him to 
submit his habilitation work as a doctoral thesis.668 For Drewnowski, this 1958 case was the 
call that announced that the Thaw was over. 
Also worth noting from discussions in the post-1956 period is that the Section now chose to 
trust the majority of the reviewers, in contrast to the first period of CQC activity, when all 
positive reviews were dismissed if the CQC expert alone was against them. Lastly, an internal 
decision by the CQC in 1958 stated that henceforth even in cases where the exception article 
was applied,669 the candidate had to hold a doctorate or kand.nauk degree. From what I have 
seen, the decision was upheld in the case of economists, and no more rapid promotions from 
master to docent occurred. However, based on the source material from the CQC, it would 
seem that there was no clear re-drawing of the lines. Despite evidence that the prevailing view 
among academics was that scientific merit alone should be the basis for reputation 
distribution, public pronouncements endorsed by political authorities to the same effect are 
hard to find.
There was no immediate dissolution of the CQC or any public repudiation of its former 
practice. A public admission that degrees were often awarded for political rather than 
scientific merit would have tainted all degrees dispensed by the CQC, and would have 
required a new ‘verification’ of all these degrees and titles. That could not happen without the 
political leadership’s firm and public commitment to a reform of reputation control, yet an 
official statement that ideology and Party matters would now take second place in the 
evaluation of scholars and their work was not forthcoming. Even during the hey-day of 
freedom of expression in mid 1956, suggestions that the Party should abdicate from its 
position as the leading force in all spheres of social and political life, bar the Catholic Church, 
was outside the limits of the possible. Hence, the pretence was outwardly sustained that 
academic quality had been the key criterion all along, that it had always co-existed with 
ideological merit, and that no conflict need appear between these two. Without a public 
political abdication from interference in research and reputation control, the best the academic 
communities could hope for was that scientific merit would have precedence over questions 
668 Drewnowski, Jan, 1990. "Autobiografia naukowa". Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki, 35, 451-489. Quote form the 
revised edition posted on http://www.pte.pl and accessed 18.12.2007 p.22 
669 The ‘exception’ article was not abolished with the reformualtion of the Law on Universities, but was renamed Art.56/3. 
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of the political suitability of the candidate and his work. The confusion about the criteria for 
promotion in economics, and also no doubt in other social sciences, did not end in 1956. 
The Marxist-Leninist scholars’ novel propensity for blending in with the majority created new 
conditions for reputation control. By the late 1950s Party members were omnipresent in 
academic institutions, allowing the Party to rely on them to exert the necessary ‘vigilance’ and 
to hinder ideologically hostile candidates. Nevertheless, this was not a foolproof system, and 
it allowed for a greater proportion of ‘politically unreliable’ but talented and skilled scholars 
to ‘slip through’ than had been the case before 1956. Individual attitudes grew in importance, 
as one loyal party scholar in a faculty could be enough to block all or most unsuitable 
candidates there, while party members who placed scientific considerations above their 
membership cards could create oases where only academic merit counted. Such a strict 
division into ‘party loyal’ and ‘scientific merit’ oriented scholars certainly applied in some 
cases, but some academics chose whether the scientific merit or the political argument suited 
their current particular or institutional interests. When he perceived this could help him 
succeed in achieving a candidate’s promotion, Waszak did not refrain from mentioning the 
political capital of his candidate, even while making it clear that he did not consider this 
argument to be relevant to the discussion. B. Minc, who according to Drewnowski was 
instrumental in holding Sulmicki back by refusing to accept his Swiss doctorate, employed 
and protected several young economists with politically questionable views and CVs at his 
own Atelier and later Institute for Economics at the Polish Academy of Science.670
An interesting example of the workings of the post-1956 reputation distribution system is the 
1963 habilitation of Stefan Kurowski, the bold speaker at the Second Convention, which I am 
tempted to mention despite its falling outside the chronological boundaries of this study. The 
study “Historical process of economic growth” was written under B. Minc’s tutelage and 
accepted by him and a committee of Main School professors as a habilitation thesis. However, 
according to Gadomski, selected quotes were brought to the attention of Gomuáka. This 
resulted in the habilitation being redrawn, and the Main School and the Polish Academy of 
Sciences being accused of harbouring counter-revolutionary forces in Gomuáka’s speech at 
the 13th PUWP CC plenum in July 1963.671 The cause of the fracas was that Kurowski had 
670 Among others S. Kurowski was employed there, and later T. Kowalik. 
671 Gadomski, Witold, 2002, “Splątane ĞcieĪki profesora”, Gazeta Wyborcza (12-13.01.2002), p.18 
APMW/PZPR/KW/716 Archival documents reveal the reaction of the Party. During a meeting of the Basic Party 
organisation of the Main School held on 9.07.1963 individual scholars who had approved Kurowski’s habilitation thesis were 
held accountable. The Council of the Department of Finance and Statistics where the thesis had been defended was obliged to 
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used analyses of historical data on iron and steel production to argue that the socialist 
economy would never catch up with or overtake capitalism. Kurowski’s case was used by the 
PUWP to redraw the line of how far the scholars could be allowed to ignore the needs and 
priorities of the political leadership. The political implications of Kurowski’s thesis are 
obvious – it offered scientifically-founded proof that socialism was inferior to capitalism. 
Given what we know about Gomuáka’s inflexible intellectual character and stubborn 
adherence to the idea that the PUWP’s rule and Soviet tutelage were the only things which 
kept Poland safe from fascism and German revisionism, as well as his auto-didact’s 
scepticism towards intellectual elites, it is tempting to ask how anyone, let alone B. Minc, 
could think that this study would be rewarded with a degree without a political row ensuing. 
Had they not read the work closely enough to realise what Kurowski was saying? Did they 
believe that there would be no repercussions as long as these opinions were restricted to the 
limited readership of economic monographs? If so, was such an assumption based on 
experience? Had studies that were potentially equally politically controversial already slipped 
through, and had Kurowski just been unlucky enough to be noticed?672 1963 is mentioned by 
Z. Landau as one of the moments when the screw was tightened in cultural policy, just as the 
last reformist, liberal cultural periodicals were being closed down. Kurowski’s case could 
then also have been part of such a campaign, but more research is needed before more than 
sketchy suggestions can be formulated.  
The Time of the Economists 
In 1956 Bobrowski returned from the exile which had followed his demise in the CPB, and 
labelled the period which then began “The time of the economists”.673 While not denying the 
importance of the changes within the discipline and the academic institutions which have so 
far been the subject of this chapter, it should be pointed out that it was not these that he was 
referring to. The Second Convention had seen the start of the ‘model debate’, an important 
series of discussions on the state of the economy and on ways of improving it. With the 
establishment of the Economic Council, economists were once more invited to offer advice on 
hold a meeting to criticise Kurowski’s work and the BOP was to organise a meeting to check on the ideological content of 
other thesis which were being submitted. 
672 MysliĔski points out that the level of control and permissiveness correlated with the extent of distribution of a given 
medium. That which from 1956 could pass muster in publications with limited readerships such as Ekonomista, could not 
pass in the more widely read weekly Polityka and even less the dailies. Lojek, Jerzy, MysliĔski, Jerzy & Wáadyka, Wiesáaw,
1988. Dzieje prasy polskiej Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Interpress. 
673 The expression was used in a lecture given at the Sorbonne in 1961 Source: RFE report located in Herder Press archive. 
“The time of the economists” had been preceded in his view by “The time of the organisers” during his own chairmanship of 
the CPB in the first years after the War and “The time of the technocrats” between 1949 and 1955. 
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policy-making. For a brief period, from 1956 to 1958, economists became central protagonists 
in the nation-wide debate on the state of the economy and on its necessary reforms. Kowalik, 
then editor of Economic Life, later described the genesis of the Economic Council and the 
beginning of the model debate at the Second Convention thus: 
The dome of the Planning Commission’s building formed a lid upon a veritable 
cauldron, in which various well-cooked or raw reform projects were prepared, for 
example, about the establishment of a Social Inquiry Commission, an Economic 
Council, etc., but where above all accusatory speeches were made.674
Both the ‘model debate’ and the activities of the Economic Council were of immense 
importance to economists, both within and outside academic institutions. 
The ‘model debate’ 
The liberalisation in early 1956 led to the re-emergence of public discussion of economic 
policy. Economists were active participants in the discussions on the social costs of the 
‘hyper-industrialisation’ and performance of the economy.675 The economic debate started 
rather later than those in other areas, such as literature. I believe that this relative tardiness of 
the Thaw among economists cannot be fully explained by Suleja’s observation that many 
academics were cautious in the early stages of the liberalisation, and unwilling to risk their 
positions,676 recalling only too well how closely the political and scholarly aspects were 
intertwined in the Central Office of Planning debate of 1948. As long as the political 
leadership was unwilling to allow criticism of the economic policy, the economists’ debates 
could have no momentum. Despite the fact that the national economy faced serious problems, 
there was no haste on the part of the PUWP leadership to engage in controversial discussions 
over their economic policy. During the spring of 1956, Economic Life was overhauled, the 
Second Convention was convened, and the first ideas on the need for a body of experts to 
advise on economic reforms were taken up. It was in June 1956 that the ‘time of economists’ 
began, because the explosive discussions at the Second Convention were followed by an 
eruption of social discontent in PoznaĔ, with disgruntlement triggering a revolt under the 
banner of “bread and freedom”. According to KaliĔski, despite some statements in late 1955 
that indicated a greater awareness of the social consequences of intensive industrialisation, 
674 Tadeusz Kowalik, 1966, “Trzy listy i kilka wspomnieĔ o Oskarze Langem” Polityka,  41 (8.10.1966) 
675 The term was used by B. RumiĔski in the CC discussion of economic policy in July 1956, and quoted by KaliĔski, Janusz, 
1995. Gospodarka Polski w latach 1944-1989. Przemiany strukturalne. Warszawa: PaĔstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne. 
p.80
676 Suleja, Teresa, 1995. Uniwersytet Wrocáawski w okresie centralizmu stalinowskiego, 1950-1955. Wrocáaw: Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Wrocáawskiego. 
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there was no sign of any serious attempt to alter economic policy until the PoznaĔ revolt.677
Public debates and criticism, and the explosion of social unrest in other cities in addition to 
PoznaĔ, finally brought the economic crisis to the forefront of the attention of both the 
leadership and newly-awakened public opinion and the press.
The focus of the analysis in this section is the economic debate that ran in the periodicals, 
these being read by a much wider public than Ekonomista or other scholarly journals. 678 The 
lion’s share of this debate was printed in Economic Life, with some responses in Po Prostu,
and, after its abolition, in Polityka. We can divide the debate into roughly two phases, relating 
firstly to what was published in the press during the summer following the Second 
Convention, and secondly to the work of the Economic Council (EC). There appears to be 
some controversy as to the relative importance of these two stages. According to Bobrowski:
As for economic matters, despite the rather large number of individual reflections, 
the period before October did not bring any precise or rich formulations. These 
were to appear only as a result of the work of the Economic Council.679
However, the historian Kazimierz Kloc observes that during this period (June 1956-January 
1957), a crystallisation of three reform alternatives took place. Bobrowski’s bias in favour of 
the work of the Economic Council is explained not only by his role as the primum mobile of 
the EC, but also by the fact that he had returned from exile only in November and had not 
been present during the first part of the debate. Also, considering his experience, and his 
strong preference for policy-making over academic pursuits, it is safe to assume that for him 
reform measures were more important than a pluralistic and varied debate would be for 
scholars who had been cut off from such opportunities for several years. From the perspective 
of the discipline of economics and its practitioners, I will therefore side with Kloc in his focus 
on the press debate. We may also note that the debate occurred before the turning of the 
liberalisation tide in October. The Economic Council, on the other hand, was active during the 
period when the Party leadership gradually regained control and started the process of 
disciplining the cultural, political and scientific spheres.  
Kloc’s analysis of the press debate leads him to identify three groups. At one extreme were 
those making far-reaching proposals for movement towards markets and competition in the 
677 KaliĔski, Janusz, 1987. Polityka gospodarcza Polski w latach 1948-1956. Warszawa: KiW. p.79-83 
678 In Poland, the cultural monthlies and weeklies have traditionally been the scene of debates on culture, society and 
politics.MysliĔski, Jerzy, 1988. Prasa w Polsce Ludowej. In E.A. Jerzy Lojek (ed.) Dzieje prasy polskiej. Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Interpress. p.174 
679 Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.233  
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economy, the ‘value wing’ (wartosciowcy). The most prominent among them were S. 
Kurowski, J. Popkiewicz and A. Brzeski, who had made their public debuts at the Second 
Convention. According to Kloc they: 
…proposed to base the economic mechanism on independent enterprises 
maximising profit. The central plan would have a co-ordinating or corrective 
function. … In sum this was a proposal to reconstruct a market system, with 
practically all of a market system’s institutions and law, but without the reversion 
to private ownership of means of production. Workers’ committees were to take the 
place of the private owner, thereby guaranteeing the socialist character of the 
economy.680
According to Kloc, those opposing the value wing reproached it for inconsequence and a 
paucity of solutions to the issues of capital flow, and to the lack of incentives for the workers’ 
councils to make investments. Kloc also concludes that this was an option that met with sharp 
criticism from the majority of economists and politicians, and that it was marginal and never 
seriously considered. However, the existence of the ‘value wing’ is significant when seen 
from the perspective of this study. The mere possibility of voicing such ideas and of having 
them published in a widely-read weekly, and the fact of being met with constructive criticism 
rather than denigration and ridicule, is central to an understanding of the developments in 
economics. The majority of the reformers coalesced around the idea of the combination of a 
market and a planned economy. Kloc distinguishes two groups in their midst, based on an 
interpretation of their views on how a reform plan was to be drawn up. He places Lange and 
Brus in the ‘model group’, as their approach was to work deductively on a total plan of 
reform. The other faction consisted of ‘realists’, represented by Bobrowski and Kalecki, who 
were more cautious about suggesting radical measures and total solutions. There were of 
course those who defended the existing system and resisted the proposed changes. Their 
voices were not often heard in the academic and public debates, but constituted a decisive 
force in the economic policy institutions.681 The debate shows that the overwhelming majority 
of economists wanted change. This is not surprising given the economic difficulties that were 
made public during that year, and their previous lack of access to the formulation and 
discussion of the Six Year Plan. In essence, economists were resuming their usual business: 
commenting on economic development; assessing problems; and discussing possible 
680Kloc, Kazimierz, 1997. "Rady robotnicze kontra socjalizm rynkowy". Polska 1944/45-1989, 3, 119-136. p.127 
681 Ibid. p.129 
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solutions.682  It was not merely a hypothetical discussion, as prominent economists were 
invited to participate in the new advisory body, the Economic Council. 
For an understanding of the evolution of the field of economics, the content of the ideas under 
discussion is less important than the fact that discussions were taking place, that opinions 
were being exchanged, and that attempts at finding compromises and solutions were being 
made. It was crucial that all those who wished to do so could take part in the debate, and that 
no-one would seriously deny the right of others to express opinions. The ‘Marxist-Leninist’ 
versus ‘bourgeois’ duality lost its relevance as the difference of opinions on other issues 
became significant. Economists were now able to choose sides without the dictates of the 
Party organisation, and to sort themselves into groups with shared ideas and concerns. 
The Economic Council 
At the Second Convention, the economists broadcast the fact that they were not being 
consulted or even informed about economic policy, and it was claimed that in enterprises they 
were paid and heeded less than the engineers. The Six Year Plan had been formed, modified 
and carried out without any public debate or consultation of economists in academic 
positions. Worse still, economists working on related issues had not been granted access to 
information about the Six Year Plan, nor about the Five Year Plan that was now under way, 
because of the extensive secrecy of data. The central role that political economy had been 
promised by the Party in the early 1950s had not materialised. 
There was some delay between the proposal being formulated at the Second Convention and 
the establishment of the Council. Representatives of the PEA formally submitted the proposal 
to Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz on August 23rd,683 and in November the prospect of leading 
the Council was held out to Bobrowski, precipitating his decision to return to Poland.684
According to Bobrowski, there was some bickering about who was to lead the new Council, 
which ended with a compromise resulting in a group of five vice-presidents.685 Bobrowski 
682 For more on these discussions, see Stankiewicz, E. àukawer,  Z historii polskiej myĞli ekonomicznej 1945-1995. 
(Warszawa : 1996), J. Kleer, 'Teoria przemocy jako podstawa analizy gospodarki socjalistycznej.' Ekonomista, 1-2 (1995), 
107-119.
683 “EkonomiĞci u Premiera Cyrankiewicza” Trybuna Ludu, 24.08.1956, nr 236 
684 During the summer of 1956, impressed by the book on the Yugoslav economic model and by a certain aura of victimhood 
from the Central Office of Planning debate, the young economists from Economic Life, had written to Bobrowski calling on 
him to return. Kowalik, Tadeusz & Hausner, Jerzy, 2000. Polscy Ekonomisci w Swiecie Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe 
PWN.p.284
685 President: Oskar Lange;  
Vice-presidents: Czesáaw Bobrowski, Wáodzimierz Brus, Michaá Kalecki, Edward LipiĔski, Edmund Pszczóákowski, 
Kazimierz Secomski,  
Members: Stefan Barcikowski, Wáadysáaw BieĔkowski, Franciszek Blinowski, Stanisáaw Bretsznajder, Stanisáaw CieĞlak, 
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and Cyrankiewicz’s original idea was that Bobrowski would be the president, but he readily 
accepted Lange as the formal president of the council on the condition that he would be the 
executive leader. Eventually, since the idea that Lange and Bobrowski, both former socialists, 
should dominate the Council was not acceptable to the Party, the top level of the group was 
extended with five more vice-presidents. Bobrowski explained the political leadership’s 
readiness to invest him with authority as being in expiation for 1948, when he was forced to 
resign from the CPB. The composition of the leadership of the Economic Council reflects the 
political confusion of the autumn of 1956. According to Bobrowski, Brus was included in the 
group as the guardian of the orthodoxy, which is surprising since by that time he was already 
turning towards a revisionist stance. The presence of Lange, Kalecki and LipiĔski speaks of 
the concern that the body should have a high level of academic competence, but despite the 
fact that this is considered to be the most liberal period of the decade, there was never any 
mention of non-socialist economists being included, nor was any academic economist based 
outside Warsaw invited. 
In the presentation of the 35 members in the press we can discern a tendency to stretch the 
label of “Economist” and “Professor” by including Stefan JĊdrychowski, Julian Kole, and 
Franciszek Blinowski, who were all key members of the Party economic policy team. Only 
one person represented the Party leadership, the young and dynamic CC secretary Edward 
Gierek. To the public, the EC was presented as an expert body, not a Party-controlled one. 
However, in his autobiography, Bobrowski speaks of the composition of the group in quite 
different terms: one fifth were CC members and one fifth had a technical or engineering 
background, leaving only three fifths of professional economists. Nevertheless, the 
economists were in the majority, and were able to determine the agenda of the Council. The 
level of attention the EC received in Economic Life, with weekly reports and interviews, 
reflected the interest it aroused among economists. Even daily papers carried extensive 
coverage of the Economic Council. On the one hand, following the drought of the previous 
years, the general public showed a greater thirst for information on economic matters. The 
second explanation is that the EC was used by the regime to bolster its public image, by 
advertising that it was now willing to take advice from key experts in economics and was 
Felicjan DembiĔski, Jan Drewnowski, Roman Fidelski, Edward Gierek, Lucjan Horowic, Stefan JĊdrychowski, Julian Kole, 
Stefan Królikowski, Bolesáaw KrupiĔski, Józef Kulesza, Stanisáaw KuziĔski,  
Aleksander Laskowski, Jerzy Olszewski, Bronisáaw Oyrzanowski, Józef Pajestka, Antoni Rajkiewicz, Stanisáaw Rączkowski,
Stanisáaw Szwalbe, Eugeniusz Szyr, Jerzy Tepicht, Jan TopiĔski, Witold TrąmpczyĔski,  
Andrzej Zalewski. 1957 “Rada Ekonomiczna” ĩycie Gospodarcze, 5, (03.02.1957), p.1 
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planning extensive changes in the economic system. Proof for this thesis is the way the EC 
was ignored and left to wither away once the regime had regained control over the Party 
apparatus and society at large. 
The Council started its work in January 1957, and combined the functions of a research 
institution with those of an advisory body. Bobrowski supervised a permanent secretariat, to 
which he recruited gifted young economists, including people whose careers had been 
blocked for political reasons.686  His was confident that there was a real chance that the 
reforms might succeed. His own reflections on the power base of the council, and his position 
in the political game, reveal him as a reality-oriented and competent politician. He stressed 
the importance of his personal relations with Cyrankiewicz, which were very good, and with 
Gomuáka, which were tolerable initially before Gomuáka ceased to listen to anyone outside 
his narrow circle of trusted workers. His ability to communicate and co-operate with 
politicians became legendary among economists. If Bobrowski found it impossible to co-
operate with a politician, it was said, it meant that that person was unable to work with or 
listen to anyone. However, Gomuáka, who stayed in power until 1970, turned out to be of that 
rare variety, and in the 1960s Bobrowski found himself advising the Algerian Government 
and teaching at Warsaw University instead. 
The lack of reliable data, after years of misinformation and secrecy in statistics, made the 
assessment of the state of the economy one of the primary tasks for the Council. Extensive 
(200-page-long) reports were published yearly for three consecutive years, without any 
interference from the economic policy leadership or the censoring authorities.687 Using the 
information processed by the Council, its commissions worked on proposals for reform. The 
Commission for Economic Models and Policy, led by Lange, was central in this work. The 
result of these deliberations, “Theses of the Economic Council” was published in May 
1957.688 This document contained the sketch of a new economic model. It was hoped that this 
would be the start of a constructive debate with the political leadership, and enable further 
work towards a deeper analysis of the situation and of possible reform measures. The authors 
of the Theses wished to install an economic system capable of continual, gradual adjustment 
to changing economic conditions. The Theses were presented to the Government, and the 
686 Some of them later became professors: S.Broniewski, R.CheliĔski, M.Ostrowski, M.PerczyĔski, Z.Sadowski Bobrowski, 
Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. p.242 
687Ibid.pp.241-242 
688 1957 „Tezy Rady Ekonomicznej w sprawie niektórych kierunkow zmian modelu gospodarczego” ĩycie Gospodarcze 22, 
(02.06.1957), pp.1-2 
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members of the Council hoped for a rapid response. While the EC had been at work, however, 
the political climate in the country had evolved in a direction which none of the reform-eager 
economists welcomed. The freedom of the press had been curtailed, and those linked with the 
pre-1956 direction of the economy had been returned to power.689 Time went by, and no 
reaction to the Theses from the authorities was forthcoming. Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz is 
reported to have said off record that the Government was neither for nor against the proposed 
changes, and the proposals were never applied. This dashed all hopes for a decisive role in 
policy formation for economists with academic backgrounds. Instead, the superficially-
reformed Planning Commission remained in control. The liberal climate gradually evaporated 
and by 1960 the publication of the Council’s analyses of the state of the economy was 
discontinued. There is no clear date for the end of the Economic Council’s work, as it was left 
to wither away from 1960 onwards, and was only formally dissolved some years later.690
The decision of the 7th Plenum of the PUWP CC in July 1956 was that the goal of the 1956-
1960 Five Year Plan would be the improvement of living standards. Nevertheless, KaliĔski 
argues that the economic adjustments of the plan never went beyond the already-initiated 
attempt to balance the economy and increase the standard of living. The party leadership was 
not able or willing to make the radical changes this would involve, and continued along the 
track laid down in the early 1950s. Bobrowski’s own reflections on why the EC economists 
failed to convince the decision-makers that thorough reforms were necessary are worthy of 
attention. He realised in retrospect that the abstract form of the advice given, and the 
academic language of the Theses, could not have appealed to Gomuáka. Focused and concrete 
measures would probably have had more luck. Bobrowski also regretted the absence of a 
more explicit critique of the command economy, which could have convinced decision 
makers of this area’s disfunctionality, but he noted that even among the economists of the 
time there were those who hoped that computers could be the solution to the problem of the 
information overload in central planning. Also, with the benefit of the experiences of the early 
1980s, he deplored the fact that the Theses did not appeal to the general public, and had no 
689 Hilary Minc never returned to active political life after 1956, but his second in command Eugeniusz Szyr returned to an 
executive position at the renamed Planning Commission. The ironic saying of the time, according to W. Brus, was “the new 
is returning”. A.W. Haugstad interview with Wáodzimierz Brus in Oxford, 2001 
690 In addition to Bobrowski’s account of the work of the Economic Council in his autobiography, I am relying on the 
testimony provided to me by Wáodzimierz Brus in several interviews (Oxford 2001), and the material concerning the Council 
published in the press. Bobrowski, Czesáaw, 1985. Wspomnienia ze stulecia Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie. 
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slogans or easily-communicable messages which could have brought general pressure from 
Polish society to bear on the decision-makers.691
The failure to encourage any reform of the economy should not overshadow the intellectual 
legacy of the EC. It was an active forum for discussion and inspired several participants to 
publish the ideas they had developed during their work there. Moreover, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary too were considering economic reforms, and when the Polish regime decided to put 
the reform proposals of the EC in the bottom drawer, the ideas and publications of the Polish 
Economic Council were received with interest in these countries. What is more, work in the 
permanent secretariat and on tasks relating to the preparation of analyses and reports provided 
opportunities for young economists to work in an inspiring environment and in close contact 
with empirical material. This was a refreshing change for those who had gone through the 
ideology-heavy education of the early fifties, and was a new opportunity for those who had 
been denied career opportunities for political reasons.
There were also some other channels of participation open to economists in this period, but 
these fared no better than the Economic Council. Kalecki, for instance, worked on a 
committee for long-term planning in the Planning Commission from the second half of 1957, 
hoping to contribute to the future direction of economic development. Just as was the case for 
the Theses of the Economic Council, the plan for 1960- 1975 was the subject of lively 
discussion among economists, but also, just as in the case of the Economic Council proposals, 
it was never put into practice. Instead, it was condemned by the 12th Party Plenum in October 
1958, when E. Szyr submitted it to an ideological critique reminiscent of the Central Office of 
Planning discussion of 1948.692
The model debate was stifled not only by the non-response to the Theses document, but also 
by the gradual restriction of critical discussions in the press on the performance of the 
economy, and on economic policies. In 1957 the critically-minded staff of Economic Life
encountered increasing problems with censorship. We can see some evidence of these 
conflicts on its pages. When texts were barred by the censors, empty columns needed filling, 
but rather than taking in a text conforming to the desires of the political leadership, the staff of 
Economic Life tried to communicate with their readers by other means. When I was reading 
through the paper, I noticed that in several issues the same photograph of a smiling young 
691 Ibid. p.252 
692 KaliĔski, Janusz, 1987. Polityka gospodarcza Polski w latach 1948-1956. Warszawa: KiW. p.99 
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woman thinning seedlings appeared.693  An illustration of someone pulling out unwanted 
plants to replace a text pulled out by censors: how much of a coincidence could this be? Even 
without a metaphoric reading, the repetition of the optimistic message of the photo and the 
caption, and its contrast with the struggling economy, communicated to readers who were 
used to reading between the lines that the editor and journalists were being forced to be more 
optimistic than they felt. Economic Life did not have many illustrations on its pages, but there 
was another one which appeared oddly out of place, a photo of a shop selling canned produce. 
In Polish ‘konserwa’ is a colloquial term for ‘conservative forces’, in case the readers needed 
a hint as to who was hindering the appearance of critical material. However, these games with 
the censors could not last in a context of increasing Party control.694 In October 1957 Po
Prostu was closed down, and the decision upheld despite student riots which lasted five days 
and cost two lives (79 demonstrators and 95 militia men were wounded).695 The editorial 
board of Economic Life was purged and the chief editor, Kowalik, was dismissed. To make 
things clear, Gomuáka publicly condemned ‘excessive’ criticism: 
We will not allow anyone to spit on socialism, on our system, on the great 
accomplishment […] We cannot allow the spreading of confusion, in which the so-
called social-cultural periodicals with similar tendencies as the weekly “Po 
prostu” especially excelled […] the time has come for choices. Journalists and 
commentators have to choose: for the party or against the party, for socialism or 
against socialism.696
Conclusion
The legacy of the Economic Council for economists was a disappointment, as Gomuáka’s
regime proved incapable of engaging in a discussion on economic reform, and reverted to the 
now well-tried mechanisms of the command economy. Frustrated at home, Polish economists 
found some solace in the end of their isolation from neighbouring countries. Their ideas on 
reform of a socialist economy were published and received with interest in countries where 
693 The first appearance of the girl with the salad was on 10th March 1957 on the front page of issue nr. 10 of Economic Life, 
with the caption “Nowalijki… Nowalijki… Nowalijki…” Nowalijki means the first fresh vegetables available in spring. The 
second time (nr.12, 24.03.57) the picture appeared on the last page and while the first time the picture might have had a mere 
decorative function, now the caption read “Nawalijki… Nawalijki… Nawaljki” - a play with words combining the original 
‘nowalijki’ with ‘nawaliü’ – a colloquial term for something not working. Two weeks later, the girl with the salad was back, 
now with the original caption (p.6, nr.14, 07.04.57). In issue nr.25 (23.06.57) in a humour section, a notice informed that 
several readers had reacted to the repeated appearance of the girl with the salad, but offered neither apologies nor 
explanations.  
694 Po Prostu editors described their efforts to work their way around the censors’ decision in Bratkowski, Stefan (ed.) (1996) 
Pazdziernik 1956. Pierwszy wylom w systemie. Bunt, mlodosc i rozsadek., Warszawa: PrószyĔski i S-ka. 
695 Persak, Krzysztof, 2006. Sprawa Henryka Hollanda Warszawa: Institut Pamieci Narodowej. p.38 
696 Gomuáka, W. O naszej partii, Warszawa: 1968, pp.346-348, quoted after Machcewicz, Paweá, 1995. Wáadysáaw Gomuáka,
Wyd. 1. ed. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne.p.52 
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economic reforms were being actively pursued, notably Czechoslovakia and Hungary. 
Political leaders in developing countries also proved to be more interested in their advice than 
Gomuáka. Throughout the 1960s, Polish economists made an industry out of expertise 
exports, working in developing countries. Pulsations from international scholarship were 
increasingly felt, both in the form of literature and personal experience, as Ford fellowships 
and internships in international organisations became accessible. 
Marxism continued to play an important role in Polish economics for another three decades, 
but it was quite different from the Marxism-Leninism of the early 1950s. The heretofore 
outwardly monolithic Marxist-Leninist position had imploded into a bitter opposition between 
‘orthodox’ and ‘revisionist’ economists, and Polish Marxist-Leninist economics after 1956 
also became open to the influence of other schools of thought. Disillusion with the regime’s 
willingness to involve economists in policy-making on the one hand, and a strengthening in 
autonomy over research, teaching and reputation control on the other, opened up the way for 
the integration of Marxists and the majority of non-Marxist scholars. This integration proved 
difficult, and probably fell short of reconciliation. There was no hearty embrace, but more 
importantly there was no longer any question of refusing to consider the other party as a 
rightful occupant of the same field of economics. The persistence of disagreements and ill-
feeling was not the only reason that the re-integration of economics was difficult. As non-
Marxist scholars were allowed to resume their places in their disciplines, they brought back 
into scholarly public discussion their views on all of their colleagues’ relative positions in the 
disciplinary hierarchy, based on merit judged according to the standards of western 
mainstream economics. The hierarchy established by Marxist-Leninist scholars and the 
hierarchy quietly upheld by ‘bourgeois’ economists had co-existed between 1949 and 1955, 
but had been kept separate. In 1956 they collided. Whenever a new position needed to be 
filled, or a new article or doctoral thesis needed to be evaluated, economists had to negotiate 
which set of standards would take precedence.
As for the autonomy of scholars, the situation first improved in 1956 and then gradually 
deteriorated again. The positive point was that despite the restrictions which became marked 
from late 1957 on, the level of repression and control that had been present in the social 
sciences before 1956 did not return. The 1960s present a quite different picture from the early 
1950s, though not necessarily a very cheerful one, as the aggressive determination to prevail 
of the early 1950s was replaced by subtler but persistent pressure. Conflicts over 
appointments to academic positions and the right to publish politically-controversial research 
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results multiplied. This led Tadeusz P. Rutkowski to argue that the term “the small 
stabilisation”, which is frequently used to characterise the 1960s in Poland, does not fit the 
relationship between the regime and scholars, since the tension between them increased 
throughout the decade.697
697 Rutkowski, Tadeusz Paweá, 2006. "Niestabilna stabilizacja. PZPR wobec nauki (1956-1960)". Przegląd Humanistyczny,
55-69.
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CONCLUSION
The story of Polish economists does not end here, as in fact most of the protagonists of this 
narrative still had years of productive work before them. Several lived to see the tables within 
the discipline turn again in the early 1990s, when mainstream economics once more became 
the dominant orientation among scholars, and formed the basis for the Polish student 
curriculum. The upheavals experienced by Polish scholars and the rest of Polish society in the 
20th century form a long list, but the fifteen-year post-war period stands out, due to the 
frequent disturbances of educational and scholarly activities. It was in this period between 
1945 and 1960 that the calamity of war and regime change was followed by not one but two 
fundamental re-orderings of the hierarchy in economic science.  
This study has covered four distinct periods. The first, between 1945 and 1947, was 
dominated by the autonomous restitution of scholarly activity after the Second World War. 
From 1948, the intervention of the Communist regime divided Polish economics into 
‘bourgeois’ and Marxist-Leninist segments, and placed the latter in control of all influential 
positions. In 1956, as the Party withdrew from active science policy in order to deal with 
more urgent problems, the monopoly of Marxism-Leninism crumbled, and non-Marxist 
scholars were readmitted to positions of influence in the discipline, leading to the 
establishment of new alliances which straddled the Marxist-Leninist / ‘bourgeois’ division. 
The fourth period, which began in 1957 and lasted well into the 1960s, was characterised by a 
more pluralistic discipline, and a new type of relations with the political regime. 
To summarise the main themes of this study, the predominantly harmonious collaboration 
seen in the reconstruction of the national economy, and of academic institutions, in the first 
post-war years, demonstrated that the regime and economists were quite able to co-operate 
with each other. The impulse to destroy this state of affairs, which had been a promising one 
for professional economists, came from events on the international stage. After the Soviet 
296
leadership decided to initiate a policy of tighter control and uniform ‘sovietisation’ of its 
satellite states in late 1947, the parameters for economic policy changed, as did those for the 
roles of economists. Communist leaders no longer wished to work with the established 
economic professionals and academic hierarchy; instead they made moves towards 
introducing their own trusted economists into the discipline. The first meetings between 
economists and Marxists-Leninists, notably at the Central Planning Board debate in 1948, 
took the form not only of political but also of cultural confrontations between Polish academic 
traditions and a ‘revolutionary’ communist ethos. There and then, the established economists 
understood that they faced an ambitious and ruthless opponent in the competition for 
influence over economics. What followed first was a period of gradual increase in the 
demands of the regime and of increasingly defensive moves on the part of academic 
institutions and individual scholars. In late 1948, having dealt with the Socialist’s claims to 
influence, the Communist Party was ready to concentrate on science, so that by 1949 nearly 
all the professors of economics found themselves dispossessed of their former functions and 
powers. They were replaced with hand-picked supporters of the communist leadership, who 
were installed in key positions in academic institutions. In the course of a few months the 
composition of the upper reaches of the disciplinary hierarchy, as expressed by occupation of 
chairs, boards of journals, and professional associations, had undergone a profound alteration. 
Involving breaches of established procedures for academic promotion as they did, these 
brusque changes did not tend to gain general acceptance. Most scholars not only resented their 
personal demotions, and the closure of or restrictions in their career opportunities, but also 
privately refused to accept the new hierarchy. Censorship and fear of repression ruled out 
public protest. For a large portion of the occupants of the field of economics a period of 
silence and inactivity began in 1949 that was to last until 1956. However, although their 
influence was radically reduced, it is important to note that most of the established scholars 
stayed on at academic institutions. For the newcomers, the Marxist-Leninist economists, the 
early fifties were a time of severe teaching overload, time-absorbing propaganda work, and 
ideological debates where the margins for critical and creative thought were minimal. Hardly 
any research was carried out or published during those years. Allocation of positions and 
honours in the discipline was subject to political approval, and consequently the significance 
of academic titles and degrees was eroded. They no longer recognised the scholarly 
competence of the candidate, but now measured current political capital. In addition, the 
regime’s demand to maintain secrecy regarding economic matters, and the Party leadership’s 
unwillingness to allow critical scrutiny of their policies, was stifling economists’ discussions 
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about the current state and future development of the economy. The regime had empowered 
its handpicked Marxist-Leninist scholars, but had left them little freedom in or influence over 
their work.
For their part, the Marxist-Leninist scholars had only accepted the reduced autonomy for 
scholars as a temporary measure. They were willing to defer demands until the political and 
social revolution was secured, but as time went by, some of them grew increasingly impatient 
with interference in their work by the political leadership and Party apparatus. Stalin’s 
confirmation of the existence of objective laws in socialist economies, published in 1952, 
followed by his death soon thereafter, initiated a gradual relaxation of ideological control, 
supported and driven forward by a contingent of reform-minded Marxist-Leninists. The Thaw 
eventually eroded the Party’s control to such a degree that even non-Marxist scholars 
reclaimed their positions and their right to public expression. The status quo established in 
1949 relied so heavily on a strong and active political regime that the crisis experienced by 
the Party in 1956 promptly resulted in a re-ordering of the field of economics. Once more, 
renegotiations were needed both on the composition of and the relative positions within the 
discipline, and concerning its relationship to the regime.  
Economists jumped at the opportunity to criticise the situation in their discipline and 
profession publicly, and, realising that no-one was going to stop them, scholars then took 
matters into their own hands. Academic institutions reverted to pre-1949 methods for running 
their business, and recalled professors and scholars who had been ousted six years earlier. 
Some Marxist-Leninist scholars lost their positions, or resigned, but most of those who had 
gained positions in 1949 stayed in place. With the Party showing much less vigour in  
academic matters, they had to fend for themselves, and to find ways of working with the non-
Marxist majority. For economists, the events of 1956 were the start of an uneasy co-habitation 
of old and new, between scholars trained in ‘western’ economics and those schooled in 
Marxism-Leninism (this latter category now including revisionists and orthodox Marxists-
Leninists). The Party bureaucracy soon recovered from the shock, and increasingly from late 
1957 set out to reclaim its influence over economics. The late 1950s and the early 1960s were 
periods of continuous conflicts and negotiations between scholars and apparatchiks. The 
initiative of the Economic Council, which had raised economists’ hopes of re-establishing 
their influence over economic policy, soon withered in the face of Gomuáka’s aversion to 
taking advice from academics. The party leadership neither trusted nor inspired the loyalty of 
Polish leftist intellectuals, disappointed as the latter were by the narrow margin of autonomy, 
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and lack of room for critical thought and discussion. Consequently a significant portion of 
them turned away from the regime and several protagonists of this study, as well as their 
students, became well-known as a result of their participation in the emerging opposition.  
The findings of this study as regards the Party’s role in economic science and the effect of its 
policies may appear contradictory. On the one hand we have evidence of the weakness of the 
PUWP in academic institutions. On the other hand, while Party policies were not always 
successful, and some of the results of their actions were unintended, they were strongly felt by 
scholars, and had a visible effect on the quality and amount of knowledge production.  
The Party’s weakness in academic institutions was related in the late 1940s to the lack of 
scholars trusted by the Party leadership, and from around 1956 to former Party intellectuals 
turning critical of the regime, and forming what could be called a ‘revisionist’ opposition. At 
the same time, while other scholars were removed from influential positions and from 
subjects considered to be central to Marxist-Leninist ideology, only a few were expelled from 
academic institutions. Party-loyal scholars were ever in the minority in their work-places, 
except at the ITSC. To this we have to add: the lack of conviction displayed even by the 
communist elite regarding the sagacity of a transfer of all Soviet experiences onto Polish soil; 
a certain measure of faulty organisation; inefficiency; incompetence; and inter-institutional 
conflict.  
Despite these handicaps the PUWP managed to bring about many changes which were keenly 
felt by scholars. The Party was not omnipotent, and its organisation was not always efficient, 
but the effects that PUWP policies had on scholarly communities were numerous and 
weighty. For a start, there was isolation from international scholarship and from access to 
empirical data and publishing outlets; the disappearance of arenas for unconstrained 
discussion; and heavy centralisation of teaching and research, which petrified the 
development of regional academic centres. To this we have to add that a whole generation of 
young, upcoming researchers was prevented from taking scientific degrees, and spent time on 
futile exegesis of ideological texts or broadcasting Party propaganda. Finally, some of the key 
effects of Party policies on scholarship appear to have been unintended. Neither the erosion of 
the prestige of academic titles, the slump in scholarly publications, nor the decline of the 
popularity of economics among students, was something the PUWP leadership had wished 
for.
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The findings of this study suggest that when it comes to the question of the means that the 
Party chose to apply to academic institutions and scholars, it relied heavily on bureaucracy to 
compensate for the small number of loyal scholars. The Polish Communist regime failed to 
engage scholars or to mobilise them to follow the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and in fact 
the PUWP dominated scholarship through administrative control, not ideological leadership. 
The local Party organisations, whose role it was to provide ideological guidance to scholars in 
their working places, actually ruled through administrative measures. The central Party 
apparatus too relied heavily on the state bureaucracy.  
If we look at the outcome of the regime’s policies from the perspective of the declarations 
made in the late 1940s, when the PUWP launched an activist science policy, it is clear that the 
professed aim of making economics the foundation of economic policy was never realised. In 
early stalinist Poland, the economic policy decision-makers, led by Hilary Minc, never 
considered allowing public discussion of their policies, and did not wish to receive expert 
advice from beyond the ramparts of the top economic authority strongholds. Instead, political 
economy was made to serve the needs of the agit-prop sector, by supplying propaganda about 
the regime’s successes and through justifying unpopular measures. The close links between 
theory and practice, which formed a central PUWP slogan for economics, never materialised; 
rather, statistical data was classified, with scholars employed in academic institutions having 
no access to it, and economists working in the planning apparatus unable to publish analyses 
of the data they worked with. The Party leadership and its chief ideologues expended a great 
deal of energy in attempting to make social science scholars follows the ‘line’ of the regime to 
the last detail. Even after the Soviet leadership had proclaimed the New Course in 1953, the 
Polish Communist regime preferred to maintain strict control over the discipline of economics 
rather than to encourage independent critical studies which would have yielded a more 
reliable picture of the economy. The Polish regime demonstrated no evidence of its alleged 
commitment to economics, or of its will to base economic policies on scientific knowledge, 
and was clearly unwilling to allow public discussion of policy, or to ask for or listen to expert 
academic advice through public channels. What appeared on the visible surface of stalinist 
public life was the predominance of the need for ideological control and “purity”. 
Scholars’ responses to the Communist regime’s demands and promises varied. If we look 
back at 1945, the majority started out by offering their co-operation, hoping for an alliance 
through which post-war reconstruction could be undertaken. The political climate then grew 
increasingly chilly, and we saw some economists withdraw from public life as soon as they 
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understood that PUWP would not accept their council, as in the case of Taylor and 
KrzyĪanowski, when invited to participate in the work of the Central Planning Board. Others, 
especially the socialist economists like Drewnowski and LipiĔski, continued to hope for 
influence, and worked to find a compromise or deal with the communists. A substantial 
number of scholars were willing to give Marxism a chance, on condition that they would be 
granted the freedom to interpret and apply it to their research as they chose, and to blend it 
with other ideas. Depending on their political and intellectual outlooks at that time, Polish 
economists differed in their willingness to accommodate the regime’s call for a re-orientation 
of scholarship. In February 1948, after the PUWP spectacularly refused to compromise by 
sharing power over scholarship with anyone but the most trusted Marxist-Leninists, the 
majority of Polish economists appear to have slumped into a state of utter disappointment and 
passive depression. The PUWP had effectively divided the disciplinary community by 
elevating its protégées to power and denying academic positions and influence to the rest. The 
economists’ influence over this situation and over their own positions in the new set-up was 
minimal. Important decisions were taken by people who could in no way be counted as peers 
of equal academic standing. Between 1948 and 1955 censorship was used actively to prevent 
expression of unorthodox ideas, and the margin of freedom that the regime offered to scholars 
was so narrow that it left no room for their responses. However, despite the notorious 
difficulty of documenting silence and passive resistance, it is clear from the sources available 
that a large number of scholars paid mere lip service to the regime, all the while holding on to 
their own values, and to their own ideas about scholarly practice and its relationship with 
politics and society.
The Marxist-Leninists started out by offering their services to the Party unconditionally, but 
then gradually transferred loyalty to their new academic institutions, so that their identity 
shifted from the role of propagandist to that of scholar. Contemporary witnesses and later 
observers of the events of June 1956 were struck by the sudden burst of energy, criticism and 
optimism that manifested itself during the Second Convention of Economists. Economists 
responded with alacrity to the opportunity to express their opinions and to take over the reins 
of their discipline, and it seemed that the initiatives pointed in two directions. Firstly, 
economists were eager to mend the lack of links with economic policy-making, and were 
determined to make themselves heard on the subject of the reform of the economy. Secondly, 
they stressed the need to re-assert their control over academic institutions, journals and 
professional associations. This meant a return to a peer-review-based disciplinary community, 
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and when scholars who had been removed from their positions for political reasons were 
called back by their colleagues, the old and new hierarchies came into open confrontation, and 
ways had to be found to accommodate the former ‘bourgeois’ and the Marxist-Leninist 
scholars within the collegial bodies of academic institutions. After the radical division of 
economists into ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ in 1949, the regime’s politicians left the scholars to 
sort out the situation themselves: new friendships and alliances were then formed, notably 
between revisionist economists and the old leftist professors who had sided with the Socialist 
Party, and these formed a bridge over the chasm introduced in 1948. 
How did the evolution of economics in Poland during the early 1950s compare with 
developments in countries where communist regimes had supported the establishment of 
Marixism-Leninism in the social sciences? With the benefit of Connelly’s comparative 
examination of the higher education policies of stalinist regimes in the DDR, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland, we can see that the latter stands out as the country where the Communist regime 
was the least determined and the least successful in transforming academic life. The room for 
manoeuvre of Polish communists, Connelly argues, was limited by the status of the old 
cultural elites. The Polish Communist regime coldly calculated that it could not afford to 
alienate a group which enjoyed so much prestige, and ultimately proved rather hesitant when 
it came to using its repressive apparatus against professors. 
The situation of Hungarian economists provides a good comparison, offering both similarities 
with and contrasts to the Polish situation. Péteri explores several types and phases of relations 
between the regime and academia, and does so by focusing, among other things, on three 
aspects of the situation in economics: the restriction of access to statistical information, the 
evolution of Marxist-Leninist economists from “party soldiers” to “professional economists”, 
and the separation of agit-prop economics from empirical economics.698 In his discussion of 
the evolution of Hungarian economics into a “partitioned bureaucracy” where political 
economy was separated from empirical and policy-oriented economics, Péteri argues that an 
alliance was forged between research economists and the political elite, in the New Course era 
that began in 1953. This alliance created viable conditions for the development of empirical 
research, and allowed Hungarian economists to establish a distance between themselves and 
698 Péteri, György, 1998b. Controlling the Field of Academic Economics in Hungary, 1953-1976. In G. Péteri (ed.) Academia
and State Socialism. Essays on the Political History of Academic Life in Post-1945 Hungary and Eastern Europe. New York: 
Atlantic Reseach and Publications. 
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the ideology and propaganda that dominated the theoretical area of the discipline. 699
Gradually, they came to stress professional standards, and loyalty to their academic peers, 
rather than to the Party organisation.
Did this tendency apply to Poland? Whilst the contexts of ‘Stalinist’ science in Poland and 
Hungary bore several similarities, there were also important differences. 700  The most 
important were to be found in the relative ‘balances of power’ of legitimacy and prestige 
between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ scholars. In Hungary the ‘old’ academic establishment had been 
tainted by its endorsement of the Horthy regime, and the communist ‘Gleichschaltung’ 
involved a thorough purge of ‘old’ economists from academic institutions. In Poland the 
prestige of the Polish professors had grown, due to their sacrifices and contributions in the 
resistance movement and clandestine higher education. Most of them stayed on in positions at 
academic institutions, even if they lost much their influence. The New Course did not seem to 
have had as prompt or strong an effect on Polish politics as in Hungary. While Rákosi was 
replaced as prime minister by Imre Nagy in 1953, in Poland the old leadership stayed on, 
stemming criticism in party ranks as best they could. Based on what CQC sources reveal 
about social scientists in general, there is a certain parallel with Hungary in the latter’s search 
for ways to escape the tight embrace of dogmatic ideology. For Polish Marxist-Leninist 
scholars, however, it was not empirical studies that offered a way out of ‘party loyalty’, as 
they were in fact not given many opportunities to pursue such research before 1956. In 
Hungary the dynamic economics research institute at the Academy of Science, led by István 
Friss, was central to the formation of the ethos of professional economists, and in the 
protection of reform economists against agit-prop control. In Poland, there was no comparable 
institution, and it fell to the ITSC to be the place where young, gifted Marxist-Leninists won 
their intellectual emancipation. Many ITSC graduates joined the vocal reformist wing of the 
Party from 1955. A ‘reformist’ ethos thus emerged that was detached from any professional 
identity, and the young Marxist-Leninists now put on a critical intellectual mantle, resembling 
699 Bockman,whose study has its focus on the heyday rather than the origin of reform economics, corroborates Péteri’s 
findings on this matter. Bockman, Johanna K., 2000. Economists and social change: Science, professional power, and politics 
in Hungary, 1945-1995. University of California. 
700 Whilst the different sections of the Soviet block were sealed off from each other in the early fifties, Polish and Hungarian 
economists enjoyed some communication during this period, meaning that there could have been exchanges of experiences 
and ideas on how to deal with the dilemmas of party vs. scholars’ interests and authority. According to information provided 
by W. Brus, COMECON had an advisory body of economists which served as a rare forum for meetings across borders 
within the Block. He himself used it to make contact with East German and Hungarian economists (Kolmajer, Benary, 
Behrens, G. Péter) A.W. Haugstad interview with Wáodzimierz Brus, Oxford 2001 
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the type of intelligentsia with a mission to lead the nation that had strong antecedents in 
Polish culture. Political revisionism rather than professional reformism was the result.  
Another point of difference between the Hungarian and Polish cases is that of continuity. 
While Közgazdasági Szemle was closed down between 1949 and 1955, Ekonomista kept 
going, with LipiĔski always its editor. Hungarian economists from the old regime were 
dismissed, but the ‘old’ staff of the Main School in Warsaw maintained enclaves of private 
liberty despite the presence of Marxist-Leninists, as did scholars in other institutions. In fact, 
notwithstanding their removal from influential positions as heads of departments and chairs, 
‘old’ scholars had been retained by most universities in the vicinity of their institutions, and 
were recalled as soon as it became possible in 1956. Both in terms of institutions and 
personnel, Polish economics maintained a tenuous but real continuity, a continuity which, in 
part, was based on the cohesive social fabric of the scholarly “milieu” (Ğrodowisko) described 
by Connelly.701 In the case of economists, we must also mention the role played by the ‘old’ 
professors, who sympathised with and were interested in Marxism, and enjoyed respect in 
both ‘camps’, thereby allowing Marxist-Leninist economists to establish relationships with 
representatives of the ‘old’ academic establishment. LipiĔski and Lange, among others, were 
central in providing not only a personal but also an intellectual and scholarly continuity within 
Polish economics. Finally, we come to the difficult question of how the Polish economists 
may have affected the Communist regime. Compared with their counterparts in Hungary, the 
Polish economics scholars were failures, and after 1948 their influence on economic policies 
was hardly significant. While the prestige of Polish professors protected them, and enabled 
them to maintain both personal and intellectual continuity in their disciplines, none of these 
brought Polish economists the trust or confidence of the Communist regime’s inner circles. 
Their influence was restricted to displays of opposition to the regime, which had no tangible 
effect while the regime felt strong enough to ignore them. 
Loren Graham has argued that we might use the case of Soviet science to test how science 
works under extreme conditions.702 A case in point could be just that transfer of discretion 
over a wide range of scholarly activities (research, teaching, evaluation of achievements, 
recruitment) from collegial bodies of scholars to political organs that was carried out by the 
701 Connelly, John, 2000. Captive University: the Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish higher education, 1945-
1956 Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
702 Graham, Loren R., 1998. What have we learned about science and technology from the Russian experience? Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
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Communist regime in relation to Polish economics. If we use it as a test-case for discerning 
how much discretion scholars need in order to fulfil the basic functions of knowledge 
production, evaluation and transmission, what will it tell us? In the period 1945-1948, we note 
that a significant number of economists actively sought a closer involvement with politics: 
they clearly believed this would improve their situation. In the next period, 1948-1955, the 
Communist regime promoted the introduction and elevation to influential positions of 
scholars whose loyalty it trusted, and extended its control to all areas of scholarly activity. In 
practice, Marxist-Leninist science meant that the Party leadership defined the content of 
Marxism-Leninism, leaving even Marxist-Leninist scholars with virtually no freedom or 
discretionary powers. During this period the level and content of scholarly discussion and 
production plummeted, and many students deserted the discipline. Increasingly, in intra-party 
fora the situation in scholarship was judged to be critical. The level of direct intervention in 
scholarly activities established by the regime the early 1950 did not provide conditions 
conducive for knowledge production. On this basis we may conclude that Polish economics 
between 1949 and 1955 is an example of a scientific organisation which had too little 
discretion over its activities to fulfil the task of knowledge production. 
Did the Polish regime realise this; did they draw the same conclusion and act upon it? It is 
evident that by 1955 protagonists in and close to the Party leadership realised the existence of 
the problem and of the need to address it. Before any planned relaxation of the Party’s hold on 
scholarship occurred, however, the turbulence of 1956 resulted in the return of discretionary 
powers to academic institutions and collegial bodies. The fact that the Party accepted such a 
development at this point tells us that it was unable to deal with it, but it does not tell us what 
it wished for instead, or whether the Party leaders had understood the need to delegate more 
discretion to scholars in order for the sector of higher education and research to function well. 
It is only by examining the activities of the Party from 1957 into the 1960s, a period which 
extends beyond the chronological limits adopted by this study, that these questions might be 
answered, and this is an enquiry that is yet to be made. Only a tentative proposition is possible 
here: the Party never returned to the practices that prevailed prior to 1956. Based on the 
testimonies of economists active in these years, it seems that different levels of control were 
applied to the subject of political economy as taught to all university students. Different 
controls were also applied to what economists were allowed to say to the general public, and 
to what they could say in publications with low print runs that were only distributed to 
specialists. Students who had to study the subject of political economy during these years 
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agree that it was dogmatic and boring, and that no-one paid any attention to it. A scholar who 
did pay attention, however, and who analysed a number of textbooks of political economy, 
asserted that “the degree of absorption of Western literature is surprisingly high, in spite of 
scanty references to in bibliographies and footnotes.”703 If Nuti is right, then throughout the 
1960s Polish students were schooled in what western economists considered to be modern 
economic techniques, but were unaware of the fact, due to the ideological packaging. These 
two examples illustrate the difference between the situations preceding and following 1956. 
What we still do not know is whether this was because the Party leadership had learned the 
lesson that too much control incapacitates scholars, because a large number of its loyal 
scholars had deserted the cause of interventionist science policy, or if there were other reasons 
for this difference between early the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Further studies of academic communities could also tell us more about the genesis of the 
opposition movement in Poland. By studying economists we can see that scholars of both 
‘bourgeois’ and Marxist-Leninist persuasion realised that they had common interests. Despite 
the resentment and distrust between them caused by the revolutionary measures introduced in 
the early 1950s, they managed to form an alliance which allowed them to reclaim control over 
academic institutions and scholarly activity. Furthermore, throughout the late 1950s and 
1960s they showed they were able to unite against the interventions of the Party apparatus. 
The new post-1956 scholarly community, divided and conflicted as it was, nevertheless 
presents us with a unique situation in the Polish context. If we consider Machcewicz’s 
argument that in 1956 a chasm separated the demands of the predominantly anti-communist 
society and the criticisms and desires of the vocal Marxist reformist elite, then Academia is a 
rare case where these two orientations came into contact.704 In academic life, revisionists and 
non-Marxists interacted. They listened to each other, and even agreed on a minimum 
programme of common interests, building the basis for an opposition which could translate 
the demands of the non-Marxist society into a language which could be understood by the 
regime. This may prove to have been the first rehearsal of an alliance between leftist 
intellectuals and the predominantly anti-communist wider Polish society which would give 
rise to an opposition movement that in the 1980s shook the foundations of communist power, 
not only in Poland but in the entire Soviet block. 
703 Nuti, Domenico Mario, 1973. "The Political Economy of Socialism. Orthodoxy and Change in Polish Texts". Soviet 
Studies, 25, 244-270. 
704 Machcewicz, Paweá, 1997. "Intellectuals and Mass Movement, Ideologies and Political Programs". Contemporary
European History, 6, 361-382.
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APPENDIX
COMPOSITION OF THE SECTION OF ECONOMICS AND ITS AND SUB-SECTIONS OF THE FIRST
CONGRESS OF POLISH SCIENCE
Presidium of the executive committee of the First Congress of Polish Science
 Leszczycki, Stanisáaw
 Petrusewicz, Kazimierz CC Science Division 
 GolaĔski, H. Vice-minister of higher education 
 Michajlow, Wáodzimierz   
      
Section of economics    
president  Lange,Oskar Main School of Planning and Statistics  
vice-president JĊdrychowski, Stefan State Commission of Economic Planning 
vice-president Blinowski, Franciszek State Commission of Economic Planning 
referent  Brus, Wáodzimierz Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres 
   
1. Sub-section of political economy and planning    
president LipiĔski, Edward Main School of Planning and Statistics 
vice-president Minc, Bronisáaw State Commission of Economic Planning 
referent Pohorille, Maksymillian Party School/ Main School of Planning and 
Stat.
 Brus, W. Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres 
 Drewnowski, J. Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 Wyrozembski, Z.J. Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 Zawadzki, Józef Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 Zurawicki, Seweryn Main School of Foreign Service 
 Konopka, Antoni àódĨ
 Zatorski, Aleksander  
 Nowik, Edward  
2. Sub-section of industry and labour organisation
president Jastrzebski, Wincenty Mininstry of Finance 
vice-president 
and referent  
Epsztejn, Ilja Central Bureua of Statistics 
 Bienkowski, Stan. Krakow Higher School of Economics 
 Bigeleisen-Zelazowski, 
Bronisáaw
Main Institute of Work 
 Blinowski, F. State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Buch, Wiktor State Commission of Economic Planning 
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 Chmielewski, Czesáaw State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Ferski, Andrzej State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Fidelski, Roman Ministry of Heavy Industry 
 Guzicki, Stanisáaw Main School of Foreign Service 
 Kozlowski, Wáadysáaw Polish Norm Commitee 
 Lesz, Mieczysáaw Vice-minister of Mining 
 NiereĔski, Jerzy  
 SkarbiĔski, Michal àódĨ polytechnic 
 Szechter, Ozjasz Central Council of Trade Unions 
 Taniewski, Ludwik Central Institue of Work Protection 
 Wang, Adam State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Zbichorski, Zygmunt Main Institute of Work 
3. Sub-section of agriculture 
president Tepicht, Jerzy Institute of Agrarian Economics 
vice-president Rzendowski, Leon State Commission of Economic Planning 
Referent Tomaszewski, Zenon Institue of Agrarian Economics 
 Brzoza, Anatol CC PUWP 
 Czerniewski, Konstanty State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Dabrowski, Kazimierz Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform 
 Dziedzic, Franciszek Institute of Agrarian Economics 
 Dziewicka, Maria Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres 
 Galaj, Dyzma Higher School of Agriculture in Olsztyn 
 Gotowiec, Marian Higher School of Agriculture in Olsztyn 
 Grosz, Irena Editor of "Polish Peasant" 
 Ignar, Stefan Main School of Agriculture 
 Kaltenberg, Piotr Ministry of Higher Education and Science 
 KuziĔski,Stanisáaw  Institute for Education of Scientific Cadres 
 Manteuffel, Ryszard Institute of Agrarian Economics 
 Pol, Ludwik Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform 
 Rabinowicz, Maks Main Union of State Farms 
 StoliĔski, Feliks Institute of Agrarian Economics 
 Wielburski, Ryszard Institute of Agrarian Economics 
 Zawidzka, Zofia-Janina Institute of Agrarian Economics 
4. Sub-section of trade 
president KoĨmiĔski, L. Main School of Planning and Statistics 
vice-president Dietrich, T. Ministry of interiour trade 
referent Pawlowski, L. Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 Bitterowa, Cecylia Institute for Scientific Research on Trade and 
Collective feeding 
 Boczar, K. Institute for Scientific Research on Trade and 
Collective feeding 
 Ehrlich, Emil Higher School of Economics in Katowice 
 Grosfeld, Ludwik Chamber of Foreign Trade 
 Iwaszkiewicz, Edw. State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Jampel, Wilhelm Ministry of interiour trade 
 Krynicki, Janusz Main School of Foreign Service 
 Kubicz, Wacáaw  
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 Lychowski, T. Polish Institute of International Affairs 
 Marszalek, Leon Central Union of Co-operatives 
 Zakrzewski, Zbigniew PoznaĔ Higher School of Economics 
5. Sub-section of finance 
president TrapczyĔski, W. National Bank of Poland, Ministry of Finance 
vice-president Blass, Br. Ministry of Finance 
referent Oráowski, M. Main School of Foreign Service 
 Drozniak, Edward Ministry of Finance 
 Kurowski, Leon Ministry of Treasury 
 Lubowicki, Jerzy Univeristy of Warsaw 
 Siebeneichen, Alfred National Bank of Poland 
 Skrzywan, St. Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 SzymaĔski, Wlad. National Bank of Poland 
 Wojciechowski, Edw. Higher School of Economics in àódĨ
 Zurawicki, Seweryn Main School of Foreign Service 
6. Sub-section of statistics 
president Szulc, Stefan Main School of Planning and Statistics 
vice-president Padowicz, Zygmunt Central Bureua of Statistics 
vice-president Szturm de Sztrem, Edward Main School of Foreign Service 
referent Weryha, Al. Main School of Foreign Service 
 Hagemejer, W. Central Bureua of Statistics 
 Gruzewski, Al. Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 Oderfeld, J. Polish Norm Commitee 
 Olekiewicz, M. Lublin State Univeristy 
 Romaniuk, K.  
 Rudnicki, Kazimierz Ministry of Higher Education and 
Science
 Steinhaus, Hugo Wrocáaw University 
7. Sub-section of construction and communal housing
president Secomski,K. State Commission of Economic Planning 
vice-president Karczorowski, Michal Institute of Housing Construction 
Referent Jaworski, Kazim. State Commission of Economic Planning 
vice-president BabiĔski, Czesáaw Ministry of Construction Industry 
 GoryĔski, Julian ZOR 
 Bartnicki, Marian State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Dyzewski, Aleksander Politechnic of Warsaw 
 DziewoĔski, Kazimierz State Commission of Economic Planning 
 Esse, Feliks Teodor Institute of Construction Technique 
 Kaczmarkiewicz, Ludomir  
 Litterer, Wanda Institute of Housing Construction 
 Przestepski, Wáadysáaw  
 Toeplitz, Kazimierz Leon State Commission of Economic Planning 
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8. Sub-section of international trade 
president Grosfeld, Ludwik Chamber of Foreign Trade 
vice-president 
and referent 
àychowski, Tadusz  Polish Institute of International Affairs 
vice-president Prawin, Jakub   National Bank of Poland 
 Siebeneichen, Alfred National Bank of Poland 
 Drewnowski, Jan Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 Gall, Stanisáaw Chamber of Foreign Trade 
 Kotlicki, Henryk Ministry of Finance 
 Rączkowski, Stanisáaw National Bank of Poland 
 Wiszniewski, Jerzy Main School of Foreign Service 
 Wyrozembski, 
Zygmunt 
Main School of Planning and Statistics 
 Zieleniewski, Jan  
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LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Interviews conducted by Aleksandra Witczak Haugstad with: 
Prof. Janusz Beksiak (1929- ) 30.06.2000 in Warsaw 
Prof. Tadeusz Kowalik (1926- ) 11.07.2000 and 29.07.2000 in Warsaw 
Prof. Wacáaw WilczyĔski (1923- ) 13.07.2000 in PoznaĔ
Prof. Jan LipiĔski (1918- ) 01.08.2000 in Warsaw 
Prof. Stanisáaw Rączkowski (1912-2006) 02.08.2000 in Warsaw 
Prof. Jan MujĪel (1923-2006) 24.08.2000 in Warsaw 
Prof. Zdzisáaw Jan Sadowski (1925- )03.08.2000 and November 2003 in Warsaw 
Prof. Kazimierz Secomski  (1910-2002) 09.12.2000 in Warsaw 
Prof. Wáodzimierz Brus (1921-2007), eight sessions between February and May 2001 in 
Oxford
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ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw 
Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne.  
Zarząd Gáówny w Warszawie 1945-1967 
Dziaá Organizacyjno-Prezydialny,
- 6 I Zjazd Ekonomistów Polskich (8-10.12.1950), 1950-51 
- 7, 8, 9 II Zjazd Ekonomistów Polskich (7-10.6.56), 1956 
- 26 DziaáalnoĞü Sądu KoleĪeĔskiego przy PTE, 1961-1967 
- 54 Organizacja i dziaáalnoĞü Sekcji Wydawniczej Rady Naukowej PTE, 1947-48 
- 55 Studium Prawno-Ekonomiczne z Szczecinie - likwidacja, 1956-63 
- 62 Sprawozdania z dziaáalnoĞci PTE, 1949-1956 
Dziaá Programowy,
- 142 Kongres MiĊdzynarodowego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego w Rzymie. 
MiĊdzynarodowa Konferencja Ekonomiczna w Moskwie. Konferencja kierowania 
gospodarka w Mariborze.,1958-65 
- 150 Zjazd ekonomistów z sprawach rolnictwa we Wrocáawiu,1957
- 151 Zjazd Ekonomistów Morskich 1-3.03.1957,1957 
Komitet Centralny PZPR (CC PUWP) 
Kancelaria Sekretariatu 
- 237/V/547 LiczebnoĞü partii, Nomenklatura kadr, odwoáania od wydaleĔ z partii, praca 
instruktorów KP - sprawozdania, pisma okólne, notatki, listy imienne i itp.1965 
- 237/V/601 Nauka i Technika ... notatki dot. PTE. 1965 
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- 237/V-1a/30 Kancelaria Sekr.Z.Nowaka. Kadry Szkolnictwa WyĪszego - notatka dla 
Sekr.BO w spr. organizacji MSzWiN, Charakterystyka ogolna naukowcow i osrodkow 
naukowych, cyfrowy wykaz pracownikow nauk w/g specjalnoĞci. ... 1950 
Wydziaá Nauki i Szkolnictwa WyĪszego 
- 237/XVI/1 Protokoáy konferencji partyjnych. Narada poĞwiĊcona samokrytyce tow. 
NowiĔskiego - 29 XI 1950. Protokóá z zebrania Wydziaáu i - 16 I 1951. 1949-1951 
- 237/XVI/4 Sprawozdania z pracy Wydziaáu . 1950-51 
- 237/XVI/5 Notatki i wnioski Wydziaáu Nauki w sprawie: - wzmocnienia kadr Wydz. Nauki. 
- usprawnienia pracy Wydz. Nauki, - utworzenia wydziaáów oĞwiaty i nauki w KW- Projekt 
uchwaly BO - w spr. utworzenia Wydz. OĞwiaty i Nauki KC. 1952-53 
- 237/XVI/8 Notatki w sprawie powolania Zakáadu Badan Ekonomicznych PAN. 1950-53 
- 237/XVI/10 Notatki dla Sekretariatu KC w sprawie nauczania przedmiotow ideologicznych 
na wyĪszych uczelniach, ...  1951 
- 237/XVI/12 Notatki dot. ... sytuacji na wyĪszych uczelniach warszawskich w okresie 
rekolekcji i po smierci Stalina...1953 
- 237/XVI/20 Notatka dot. objecia stanowisk kierowniczych na wyĪszych uczelniach. ... 
1949-51
- 237/XVI/25 Sprawozdania, notatki oraz informacje instruktorow i towarzyszy 
delegowanych w teren - woj. Szczecin, Warszawa, Wrocáaw. 1949-53 
- 237/XVI/27 Uchwala BP w sprawie Kongresu Nauki. Projekt uchwal PB w sprawie: zmiany 
SGH na SGPiS utworzenia Akademii Handlu Zagranicznego; wyĪszego szkolnictwa 
ekonomicznego; nauki rolniczej. ... 1949-52 
- 237/XVI/33 Uchwaly Sekretariatu BO w sprawie ... Zjazdu Ekonomistów...1950-52 
- 237/XVI/37 Wytyczne, oceny, protokoáy zjazdów: ... ekonomistów. 1949-50 
- 237/XVI/38 Zjazdy i konferencje naukowe: ... ekonomistów, ekologow...1951  
- 237/XVI/65 Wykazy skáadow osobowych Komitetow Uczelnianych PZPR na wyĪszych
uczelniach. 1950 
- 237/XVI/88 Memoriaá Koáa Ekonomistów - studentów KUL do Ministerstwa OĞwiaty w 
sprawie umoĪliwienia zakoĔczenia studiów ekonomicznych.1949-53 
- 237/XVI/100 WyĪsze uczelnie w Warszawie. Pismo Wydz.Nauki KC do I Sekr. Kom. 
Warsz. dot. zlej pracy Wydz.Prop.i OĞwiaty Kom.Warsz. ...Notatki Kom.Warsz. w sprawie 
sytuacji na wyĪszych uczelniach. 1949-53 
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- 237/XVI/109 SGPiS Notatki sekretarza Komitetu Uczelnianego POP PZPR przy SGPiS; 
skrocony stenogram referatu tow. NowiĔskiego na zebraniu OOP profesorów SGPiS. 
Programy i projekty planów nauczanie poszczególnych Wydziaáów SGPiS na lata 1949/1951. 
1949-52
- 237/XVI/178 Wydziaá Nauki, Sprawozdania z prac Wydziaáu. 1954-56 
Wydziaá Nauki 
- 237/XVI/209 Stenogram narady sekretarzy POP wyĪszych uczelni poĞwiĊconej
problematyce XX Zjazdu KPZR, notatka o naradzie. 1956 
- 237/XVI/226 Komitet Warszawski - notatki, informacja, komisji KW Wnioski Egzekutywy 
KW, Pismo sekretarza KW, Wyciagi z Protokoáów posiedzeĔ Senatu SGZS i SGPiS 1954-
1956
Komisja Nauki 
- 237/XVI/239 Plany pracy i sprawozdania Komicji Szkol WyĪszych KWAnalizy i 
informacje o sytuacji na wyĪszych uczelniach /GdaĔsk, Katowice, Kraków, Lublin, àódĨ,
Olsztyn, Szczecin, Warszawa, Wrocáaw. 1959 
Wydziaá Nauki i OĞwiaty, Dzial nauki
- 237/XVI/261 Realizacja uchwaly Sekretariatu KC z 30.VI.1960 r. w sprawie rozszerzenia 
zasiegu przedmiotów ideologicznych i wzmocnienia ich walorów ideowych i 
Ğwiatopogladowych. - Informacje, notatki: Wydziaáu, Min.Szkol.Wyz., Komitetów 
Wojewodzkich PZPR. 1960-1961 
- 237/XVI/ 263 Sytuacja polityczna na wyĪszych uczelniach. Stan upartyjnienia wsrod 
studetów. Informacje Wydziaáu, komitetów uczelnianych, komitetów wojewodzkich PZPR. 
1962
Komisja nauki KC
 - 237/XVI/271. Stenogramy posiedzeĔ 13 I, 27 I 1960 
Wydziaá Nauki i OĞwiaty, Dzial nauki,  Komisja nauki KC
- 237/XVI/272 Protokoáy posiedzeĔ, zawiadomienia o posiedzeniach, listy obecnoĞci, 
zalaczniki. 1961-63 
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- 237/XVI/274 Sekcja ekonomiczna - notatki posiedzeĔ, zawiadomienia, zalaczniki.1960-
1963
Ministerstwo Szkolnictwa WyĪszego 1950-1967 
Dept. Studiów Ekonomicznych,
- 1635 Wspolpraca naukowa z zagranica. Program, protokoáy, notatki,1952 
- 1637 Kurs ekonomistów w Moskwie 24.9.-17.12.1951 Sprawozdanie,1952 
- 1638 Organizacja szkolnictwa wyĪszego ekonomicznego w ZSRR. Sprawozdanie z podróĪy
sáuĪbowej. 1955 
Dept. Studiów Uniwersyteckich,
- 1668 Organizacja toku studiów uniwersyteckich w roku akademickim 1950/51. Ekonomia. 
Program wykáadów. b.d. 
- 1805 Wyjazdy zagraniczne pracowników naukowych wyĪszych szkóá ekonomicznych. 
Sprawozdania. 1957-62 
Dept. Studiów Uniwersyteckich i Ekonomicznych,
- 1912 Opracowanie planów badan naukowych w zakresie problemów i szkóá ekonomicznych 
na lata 1961-65, 1961 
- 1930 5-letni plan badan naukowych na lata 1961-1965 Ekonomia. Protokol, referat, 
zestawienia, wykaz tematow i dyscyplin, tezy do dyskusji, wnioski.,1961 
- 1961 Pracownicy katedr ekonomii politycznej zatrudnieni na uniwersytetach. Zestawienia, 
notatki sáuĪbowe. 1961-62 
Dep. Zatrudnienia i Ksztalcenia Kadr,
- 2688 Organizacja toku studiów wyĪszych. Projekty tez do wykáadów, programy nauczania 
Ekonomii Politycznej, wnioski, 1952, 1954 
Dept. Ksztalcenia i Doskonalenia Kadr,
- 2692 Konferencje i seminaria dla kierownikow, wykáadowców i asystentów katedr ekonomii 
politycznej. Tematyka, tezy referatów, referaty, bibliografia. 1954 
Biuro Centralnej Komisji Kwalifikacyjnej dla Pracowników Nauki. ,
- 2761 Organizacja i zadania Centralnej KOmisji Kwalifikacyjnej dla Pracowników Nauki. 
Informator, kryteria oceny dziaáalnoĞci, dorobku i rozwoju kadry naukowej.,1953 
- 2780a Czáonkowie CKK. Projekt uchwaly Rady Ministrów, protokoáy posiedzeĔ Sekcji 
Rady Gáównej Szkolnictwa WyĪszego, wykazy imienne, opinie, nominacje, odwoáania...,
1956-57
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- 2780b Rzeczodawcy CKK. Zasady pracy, wykazy imienne, nominacje, podziĊkowania,
pokwitowanie, koresponencja. 1952-56 
- 2782 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - od 16.10. do 20.12.1954. Programy, 
stenogramy, listy obecnoĞci, 1954 
- 2781 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - od 17.8.53. do 24.9.1954. Regulaminy pracy, 
programy, protokoáy, stenogramy, listy obecnoĞci, 1953-54 
- 2783 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - 1955 r., od 17.1. do 12.5.55. Programy i 
stenogramy,1955 
- 2784 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - 19.5.-16.12.1955. Porzadki dzienne i 
stenogramy,1955 
- 2785 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - 26.1.-19.12.1956. Stenogramy,1956 
- 2786 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - 15.1.-12.12.1957. Stenogramy,1957 
- 2787 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - 23.1.-20.11.1958. Stenogramy,1958 
- 2788 Posiedzenia Sekcji Nauk Spoáecznych - 15.1.59-24.3.1960. Stenogramy,1959-60 
Akademia Nauk Spoáecznych1944-1990
INS przy KC PZPR / IKKN przy KC PZPR 
Protokol nr 5/ Katedra Ekonomii Politycznej 
- 42 Sesja naukowa poĞwiĊcona pracy J.Stalina - «Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w 
ZSRR» (27.2.-1.3.1953) 
- 43, 44 Sesja naukowa poĞwiĊcona pracy J.Stalina - «Ekonomiczne problemy socjalizmu w 
ZSRR» (27.2.-1.3.1953) 
- 79 Plany pracy katedry 1950-57 
- 91 Tematyka seminariów i referatów protokoáy i ocena seminariów (1950-1955) 
Archiwum Dokumentacji Mechanicznej, Warsaw 
Collection of photographs 
Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych 
AMSZ/8 /631/48 Wycieczki i podróĪe 1954-1955 
Archiwum Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warsaw 
Personel files: Edward LipiĔski, Oskar Lange 
Material on the First Congress of Polish Science: 
APAN/IKNP/ I- Kancelaria i wydziaá ogólny
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-16  Zjazd Ekonomistów rok 1950 
-17 Podsekcja Ekonomiki Handlu, Podsekcja Finansów, Podsekcja statystyki, Podsekcja 
Ekonomiki budownictwa i gospodarki komunalnej, Podsekcja ekonomiki, obrotu 
zagranicznego 
-18 Korespondecja w sprawach koordynacji prac Sekcji i Podsekcji 
APAN/IKNP/ II-  Wydziaá Koordynacji i Dokumentacji
- 128 Protokoáy z posiedzeĔ Sekcji i Podsekcji,: Sekcja II ( Nauk Ekonomicznych), Podsekcja 
Ekonomiki Przemysáu, Budownictwa i Transportu, Podsekcja Ekonomii Politycznej i 
Planowania Gospodarki Narodowej, Podsekcja Ekonomiki i Organizacji Pracy, Podsekcja 
Ekonomiki Rolnictwa, Podsekcja Finansów,  
- 129 Protokoáy z posiedzeĔ Sekcji i Podsekcji, Podsekcja Statystyki, Podsekcja ekonomiki 
obrotu zagranicznego,
- 135 Sprawozdania Sekcji i Podsekcji z objazdów terenowych, Podsekcja Ekonomiki 
Handlu,
- 148 Sekcja II - Sprawozdania ze Zjazdu Ekonomistów,  
- 149, 150  Sekcja II. Dyktafonogram ze Zjazdu Ekonomistów 
- 151 Sprawozdanie ze zjazdów i rozszerzonych konferencji Sekcji i Podsekcji 
- 164 Wykaz zebraĔ sekcji i podsekcji 
-165, 166 Kartoteka dotyczaca dziaáalnoĞci sekcji i podsekcji 
-167 Materialy dotyczaca dziaáalnoĞci poszczegolnych sekcji 
-171, 172 Korespondencja dotycząca prac Podsekcji.  
-173 Referaty pomocnicze, tematy, tezy, wykazy prac seminaryjnych 
-174, 175 Korespondencja dot. przedkongresowych prac Podsekcji oraz okolniki.
-192, 193 Kartoteka nazwisk i adresów osob biorących udziaá w pracach Sekcji i Podsekcji  
-218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, Referaty problemowe, Sekcja II,
-279, 291 Referaty Sekcji i Podsekcji na I KPN 
-319 Sesja Kongresu, Stenogram z obrad Sekcji II 
Archiwum Szkoáy Gáównej Handlowej, Warsaw 
Personel files: W. Brus, A. Wakar, S. ĩurawicki
Protokoáy z posiedzeĔ Senatu 1956-1957 
Archium PaĔstwowe Miasta Warszawa, Oddziaá w Otwocku 
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PZPR (PUWP)
Komitet Warszewski / Wydziaá Nauki/ 716 - Informacje, notatki o pracy partyjnej, sytuacji 
politycznej, problemach: - Szkoly Gáównej Planowania i Statystyki 
Komitet Warszewski /153 -  Protokoáy posiedzeĔ egzekutywy Komitetu Warszawskiego 
PZPR IX-XII 1949 r. 
Komitet Uczelniany SGPiS 214/III-1 Protokoáy posiedzeĔ Egzekutywy POP PZPR w SGPiS 
1949-50
Archiwum Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego 
Personel files: Edward LipiĔski, Helena Tatar-Zagórska Hagemeyer, Stefan Zaleski,  
Press Archive of Herder Institut, Marburg (collections of press articles) 
P 29 Personal files, P 60 Economy, P 607 Economics 
Biblioteka Szkoáy Gáównej Handlowej, Wydziaá zbiorów specjalnych. 
- TaĞmy Profesora Bobrowskiego 
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